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

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THE

WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;

NINE OF THE DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

81434
a

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEARLY ALL THE EXISTING GREEK MS. COMMENTARIES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO,

AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ ΤΥΠΟΝ ΦΑΙΗΝ ΑΝ ΕΓΩ ΕΙΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΕΛΘΕΙΝ ΕΠ' ΕΥΕΡΓΕΣΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΤΗΔΕ ΨΥΧΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΛΗΣ ΑΓΙΣΤΕΙΑΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑΣ ΑΡΧΗΓΟΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΓΕ ΝΥΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΙΣΑΥΘΙΣ ΓΕΝΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ.

PROCL. MS. COMMENT. IN PARMENIDEM.

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
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THE LAWS.



INTRODUCTION.

PLATO, in compoſing the following books of Laws after his Republic, appears to have acted in perfect conformity to the genius of his philoſophy, which every where aſcends to things more univerſal and thence deſcends to things more particular, and contends that the latter can only be accurately known by contemplating the former. As, therefore, in his Republic, or, the great polity, he aſſigned all things in common, ſo here he diſtributes land and a habitation, a wife and children, to every individual.

The Athenian gueſt, the chief ſpeaker in this Dialogue, is Plato himſelf, as is well obſerved by the Greek Scholiaſt, whom we have frequently cited in the Notes to the Republic. For this gueſt obſerves, in the courſe of the Laws, that he had already completed two polities; ſo that either theſe muſt be the polities of Plato, or, if this is not admitted, Plato will be the ſame with the Athenian gueſt. Plato, therefore, travelling to Crete, met near Cnoſſus with Megillus the Lacedæmonian, and Clinias the Cretan, whom, together with nine others, the Cnoſſians had invited to their country that they might there eſtabliſh a colony, build a city, and give it laws. Megillus then and Clinias, ſays the Scholiaſt, betook themſelves to the ſacred cavern of Jupiter, which was the moſt holy of all others, and in which the moſt venerable and arcane of the myſteries were performed [1]. The Athenian gueſt meeting with theſe two, and having aſked them in what deſign they were engaged, they replied, In the eſtabliſhment of laws. However, as they had been aſked many things concerning laws by the gueſt, and had by no means ſatisfactorily anſwered his queſtions, and as he appeared to them to be well ſkilled in the ſubject, they requeſt him to aſſiſt them in framing laws for the city.

The genius of Plato in compoſing theſe laws is truly admirable; for, prompted by a philanthropy of which a reſemblance has from time imme-

[1] προσεχως δ' ωρμημενοις επι το του Διος αντρον ἱερον, τουτο γενομενον ἁγιωτατον, εν ῳ τα σεπτοτατα και ἀρρητοτατα των μυστηριων επιτελειτο.—Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 214.

morial been rarely ſeen, he has deviſed certain exhortatory introductions, which he calls prefaces, to the ſeveral laws, that the citizens may be led by perſuaſion, and not by terror, to act legally, and that they may ſpontaneouſly obey the laws as paternal injunctions, and not unwillingly ſubmit to them as the mandates of a tyrant. The obſervation, therefore, of Seneca[1], that 'nothing can be more trifling, nothing more frigid, than a law with a prologue,' is frigid and trifling in the extreme, when applied, as Seneca does apply it, to Plato's prefaces to his Laws. But Seneca was ignorant of the benevolent intention of the divine philoſopher, in this inſtance, and perfectly unſkilled in his doctrines. Can the objections, therefore, of ſuch a *Roman* be of any weight againſt ſuch a *Greek*?

In ſhort, Plato, in this work, appears to have moſt happily blended the Socratic philanthropy with the Pythagoric intellectual elevation. Hence, beſides an eaſy accommodation to familiar diſcourſe, and the ethical peculiarity, in the tenth book, in perfect conformity to the dogmas of the Pythagoræans, he demonſtrates the exiſtence of the Gods and Providence, and ſhows that the divinities poſſeſs immutable perfection. This book, indeed, may be conſidered as forming one of the moſt important parts of the writings of Plato, as it indiſputably proves that he was a firm believer in the religion of his country, and that, when properly underſtood, the theology of the Pagans is the ne plus ultra of ſublimity. An introduction, therefore, of conſiderable extent will be prefixed to that book, which I earneſtly recommend to the diligent peruſal of the liberal reader.

[1] Senec. Epiſt. 94.

THE LAWS.

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An ATHENIAN GUEST,
CLINIAS the Cretan, and
MEGILLUS the Lacedæmonian.

DO you think, O gueſts, that a God, or ſome man, was the cauſe of the eſtabliſhment of laws?

CLIN. A God, O gueſt, a God, as it is moſt juſt to aſſert: with us, indeed, Jupiter; but, with the Lacedæmonians (whence originated this our gueſt), I think, Apollo dictated the laws. Is it not ſo?

MEGIL. It is.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, do you ſpeak according to Homer, viz. that Minos [1] every year, for the ſpace of nine years, went to converſe with his father, and eſtabliſhed laws for your cities, according to his conceptions?

CLIN. It is ſo ſaid by us: and, likewiſe, that his brother Rhadamanthus (you have heard the name) was moſt juſt. We Cretans, therefore, ſay that he obtained this praiſe, from his diſtributing, at that time, things pertaining to juſtice in a proper manner.

[1] Minos was an intellectual hero, or, in other words, a hero who energized according to intellectual virtue; and, as he was illuminated by Jupiter, from whom he proceeded, he is on this account ſaid to have converſed with his father. For an ample account of heroes, ſee the Notes to the Cratylus.

GUEST.

GUEST. His renown is indeed beautiful, and highly becoming the ſon of Jupiter. But ſince both you and this other have been educated in legal inſtitutions of this kind, I perſuade myſelf, it will not be unpleaſant to us to ſpeak and hear about the eſtabliſhment of cities and laws, at the ſame time that we are proceeding on our journey. But the way from Cnoſſus to the cavern [a] and temple of Jupiter is, as we have heard, ſufficiently long; and the reſting-places along the road are, as it is proper they ſhould be during the preſent hot weather, ſhady, from their poſition under lofty trees. It will likewiſe be ſuitable to our age, to reſt in them frequently; and thus, by the allurements of diſcourſe, render the whole of our journey eaſy.

CLIN. Indeed, O gueſt, in the courſe of our journey, we ſhall meet in the groves with cypreſs trees of an admirable height and beauty, and meadows in which while we reſt we may diſcourſe.

GUEST. You ſpeak rightly.

CLIN. Entirely ſo. We ſhall however ſpeak with more confidence when we become ſpectators of theſe. But let us now proceed on our journey with good fortune.

GUEST. Let it be ſo. But inform me, why the law inſtituted for you public feaſts, gymnaſtic exerciſes, and the cuſtom of uſing arms.

CLIN. I think, O gueſt, that theſe particulars reſpecting us may be apprehended with perfect eaſe. For you ſee that the nature of the whole region of Crete is not plain, like that of Theſſaly. On this account, with them, horſes are more uſed, and, with us, courſes on foot. For this, irregularity of the ground is more adapted to the exerciſe of pedeſtrial races. Hence, for this purpoſe, it is neceſſary that the arms ſhould be lighter, that they may not hinder the race by their weight. But lightneſs of bows and arrows ſeems to be adapted to this purpoſe. All theſe particulars, therefore, are ſubſervient to our uſe in war; and the legiſlator, as it appears to me, looking to this, eſtabliſhed every thing. For he ſeems to have inſtituted public banquets, in conſequence of perceiving that all men, when they engaged in war, were compelled by the thing itſelf, for the ſake of their own defence, to feaſt at that time together.

[a] According to the Greek Scholiaſt, not only the greateſt myſteries of Jupiter but alſo thoſe of the Curetes were performed in this cavern.

But he appears to me to be charged with folly by the multitude, in conſequence of their not having learnt that cities are perpetually at war with each other. But if during the time of war it is neceſſary to feaſt together for the ſake of defence, and that certain governors and men governed ſhould be the armed defenders of them, this alſo ſhould be done in the time of peace. For that which moſt men call peace, is only a name; but, in reality, war is perpetually proclaimed according to nature, by all cities, againſt all. And thus conſidering, you will nearly find that the Cretan legiſlator eſtabliſhed for us all the laws, both public and private, as if looking to war; and ordered them to defend theſe laws in ſuch a manner as if nothing elſe was uſeful, either of poſſeſſions or ſtudies, unleſs a man became victorious in war; and as conſidering that all the goods of the vanquiſhed become the property of the victors.

GUEST. You appear to me, O gueſt, to be well exerciſed for the purpoſe of explaining the Cretan laws. But explain this yet more clearly to me. For you ſeem to me to ſay that a city is then well eſtabliſhed when it is ſo conſtituted as to be able to vanquiſh other cities in war. Is it not ſo?

CLIN. It is perfectly ſo; and I think that this our other gueſt will be of the ſame opinion.

MEGIL. How can a Lacedæmonian, O divine man, anſwer otherwiſe?

GUEST. Whether, therefore, is this right from cities towards cities, but not from one village towards another?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. Is it therefore the ſame?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But what then? Is it likewiſe the ſame from one houſe to another in the ſame village, and from one man to another?

CLIN. The ſame.

GUEST. But what ſhall we ſay of one man towards himſelf? Shall we conſider the relation as that of an enemy to an enemy? Or, how ſhall we ſay?

CLIN. O Athenian gueſt! for I am not willing to call you Attic, becauſe you appear to me rather to deſerve to be called by the ſurname of the Goddeſs Minerva [1]. For, rightly reducing the diſcourſe to its principle,

[1] Alluding to Minerva being called the Goddeſs of Wiſdom.

you

you render it more clear; and, by this mean, are able to find with facility that which has now been rightly aſſerted,—I mean, that all men are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and likewiſe, that each individual is an enemy to himſelf.

GUEST. How do you ſay, O wonderful man?

CLIN. This, O gueſt; that for a man to vanquiſh himſelf is the firſt and beſt of all victories, but to be vanquiſhed by himſelf is a thing the moſt ſhameful and vile. For theſe things ſignify that there is war in each of us againſt ourſelves.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us reſume the diſcourſe. For, ſince each of us is either better or worſe than himſelf, whether ſhall we ſay that a houſe, a village, and a city, have this ſame thing in them, or not?

CLIN. Do you mean that one is better, and the other worſe than itſelf?

GUEST. I do.

CLIN. Concerning this alſo you have rightly inquired. For this does not leſs happen to cities, but in the higheſt degree. For, in thoſe in which the better vanquiſh the multitude and the worſe, ſuch a city is with propriety ſaid to be better than itſelf, and may with the greateſt juſtice be praiſed for ſuch a victory. But the contrary muſt be the caſe with a contrary city.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, here, the worſe is at any time more excellent than the better, muſt be left uninveſtigated; (for it would require a prolix diſcuſſion;) but I underſtand what is at preſent aſſerted by you, thus: That ſometimes citizens who are allied to each other, and of the ſame city, being unjuſt and numerous, will forcibly attack the juſt, being fewer in number, that they may ſubject them to ſlavery; and that, when they conquer, the city may be juſtly ſaid to be inferior to itſelf, and at the ſame time depraved, but, when they are conquered, better than itſelf, and good.

CLIN. What is now ſaid, O gueſt, is wonderful in the extreme; but, at the ſame time, thus to confeſs is moſt neceſſary.

GUEST. Come then, let us again conſider this. Many brothers may be born from one father, and from one mother. Nor is it at all wonderful that the greater part of them ſhould be unjuſt, and the leſſer juſt.

CLIN. It is not wonderful.

GUEST. Nor will it be proper for me and you to inveſtigate this, that

when the baſe vanquiſh, both the houſe and every kind of alliance may be called inferior to themſelves, but better than themſelves when the baſe are vanquiſhed. For we do not inveſtigate theſe things at preſent for the ſake of an elegant or inelegant arrangement of words, according to the manner of many, but for the ſake of diſcovering what is natural rectitude and error concerning laws.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly, O gueſt.

MEGIL. It appears to me, too, that what has hitherto been ſaid is beautiful.

GUEST. Let us beſides conſider this: Can any one become a judge of ſuch brothers as we have juſt ſpoken of?

CLIN. Doubtleſs.

GUEST. Which therefore will be the better judge? he who cuts off thoſe that are unworthy, and orders the worthy to govern themſelves? or he who cauſes the worthy to govern, but ſuffers the unworthy to live, when they are willing to be governed? But we will ſay that a third is a judge with reſpect to virtue, if ſuch a one can be found, who, receiving one diſcordant alliance, will not deſtroy any one, but, reconciling the diſagreeing parties, will eſtabliſh for them laws by which they may be enabled to preſerve friendſhip towards each other.

CLIN. Such a judge and legiſlator will be by far the beſt.

GUEST. And he will frame laws for them, by acting in a manner contrary to looking at war.

CLIN. This indeed is true.

GUEST. But what—Whether does he who aptly conſtitutes a city look to external war, and by this mean principally adorn the lives of the citizens, or to the war produced within the city, which is called ſedition, which every one would particularly wiſh not to ariſe in his city; and that, when it ariſes, the city may be liberated from it with the utmoſt celerity?

CLIN. It is evident that he would look to the latter.

GUEST. Whether would any one chooſe that peace ſhould be the reſult of ſedition, in conſequence of one part of the citizens being deſtroyed, and the other part being victorious, or rather that peace and friendſhip ſhould be the conſequence of reconciliation, and thus the mind of the citizens be neceſſarily directed to external wars?

CLIN. Every one would rather wiſh that the latter ſhould happen to his city, than the former.

GUEST. Would not a legiſlator in a ſimilar manner?

CLIN. He would.

GUEST. Does not every one eſtabliſh all laws for the ſake of that which is beſt?

CLIN. How ſhould he not?

GUEST. But neither war nor ſedition is the beſt of things (for to be in want of theſe is execrable), but mutual peace and benevolence. Nor is that victory by which a city vanquiſhes itſelf, one of the beſt of things, but it ranks among things neceſſary. But to think that the beſt ſtate of a city conſiſts in fighting and conquering, is juſt as if any one ſhould think that a wearied body, when undergoing medicinal purification, then acted in the beſt manner, but ſhould pay no attention to a body which was not at all indigent of medical aſſiſtance. And if any one thinks in a ſimilar manner, either of the felicity of a city or of a private man, he will never become a politician, while he thus alone and primarily looks to external war; nor will he be an accurate legiſlator, unleſs he eſtabliſhes laws reſpecting war for the ſake of peace, rather than laws reſpecting peace for the ſake of war.

CLIN. Theſe things, O gueſt, appear in a certain reſpect to be rightly ſaid. But I ſhould wonder to find any one contending that our laws, and likewiſe thoſe of the Lacedæmonians, were not with all poſſible attention framed for the ſake of war.

GUEST. Perhaps this is the caſe. We ought not, however, to inveſtigate the preſent affair in a contentious but in a quiet manner; the greateſt diligence being employed, both by us and them, about things of this kind. Attend therefore to my diſcourſe. In the firſt place, we ſhall adduce Tyrtæus [1], who was by birth an Athenian, but afterwards a citizen of Lacedæmonia, and who moſt of all men applied himſelf to theſe particulars: "I ſhall not then (ſays he) conſider that man as worthy of being mentioned, or of any

[1] Tyrtæus was an elegiac poet, lame, and deſpiſed by the Athenians. The Oracle of Apollo, however, ordered the Lacedæmonians to uſe him as their general, in the war in which they were then engaged with the Meſſenians. Tyrtæus therefore coming to Lacedæmon, and being inſpired by the God, ſo animated the Lacedæmonians that they vanquiſhed the Meſſenians. He flouriſhed 684 years before Chriſt.

conſequence, though he ſhould be the moſt wealthy of all men, and ſhould poſſeſs abundance of goods (and he enumerates almoſt all goods), who does not always conduct himſelf in the moſt excellent manner in warlike affairs." Theſe poems perhaps you alſo have heard. For this other aſſociate of ours is, I think, ſatiated with them.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

CLIN. And theſe alſo have reached us, being brought from Lacedæmonia.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in common interrogate this poet thus: O moſt divine poet, Tyrtæus! for you appear to us to be wiſe and good, becauſe you have in the higheſt degree celebrated thoſe who in the higheſt degree excel in war. I, therefore, and this Clinias the Cnoſſian, appear very much to agree with you in this particular. But we wiſh clearly to know, whether or not we ſpeak about the ſame men. Inform us, therefore, whether you alſo as well as we are clearly of opinion, that there are two kinds of war? Or how do you ſay? For I think that a man much worſe than Tyrtæus would anſwer that there are two kinds; one, which we all denominate ſedition, and which we conſider as the moſt grievous of all wars; but the other kind, I think, is that which we all conſider as milder than the former, and which we employ againſt thoſe who do not belong to the city, and who are of a different tribe.

CLIN. How is it poſſible he ſhould anſwer otherwiſe?

GUEST. Inform us, therefore, who were the men, and what the kind of war, in which you have ſo tranſcendently praiſed ſome, and blamed others. For you appear to have praiſed thoſe that fought in external wars. Thus, you ſay in your poems, that you can by no means endure thoſe who are not hardy enough to behold bloody ſlaughter, and to aſpire after fierce battle, hand to hand. From this, O Tyrtæus, we ſhould infer, that you praiſe thoſe who have been eminently illuſtrious in waging external war. Shall we ſay that Tyrtæus would grant this?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But we, ſince theſe are good, ſhall aſſert that thoſe are far better who evidently excel in the greateſt war. We have too the poet Theognis [1]

[1] This poet flouriſhed about 549 years before Chriſt.

a witneſs in our favour, who was a citizen of the Megarenſians in Sicily. For he ſays:

Who faithful in infane ſedition keeps,
With ſilver and with ruddy gold may vie.

We ſay, therefore, that ſuch a one will conduct himſelf in the moſt difficult war in a manner nearly as much ſuperior to the other, as juſtice, temperance, and prudence, when conjoined with fortitude, are ſuperior to fortitude alone. For no one can be found faithful and ſound in ſeditions, without the whole of virtue. But, as Tyrtæus ſays, there are a great number of mercenaries who fight intrepidly and die willingly in battle, moſt of whom are ferocious, injurious, reproachful, and, with a very few exceptions, are the moſt ſtupid of all men. But to what does all this tend? And what did he perſpicuouſly intend to ſignify by theſe aſſertions? It is evidently this, that both he who framed laws here from Jupiter, and every other legiſlator who profits cities in the ſmalleſt degree, eſtabliſhes laws by always looking as much as poſſible to the greateſt virtue. But it is, as Theognis ſays, confidence in dire events, which may be denominated perfect juſtice. But that which Tyrtæus ſo highly praiſes is indeed beautiful, and opportunely celebrated by the poet; yet it may moſt rightly be ſaid to be honourable, the fourth in number, and in power.

CLIN. Shall we, therefore, O gueſt, rank our legiſlator among remote legiſlators?

GUEST. Not him indeed, moſt excellent man, but ourſelves, ſince we are of opinion, that both Lycurgus and Minos eſtabliſhed all the laws in Lacedæmon, and here, in conſequence of eſpecially directing their attention to war.

CLIN. In what manner then ought we to ſpeak?

GUEST. As truth and juſtice, I think, require thoſe ſhould ſpeak who diſcourſe about a divine republic; for ſuch ought not to be conſidered as looking to a certain part of virtue, and that the moſt abject, but as regarding the whole of virtue, and inquiring after laws, according to the ſpecies of virtue;—not, indeed, inveſtigating thoſe ſpecies which many at preſent propoſe; for, at preſent, every one propoſes to inquire after that which he is principally in want of. Thus, one inquires about an inheritance, another about women who are left the only heirs, another about an injury,

and

and others about ten thouſand things of a ſimilar kind. But we ſay that inquiries about laws rank among good inquiries, when they are ſuch as we have juſt now begun. And, indeed, I in every reſpect approve of the manner in which you have entered on the diſcuſſion of laws. For you are certainly right in beginning from virtue, and aſſerting that for its ſake laws are framed. But you do not appear to me to be right in ſaying, that the legiſlator framed all his laws by regarding a part of virtue, and this he leaſt; and this has been the cauſe of all that was afterwards ſaid by me. Are you, however, willing I ſhould tell you in what manner I wiſh you to diſtinguiſh in this affair?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It is proper, O gueſt, to aſſert that the laws of the Cretans are not raſhly approved by all men, and particularly by all the Greeks. For they are rightly framed, ſince they render thoſe who uſe them happy; and this becauſe they impart every good. But there are two kinds of goods, one human, and the other divine; and the former is ſuſpended from the latter. And if any city receives the greater goods, it alſo poſſeſſes the leſſer; but if not, it is deprived of both. But the leſſer goods are thoſe of which health is the leader, beauty the ſecond in order, and ſtrength for the courſe, and all the other motions pertaining to the body, the third. But riches rank in the fourth place, which are not blind[1], but perceive acutely, if they follow prudence. However, that which is the firſt leader of all divine goods is prudence[2]. That which ranks in the ſecond place

[1] "Theophraſtus (ſays the Greek Scholiaſt) obſerves, that if wealth had life, it would come only to the good. For every thing deſires its proper good; but this is the good of wealth, to become an inſtrument to the worthy: ſince that which is the good of any thing is the object of deſire to that thing, and this alſo is according to nature to it. But all things aſpire after a diſpoſition according to nature. However, ſince wealth is without life, it now alſo falls among the evil." Ὁ Θεοφραστος φησιν· ει ζωην ειχεν ὁ πλουτος, προς μονους αν απηλθε τους αγαθους· εκαστον γαρ του οικειου εφιεται αγαθου· τουτο δε τῳ πλουτῳ εστιν αγαθον, το τοις αγαθοις οργανον γιγνεσθαι· το γαρ εκαστῳ αγαθον, τουτο και εφετον ὑπαρχει· τουτο δ' αυτῳ και κατα φυσιν· παντα δε της κατα φυσιν ορεγεται διαθεσεως· νυν δε επειδη ὁ πλουτος ουκ εχει ζωην, εμπιπτει και εις τους κακους.—Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 222.

[2] Meaning intellectual prudence, through which we obtain a knowledge of things good and advantageous, of things beautiful and the contrary; and which, in ſhort, is the governor of man, referring cities and houſes, and the life of every individual, to a divine paradigm. Plato immediately after this calls it intellect, becauſe it is generated from a pure and perfect intellect.

after

after intellect is a temperate habit of the ſoul. From theſe mingled with fortitude, the third in order will be juſtice. And the fourth will be fortitude. All which are to be placed, according to nature before thoſe human goods. A legiſlator, therefore, ought to follow this order, and ſhould command the citizens to look to theſe divine goods in all their actions. But, of theſe, human ſhould be referred to divine goods, and all divine goods to their leader intellect. After theſe things he ought to pay attention to the marriages of the citizens, and to the procreation and education of children, both male and female, and likewiſe to the young, and thoſe who are advancing to old age. Such too, among theſe, as behave well, he ſhould honour as they deſerve, but ſhould reprobate in all the converſations of theſe, their pains, pleaſures, and deſires. He ſhould likewiſe conſider, and act as a guardian over, the ſtudies of all lovers; and, through the laws, praiſe ſuch as are worthy, and blame the contraries to theſe. With reſpect to anger and fear, too, he will ſhow what in each of theſe is laudable, and what to be avoided; likewiſe what perturbations are produced in the ſoul through misfortune, and what the means by which theſe are avoided in proſperity. Laſtly, he will ſhow what paſſions men are ſubject to, through diſeaſe, war, poverty, or the contraries to theſe; and in all ſuch things he will teach and define what is beautiful, or otherwiſe, in the diſpoſition of each. After this, it is neceſſary that the legiſlator ſhould pay attention to the poſſeſſions and expenſes of the citizens, ſo as to know how they are conducted, together with ſocieties, and their diſſolutions, whether voluntarily or involuntarily inſtituted; where juſtice is found among theſe, and where it is wanting; that by theſe means he may diſtribute honours to thoſe that obey the laws, and puniſh thoſe who cannot be perſuaded to obey them. In the laſt place, having inſtituted every thing as far as to the end of every polity, it is neceſſary he ſhould eſtabliſh the manner in which the monuments of the dead ſhould be raiſed, and what honours are to be paid to them. The legiſlator, having eſtabliſhed all theſe particulars, ſhould place over them guardians, ſome of whom conduct public affairs according to prudence, but others according to true opinion; ſo that intellect, binding all theſe together, may evince that the city follows temperance and juſtice, and not riches or ambition. After this manner, O gueſts, I have wiſhed, and am now deſirous, you would explain how all theſe particulars are to be found in thoſe laws which are

called

called the laws of Jupiter, in thoſe of Pythian Apollo, and in thoſe which Minos and Lycurgus eſtabliſhed; and how, being aſſumed in a certain order, they may become evident to one who is ſkilled in the legiſlative ſcience, either by art or from certain cuſtoms, though to us they are by no means apparent.

CLIN. How then, O gueſt, ought we to diſcuſs what follows?

GUEST. It appears to me that we ought to commence our diſcuſſion from the beginning (as we began to do); conſidering in the firſt place the purſuits of fortitude, and afterwards diſcuſſing another and another ſpecies of virtue, if you are willing: and that we may diſcuſs the firſt object of our inquiry, we will endeavour to eſtabliſh a paradigm, and refer to it the other particulars, that by mutual converſe of this kind we may beguile the tediouſneſs of the way. But afterwards we will conſider the purſuits of the whole of virtue, and evince that our preſent diſcuſſion, if divinity is willing, looks thitherward.

CLIN. You ſpeak well. Endeavour therefore, in the firſt place, to judge for us reſpecting this praiſer of Jupiter.

GUEST. I will endeavour to do this, both for you and myſelf. For the diſcourſe is common. Speak therefore. Shall we ſay that common banquets and gymnaſtic exerciſes were invented by the legiſlator, for the purpoſes of war?

CLIN. They were.

GUEST. And is this the caſe with a third or fourth thing? For, perhaps, it is proper thus to enumerate in the things pertaining to another virtue, whether it is right to call them parts, or any thing elſe, for the ſake of perſpicuity.

MEGIL. I, therefore, as well as every Lacedæmonian, ſhould ſay that hunting was invented as the third thing. But we ſhould endeavour, if poſſible, to diſcover the fourth or fifth thing. I therefore ſhall endeavour to evince that the fourth thing conſiſts in the endurance of pain. For we are much exerciſed in this, in fighting with each other with our hands, and in certain violent ſeizures, each of theſe being attended with a multitude of wounds. Beſides this we have an exerciſe, which is called a certain concealment [1], which is wonderfully laborious, and is undertaken for the purpoſe

[1] A young man was ſent from the city, in order that he might not be ſeen for a certain time. He was therefore compelled to wander round the mountains, and could neither ſleep without

purpoſe of ſtrengthening our endurance. Beſides, in winter, without ſhoes, without any covering to our body, and without ſervants, waiting indeed on ourſelves, we wander both night and day through every region. Further ſtill: in the exerciſes of naked young men, ſevere endurances take place among us, when we contend with the ſtrength of ſuffocating heat; and there are many other things of this kind among us, which it would not be eaſy to enumerate.

GUEST. You ſpeak well, O Lacedæmonian gueſt. But whether or not ſhall we place fortitude as ſimply conſiſting in a conteſt alone with fears and pains? or, ſhall we ſay that it likewiſe conſiſts in oppoſing deſires and pleaſures, and certain vehement flatteries, which ſoften the minds of thoſe who are conſidered as venerable perſons, and beſides this render them like wax?

MEGIL. I think it likewiſe conſiſts in oppoſing all theſe.

GUEST. If, therefore, we call to mind what was advanced above, this our other gueſt ſaid, that ſome city was inferior to itſelf, and ſome man to himſelf. Was it not ſo, O Cnoſſian gueſt?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Now, then, which ought we to call the inferior,—he who is ſubdued by pain, or he who is ſubdued by pleaſure?

CLIN. It appears to me, he who is ſubdued by pleaſure. And, in every reſpect, we ſhould rather ſay that he who is vanquiſhed by pleaſures is diſgracefully inferior to himſelf, and, prior to this, to him who is vanquiſhed by pains.

GUEST. Did therefore the legiſlators of Jupiter and Apollo eſtabliſh by law fortitude as lame, and conſider it as alone able to oppoſe things on its left hand, but incapable of reſiſting elegancies and flatteries on its right hand? or, did they conſider it as able to oppoſe both?

CLIN. Both, I think.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again relate what thoſe purſuits are, in both your cities, which taſte of pleaſures, and do not avoid them, in the ſame

without fear, leſt he ſhould be detected, nor employ ſervants, nor carry food for his ſubſiſtence. There was alſo another form of exerciſe for the purpoſe of war: for, ſtripping every one of the young men naked, they ordered them to wander for a whole year out of the city, among the mountains, and to ſupport themſelves by theft, and other ſtratagems, but in ſuch a manner that no one might detect them. Hence this was called κρυπτεια, a concealment: for they were puniſhed if they were at any time diſcovered.—Schol. Gr. in Plat. p. 225.

manner

manner as they do not avoid pain, but bring them into the midſt, and cauſe the citizens to vanquiſh them, partly by force, and partly by the allurements of honour. But, inform me where the ſame thing is ordained in your laws reſpecting pleaſures, as reſpecting pains; and what that is which renders you ſimilarly brave both with reſpect to pain and pleaſures; which renders you victorious over thoſe things which you ought to vanquiſh, and by no means ſuffers you to be inferior to your neighbouring and moſt grievous enemies?

MEGIL. I cannot, O gueſt, ſo eaſily adduce a multitude of laws oppoſite to pleaſures, as I can a multitude oppoſite to pains. Nor perhaps is it eaſy to ſpeak of pleaſures according to great and apparent parts, but only according to ſuch as are ſmall.

CLIN. Nor am I able in a ſimilar manner to render the ſame apparent in the Cretan laws.

GUEST. This, O beſt of gueſts, is by no means wonderful. If any one, therefore, who is deſirous of perceiving that which is true and at the ſame time moſt excellent, ſhould find ſomething to reprehend in the laws of our reſpective countries, we ſhould behave towards each other with mildneſs, and not with ſeverity.

CLIN. You ſpeak well, O Athenian gueſt; and therefore we ought to follow your advice.

GUEST. Indeed, Clinias, a conduct of this kind becomes men of your age.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. The next queſtion, therefore, will be, whether or not the Laconian and Cretan polity is reprehenſible. Perhaps, indeed, I can better relate what is ſaid by the multitude on this occaſion, than either of you. As to your laws, though they ſhould be but of a moderate degree of excellence, yet you certainly have one moſt beautiful law, which forbids any youth from inquiring whether the laws are well or ill eſtabliſhed, but orders them all to accord, with one voice, and with one mouth, that they are all beautifully conſtituted, as if they had been eſtabliſhed by the Gods; and that, if any young man aſſerts the contrary, no one ſhall by any means liſten to his diſcourſe: but that an old man, if he has any thing to urge againſt them, ſhall relate his objections to the rulers, and his equals in age, yet not in the preſence of any young man.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt properly, O gueſt: and though at the time this law was eſtabliſhed you was abſent from the thought of the founder, yet you appear to me to conjecture his intention ſufficiently, as if you were a prophet, and to ſpeak the truth in the moſt eminent degree.

GUEST. At preſent, therefore, let us be free from young men, but we, on account of our old age, are permitted by the legiſlator to ſpeak about the laws among ourſelves, without committing any offence.

CLIN. We are ſo. Do not ſpare, therefore, but freely reprove our laws. For it is not diſhonourable to know if any thing is not beautifully eſtabliſhed; but, by this mean, a remedy is applied, when what is aſſerted is received with a benevolent, and not an envious mind.

GUEST. You ſpeak well. I ſhall not, however, reprehend the laws till I have diligently conſidered them to the utmoſt of my ability; or rather, I ſhall proceed in this affair by doubting. For you alone, of all the Greeks and Barbarians with whom we are acquainted, the legiſlator has ordered to abſtain from the greateſt pleaſures and ſports, and not to taſte them. But with reſpect to pains and fears, which we have lately diſcuſſed, he was of opinion, that if any one avoided them from his infancy, when he came to endure neceſſary pains, fears, and labours, he would avoid thoſe who are exerciſed in them, and would become their ſlave. This legiſlator ought, in my opinion, to have thought the ſame reſpecting pleaſures, and to have ſaid to himſelf: If the citizens ſhould from childhood be unexperienced in the greateſt pleaſures, and never be taught how to ſuſtain the attacks of pleaſure, or informed that they ſhould never be compelled to do any thing baſe for the ſake of the ſweetneſs with which pleaſure is attended, they would be induced to act in the ſame manner as thoſe who are vanquiſhed by fear, and would become ſervile in a different and yet baſer manner than thoſe who are able to endure the aſſaults of pleaſure, but yet procure pleaſures for themſelves, and are ſometimes the worſt of men. The ſoul of ſuch, likewiſe, is partly a ſlave, and partly free; and they do not deſerve to be called ſimply brave, and free. Conſider, therefore, whether any thing that has been now ſaid appears to you to be proper.

CLIN. It does. But immediately and readily to aſſent to things of ſuch great importance would be the province of young men, or rather of ſtupid men.

GUEST. Shall we then, O Clinias and Lacedæmonian gueſt, after this, diſcuſs

diſcuſs what we at firſt propoſed; (for after fortitude we ſhall ſpeak of temperance,) I mean, what difference there is between theſe polities and thoſe which are governed by chance, in the ſame manner as we have now ſpoken about war?

MEGIL. This is not very eaſy to accompliſh.

CLIN. Yet it appears that the common banquets, and gymnaſtic exerciſes, were beautifully invented by both polities.

GUEST. It appears, O gueſts, to be a difficult undertaking to introduce, in reality as well as in diſcourſe, the indubitable, reſpecting polities. For it ſeems that, as in bodies it is not poſſible to accommodate any one purſuit to any one body, becauſe the ſame thing is ſeen to injure ſome and benefit others, the like takes place in cities. For gymnaſtic exerciſes, public banquets, and a multitude of other things, at one time are beneficial to cities, but in ſeditions they are hurtful. The truth of this is evinced by the Mileſians, Bœotians, and Thurians. But this antient, legal, and natural purſuit appears to have perverted the venereal pleaſures, not only of men, but of beaſts. And your cities may be firſt accuſed of this, and ſuch others as have particularly applied themſelves to gymnaſtic exerciſes. And whether things of this kind ought to be conſidered jocoſely, or ſeriouſly, ſtill we muſt be convinced that, when the male and female unite for the purpoſe of producing offspring, the pleaſure attending ſuch a conjunction appears to be imparted according to nature; but, that the conjunction of males with males, or of females with females, is contrary to nature. We muſt likewiſe aſſert, that he who firſt dared to act in this manner was induced by the incontinence of pleaſure. We all of us, indeed, blame the fable of the Cretans about Ganymedes, as diſcourſing about theſe particulars. For, as they believe that their laws were given by Jupiter, they have deviſed this fable againſt Jupiter, that they may give themſelves up to this pleaſure, following the example of the God. But let us bid farewell to the fable. Again, with reſpect to thoſe who make the laws the ſubject of their ſpeculation, almoſt all their attention ſhould be directed to pleaſures and pains, both in the manners of cities and of individuals. For theſe two fountains are permitted to flow by nature; of which, he who draws whence, when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this is equally true of a city, an individual, and of every animal: but

he who draws unſcientifically, and at an improper time, will, on the contrary, live unhappy.

Megil. Theſe things, O gueſt, are ſo beautifully ſaid, as to render us incapable of urging any thing againſt them. But, at the ſame time, the Lacedæmonian legiſlator appears to me to have very properly forbidden the avoiding of pleaſure. But this our other gueſt can, if he pleaſes, aſſiſt us with reſpect to the Cnoſſian laws. For it appears to me that the inſtitutions in Sparta about pleaſures are the moſt beautiful of all inſtitutions; ſince that through which men principally fall into the greateſt pleaſures, the moſt injurious conduct, and every kind of folly, our law exterminates from the whole of our country: nor will you ſee in the fields, nor in any of the Spartan cities, banquets, nor ſuch other particulars attendant on theſe, as excite, according to their power, every kind of pleaſure. Nor is there any one who, happening to meet with a perſon wanton through intoxication, would not immediately inflict on him the greateſt puniſhment. Nor would the pretext of celebrating the feſtival of Bacchus abſolve him from chaſtiſement, as I once ſaw was the caſe with your people in carriages. And in Tarentum, with thoſe of our colony, I have ſeen all the city intoxicated during the Bacchic feſtival. With us, however, there is nothing of the kind.

Guest. O Lacedæmonian gueſt, all ſuch things as theſe are laudable where they are attended with certain endurances; but, where they are permitted, they are of a moſt ſlothful nature. For ſome one, defending our inſtitutions, would very readily reprove you by ſhowing the licentiouſneſs of your women. But one anſwer appears to liberate all ſuch particulars, in Tarentum, with us, and with you, from not being baſe, but upright. For every one who anſwers may ſay to an admiring ſtranger, on his beholding things unuſual in his own country: Wonder not, O gueſt, that this law is eſtabliſhed among us, but with you a different law, perhaps about the ſame things. At preſent, however, O friends, our diſcourſe is not about different men, but about the vice and virtue of the legiſlators. But let us ſpeak more fully about all intoxication. For it is not a thing of a trifling nature; nor is the knowledge of it the province of a depraved legiſlator. I do not mean to inquire, whether wine ought to be drunk or not, but about intoxication itſelf,—whether it is to be uſed, as the Scythians

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and Perſians uſe it, and beſides theſe the Carthaginians, Celtæ, Iberians, and Thracians, who all of them are warlike nations; or, as it is uſed by you; for you (as you ſay) entirely abſtain from it. But the Scythians and Thracians uſe it unmingled with water, women as well as men, and pour it on their garments, thinking that thus they are engaged in a beautiful and bleſſed purſuit. But the Perſians are very much given to other luxuries, which you reject; yet, O beſt of men, they are more orderly in theſe than the Scythians and Thracians.

MEGIL. All theſe, however, we ſhall put to flight, when we take up arms.

GUEST. O beſt of men, do not ſpeak in this manner. For many flights and purſuings have taken place, and will take place, of which it is impoſſible to form any conjecture; on which account, we cannot at any time give an evident definition, but are involved in doubts about beautiful and baſe purſuits, when we ſpeak of victory and flight in war; eſpecially ſince the greater vanquiſh in battle, and enſlave the leſſer cities. Thus, the Locrians were vanquiſhed and enſlaved by the Syracuſans, who appear to have poſſeſſed the beſt laws of all the neighbouring nations; and the Cei by the Athenians; and innumerable inſtances of the ſame kind may be found. Neglecting, therefore, the conſideration of victory and being vanquiſhed, we will endeavour to ſpeak and perſuade ourſelves about every purſuit; and to ſhow how this thing is beautiful, and that is not ſo. But, firſt of all, hear me, how we ought to conſider what is good or bad in things of this kind.

MEGIL. How do you ſay?

GUEST. All thoſe who introduce any diſpute in their diſcourſe, and immediately propoſe to praiſe or blame it, appear to me to act by no means in a proper manner, but to do juſt the ſame as if, any one praiſing a piece of bread as good, another ſhould immediately diſcommend it, without either underſtanding its operation or utility, and without knowing after what manner, by whom, and with whom it was prepared, and the paſt and preſent habit of the bodies to whom it ought to be offered. But we appear to act in the very ſame manner, at preſent, in our diſcourſes. For, upon only hearing intoxication mentioned, ſome of us immediately blamed, and others praiſed it; and this very abſurdly. For, employing witneſſes

and

and thoſe who praiſe, we likewiſe praiſed; and ſome of us thought that we advanced ſomething ſeaſonable, becauſe we adduced a multitude of witneſſes; but others, becauſe thoſe who make no uſe of wine conquer in battle. This, however, is to us ambiguous. If then we proceed in this manner in the diſcuſſion of other particulars pertaining to laws, we ſhall not in my opinion proceed rationally. But adducing intoxication as an inſtance, I will endeavour to the utmoſt of my ability to point out a right method for us, about all ſuch ſubjects of inquiry; ſince innumerable nations, who are doubtful about theſe particulars, will verbally contend with your two cities.

MEGIL. We muſt not through ſluggiſhneſs refuſe to hear, whether we poſſeſs any right conſideration about theſe affairs.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, thus conſider. If any one ſhould praiſe the employment of nurturing goats, and the poſſeſſion of that ſpecies of animals, as a beautiful thing, but another ſhould blame it, in conſequence of ſeeing that goats are fed in cultivated places without a ſhepherd, and that every kind of cattle is either without a ſhepherd, or is under the direction of bad ſhepherds; ſhould we conſider the accuſation of ſuch a one as ſane, or not?

MEGIL. How is it poſſible we could?

GUEST. But, whether will a pilot be uſeful in a ſhip, if he alone poſſeſſes the nautical ſcience, whether he is troubled with ſea ſickneſs or not? or how ſhall we ſay?

MEGIL. This paſſion which you ſpeak of is not in any reſpect connected with the nautical art.

GUEST. But what ſhall we ſay of the general of an army? Is he to be conſidered as ſufficient to the purpoſes of commanding, if he poſſeſſes the warlike ſcience, though, being timid in dangers, yet through intoxication he ſhould loath fear?

MEGIL. How can he?

GUEST. But what ſhall we ſay, if he does not poſſeſs art, and is timid?

MEGIL. You ſpeak of one in every reſpect depraved, and who is by no means a ruler of men, but of ſome extremely weak women.

GUEST. But he who praiſes or blames a community, which is naturally capable of being governed, and which with a proper governor is a uſeful

ſociety, but, at the ſame time, has either never ſeen it well governed, or has always beheld it without governors, can he with propriety ever praiſe or blame ſuch a community?

MEGIL. How is it poſſible he can, who has never beheld a ſociety well governed?

GUEST. Attend then: Do we not conſider gueſts and banquets as one certain aſſociation out of many communities?

MEGIL. We do in the higheſt degree.

GUEST. Has no one, therefore, ever beheld this ſubſiſting in a proper manner? But it is eaſy for you to anſwer, that this has never in any reſpect been beheld (for this is neither according to the manner of your country nor your laws). But I have met with many, and in many places, and have diligently inquired, as I may ſay, about all of them. And, indeed, I have ſcarcely ſeen or heard of one whole community that has been eſtabliſhed in a proper manner; but I have ſeen that this has been the caſe with certain few and ſmall parts, while many have, as I may ſay, been entirely faulty.

CLIN. How do you ſay, O gueſt? Speak ſtill more perſpicuouſly. For we, as you ſay, being unſkilled in ſuch things, and perhaps not having met with them, cannot immediately know what in them is right or wrong.

GUEST. You ſpeak probably: but, while I ſpeak, endeavour to learn. Do you then acknowledge, that, in all aſſociations and communions of actions whatever, it is proper for each to have a governor?

CLIN. How is it poſſible I ſhould not?

GUEST. But we have already ſaid, that the governor of warlike affairs ought to be brave.

CLIN. We have.

GUEST. But the brave will be leſs diſturbed by fear than the timid man.

CLIN. And this alſo will be the caſe.

GUEST. If any method could be deviſed by which a general of an army might be rendered neither timid, nor ſubject to perturbation, ſhould we not accompliſh this by all poſſible means?

CLIN. In the greateſt degree.

GUEST. But now we do not ſpeak of an army which is governed in the inimical aſſociations of inimical men, in war, but of the benevolence of friends communicating with each other in peace.

CLIN.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But an aſſociation of this kind, if it is attended with intoxication, will not be without perturbation. Or, do you think it will?

CLIN. How ſhould it be without?

GUEST. In the firſt place, therefore, theſe have need of a governor.

CLIN. Moſt of all.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, is it proper to chooſe for them, if poſſible, a governor who is free from perturbation?

CLIN. How can it be otherwiſe?

GUEST. And, indeed, as it appears, he ought to be prudent with reſpect to aſſociation. For he ſhould be the guardian of their friendſhip, and ſhould take care that it may be increaſed through this their aſſociation.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. It is proper, therefore, to place over the intoxicated a ſober and wiſe governor, and not the contrary. For, if the governor of the intoxicated is himſelf intoxicated, young, and not wiſe, he muſt be abundantly fortunate if he does not accompliſh ſome mighty evil.

CLIN. Abundantly indeed.

GUEST. If, therefore, any one ſhould blame drinking aſſociations, though they ſhould be as well inſtituted as poſſible in cities, while he accuſes the thing itſelf, he will perhaps very properly blame them. But if he ſhould blame all drinking aſſociations, merely becauſe he had ſeen one defective; in the firſt place, it is evident he is ignorant that this was not well inſtituted; and, in the next place, every thing after this manner will appear baſe, although the maſter and governor ſhould be ſober. Or, do you not perceive, that when the pilot is intoxicated, or any other governor, he will ſubvert every thing, whether it is a ſhip, or a chariot, or an army, or any thing elſe that is governed by him?

CLIN. You ſpeak, O gueſt, in every reſpect, true. But inform me what advantage can be derived from drinking aſſociations when they are well conducted. As that which we juſt now aſſerted, that an army well commanded would procure victory in war, which is no ſmall good: and in the ſame manner we muſt judge of other things. But what great advantage will accrue either to individuals, or cities, from drinking aſſociations being properly inſtituted?

GUEST. What great advantage can a city derive from one boy, or one company

company being properly educated? or ſhall we not reply to him who aſks this queſtion, that the city derives but very little advantage from the education of an individual, or a company? But, if you inquire univerſally about the education of youth, of what great advantage it is to a city, it is not difficult to reply, that, when boys are well educated, they will become good men; and that, in conſequence of becoming good men, they will both act in other reſpects in a beautiful manner, and will vanquiſh their enemies in battle. Diſcipline, therefore, will give victory, but victory ſometimes produces ignorance. For many becoming inſolent through victory in war are filled, in conſequence of their inſolence, with a thouſand other evils. And diſcipline indeed has never at any time been Cadmeian; but there have been, and will be, many victories of this kind among men.

CLIN. You ſeem to ſay, O friend, that aſſociations for the purpoſe of drinking wine form a great part of diſcipline, if they are properly conducted.

GUEST. Certainly.

CLIN. Will you after this be able to prove that your aſſertion is true?

GUEST. To contend, O gueſt, that theſe things are true, ſince many doubt about them, is alone the province of divinity; but, if it be requiſite to aſſert what appears to me, I think no one will be envious, ſince our intention, at preſent, is to diſcourſe about laws and a polity.

CLIN. We will therefore endeavour to learn what is your opinion with reſpect to theſe ambiguities.

GUEST. It is proper to do ſo; and, beſides this, that you ſhould endeavour to learn, and I to teach, and that this ſhould be the whole buſineſs of our diſcourſe. But, firſt of all, hear what follows. All the Greeks conſider this city of ours as philological, and abounding in words. But with reſpect to Lacedæmon and Crete, the former is conſidered as ſparing of words, but the latter, as more remarkable for abundance of ſagacity than abundance of words. But I am afraid I ſhall appear to you to ſpeak much about a ſmall affair,—I mean intoxication. An emendation of it, indeed, according to nature cannot be accompliſhed with perſpicuity, without muſical rectitude, nor be ſufficiently handled in diſcourſe. But muſic cannot be diſcuſſed without the whole of erudition. And all this requires a multitude of words. Conſider, therefore, what we ſhall do: whether

we ſhall omit theſe things at preſent, and paſs on to ſome other queſtion about laws.

Megil. Perhaps you do not know, O Athenian gueſt, that our family is the public gueſt of your city. Perhaps, therefore, a certain benevolence will immediately enter into the minds of all boys towards a city, when they hear that they are the public gueſts of that city; and they will conſider it as another native country, which ranks in the ſecond place after their own. And this is the caſe with myſelf at preſent. For I have heard the Lacedæmonian youth, as often as they praiſed or blamed any thing belonging to the Athenians, ſay, Your city, O Megillus, has been the cauſe of this evil, or that good. But, on hearing this, I have fought againſt thoſe who blamed your city, in conſequence of poſſeſſing all poſſible benevolence towards it. And now, indeed, your voice is grateful to me; and that which is ſaid by many, that ſuch of the Athenians as are good are ſo in a remarkable degree, appears to be moſt truly aſſerted. For they alone, without neceſſity, ſpontaneouſly, and from a divine allotment, are truly and not fictitiouſly good. Therefore, for my ſake, my friend, you may boldly ſay whatever you pleaſe.

Clin. And hearing and receiving, O gueſt, what I have to advance, you may confidently ſpeak what you pleaſe. For you have perhaps heard, that Epimenides was a divine man, who was of our family, and who ten years prior to the Perſian war came to your city through the admonition of an oracle, and performed certain ſacrifices which the God had enjoined. And beſides this, he told the Athenians, who were terrified at the Perſian expedition, that the Perſians would not come for the ſpace of ten years; and that, when they came, they would depart without accompliſhing any thing which they hoped to accompliſh, and would ſuffer greater evils than they cauſed. At that time our anceſtors hoſpitably received yours; and, in conſequence of this, both myſelf and our parents are benevolently diſpoſed towards you.

Guest. You therefore, as it appears, are prepared to hear; but I am indeed prepared ſo far as relates to my will, but not altogether with reſpect to my ability. I ſhall however endeavour to gratify your requeſt. In the firſt place then, as preparatory to our diſcourſe, let us define what diſcipline is, and what power it poſſeſſes. For we ſay that through this the

diſcourſe propoſed by us at preſent muſt proceed, until it arrives at divinity.

CLIN. We ought entirely to act in this manner, if agreeable to you.

GUEST. While, therefore, I aſſert what it is proper to ſay diſcipline is, do you conſider whether my aſſertion accords with your opinion.

CLIN. You may begin when you pleaſe.

GUEST. I ſay, then, that thoſe who are hereafter to become great men ought from their very childhood to meditate both in ſport, and when acting ſeriouſly, things accommodated to the objects of their purſuit. Thus, if any one is to become a good huſbandman or architect, he ought from childhood, even in play, either to till the ground, or build certain puerile houſes. And he who is intruſted with the education of both theſe ſhould provide each of them with ſmall inſtruments, which are imitations of the true ones. And beſides this, he ſhould learn ſuch diſciplines as are neceſſary to be previouſly learned. Thus, a workman ſhould learn how to meaſure, or uſe a rule. He who is deſtined to be a warrior ſhould in ſport ride on horſeback, or do ſomething elſe of a ſimilar kind. And the maſter of the children ſhould endeavour, by ſports, to turn the pleaſures and deſires of the children thither, where when arrived, it is proper they ſhould receive their conſummation. But we ſay that the head or ſummit of diſcipline is a right education, which eſpecially leads the ſoul of him who ſports to a love of that which it will be requiſite for him to do when he has arrived at manhood, and has acquired perfection in the virtue of his art. Conſider therefore, now, whether (as I ſaid) what has been thus far aſſerted pleaſes you.

CLIN. How is it poſſible it ſhould not?

GUEST. Neither, therefore, ſhould that which we have ſaid diſcipline is, be left indefinite. For now, when we blame or praiſe the education of particular perſons, we ſay that ſuch a one is endued with diſcipline, but another is undiſciplined, although he may poſſeſs the greateſt ſkill in cooking, or navigation, and other things of this kind. For we do not, as it appears, conſider theſe to be diſcipline, but that which cauſes a citizen from his childhood to deſire and love virtue, and through which acquiring perfection, he may know how to govern and be governed with juſtice. This is what our diſcourſe defines to be education; from which it appears,

that this alone ought to be called diſcipline, according to our ſentiments; but that the education which tends to the acquiſition of wealth, or bodily ſtrength, or any other particular wiſdom, without intellect and juſtice, is mechanical and illiberal, and does not in any reſpect deſerve to be called diſcipline. We ſhall not, however, contend about a word. But let what we have juſt now aſſented to remain, that thoſe who are properly diſciplined become nearly all of them good. So that it is by no means proper to deſpiſe diſcipline, becauſe it is preſent to the moſt excellent men, the firſt of all beautiful things. And if at any time one properly diſciplined ſhould depart from right conduct, he is capable of being put in the right way; and this he may always accompliſh according to his ability, through the whole of life.

CLIN. Right: and we aſſent to what you ſay.

GUEST. But we formerly granted, that thoſe are good who are capable of governing themſelves, but thoſe bad, who do not poſſeſs this ability.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt rightly.

GUEST. We will therefore reſume this aſſertion, that what we ſay may become more clear. And receive me through an image, if in any reſpect I may be able to manifeſt to you a thing of this kind.

CLIN. Only ſpeak.

GUEST. Do we not conſider each of us as one?

CLIN. We do.

GUEST. But that we contain in ourſelves two counſellors, contrary to each other, and fooliſh, which we denominate pleaſure and pain?

CLIN. This alſo we admit.

GUEST. With theſe are connected the opinions of things future, the common name of which is hope. But, properly ſpeaking, the hope prior to pain is fear, but that which is prior to its contrary is confidence. But in all theſe there is a reaſoning proceſs, determining which of them is better or worſe; and which, when it becomes the common dogma of the city, is denominated law.

CLIN. I can ſcarcely follow you. However, proceed with what remains, as if I were able to follow you.

MEGIL. I likewiſe am affected in the ſame manner.

GUEST.

GUEST. But we ſhould thus think about theſe things. We ſhould conſider that each of us is reckoned a prodigy by divine animals [1], whether we were produced as their ſport, or as the reſult of a ſerious operation: for of this we are ignorant. This however we know, that theſe paſſions are inherent in our nature like nerves or ropes, that they draw contrary to each other, being themſelves contrary, and that they draw us to contrary actions, where virtue and vice are ſituated apart from each other. For reaſon ſays, that we ought always to follow one of the drawings, and ſhould never abandon it, but through this draw in a contrary direction to the other nerves; and that this is the golden and ſacred guidance of the reaſoning energy, which is called the common law of the city. It adds, that the other drawings are hard, and of an iron nature; but that this is ſoft, as being golden. That it is beſides uniform, but that the others are ſimilar to all-various forms. It is neceſſary, therefore, that we ſhould always follow the moſt beautiful guidance of law. For, ſince the energy of reaſoning is beautiful and gentle, but not violent, ſervants have need of its guidance, that the golden race [2] in us may vanquiſh the genera of a different kind. And thus the fable, ſince we are beings of a wonderful nature, will be preſervative of virtue; and we ſhall be able to underſtand more clearly how any one may be ſaid to be ſuperior and inferior to himſelf: and both cities and individuals, apprehending the true reaſon reſpecting theſe drawings, ought to live conformable to it. We ſhall likewiſe be convinced that a city, whether it receives reaſon from ſome one of the Gods, or from him who knows theſe particulars, will eſtabliſh it as law, and employ it in its own tranſactions, and in its tranſactions with other cities. For thus vice and virtue will appear to us more clearly diſtinct; and this diſtinction becoming more conſpicuous, both diſcipline and other ſtudies will perhaps be rendered more apparent. This will likewiſe be the caſe with reſpect to the cuſtom of drinking ſocieties, about which it might appear deſpicable to diſcourſe any further.

CLIN. Perhaps it will appear not to be unworthy of a long diſcourſe.

[1] Plato, by divine animals, means the mundane, or, as he calls them in the Timæus, the junior Gods.

[2] Viz. the intellectual form of life, or a life according to intellect. See the Additional Notes to the Republic for an account of the different ages.

GUEST. You ſpeak well. We will therefore endeavour to relate what appears to be praiſe-worthy in a cuſtom of this kind.

CLIN. Speak then.

GUEST. If to this wonderful thing we ſhould add intoxication, what ſort of a thing ſhall we faſhion him?

CLIN. What thing do you look to in aſking this queſtion?

GUEST. To nothing particular. But if this prodigy or wonderful thing ſhould become connected with intoxication, what would happen to be the reſult? But I will endeavour to explain more clearly what I mean. For this is what I aſk: Does the drinking of wine more vehemently excite pleaſure, pain, anger, and love?

CLIN. It does very much ſo.

GUEST. Does it in a ſimilar manner render the ſenſes, memory, opinion, and prudence, more vehement? or does it entirely extinguiſh theſe, when any one has drunk of it to intoxication?

CLIN It entirely extinguiſhes theſe.

GUEST. Such a one, therefore, returns to that habit of ſoul which he poſſeſſed when he was a boy.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Hence ſuch a one has at that time the leaſt poſſible command of himſelf.

CLIN. The leaſt.

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, call ſuch a one moſt depraved?

CLIN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. Not only then, as it appears, does an old man become twice a boy, but this is likewiſe the caſe with a man when intoxicated.

CLIN. You ſpeak, O gueſt, in a moſt excellent manner.

GUEST. Is there any reaſon which can perſuade us that we ought to taſte this liquor, and not to the utmoſt of our power avoid it?

CLIN. It appears that there is; and you juſt now ſaid you was prepared to ſhow it.

GUEST. You have very properly reminded me; and I am now prepared, ſince you have both ſaid that you are willing to hear me with alacrity.

CLIN. How is it poſſible we ſhould not hear you, if on no other account, yet for the ſake of the wonderful and the abſurd which it contains,

if

if it is neceſſary that a man ſhould at any time voluntarily hurl himſelf into every kind of depravity?

GUEST. Do you ſpeak of the ſoul?

CLIN. I do.

GUEST. But what? Shall we wonder, my friend, if at any time ſome one ſhould voluntarily arrive at depravity of body,—I mean leanneſs, deformity, and imbecility?

CLIN. How is it poſſible we ſhould not?

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, think that thoſe who go to a diſpenſary for the ſake of obtaining medicines, are ignorant that, in a ſhort time after they have taken the medicines, their body will for many days be ſo affected, that, if they were to remain in that condition to the end of life, they would not wiſh to live? or, Do we not know that thoſe who undergo gymnaſtic exerciſes and labours are immediately rendered weak?

CLIN. All this we know.

GUEST. And that they willingly tend to theſe things, for the ſake of conſequent utility?

CLIN. Moſt beautifully ſaid.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, neceſſary to think after the ſame manner about other purſuits?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. In the ſame manner, therefore, we ought to think about the employment of drinking wine, if it is admitted that this among other employments may be conſidered in a proper light.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. If it ſhould, therefore, appear to us to poſſeſs any utility, which is not inferior to corporeal exerciſe,—in the firſt place, it will vanquiſh this, becauſe corporeal exerciſe is attended with pain, but the employment of drinking wine is without pain.

CLIN. You ſpeak very properly. But I ſhould wonder if we were able to perceive any ſuch thing in it.

GUEST. This, therefore, as it appears, I muſt now endeavour to explain to you. Tell me then, are we able to underſtand two ſpecies of fear, which are nearly contrary to each other?

CLIN. Of what kind are they?

GUEST.

GUEST. They are ſuch as theſe. We are afraid of things evil, when we expect they will arrive.

CLIN. We are.

GUEST. And we are often afraid of opinion, thinking we ſhall be conſidered by others as depraved characters, when we do or ſay any thing which is not becoming; which fear, I think, both we and all others denominate ſhame.

CLIN. Doubtleſs.

GUEST. Theſe are the two fears I ſpoke of,—one of which is contrary to pain, and other fears, and is alſo contrary to the greater part and the greateſt of pleaſures.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt rightly.

GUEST. Will not therefore a legiſlator, and every one who is in the leaſt degree uſeful, reverence this fear with the greateſt honour, and call it ſhame,—but denominate confidence the contrary to this, impudence, and conſider it as the greateſt evil that can befall men, both in public and private?

CLIN. You ſpeak rightly.

GUEST. This fear, therefore, will preſerve us in many other and great concerns, and nothing will ſo much procure for us victory and ſafety in war, one being oppoſed to one, as this. For there are two things which procure victory, confidence of the enemy, and the dread of friends with reſpect to baſe infamy.

CLIN. It is ſo.

GUEST. It is neceſſary, therefore, that each of us ſhould become intrepid, and, at the ſame time, timid. But we ſhall ſhow, by diviſion, on what account we ought to become each of theſe.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. When we wiſh to render any one intrepid, we ſhall accompliſh this by leading him, according to law, to the dread of many terrible things.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But, what,—when we endeavour to render any one juſtly terrified, ought we not, by exerciſing him in impudence, to cauſe him to be victorious in contending with pleaſures? Or, by contending with and vanquiſhing his uſual mode of living, ought he not thus to obtain perfection

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in fortitude? And will not he who is unexperienced and unexerciſed in conteſts of this kind remain, as to one half of himſelf, deſtitute of virtue? But how can any one be perfectly temperate, who has not contended with and vanquiſhed, by reaſon, labour and art, in ſport and in earneſt, many pleaſures and deſires, which urge him to act impudently and unjuſtly; but who is impaſſive with reſpect to all ſuch things?

CLIN. It is by no means probable that he can.

GUEST. But what,—has divinity given men any medicine of fear, ſo that by how much more deſirous any one is of drinking it, by ſo much the more unhappy will he think himſelf from every draught; ſo that he will dread every thing, both preſent and future, and will at length, though he ſhould be the braveſt of men, be filled with every kind of dread; and, after having ſlept, and being freed from the potion, will again every day be equally terrified?

CLIN. And what potion of this kind, ſhall we ſay, O gueſt, is found among men?

GUEST. None. Yet if ſuch a potion ſhould be found, would it be uſeful to the legiſlator with reſpect to fortitude, ſo that we might thus ſpeak to him reſpecting it: O legiſlator, whether you have given laws to the Cretans, or to any other nation, are you willing to make trial of your citizens with reſpect to fortitude and timidity?

CLIN. He would doubtleſs ſay, that he was willing.

GUEST. But what,—are you willing to do this with ſafety, and without great danger; or the contrary?

CLIN. Every one muſt acknowledge, he would wiſh to do this with ſecurity.

GUEST. Would you uſe this potion, leading them to terrors, and accuſing them during their perturbation, ſo as to compel them to become intrepid, by exhortations and honours; diſgracing him who will not be perſuaded to become in all things ſuch a one as you wiſh; and diſmiſſing him with impunity who exerciſes himſelf in a proper and valiant manner, but puniſhing him who acts otherwiſe? or, Would you by no means uſe this potion, though you could find nothing elſe in it to accuſe?

CLIN. Why ſhould he not uſe it, O gueſt?

GUEST. An exerciſe, therefore, O friend, different from thoſe at preſent,

ſent, will poſſeſs a wonderful facility, both with reſpect to one perſon and a few, and as many as you ſhall always wiſh to be exerciſed. And whether any one, being alone in ſolitude, ſhould place ignominy before his eyes, thinking that he ought not to be ſeen till he has made ſufficient advances in virtue, and ſhould thus exerciſe himſelf againſt fear, preparing this potion alone, in preference to ten thouſand other things, he would do ſomething proper: or whether ſome one, confiding in his own nature, and being properly prepared by meditation, ſhould not refuſe to exerciſe himſelf with many drinking aſſociates, and ſhould evince, in the neceſſary conſumption of the liquor, a power ſo tranſcendent and ſtrong, as neither greatly to err through impudence, nor to be changed through virtue, but towards the end of the liquor ſhould depart without being intoxicated, fearing any human potion the leaſt of all things;—in this caſe, he would do ſomething well.

CLIN. Certainly. For ſuch a one, by thus acting, would conduct himſelf with temperance and modeſty.

GUEST. Again, let us thus addreſs the legiſlator: Neither, O legiſlator, has any God given to mankind ſuch a medicine, nor have we deviſed ſuch a one: (for I do not conſider witches at a banquet) but whether or not, is there a potion capable of producing intrepidity, together with vehement and unſeaſonable confidence? Or how ſhall we ſay?

CLIN. There is, and he would ſay that it is wine.

GUEST. But this produces contrary effects to the potion of which we have juſt now ſpoken. For, when a man drinks of it, it makes him at firſt immediately more cheerful than he was before; and by how much more he drinks of it, by ſo much more is he filled with good hope, and an opinion of his own power; till at length, as if he were a wiſe man, he becomes replete with all poſſible freedom of ſpeech and behaviour, and intrepidly both ſays and does whatever he pleaſes.

CLIN. I think every one will admit this.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. But do we recollect that we ſaid there were two things in our ſouls which ought to be cultivated;—the one, that we may poſſeſs confidence in the higheſt degree; but the other, which is the very contrary, that we may be afraid in the higheſt degree?

CLIN. I think you ſaid this of ſhame.

GUEST,

GUEST. You very properly remember. But ſince it is neceſſary that fortitude and intrepidity in fear ſhould be the ſubjects of meditation, let us conſider whether it will be proper that the contrary ſhould be cultivated in the contrary to fear.

CLIN. It is probable.

GUEST. In thoſe things, therefore, in which, naturally ſuffering, we are remarkably confident and audacious, in theſe it will be proper, as it appears, to meditate how we may become in the leaſt degree impudent and audacious, but timid with reſpect to daring to ſpeak, or ſuffer, or do any thing baſe.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Are not all theſe, therefore, the things in which we are thus affected, viz. anger, love, petulance, ignorance, the love of gain, and timidity; and beſides theſe, riches, beauty, ſtrength, and all ſuch things as, intoxicating men through pleaſure, render them delirious? In order to make an eaſy and innocent trial of all theſe, and afterwards meditate upon them, what pleaſure have we more convenient than that which explores the diſpoſition of men by means of wine, when it is attended with prudent caution? For, let us conſider: whether ought we to make trial of a moroſe and ruſtic ſoul, from which a thouſand injuries germinate, in his contracts with others, or from his being preſent at the ſhows of Bacchus, or from his ſoul being vanquiſhed in venereal affairs, ſo as to behold the manners of his ſoul when his ſons, daughter, and wife, are expoſed to danger? In ſhort, among ten thouſand things, you will not find any thing in which in jeſt, and without any danger, you can ſo well contemplate the diſpoſition of any one, as by wine. We ought, therefore, to think that neither the Cretans, nor any other nation, would ever doubt but that this trial of the diſpoſition of each other is convenient, and above all others ſafe and eaſy.

CLIN. You ſpeak truly.

GUEST. This, then, will be one of the moſt uſeful things, to know the natures and habits of ſouls by that art whoſe province it is to procure a remedy for theſe. But this, as I think, is the province of the politic art. Or is it not?

CLIN. It is entirely ſo.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

THE LAWS,

BOOK II.

AFTER this, as it appears, we ſhould conſider reſpecting theſe particulars, whether this alone is beneficial, to contemplate after what manner we poſſeſs certain natures, or whether alſo ſome great advantage which deſerves much attention is inherent in the proper uſe of drinking wine in conjunction with others. What then ſhall we ſay? Our diſcourſe would ſeem to inſinuate that it is inherent. But when, and after what manner, let us attentively hear, leſt we ſhould be impeded in our inquiry by this affair.

CLIN. Speak then.

GUEST. I am deſirous, therefore, of again recalling to our memory our definition of proper diſcipline. For the ſafety of this, as I conjecture at preſent, conſiſts in the employment we are now ſpeaking of, when well conducted.

CLIN. You ſpeak largely.

GUEST. I ſay then, that the firſt puerile ſenſe of boys is pleaſure and pain; and that theſe are firſt inherent in the ſoul, in which vice and virtue ſubſiſt. But he is happy who in old age acquires the firm poſſeſſion of prudence [1] and true opinions. And that man is perfect who poſſeſſes theſe, and all the goods they contain. But I call diſcipline that virtue which firſt accedes to boys. When pleaſure, love, pain, and hatred, are properly produced in the ſoul, before it is able to receive theſe attended with reaſon; if, when they are attended with reaſon, they accord with it in conſequence of being properly accuſtomed by well adapted manners, then this conſent is the

[1] The prudence of which Plato ſpeaks in this place is intellectual; for this is peculiarly adapted to old age, or the Saturnian period of life.

whole

whole of virtue. But the proper nurture of the ſoul, with reſpect to pleaſure and pain, ſo as that it may hate what it ought to hate, immediately from the beginning to the end, and love what it ought to love,—this, if it is conſidered ſeparately, and is denominated diſcipline, will, according to my opinion, be properly denominated.

CLIN. What you have ſaid, O gueſt, formerly and at preſent, about diſcipline, appears to be well ſaid.

GUEST. It is well, therefore. For theſe pleaſures and pains, which when properly nurtured are diſciplines, are often looſened and corrupted by men in the buſineſs of life. But the Gods, commiſerating the naturally laborious race of men, ordained for them remiſſions of labours, and gave them the viciſſitudes of feſtivals [1], in honour of the Gods, together with the Muſes, Apollo

[1] The following account of the feſtivals of the antients, from the Deſcriptions of Libanius, fully proves the truth of what is here aſſerted by Plato repreſents to us the liberal, philanthropic, and hoſpitable ſpirit of Paganiſm in the moſt amiable point of view, and naturally leads the truly benevolent mind to regret that ſuch philanthropy has been for ſo long a period baniſhed from the earth; that the preſence of divinity is no longer conſidered as eſſentially neceſſary to the ſplendour of feſtivity, and that a feſtival at preſent is every thing but a ſolemnity!

"Solemn feſtivals when approaching produce deſire in the human race, when preſent they are attended with pleaſure, and when paſt with recollection: for remembrance places men very near the tranſactions themſelves. The recollection alſo poſſeſſes a certain advantage. For, in ſpeaking of ſolemn feſtivals, it is alſo neceſſary to ſpeak concerning the Gods in whoſe honour they are inſtituted. Men prepare themſelves for theſe feſtivals, when they approach, with joy. The multitude indeed procure ſuch things as may furniſh them with a ſplendid entertainment, but the worthy, thoſe things by which they may reverence the Gods. Cattle and wine, and whatever elſe is the produce of the fields, are brought from the country. Garments alſo are purified; and every one is anxious to celebrate the feſtival in perfection. Thoſe that are in want of garments are permitted to borrow ſuch as are requiſite to adorn themſelves on this occaſion, from thoſe that have abundance. When the appointed day arrives, the prieſts open the temples, pay diligent attention to the ſtatues; and nothing is neglected which contributes to the public convenience. The cities too are crowded with a conflux of the neighbouring inhabitants, aſſembled to celebrate the feſtival; ſome coming on foot, and others in ſhips.

"At ſunriſe they enter the temples in ſplendid garments, worſhipping that divinity to whom the feſtival is ſacred. Every maſter of a houſe therefore precedes, bearing frankincenſe: a ſervant follows him, carrying a victim; and children walk by the ſide of their parents, ſome very young, and others of a more advanced age, already perceiving the ſtrong influence of the Gods. One having performed his ſacrifice departs; another approaches to perform it. Numerous prayers are every where poured forth; and words of good omen are mutually ſpoken. With reſpect to the women,

Apollo the leader of the Muſes, and Bacchus, as their aſſociates in theſe celebrations; that in theſe feſtivals they might rectify the education of youth, in

women, ſome offer ſacrifices in the temples; and others are ſatisfied with beholding the crowd of thoſe that ſacrifice. When ſuch things as pertain to the divinities are properly accompliſhed, the tables follow, at which hymns are ſung in praiſe of the God who is honoured in the feſtival. Social drinking ſucceeds, with ſongs which are partly ſerious and partly jocoſe, according to the different diſpoſitions of the company. Some likewiſe feaſt in the temples, and others at home; and citizens requeſt ſtrangers to partake with them of the banquet. In the courſe of drinking, antient friendſhips are rendered more firm, and others receive their commencement. After they have feaſted, riſing from table, ſome take the ſtrangers and ſhow them whatever is worthy to be ſeen in the city; and others ſitting in the Forum gaily converſe. No one is ſorrowful, but every countenance is relaxed with joy. The exaction of debts gives place to feſtivity; and whatever might cauſe affliction is deferred to another time. Accuſations are ſilent, and the judge does not paſs ſentence; but ſuch things as produce pleaſure alone flouriſh. The ſlave is not afraid of blows from his maſter, and pedagogues are mild to youth.

"In the evening they ſup ſplendidly, at which time there are ſo many torches that the city is full of light. There are alſo many revellers, and various flutes, and the ſound of pipes is heard in the narrow ſtreets, accompanied with ſometimes the ſame, and ſometimes different ſongs. Then to drink even to intoxication is not perfectly diſgraceful; for the occaſion in a certain reſpect appears to take away the opprobrium. On the following day the divinity is not neglected; but many of thoſe that worſhipped on the preceding day do not again come to the ſhows. Thoſe that contend in the compoſition of verſes attend on this, but thoſe with whom the conteſt is in the ſcenes, on the preceding day. The third day alſo is not far ſhort of theſe; and pleaſure and hilarity are extended with the time of the feſtival. When the ſolemnity ends, prayers are offered for futurity, that they, their children and families may again be ſpectators of it; after which the ſtrangers depart, and the citizens accompany them."

The ſame author likewiſe in his account of the Calends obſerves as follows: "This feſtival is extended as far as the dominion of the Romans; and ſuch is the joy it occaſions, that if it were poſſible time could be haſtened for mortals, which according to Homer was effected by Juno reſpecting the ſun, this feſtival alſo would be haſtened by every nation, city, houſe, and individual of mankind. The feſtival flouriſhes in every plain, on every hill and mountain, and in every lake and navigable river. It alſo flouriſhes in the ſea, if at that time it happens to be undiſturbed by tempeſt; for then both ſhips and merchants out through its waves and celebrate the feſtival. Joy and feaſting every where abound. The earth is then full of honours; in conſequence of men honouring each other by gifts and hoſpitality. The foot-paths and the public roads are crowded with men, and four-footed animals bearing burthens, ſubſervient to the occaſion; and the ways in the city are covered, and the narrow ſtreets are full. Some are equally delighted with giving and receiving; but others, though they do not receive any thing, are pleaſed with giving, merely becauſe they are able to give. And the ſpring by its flowers, indeed, renders the earth beautiful; but the feſtival by its gifts, which pouring in from every place are every where diffuſed.

in conjunction with the Gods. Conſider, therefore, whether it is proper to ſay, that our diſcourſe at preſent is celebrated as true according to nature, or how

diffuſed. He therefore who aſſerts that this is the moſt pleaſant part of the year, will not err; ſo that, if the whole time of life could be paſſed in the ſame manner, the iſlands of the bleſt would not be ſo much celebrated by mankind as they are at preſent. The firſt appearance of the ſwallow is indeed pleaſant, yet does not prevent labour; but this feſtival thinks proper to remove from the days of its celebration every thing laborious, and permits us to enjoy minds free from moleſtation. Theſe days free the youth from two-fold fears, one ariſing from their preceptors, the other from their pedagogues. They alſo make ſlaves as much as poſſible free, and exhibit their power even in thoſe in chains, removing ſorrow from their countenances, and exciting ſome of them to mirth. They can alſo perſuade a father who expects the death of his ſon, and through ſorrow is waſting away, and averſe to nouriſhment, to be reconciled to his condition, to abandon darkneſs, lay aſide his ſqualid appearance, and betake himſelf to the bath: and what the moſt ſkilful in perſuaſion are unable to accompliſh, that the power of the feſtival effects. It alſo conciliates citizen with citizen, ſtranger with ſtranger, one boy with another, and woman with woman. It likewiſe inſtructs men not to be avaricious, but to bring forth their gold, and depoſit it in the right hands of others." He concludes with obſerving, "that the altars of the Gods in his time did not poſſeſs all that they did formerly, this being forbidden by the law of the Chriſtians; but that, before this prohibition, much fire, blood, and fume of ſacrifice aſcended to heaven from every region, ſo that the banquets in honour of the Gods were then ſplendid during the feſtival."

The moſt remarkable circumſtance in theſe feſtivals was the cauſe of this univerſal joy, which was no other than the firm perſuaſion that divinity was then preſent and propitious, as is evident from the following beautiful paſſage from Plutarch, in the Treatiſe in which he ſhows that pleaſure is not attainable according to Epicurus: "Neither the diſcourſes (ſays he) of thoſe that wait in the temples, nor the ſeaſons of ſolemn feſtivals, nor any other actions, or ſpectacles, delight us more than thoſe things which we ourſelves do concerning the Gods, when we celebrate orgies, or join in the dance, or are preſent at ſacrifices, or the greateſt of the myſteries. For then the ſoul is not ſorrowful, abject, and languid, as if converſing with certain tyrants, or dire avengers, which it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe ſhe then would be; but where ſhe eſpecially thinks and rationally conceives divinity is preſent, there ſhe eſpecially baniſhes ſorrow, and fear, and care, and lets herſelf looſe even to intoxication, frolic and laughter. In amorous concerns, indeed, as the poet once ſaid,

Remembrance of the joys that Venus gave,
Will fire the boſom of the aged pair.

But in public proceſſions and ſacrifices, not only the old man and the old woman, not only the poor and the plebeian, but alſo

The duſty thick-legg'd drab that turns the mill,

and houſehold ſlaves and hirelings, are elevated with joy and gladneſs. Banquets and public entertainments

how ſhall we ſay? But it aſſerts, in ſhort, that every youth is incapable of being at reſt, either in body or voice, but that he always ſeeks to be moved and to ſpeak; ſometimes exulting and leaping, dancing and ſporting as it were with pleaſure, but at other times uttering ſounds with every kind of voice. Other animals, indeed, have no ſenſation either of order or diſorder in motions, which order is denominated rhythm and harmony; but thoſe Gods whom we call aſſociates in the choir have beſtowed upon us a rhythmical and harmonic ſenſe, which might agitate us with pleaſure, by connecting us with each other through ſinging and dancing. But the word choir was denominated from joy, as its natural name. In the firſt place, however, it is neceſſary to aſk, whether we admit that diſcipline firſt ſubſiſts through the Muſes and Apollo? or how ſhall we ſay?

tertainments are given both by the wealthy and kings; but thoſe which take place at ſacrifices and ſolemnities, when through inſpiration we appear to approach very near to a divine nature, are attended with much greater joy and pleaſure, in conjunction with honour and veneration. Of this, the man who denies a Providence has no portion. For it is not the abundance of wine, nor the roaſting of meat, which gives delight in ſolemn feſtivals, but the good hope and belief that divinity is propitiouſly preſent, and gratefully receives what is done. From ſome of our feſtivals we exclude the flute and the crown; but when divinity is not preſent at the ſacrifice, as the ſolemnity of the banquet, the reſt is impious, is void of feſtivity, and poſſeſſes nothing of divine fury; or, rather, the whole is unpleaſant, and even painful."

Ουτε διατριβαι των εν ιεροις, ουτε καιροι των εορτασμων, ουτε πραξεις, ουτε οψεις ευφραινουσιν ετεραι μαλλον ων ορωμεν ἡ δρωμεν αυτοι περι θεων, οργιαζοντες, ἡ χορευοντες, ἡ θυσιαις παροντες, ἡ τελεταις. ω γαρ ὡς τυραννοις τισιν ἡ δεινοις κολαξαις ομιλουσα τηνικαυτα ἡ ψυχη περιλυπος εϛι και ταπεινη και δυσθυμος, ὁπερ εικος ην· αλλ' ὁπου μαλιϛα δοξαζει και διανοειται παρειναι τον θεον, εκει μαλιϛα λυπας και φοβους και το φροντιζειν απωϛαμενη, τω ηδομενω μεχρι μεθης και παιδιας και γελωτος αφιησιν εαυτην. Εν τοις ερωτικοις ὡς ὁ ποιητης ειρηκε,

Και τε γερων και γρηϋς, επην χρυσης Αφροδιτης
Μνησωνται, και τισιν επηερθη φιλον ητορ.

εν δε πομπαις και θυσιαις ου μονον γερων και γρηϋς, ουδε πενης και ιδιωτης, αλλα και παχυσκελης αλετρις προς μυλην κινουμενη και οικοτριβες και θητες ὑπο γηθους και χαρμοσυνης αναφερονται. πλουσιοις τε και βασιλευσιν εϛιασεις και πανδαισιαι τινες παρεισιν· αι δ' εφ' ιεροις και θυηπολιαις, και ὁταν εγγιϛα του θειου τη επινοια ϕαυειν δοκωσι, μετα τιμης και σεβασμου πολυ διαφερουσαν ηδονην και χαριν εχουσιν. ταυτης ουδεν ανδρι μετεϛιν απεγνωκοτι της προνοιας. ου γαρ οινου πληθος, ωδε οπτησις κρεων το ευφραινον εϛιν εν ταις εορταις, αλλα και ελπις αγαθη και δοξα του παρειναι τον θεον ευμενη, και δεχεσθαι τα γινομενα κεχαρισμενως· αυλον μεν γαρ ετερων εορτων και ϛεφανον αφαιρουμεν, θεου δε θυσια μη παροντος, ωσπερ ιερον δοχης, αθεον εϛι και ανεορταϛον και ανευθυσιαϛον το λειπομενον μαλλον δε ὁλον ατερπες αυτω και λυπηρον. The ſame author alſo obſerves, in his Treatiſe on Superſtition, "that holy days, temple feaſts, the being initiated in myſteries, proceſſions, with public prayers and ſolemn devotions, were conſidered as the moſt agreeable things in human life."

CLIN. That it does.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is void of diſcipline, is with us one who has never joined a choir; but he who is diſciplined is to be conſidered as one who has ſufficiently engaged in a choir.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But the whole of a choir conſiſts in dancing and ſinging.

CLIN. It is neceſſary it ſhould.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is properly diſciplined will be able to ſing and dance in a becoming manner.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But let us conſider what it is that we have now aſſerted.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. We have ſpoken of ſinging and dancing in a becoming manner. But whether or not is it proper to add, that things beautiful ought to be the ſubjects of ſinging and dancing?

CLIN. This ought to be added.

GUEST. But what,—will he who conſiders things beautiful, as beautiful, and things baſe, as baſe, and who uſes them as ſuch,—will ſuch a one be better diſciplined for us, with reſpect to the choir and muſic, than he who is ſufficiently able to become ſubſervient to that which he conſiders as beautiful in body and voice, but yet does not rejoice in things beautiful, nor hate ſuch as are void of beauty? Or he, who, though he is not altogether able to act or think rightly, with reſpect to his voice and body, yet acts rightly with reſpect to pleaſure and pain; embracing ſuch things as are beautiful, and hating ſuch as are baſe?

CLIN. You ſpeak, O gueſt, of a mighty difference of diſcipline.

GUEST. If, therefore, we three poſſeſs a knowledge of the beautiful in ſinging and dancing, we alſo know when any one is properly or improperly diſciplined: but, if we are ignorant of this, we ſhall not be able to know what is the defence of diſcipline, and where it is to be found. Is not this the caſe?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in the next place, like dogs on the ſcent, inveſtigate beautiful figure, melody, ſinging and dancing. For, if theſe elude our

purſuit, our diſcourſe about proper diſcipline, whether Grecian or Barbarian, will be in vain.

CLIN. It will.

GUEST. What figure, therefore, or melody, is it proper to call beautiful? Shall we ſay, that in the ſame and equal labours the figures and voices of a brave and timid ſoul are ſimilar?

CLIN. How can they, ſince neither are their colours ſimilar?

GUEST. Well obſerved, my companion. But in muſic there are both figures and melody, ſince muſic is converſant with rhythm and harmony. So that melody or figure may poſſeſs proper rhythm or harmony, but not a proper colour, that we may ſpeak in the aſſimilative way, as the maſters of the choir are accuſtomed to aſſimilate. But there is a certain figure or melody of a timid, and of a brave man; and it will be proper to call theſe things in brave men, beautiful, but in the timid, baſe. And that we may not be prolix about theſe particulars, all the figures and melodies which ſimply adhere to the virtue of the ſoul or body, or to a certain image of it, are beautiful; but the contrary muſt be aſſerted with reſpect to the vice of the ſoul or body.

CLIN. You are right; and we judge that theſe particulars ſubſiſt in this manner.

GUEST. But we muſt ſtill further conſider, whether all of us are ſimilarly delighted with all choirs, or whether this is far from being the caſe?

CLIN. It is far from being the caſe.

GUEST. What then ſhall we ſay is the cauſe of our error? Is it becauſe not the ſame things are beautiful to all? Or ſhall we ſay that they are the ſame things, but do not appear to be the ſame? For no one will ſay that a vicious is better than a virtuous choir; or that he is delighted with depraved figures, but others with a muſe contrary to this. Though, indeed, moſt men aſſert, that the rectitude of muſic conſiſts in a power which imparts pleaſure to the ſoul. This, however, is neither to be endured, nor is it holy by any means to make ſuch an aſſertion. But this is more probably the cauſe of our error.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. Since the particulars reſpecting choirs are imitations of manners

and of actions which take place in all-various fortunes and habits, thoſe by whom the imitations of manners, whether expreſſed by diſcourſe, or melody, or dancing, are approved, either from nature or cuſtom, or from both, muſt neceſſarily rejoice in and praiſe theſe, and denominate them beautiful. But thoſe to whom they appear contrary to nature, or manners, or cuſtom, can neither rejoice in nor praiſe them, but muſt neceſſarily denominate them baſe. And thoſe, again, to whom theſe particulars happen right by nature, but the contrary from cuſtom; or right from cuſtom, but the contrary from nature;—theſe will denominate things contrary to pleaſures, laudable. For they will aſſert that each of theſe is pleaſant, but at the ſame time baſe. Hence, before others, whom they conſider as intelligent perſons, they will be aſhamed that their body ſhould be moved after that manner, and will bluſh to ſing, and to call ſuch things beautiful, or deſerving ſerious attention; but, by themſelves, they will be delighted with them.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. Does he then ſuffer any injury who is delighted with baſe figures or melodies; or do they receive any advantage who are pleaſed with the contraries to theſe?

CLIN. It is probable.

GUEST. Is it only probable, or alſo neceſſary, that the ſame thing ſhould happen as takes place when any one, being converſant with the depraved habits of depraved men, does not hate, but rejoices in and admits them; and yet blames them in jeſt, having a dreaming perception of his own depravity? For, in this caſe, it is neceſſary that he ſhould be aſſimilated to the things in which he rejoices, although he ſhould be aſhamed to praiſe them. But what greater good, or evil, ſhall we ſay, can poſſibly happen to us than a thing of this kind?

CLIN. I think, none.

GUEST. But where laws are beautifully eſtabliſhed, or will be in ſome future period of time, can we think it will be lawful for poets, in diſcipline and ſport reſpecting the Muſes, to teach in their poetical compoſitions whatever delights them, by rhythm, or melody, or verſe, and to form in choirs the boys and young men of well inſtituted polities, either to virtue or vice?

CLIN. It is contrary to reaſon to ſuppoſe this would be allowed.

MEGIL. For how is it poſſible it ſhould be?

GUEST. But, in ſhort, it is lawful to act in this manner at preſent in all cities, except Egypt.

CLIN. But how do you ſay a thing of this kind is eſtabliſhed by law in Egypt?

GUEST. It is wonderful to hear. For, as it appears, they formerly knew what we have now ſaid, that young men in cities ſhould be accuſtomed to beautiful figures and beautiful melodies; and it is one of their inſtitutions to exhibit in their temples what theſe are, and what the qualities which they poſſeſs; and beſides theſe, it is not lawful, either for painters or other artificers of figures, to introduce any that are new, or even to think of any other than thoſe belonging to their country: nor is it lawful at preſent to do this, either in theſe particulars or in the whole of muſic. If you obſerve, therefore, you will find that paintings and ſculptures there, which were executed TEN THOUSAND YEARS ago, as if they were not of ſuch great antiquity, are neither more beautiful, nor more deformed, than paintings or carvings of the preſent day, but are faſhioned by juſt the ſame art.

CLIN. You ſpeak of a wonderful circumſtance.

GUEST. It is, however, a circumſtance pertaining to law and politics in a tranſcendent degree. You will likewiſe find other things there of a trifling nature. But this reſpecting muſic is true, and deſerves attention, becauſe the legiſlator could firmly give laws about things of this kind, and with confidence introduce ſuch melodies as poſſeſſed a natural rectitude. But this muſt be the work of a God, or of ſome divine perſon. Juſt as they ſay there, that their melodies, which have been preſerved for ſuch a length of time, are the poems of Iſis. So that, as I ſaid, if any one is able to apprehend the rectitude of them, he ought to have the courage to reduce them to law and order. For the ſearch of pleaſure and pain, which is always directed to the uſe of new muſic, perhaps poſſeſſes no great power of corrupting the conſecrated choir by an accuſation of its antiquity. It appears, therefore, that the choir of the Egyptians was by no means capable of being corrupted, but that the contrary was entirely the caſe.

CLIN. From what you have now ſaid, it appears that it muſt be ſo.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, confidently ſay, that a choir is after a certain manner properly connected with ſports and muſic; and, that we rejoice

joice as often as we think that we do well, and, when we rejoice, think we do well? Is it not ſo?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But, rejoicing in a thing of this kind, we are incapable of being at reſt.

CLIN. We are ſo.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, thoſe among us that are young men prompt to dance? And do not we who are old men think that we conduct ourſelves in a becoming manner in beholding theſe, while we rejoice in their ſports, and in their celebration of ſacred feſtivals, ſince lightneſs of body fails us at our time of life,—through the deſire of which, we thus eſtabliſh games for thoſe who are able in the higheſt degree to excite in us the memory of our juvenile period?

CLIN. Moſt true.

GUEST. Shall we therefore conſider that which is ſaid by many of thoſe who celebrate ſacred feſtivals, as ſaid in vain, that it is proper to reckon him moſt wiſe, and to judge that he will conquer who cauſes us to be delighted and to rejoice in the greateſt degree? For it is proper, ſince we permit ſport in things of this kind, that we ſhould particularly honour him who cauſes the greateſt number and in the greateſt degree to rejoice; and, as I juſt now ſaid, that we ſhould pronounce him victor. Is this, therefore, rightly ſaid, and will a conduct of this kind be right?

CLIN. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But, O bleſſed man, we ſhould not haſtily judge a thing of this kind, but, dividing it into parts, conſider after this manner: If any one ſhould at any time ſimply eſtabliſh a certain game, but without defining whether it is gymnaſtic, or equeſtrian, or muſical; and, collecting together all the inhabitants of the city, ſhould proclaim, that he was going to eſtabliſh a conteſt for the ſake of pleaſure alone, in which (without expreſſing the mode of conteſt) rewards would be aſſigned for him who gave the ſpectators the greateſt delight, and that for this he would be conſidered as victor, and as the beſt of all thoſe engaged in the conteſt,—what do we think would be the conſequence of this proclamation?

CLIN. Of what are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. It is proper that one ſhould exhibit, like Homer, a rhapſody,

another the modulation of the harp, another tragedy, and another comedy. Nor will it be wonderful, if ſome one, by exhibiting prodigies, ſhould think that he is eſpecially victorious. But, theſe and an innumerable multitude of other champions aſſembling together, can we ſay which of them is juſtly the victor?

CLIN. You aſk an abſurd thing. For, who can give you an anſwer to this queſtion, unleſs he has himſelf been an auditor of each of the champions?

GUEST. Are you therefore willing that I myſelf ſhould reply to this abſurd queſtion?

CLIN. How is it poſſible I ſhould not?

GUEST. If, therefore, very little children were to judge in this affair, they would give the palm of victory to him who exhibited prodigies: or would they not?

CLIN. How ſhould they do otherwiſe?

GUEST. The greater boys, however, would give the preference to thoſe that exhibited comedies; but ſuch women as are better educated than others, young men, and perhaps almoſt the whole multitude, would prefer the tragedians.

CLIN. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But perhaps we old men ſhould hear with the moſt pleaſure the rhapſodiſt when properly handling the Iliad and Odyſſey, or ſome of the works of Heſiod, and ſhould by far proclaim him the victor of all the others. Ought we not, therefore, after this to ſhow who is properly the victor in theſe conteſts?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. It is evident that both I and you ought neceſſarily to confeſs, that he will be properly the victor whom thoſe of our age judge to be ſo: for the ſkill which we derive from age appears to be every where by far the beſt of all political concerns.

CLIN. Doubtleſs.

GUEST. I therefore grant thus much to the multitude, that muſic ought to be judged by pleaſure, yet not by the pleaſure it imparts to every man,—but that, nearly, that is the moſt beautiful muſe which delights the beſt of men, and ſuch as are ſufficiently diſciplined; but eſpecially when it delights a man who excells in virtue and diſcipline. On this account we ſay that judges of theſe

theſe things require virtue, becauſe they ought to participate of prudence and fortitude. For a true judge ought not to learn how to judge from another, and thus become as it were ſtupefied by the clamours of the multitude, and his own ignorance. But he ought to poſſeſs fortitude, becauſe, though he ſhould be endued with knowledge, he ought not, through ſloth and timidity, to give an unjuſt deciſion from the ſame mouth with which when about to judge he invoked the Gods. For a judge does not ſit as a diſciple, but rather, as it is juſt he ſhould, as a maſter of the ſpectators, and as one who is averſe to things which do not afford the ſpectators a fit and proper pleaſure. For it was allowed by the antient and Grecian law, as by that of Sicily and Italy at preſent, that the multitude of ſpectators ſhould decide who was victor, by holding up their hands: but this corrupted the poets themſelves, who wrote according to the depraved pleaſure of vulgar judges; ſo that the ſpectators both diſciplined themſelves and the poets. It likewiſe corrupted the pleaſures of the theatre. For, as it is here proper that the ſpectators ſhould always hear of manners better than their own, and thus obtain a more excellent pleaſure, the very contrary to this takes place at preſent. What then does the preſent diſcourſe wiſh to ſignify? Conſider whether it is this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. My diſcourſe appears to me to have thrice or four times revolved to the ſame thing, that diſcipline is the drawing and leading of youth to that which is called by the law, right reaſon, and which the moſt worthy and antient men have found by experience to be truly right. That the ſoul of a youth, therefore, may be accuſtomed by law, and by thoſe who are perſuaded by law, not to rejoice in things contrary, but to be delighted or afflicted with the ſame things as an old man; for the ſake of this, thoſe poetical compoſitions called odes, and which are truly epodes, or incantations to the ſoul, are compoſed at preſent, and which haſtily tend to that kind of ſymphony of which we are ſpeaking. But ſince the ſouls of boys are incapable of engaging in ſerious purſuits, ſports and odes were inſtituted by the legiſlator. Juſt as, in curing diſeaſed and imbecil bodies, phyſicians endeavour to introduce uſeful food in pleaſant meats and drinks, but noxious food in ſuch as are bitter, that they may be rightly accuſtomed to embrace the one, and hate the other. A proper legiſlator will perſuade the poet to do the ſame in beautiful and laudable words; and will compel him, if he cannot

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be perſuaded, that when he produces figures of temperate, brave, and, in ſhort, of all good men, in rhythms, and melodies in harmonies, he ſhall produce them properly.

CLIN. By Jupiter, O gueſt, does it appear to you that this is done at preſent in other cities? For I do not know of any city in which what you ſpeak of takes place, except ours, and that of the Lacedæmonians. But in other cities there are always ſome new regulations about dancing, and the reſt of the muſic; and this not from any mutation in the laws, but from certain inordinate pleaſures, which are very far from remaining perpetually the ſame, like thoſe Egyptian regulations which you related, but continually vary.

GUEST. Moſt excellent, O Clinias! But if I have appeared to you, as you ſay, to aſſert theſe things as exiſting at preſent, I ſhall not wonder that I have done this in conſequence of not clearly unfolding my meaning. But having ſpoken about certain particulars, which I wiſhed to take place, reſpecting muſic, I perhaps appeared to you to ſpeak as if they actually exiſted at preſent. For, to blame a thing which is incurable, and which is very far advanced in error, is by no means pleaſant, though ſometimes neceſſary. But, as we are thus far agreed, will you not ſay that theſe things ſubſiſt among us, and thoſe, more than among the other Greeks?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But if they ſhould alſo take place among others, would they not be better conducted than at preſent?

CLIN. By far better, if they ſubſiſted as you juſt now ſaid they ought to ſubſiſt, and as they ſubſiſt among thoſe and with us.

GUEST. Shall we then agree at preſent, that the things aſſerted by you, in every kind of diſcipline and muſic, are theſe: that poets ſhould be compelled to aſſert that a good man, being temperate and juſt, is happy and bleſſed, whether he is large and robuſt, ſmall and weak, rich or poor; but that an unjuſt man is miſerable, and paſſes his days in ſorrow, though he ſhould be richer than Cinyras or Midas? A poet, therefore, if he ſpeaks rightly, will ſay to us: I ſhall never mention nor conſider him as a man, who does not perform with juſtice, and poſſeſs every thing which is denominated beautiful in conduct. Such a one too, being juſt, will deſire to contend with his enemies in cloſe engagement. But he who is unjuſt will neither

neither dare to behold bloody ſlaughter, nor to vanquiſh, running, the Thracian Boreas, nor will he acquire any of thoſe things which are denominated good. For the things which are called by the many good, are not rightly denominated. For it is ſaid that health is the beſt thing; beauty the next; ſtrength the third; and riches the fourth. And an innumerable multitude of other things are called good. Thus, to ſee and hear acutely, and to poſſeſs in a proper manner all ſuch things as belong to the ſenſes; likewiſe to do in a tyrannical manner whatever you pleaſe, appears to be good. And beſides this, it is conſidered as the end of all bleſſedneſs to become in the moſt rapid manner immortal, while poſſeſſing all theſe. But you and I ſay that all theſe are the beſt of poſſeſſions to juſt and holy men, but that to unjuſt men they are the worſt of all things, beginning the enumeration from health. For to be well, to ſee, hear, and poſſeſs the other ſenſes, and, in ſhort, to live, is the greateſt evil, though a man ſhould be immortal through the whole of time, and poſſeſs every thing that is called good, if all theſe are not attended with juſtice and every virtue. But it is a leſs evil to live in this manner for the ſhorteſt time. I think that your poets ſhould ſpeak in this manner, and that you ſhould perſuade and compel them to do ſo, and to inſtruct the youth, through rhythms and harmonies, conſequent to theſe aſſertions. Do you perceive this? For I clearly aſſert, that the things which are called evil are good to the unjuſt, but evil to the juſt; but that things good are truly good to the good, but evil to the wicked. Do, therefore, you and I agree in what is ſaid, or not?

CLIN. We appear partly to agree, and partly not.

GUEST. Perhaps I have not perſuaded you that he is not happy, but clearly wretched, who alone poſſeſſes in himſelf injuſtice and inſolence, though he ſhould be healthy and rich, and a tyrant to the end of life; and, beſides all theſe, ſhould be endued with uncommon ſtrength of body, in conjunction with immortality, and ſhould never experience any of thoſe things which are called evils.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. Be it ſo then. But what ought we to ſay after this? If he is valiant, and ſtrong, and beautiful, and rich, and accompliſhes through the whole of life whatever he deſires,—will he not neceſſarily appear to you, if he is unjuſt and inſolent, to live in a ſhameful manner?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Will he not alſo appear to you to live badly?

CLIN. This will not in a ſimilar manner appear to me.

GUEST. But will you not admit that he muſt live unpleaſantly, and in a manner contrary to his intereſt?

CLIN. How can I admit this?

GUEST. How? If a God, my friends, ſhould cauſe us to agree in ſentiment, as we now nearly diſſent from each other. For theſe things appear to me ſo neceſſary; that Crete, O friend Clinias, does not more clearly appear to be an iſland. And if I were a legiſlator, I would endeavour to compel the poets, and all the other inhabitants of the city, to ſpeak in this manner: and I would ordain, that nearly the greateſt of all puniſhments ſhould be inflicted on him who ſhould aſſert, in the country to which he belonged, that there are certain men of a baſe character who lead a pleaſant life; or that ſome things are advantageous and lucrative, but others more juſt. And I would perſuade my citizens to aſſert many other things, contrary to what are now advanced by the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, as it appears, and, indeed, by the reſt of mankind. For, by Jupiter and Apollo, O beſt of men! if we ſhould aſk thoſe Gods who gave us laws, whether the moſt juſt is the moſt pleaſant life, or whether there are two certain lives, one of which is moſt pleaſant, and the other moſt juſt:—if, in anſwer to our inquiry, they ſhould ſay there are two lives, we might, perhaps, again aſk them (if we inquire properly) which we ought to call moſt happy; thoſe who lead the moſt juſt, or thoſe who lead the moſt pleaſant life. If they ſhould ſay, thoſe who lead the moſt pleaſant life, their anſwer would be abſurd. But I am deſirous that a thing of this kind ſhould not be ſaid by the Gods, but rather by our fathers and legiſlators. I ſhall therefore put the ſame queſtion to my father and legiſlator, and I ſhall ſuppoſe him to reply, that he who lives the moſt pleaſant life is the moſt bleſſed. After this, I ſhall thus interrogate him: O father, do you not wiſh me to live moſt happily? But you never ceaſe exhorting me to live moſt juſtly. He, therefore, who acts in this manner, whether he is a legiſlator or a father, acts I think abſurdly, and ſpeaks inconſiſtently. But if he ſhould evince that the moſt juſt life is the moſt bleſſed, every one who hears him may, I think, inquire what it is which the law praiſes in that life as good and beautiful, and better than

pleaſure.

pleaſure. For, what good ſeparate from pleaſure can be preſent to the juſt man? Can it be ſaid that renown and praiſe, both from men and Gods, are good and beautiful, but at the ſame time unpleaſant? and that the contrary is true with reſpect to infamy? We ſhall ſay, By no means, O legiſlator. But is neither to do an injury, nor to ſuffer one, unpleaſant indeed, but at the ſame time good, or beautiful? And are other things pleaſant, but ſhameful and baſe?

CLIN. How can they?

GUEST. The reaſon, therefore, which neither ſeparates the pleaſant and the juſt, nor the good and the beautiful, is perſuaſive, if to nothing elſe, yet at leaſt to the wiſh to live a holy and juſt life. So that the diſcourſe of the legiſlator will be moſt ſhameful and diſcordant, if he denies that theſe things are ſo. For no one will voluntarily wiſh to be perſuaded to do that which is not attended with more joy than ſorrow. But that which is beheld afar off affects every one, as I may ſay, and even boys, with a dark vertigo. The legiſlator, therefore, diſperſing the darkneſs, ſhall eſtabliſh for us an opinion the contrary to this; and ſhall perſuade the citizens, by cuſtom, and praiſe, and arguments, that both things juſt and unjuſt are involved in ſhade; and that things unjuſt, which appear contrary to the juſt, being ſurveyed by the unjuſt and depraved man, ſeem to be pleaſant, but things juſt, moſt unpleaſant: but when they are ſurveyed by the juſt man, they appear to be entirely the contrary.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But which of theſe deciſions, ſhall we ſay, is moſt true? Whether is it that of the worſe, or of the better ſoul?

CLIN. Neceſſarily, that of the better ſoul.

GUEST. It is neceſſary, therefore, that an unjuſt life ſhould not only be more baſe and depraved, but, in reality, more unpleaſant, than a juſt and holy life.

CLIN. It appears ſo, my friend, according to the preſent reaſoning.

GUEST. A legiſlator, therefore, who is in the leaſt degree uſeful, though what we have now aſſerted ſhould not ſubſiſt in this manner,—yet, as there is not any thing elſe which can be more advantageous to youth, he will venture to aſſert it, though falſe, for their good; becauſe he will thus be enabled to lead them to act juſtly, not by force, but willingly.

CLIN. Truth, indeed, O gueſt, is beautiful and ſtable: but it does not appear eaſy to perſuade.

GUEST. Be it ſo. But that fable of the Sidonian, though improbable, yet eaſily perſuades, as well as an innumerable multitude of others.

CLIN. What fable?

GUEST. That, teeth being once ſown, armed men were produced from them. For this may ſerve as a great example to a legiſlator, that any one may perſuade the ſouls of young men to whatever he pleaſes. So that he ought, by conſidering, to find out nothing elſe than by what means he may confer, through perſuaſion, the greateſt good on the city; and ſhould, by every poſſible contrivance, diſcover after what manner the whole of ſuch an aſſociation may always ſpeak one and the ſame thing about theſe particulars, through the whole of life, in odes, fables, and diſcourſes. But if it appears to you to be otherwiſe, no diſcord will ariſe from this difference in opinion.

CLIN. It does not appear to me that either of us can doubt about theſe particulars.

GUEST. I will, therefore, continue my diſcourſe. I ſay then, that it is neceſſary to inſinuate, as by enchantment, all the choirs, which are three, into the young and tender ſouls of boys, together with all ſuch other beautiful things as we have ſpoken of, and which yet remain for us to diſcuſs. But the principal thing among them is this: that if the life which is pronounced by the Gods to be the moſt pleaſant, and the beſt, appears to be the ſame with that which we have deſcribed, we ſhall have ſpoken moſt truly, and ſhall more perſuade thoſe whom we ought to perſuade, than if we had aſſerted any thing elſe.

CLIN. What you ſay muſt be granted.

GUEST. In the firſt place, therefore, the puerile choir of Muſes ſhould enter, being about to ſing things of this kind, with all poſſible earneſtneſs to the whole city. In the ſecond place, that choir which conſiſts of men thirty years old ſhall invoke the God Pæan as a witneſs of the truth of what is ſaid, and ſhall beſeech him, together with the divinity Perſuaſion, to be propitious to the youth. But it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a third choir, conſiſting of thoſe who are between thirty and ſixty years old. But the mythologiſts about the ſame odes, who are more advanced in years than theſe,

as they will no longer be able to ſing to the harp, ought agreeably to a divine oracle to be diſmiſſed.

CLIN. Who do you mean, O gueſt, by theſe third choirs? for I do not clearly underſtand what you wiſh to ſay about them.

GUEST. Theſe are nearly thoſe for whoſe ſake moſt of the above aſſertions were made.

CLIN. We do not yet underſtand: endeavour therefore to ſpeak yet clearer.

GUEST. We ſaid, if I remember, in the beginning of this diſcourſe, that the nature of every youth was ſo ardent, that it could not be at reſt either in body or voice, but that it was always ſpeaking and leaping without order; and that no other animal poſſeſſed a ſenſe of the order of both theſe, but that this was alone the province of the nature of man. We likewiſe ſaid, that rhythm was the name given to the order of motion, but harmony to that of the voice, when the ſharp and the flat are mingled together; and that both together are denominated a choir. We ſtill further aſſerted, that the Gods, commiſerating our nature, gave us Apollo and the Muſes as our aſſociates in and leaders of the choir; and Bacchus (if we recollect) as the third.

CLIN. How is it poſſible we ſhould not remember?

GUEST. We have therefore ſpoken concerning the choir of Apollo and the Muſes: and hence it is neceſſary that we ſhould ſpeak reſpecting the third and remaining choir, or that of Bacchus.

CLIN. Inform me how you mean: for a Bacchic choir of old men appears, on the firſt hearing, to be very abſurd; if thoſe who form this choir exceed thirty, ſo as to be from fifty to ſixty years old.

GUEST. You ſpeak moſt truly. But I think reaſon is requiſite, that it may appear how this may be opportunely accompliſhed.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Do we therefore agree in what has been previouſly ſaid?

CLIN. Reſpecting what?

GUEST. That every man and boy, thoſe who are free, and thoſe who are ſlaves, the male and the female, and in ſhort the whole city, ſhould ſing theſe things to the whole city without ceaſing, according to all the varieties

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of harmony, ſo as that thoſe who ſing the hymns may experience an inſatiable pleaſure.

CLIN. How is it poſſible not to acknowledge that theſe things ought to be ſo?

GUEST. But by what means will the beſt part of the city, and which is moſt capable of perſuading by age, in conjunction with prudence, be able, by ſinging the moſt beautiful things, to be the cauſe of the greateſt good? or ſhall we fooliſhly omit that which will be the moſt principal thing in the moſt beautiful and moſt uſeful odes?

CLIN. In conſequence of what has been juſt now ſaid, it is impoſſible to omit it.

GUEST. How then will it be accompliſhed in a becoming manner? Conſider, if in this way.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Every one who is more advanced in age, being full of ſluggiſhneſs with reſpect to odes, will be leſs delighted with theſe; and by how much the older and more modeſt he is, by ſo much the more will he neceſſarily be aſhamed to ſing. Will it not be ſo?

CLIN. It will.

GUEST. He will therefore be ſtill more aſhamed to ſing, ſtanding upright in the theatres, before an all-various multitude of men; eſpecially if the choir, like thoſe that contend for victory when exerciſing their voice, ſhould be compelled to ſing though lean and faſting; for, thus circumſtanced, they will not ſing without moleſtation and ſhame, and, when they do, it will be without alacrity.

CLIN. You ſpeak of things moſt neceſſary.

GUEST. How then ſhall we render them diſpoſed to engage in odes with alacrity? Shall we not ordain by law, in the firſt place, that boys ſhall not by any means taſte wine till they are eighteen years old? For we ought to teach them, that it is not proper to deduce like a river, fire to fire, into the body and ſoul, before they begin to engage in manly labours; but that we ſhould dread the furious habit of youth. In the next place, we ſhould inform them that wine is to be moderately uſed till they are thirty years old, and that young men ſhould by all means avoid intoxication and abundance

of wine. But when they have attained the fortieth year, then they may be allowed to attend feaſts, to invoke the other Gods, and beſeech Bacchus to be preſent at the myſtic ceremonies and ſports of the old men; for this divinity beſtowed wine upon men as a remedy againſt the auſterity of old age, that through this we might acquire a ſecond youth, forget ſorrow, and render the manners of our ſoul ſofter,—juſt as iron is ſoftened by the action of fire. In the firſt place, therefore, will not every one who is thus affected, be willing, with more alacrity and leſs ſhame, not indeed in a great but in a moderate multitude, nor among ſtrangers, but his familiars, to ſing, and, as we have often ſaid, to enchant?

CLIN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. This mode then will not be altogether improper to induce them to join with us in ſinging.

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But with what voice, and with what muſe, will theſe men ſing? or is it not evident that it will be with ſuch a one as is adapted to them?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But which will be adapted to divine men? Will it not be that of choirs?

CLIN. We indeed, O gueſt, and theſe, are not able to ſing any thing elſe than that which we have learnt in the choirs, having been accuſtomed thus to ſing.

GUEST. It is reaſonable it ſhould be ſo. For you have not in reality been partakers of the moſt beautiful finging; and this becauſe your government is rather military than civil. Hence your young men are like a compact multitude of colts feeding together in herds. And no one of your people, taking to himſelf his own offspring, commits him as it were to a groom, that his fierceneſs may be tamed, and that he may be gently and mildly educated, and from whom he may receive every thing proper to the diſcipline of youth; whence he may not only become a good ſoldier, but an able governor of a city, and one who, in the beginning we ſaid, would be more warlike than the ſoldiers of Tyrtæus, and would always and every where, both in private and public, honour the poſſeſſion of fortitude, as ranking in the fourth, and not in the firſt place among the virtues.

CLIN.

CLIN. I do not know, O gueſt of ours, for what reaſon you again degrade our legiſlators.

GUEST. It is not my intention, excellent man, to do ſo, if I do it; but where reaſon leads, there, if you are willing, we will direct our courſe. For if we poſſeſs a muſe more beautiful than that of the choirs, and the common theatres, we will endeavour to impart this to ſuch as we ſaid were aſhamed of that muſe, and endeavoured to participate of one more beautiful.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. In the firſt place, then, it is proper that this ſhould be preſent to all whom a certain grace follows, that either the grace itſelf alone ſhould be the moſt approved, or a certain rectitude, or, in the third place, advantage. Thus, for example, a grace follows food and drink, and every kind of aliment, and this grace we call pleaſure: but if it contributes to health, we denominate it rectitude and utility.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Thus, too, a grace follows diſcipline, which is alſo called pleaſure; and the truth reſulting from diſcipline is denominated rectitude and advantage, the beneficial and the becoming.

CLIN. It is ſo.

GUEST. But what? In the artificial production of ſimilitudes, when pleaſure is the reſult of ſuch productions, may not ſuch pleaſure be moſt juſtly denominated a grace?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But, in ſhort, the equality of ſuch things, rather than pleaſure, renders them ſuch and ſo great.

CLIN. It is well ſaid.

GUEST. Hence that alone can be rightly judged by pleaſure, which neither affords a certain advantage, nor truth, nor ſimilitude; nor yet again is the cauſe of any injury, but which alone ſubſiſts for the ſake of that grace which follows other things, and which may be moſt beautifully denominated pleaſure, when none of theſe attend it.

CLIN. Do you alone ſpeak of innoxious pleaſure?

GUEST. I do; I ſay that this is ſport, when it is neither the cauſe of any thing detrimental or advantageous, which deſerves ſerious conſideration.

CLIN.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. Shall we not then aſſert, from what has been now ſaid, that it is fit all imitations ſhould be judged in the leaſt degree by pleaſure and falſe opinion, and in like manner, all equality? For it does not follow, that becauſe *this* thing appears to ſome one to be equal, or ſome one is delighted with *that*, that therefore *this* thing is equal, or *that* poſſeſſes ſymmetry; but it is ſo from truth, the moſt of all things.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do we not therefore ſay, that all muſic is aſſimilative and imitative?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. In the ſmalleſt degree, therefore, when any one ſays that muſic is to be judged by pleaſure, is ſuch an aſſertion to be admitted, and in the ſmalleſt degree is ſuch a muſic to be inquired after as a ſerious thing, if it is any where to be found; but that muſic alone is to be explored which poſſeſſes ſimilitude by its imitation of the beautiful.

CLIN. Moſt true.

GUEST. Thoſe, therefore, that inquire after the moſt beautiful ſinging, and the moſt beautiful muſe, ought, as it appears, to explore not that which is pleaſant in each of theſe, but that which is right. For the rectitude of imitation, as we have ſaid, conſiſts in expreſſing the magnitude and quality of that which it repreſents, ſuch as they are.

CLIN. How ſhould it not be ſo?

GUEST. But every one will acknowledge this with reſpect to muſic, that all poems are an aſſimilation and imitation of it. Or, do you think that all poets, auditors, and players, will not aſſent to this?

CLIN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But it is proper, as it appears, to know reſpecting every poem, what kind of a thing it is, if any one wiſhes not to err in deciding upon it. For he who does not know what the eſſence of it means, nor of what it is the image, will never underſtand the rectitude or erroneouſneſs of its intention.

CLIN. It is impoſſible he ſhould.

GUEST. But can he who does not know the rectitude of a performance ever be able to know whether it is well or ill accompliſhed? I do not indeed

ſpeak in a manner perfectly clear; but, perhaps, I ſhall thus ſpeak with more perſpicuity.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. There are ten thouſand ſimilitudes which have reference to the ſight.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. What then? If any one is ignorant what each of the imitated bodies is, can he ever know whether it is properlyre preſented? as, for inſtance, whether the repreſentation poſſeſſes the joints and reſpective members of the body, their poſitions, number, and quality, ſuch as they ought to be, and beſides all theſe, the proper colours and figures; or, on the contrary, whether all theſe are exhibited in a diſordered manner. Do you think that any one can at all know theſe particulars who is unacquainted with the animal which is imitated?

CLIN. How ſhould he?

GUEST. But if any one knows that it is a man who is painted, or otherwiſe repreſented, and that he has received all his parts, colours and figures, from art, would it be neceſſary that he who knows this ſhould likewiſe readily know whether the repreſentation is beautiful, or whether it is in any reſpect defective in beauty?

CLIN. We ſhould all of us, O gueſt, as I may ſay, know the beautiful parts of animals.

GUEST. You ſpeak with perfect propriety. Is it not therefore neceſſary, that a prudent judge ſhould poſſeſs theſe three things about every image, both in painting and muſic? In the firſt place, that he ſhould know what the thing is; in the ſecond place, that it poſſeſſes rectitude; and, in the third place, that the image is properly executed in words, melodies, and rhythms?

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. We ſhould not, therefore, omit to ſpeak concerning the difficulty which is in muſic. For, ſince it is more celebrated than other images, it requires more caution than the reſt. For he who errs in this will be injured in the greateſt degree, ſince he will thus conciliate to himſelf depraved manners. But it is moſt difficult to be known, becauſe poets are more depraved than the Muſes. For theſe are incapable of erring to ſo great a degree as,

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in faſhioning the words of men, to give the figure and melody of women; or, in compoſing the melody and figures of thoſe who are free, to harmonize together the rhythms of ſlaves and the free-born; or, in exhibiting rhythms and liberal figures, to aſſign a melody or diſcourſe contrary to the rhythms. Beſides this, they will never place together the voices of beaſts, and men, and inſtruments, and every kind of noiſe, as imitating one certain thing. But human poets combine things of this kind together in the greateſt degree, and irrationally mingle them with each other, exciting ſuch men by theſe means to laugh, who, as Orpheus ſays, "are allotted the elegance of delight." For they perceive all theſe particulars mingled together: and, beſides this, the poets dilacerate rhythm and figures ſeparate from melody, arranging naked words in meaſure; producing melody and rhythm without words; and employing the naked ſound of the harp and the pipe. Among which particulars, it is very difficult to know the intention of the rhythm and harmony which ſubſiſt without words, and to which of the imitations deſerving to be mentioned they are ſimilar. But it is neceſſary to conſider every thing of this kind as replete with ruſticity; as immoderately loving ſwiftneſs without falling, and the voice of wild beaſts, and on this account uſing the melody of the harp and the pipe for other purpoſes than dancing and ſinging. But to uſe either of theſe inſtruments unaccompanied with words, is full of all unſkilfulneſs and legerdemain. But the reaſon of this is as follows: We do not conſider that we ought not to employ our Muſes when we are fifty, or thirty, years old, but we ought to find out when it is proper. Our diſcourſe, however, appears to me, from what has been ſaid, to ſignify thus much concerning the muſe belonging to choirs, that it is neceſſary thoſe who are fifty years old ſhould be better inſtructed than others in the particulars belonging to ſinging. For they muſt neceſſarily poſſeſs a proper ſenſation and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. Or how can they know the rectitude of melodies; to what the Doric harmony is proper or improper; and whether the rhythm which the poet has united to it is right, or not?

CLIN. It is evident that they cannot by any means.

GUEST. But the numerous vulgar are ridiculous in thinking that they ſufficiently know what is well harmonized, and poſſeſſes proper rhythm, and

what is not ſo: for theſe have been *compelled* to ſing and walk in rhythm. But in conſequence of doing each of theſe ignorantly, they would not ſyllogize as follows: Every melody, when it poſſeſſes things which accord, ſubſiſts in a proper manner; but when it does not poſſeſs things which accord, it is defective.

CLIN. Moſt neceſſarily ſo.

GUEST. What then? Can he who does not underſtand what it poſſeſſes, and what its definition is, know, as we have ſaid, how it properly ſubſiſts at any time in any one?

CLIN. How is it poſſible he ſhould?

GUEST. This then, as it appears, we have now diſcovered, that thoſe ſingers which we have now called upon, and have after a manner compelled to ſing voluntarily, ought from neceſſity to be diſciplined thus far, as to be able each of them to follow the progreſſions of the rhythms, and the chords of the melodies, that, perceiving the harmonies and the rhythms, they may chooſe ſuch as are fit to be ſung by ſo many, and by ſuch particular perſons; and, thus ſinging, may themſelves immediately be innocently delighted, and thus induce young men to embrace worthy manners. But, being thus far inſtructed, they will participate of a more accurate diſcipline than that which is directed to the multitude, and to poets themſelves. For, in the third place, it is by no means neceſſary that a poet ſhould know whether the imitation is beautiful or not; but it is nearly neceſſary that he ſhould know this of harmony and rhythm. But all the three ought to be known for the ſake of chooſing the moſt beautiful, and the ſecond; for otherwiſe, they will never become a ſufficient enchantment to youth to the acquiſition of virtue. And thus, that which our diſcourſe intended in the beginning, viz. that it might afford proper aſſiſtance to the choir of Bacchus, has been accompliſhed by us to the utmoſt of our ability. But let us conſider whether this ſhould be accompliſhed in this manner. For ſuch an aſſembly muſt neceſſarily be tumultuous, in conſequence of the compotation proceeding to a greater degree, which we ſuppoſed in the beginning of our diſcourſe muſt neceſſarily happen to drinking aſſociations of the preſent day.

CLIN. It is neceſſary it ſhould.

GUEST. But every one becoming lighter than himſelf will be elevated

and delighted; will be filled with freedom of ſpeech; and in this condition will not hear him who is near him, but will conſider himſelf ſufficient both to govern himſelf and others.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Have we not ſaid, that, when theſe things take place, the ſouls of the drinkers, being rendered fervid, will become more ſoft and juvenile, like iron heated in the fire? ſo that they may be eaſily led, as when they were young, by thoſe who are able and know how to inſtruct and faſhion them: but that he who is able to faſhion them is the ſame as he who was then ſaid to be a good legiſlator, by whoſe laws reſpecting compotation he may be reſtrained who is confident and audacious, and more impudent than is proper, and who is unwilling to endure order with reſpect to ſilence, diſcourſe, drinking, and the muſe; and may be willing to act in a contrary manner in every reſpect; ſending out againſt advancing and baſe confidence, the moſt beautiful oppoſing fear, in conjunction with juſtice; which divine fear we have denominated ſhame and modeſty.

CLIN. It is ſo.

GUEST. But the guardians and fabricators of theſe laws ought, as leaders of thoſe that are not ſober, to be themſelves free from perturbation and ebriety; without which it is more difficult to fight againſt intoxication than to contend with enemies without unterrified leaders. But he who is unwilling to be perſuaded by theſe, and by the leaders of Bacchus who are more than ſixty years old, ſuſtains an equal, and indeed a greater diſgrace than he who is unperſuaded by the leaders of Mars.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. If ſuch ebriety and ſuch ſport were adopted, would not ſuch drinking aſſociates derive great utility from thence, and be more conjoined in friendſhip than before, and not be enemies as at preſent? Would not likewiſe the whole of their aſſociation be according to law, in conſequence of the ſober being the leaders of the intoxicated?

CLIN. Certainly, if the ebriety was conducted in the manner you now ſpeak of.

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to blame the gift of Bacchus ſimply, as if it were evil, and not worthy to be received into the city. For much more might yet be ſaid to this purpoſe; though I ſhould be fearful to diſ-

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cloſe to the multitude the greateſt good which this divinity imparts, becauſe men when they hear it will not receive and underſtand it as they ought.

CLIN. What is that good?

GUEST. A certain narration and rumour has devolved to us, that this God was once diſordered in his mind by his mother Juno, and that on this account he introduced the Bacchic rites, and the whole of the inſane choir, that he might take vengeance on the Goddeſs. It is further reported, that for this purpoſe he beſtowed wine upon mankind. But I leave things of this kind to be ſaid by thoſe who think that they can aſſert them with ſafety reſpecting the Gods. Thus much, however, I know, that no animal is born with ſuch, and ſo much, intelligence as is proper to it, when it acquires a perfection of intellect. But every animal, during the time in which it has not yet obtained its proper prudence, rages and vociferates in a diſordered manner; and when any one ſlays it rapidly, it again leaps without order [1]. But we may recollect that we ſaid theſe were the principles of muſic and gymnaſtic.

CLIN. We do recollect.

GUEST. Did we not alſo ſay, that this principle imparted to us the ſenſe of rhythm and harmony? and that Apollo, the Muſes, and Bacchus, were the cauſes of theſe?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But wine, according to the aſſertions of ſome, was given to men as a puniſhment, that they might be rendered, through it, inſane. Agreeably, however, to what has now been aſſerted by us, it is on the contrary a medicine; and was imparted that the ſoul might acquire ſhame, but the body health and ſtrength.

CLIN. You have very beautifully, O gueſt, reminded us of what has been ſaid.

GUEST. But now the half of the particulars pertaining to the choir is complete. Shall we finiſh or omit the remaining part?

CLIN. What parts do you ſpeak of; and how do you divide each of them?

GUEST. According to us, the whole of the choir is the whole of diſcipline. But, of this, one part conſiſts in vocal rhythms and harmonies.

[1] Viz. in another life: for the ſoul carries with it into another the habits and manners which it poſſeſſed in the preſent life.

CLIN.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But the other in the motion of the body, which has rhythm in common with the motion of the voice, but figure peculiar to itſelf: but, in the former part, melody is the motion of the voice.

CLIN. Moſt true.

GUEST. I know not, therefore, after what manner we have denominated things pertaining to the voice, which extend as far as to the ſoul, and contribute to the diſcipline of virtue, muſic.

CLIN. They were rightly called ſo.

GUEST. But things pertaining to the body, which we have called dancing in ſport, if ſuch a motion ſhould extend as far as to the virtue of the body, we ſhould denominate the artificial leading of it to this purpoſe, gymnaſtic.

CLIN. Moſt right.

GUEST. But we appear to have ſpoken ſufficiently of that part of muſic, which we have ſaid is the half of the choir. Shall we, therefore, ſpeak of the remaining half, or how ſhall we do?

CLIN. O moſt excellent man, who art diſcourſing with Cretans and Lacedæmonians, as you have ſpoken ſufficiently about muſic, but gymnaſtic remains yet to be diſcuſſed, what do you think each of us ought to reply to your interrogation?

GUEST. I ſhall ſay that you have perſpicuouſly anſwered by your queſtion. For I underſtand that your preſent interrogation is, as I have ſaid, an anſwer, and, beſides this, a mandate to diſcuſs the particulars about gymnaſtic.

CLIN. You apprehend my meaning excellently well; and therefore diſcuſs theſe particulars.

GUEST. We ſhall do ſo: for it is not very difficult to ſpeak about things known to both of you. And beſides, you are far more ſkilled in this art than in that of muſic.

CLIN. You nearly ſpeak the truth.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, the principle of this ſport, every animal being naturally accuſtomed to leap? But man, as we have ſaid, receiving a ſenſe of rhythm, generated and brought forth dancing. And melody, recalling to mind, and exciting rhythm, theſe two, communicating with each other, brought forth the choir and ſport.

CLIN. Moſt true.

GUEST. One part of this we have ſaid we have already diſcuſſed, and that we ſhould in the next place endeavour to diſcuſs the remaining part.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We will, therefore, firſt of all bring to a concluſion the choir of intoxication, if it is agreeable to you.

CLIN. Of what are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. If any city ſhould uſe drinking aſſociations as a ſerious concern, with law and order, and as an exerciſe to the acquiſition of temperance, and ſhould not at the ſame time avoid other pleaſures, but in a ſimilar manner ſhould engage in them for the ſake of ſubduing them, after this manner it may be allowed to uſe all theſe. But if it uſes drinking aſſociations as ſport, and gives permiſſion to any one to drink when he pleaſes, and with whom he pleaſes, and to engage in any other purſuit without reſtraint, I ſhould not be of this opinion, that this city, or any individual in it, ought, at any time, to make uſe of intoxication. But I ſhould much prefer the law of the Carthaginians to the cuſtom of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians. For their law forbids any one belonging to the camp to taſte of wine, but orders water to be drunk during all this period. I likewiſe would not permit it to be drunk in the city by either male or female ſlaves; nor by magiſtrates during the year of their office; nor by pilots, nor judges, when engaged in their reſpective employments; nor, in ſhort, by any one when deliberating about things of importance. Again, I would not permit it to be drunk by any one in the day-time, unleſs for the ſake of bodily exerciſe or diſeaſe; nor by a man and woman at night, when they intend to beget children. And many other circumſtances might be adduced, in which thoſe who poſſeſs a ſound mind, and conform to good laws, will abſtain from wine. So that, according to this reaſoning, no city has occaſion for a multitude of vineyards. But other concerns of agriculture, and every thing reſpecting diet, ſhould be orderly diſpoſed: and wine ſhould be nearly uſed in the moſt moderate and leaſt degree of all things. And this, if it is agreeable to you, O gueſts, ſhall be the concluſion of my diſcourſe reſpecting wine.

CLIN. Beautifully ſaid: and it is agreeable to us it ſhould be ſo.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK III.

AND thus much concerning theſe particulars. But ſhall we ſay that civil government had a certain beginning? And may not any one behold it hence with eaſe, and in the moſt beautiful manner?

CLIN. Whence?

GUEST. Whence any one may behold the progreſs of cities to virtue, and at the ſame time to vice.

CLIN. Whence do you ſay?

GUEST. I think, indeed, from a length and infinity of time, and from the mutations in it.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Do you appear to have ever underſtood what a multitude of time has elapſed ſince cities and the politic inſtitutions of men commenced?

CLIN. This is by no means eaſy to underſtand.

GUEST. It is indeed infinite [1], and impoſſible to be expreſſed.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Will not myriads upon myriads of cities have ſubſiſted in this time? and, in conſequence of the ſame temporal infinity, have not as many been deſtroyed? and will they not every where have been governed according to every kind of polity; and at one time paſs from the leſſer to the greater, and at another from the greater to the leſſer; and have become worſe from the better, and better from the worſe?

CLIN. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. Let us therefore aſſign, if we are able, the cauſe of this muta-

[1] From hence it is evident that they are not genuine Platoniſts, who contend that according to Plato the world had a beginning. See the Timæus.

tion: for perhaps it may exhibit to us the firſt generation and mutation of polities.

CLIN. You ſpeak well. It is therefore neceſſary that you ſhould readily unfold what you conceive to be the truth concerning them, and that we ſhould at the ſame time follow you.

GUEST. Do antient diſcourſes then appear to you to poſſeſs any truth?

CLIN. Of what kind?

GUEST. That there have been many deſtructions of the human race, through deluges, diſeaſes, and many other things, in which a very ſmall part of mankind was left.

CLIN. Every thing of this kind muſt be very probable to every one.

GUEST. Let us then conſider one of theſe deſtructions out of many,—I mean that which was cauſed by a deluge.

CLIN. What ought we to think about this?

GUEST. That thoſe who then eſcaped the deſtruction were nearly mountain ſhepherds, a few dormant ſparks of the human race, preſerved on the ſummits of mountains.

CLIN. Evidently ſo.

GUEST. But ſuch as theſe muſt neceſſarily have been ignorant of other arts, and of thoſe artifices in cities of men towards each other, with a view to prerogative and contention, and other baſe ends.

CLIN. It is likely.

GUEST. But we ſhall alſo ſuppoſe that the cities which were ſituated in plains, and thoſe bordering on the ſea, entirely periſhed at that time.

CLIN. We will ſuppoſe ſo.

GUEST. We muſt aſſert, therefore, that all inſtruments were deſtroyed at that time, together with every invention pertaining to art, politic diſcipline, or any other certain wiſdom.

CLIN. For how, O moſt excellent man, if theſe particulars remained through the whole of time in the ſame perfection as at preſent, could any thing new have ever been invented? It is becauſe an innumerable multitude of years was unknown to the inventors. But one or two thouſand years have elapſed ſince ſome things were invented by Dædalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes. The particulars indeed reſpecting muſic were diſcovered by Marſyas and Olympus; but thoſe relating to the lyre by Amphion.

And

And a multitude of other things were, as I may ſay, invented by others but yeſterday.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, O Clinias, that you have omitted to mention the friend who was yeſterday preſent?

CLIN. Do you mean Epimenides?

GUEST. I do. For he far excelled all among you in inventions; and, as you ſay, brought to perfection in reality what Heſiod had formerly divined in his writings.

CLIN. We do ſay ſo.

GUEST. We muſt aſſert, therefore, that when that devaſtation by a deluge took place, human affairs were in a ſtate of infinite and dreadful ſolitude; that a prodigious part of the earth was unprolific; and other animals having periſhed, ſome herds of oxen, and a few goats, which were rarely found, ſupplied thoſe men with food that eſcaped the devaſtation.

CLIN. Doubtleſs.

GUEST. But are we of opinion that there was then any memory of a city, politic diſcipline, and legiſlation, which is the ſubject of our preſent diſcourſe?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. From theſe people, therefore, thus circumſtanced, all the particulars which exiſt at preſent derived their ſubſiſtence; viz. cities and polities, arts and laws, many vices and many virtues.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Can we be of opinion, O wonderful man, that as thoſe who then exiſted were ignorant of many beautiful things pertaining to citizens, and many of a contrary nature, they could ever become perfect either in virtue or vice?

CLIN. You ſpeak well; and I underſtand what you ſay.

GUEST. In conſequence, therefore, of the progreſſion of time, and the increaſe of the human race, all things advanced to the condition of all things at preſent.

CLIN. Moſt right.

GUEST. But this was probably not effected ſuddenly, and in a ſhort, but in a very extended period of time.

CLIN. It is very proper it ſhould be ſo.

GUEST. For I think that fear would prevent all the inhabitants from deſcending from their elevated abodes to the plains.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Would not likewiſe thoſe who lived at that time be delighted in beholding each other, on account of their paucity? And would they not have nearly loſt, as I may ſay, all the artificial means of paſſing over to each other, either by land or ſea? I do not therefore think it would be very poſſible for them to mingle with each other. For iron and braſs and all metals would have periſhed, confuſed together; ſo that it would be impoſſible to ſeparate and bring them into light. Hence trees would be but rarely cut down. For, if any inſtrument ſhould happen to be left on the mountains, theſe rapidly wearing away would vaniſh; and no other could be made, till the metallic art ſhould again be diſcovered by men.

CLIN. How indeed could it?

GUEST. But in how many generations afterwards do we think this would take place?

CLIN. It is evident, in a great many.

GUEST. The arts therefore which are employed about iron and braſs, and all ſuch things, muſt at the ſame time be involved in darkneſs, and indeed in a ſtill greater degree.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Sedition, therefore, together with war, muſt at that time be every where extirpated.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. In the firſt place, they will be benevolent towards and love each other, on account of their ſolitude. In the next place, food will not be the cauſe of war to them: for paſtures will be rare; a few only perhaps remaining from the firſt, in which the inhabitants of that time will for the moſt part live. For they will not by any means be in want of milk and animal food. Further ſtill, hunting will ſupply them with food, neither of a bad kind nor in a ſmall quantity. They will likewiſe poſſeſs abundance of clothing, beds and habitations, together with apparatus pertaining to fire, and ſuch as has no occaſion for fire. The plaſtic too and weaving arts will not be indigent of iron. But divinity imparted all theſe together with theſe arts to men, that, if at any time they ſhould fall into ſo great a calamity,

mity, they might be able to propagate the human race. On this account, at that time they were not very poor, nor were they compelled by poverty to quarrel with each other. But neither could they ever become rich, becauſe they were without ſilver and gold. But in any aſſociation where neither riches nor poverty take up their abode, in this the moſt juſt manners will nearly be found. For neither inſolence nor injuſtice, neither emulation nor envy, can ſubſiſt in ſuch a ſociety. From theſe cauſes, and through their innocence which we have ſpoken of, they were good. For, whenever they heard that any thing was beautiful or baſe, they thought, in conſequence of their innocence, that it was moſt truly ſaid to be ſo, and were perſuaded. For no one was ſuſpected of lying, through his wiſdom, as is the caſe at preſent; but, believing all that was aſſerted about Gods and men to be true, they lived conformably to what they heard; on which account they were altogether ſuch as we a little before repreſented them to be.

CLIN. Theſe things appear both to me and this other to be ſo.

GUEST. We ſay moreover, that many generations living in this manner, both of thoſe prior to the deluge and of thoſe at preſent, they muſt be leſs ſkilful and leſs learned both in warlike and other arts, which at preſent are exerciſed by land and ſea; likewiſe in judicial affairs and ſeditions, which men have deviſed both in words and works, with every poſſible ſubtilty of contrivance, in order to injure and act unjuſtly towards each other. That beſides this they muſt be more innocent, brave, and at the ſame time modeſt, and in every reſpect more juſt. But of theſe things we have already aſſigned the cauſe.

CLIN. You ſpeak with rectitude.

GUEST. Theſe things, therefore, have been aſſerted by us; and we ſhall ſpeak of every thing conſequent to theſe particulars, for the ſake of underſtanding what occaſion they had at that time for laws, and who was their legiſlator.

CLIN. You have ſpoken well.

GUEST. Were they, therefore, neither indigent of laws, nor was any ſuch thing adopted at that time? For men of that period were unacquainted with letters, but lived following the manners and laws, as they were called, of their anceſtors.

CLIN. It is probable.

GUEST. But the manner of their polity was this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. All of that period appear to me to have called a polity, a dynaſty, which even at preſent ſubſiſts in many places, both among the Greeks and Barbarians. And Homer ſays that it was adopted in the habitation of the Cyclops; for he thus ſpeaks:

> "By theſe no ſtatutes and no rights are known,
> No council held, no monarch fills the throne;
> But high on hills or airy cliffs they dwell,
> Or deep in caves whoſe entrance leads to hell.
> Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care,
> Heedleſs of others, to his own ſevere[1]."

CLIN. Homer appears to you to have been an elegant poet. We have alſo met with other pieces, though not many, of his compoſing, extremely elegant. For we Cretans do not very much make uſe of foreign poems.

MEGIL. We however do make uſe of them. And Homer appears to me to excell poets of this kind, though he does not deſcribe a Laconic, but rather throughout his poems an Ionic life. At preſent, indeed, he appears to give a good teſtimony to your diſcourſe, mythologically referring the antient condition of mankind to ruſticity.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. For he teſtifies the truth of our aſſertion: and we ſhall therefore admit him as one who indicates that polities of this kind once ſubſiſted.

CLIN. It is well ſaid.

GUEST. Were not polities of this kind formed from families and kindred diſperſed through the want ariſing from theſe devaſtations,—polities, in which the oldeſt perſon rules over the reſt, on account of their origin being derived from father and mother; and who following theſe like birds produce one herd, are obedient to paternal mandates, and are governed in a kingdom, the moſt juſt of all?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But after this, more of them collecting together into one body, they will form larger cities: and firſt of all betaking themſelves to agri-

[1] Odyſſ. lib. ix.

culture,

culture, at the roots of mountains they will make certain enclosures from hedges, as defensive walls against the attacks of wild beasts, and thus produce one common and mighty habitation.

CLIN. It is probable that this would be the case.

GUEST. But is not this also probable?

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That since these more increased habitations are composed from such as are lesser and first, each of the small ones should be present, having at the same time its most antient governor, according to alliance, together with its own proper manners; and this on account of their living separate from each other, and having had different parents and preceptors, by whom they have been accustomed to reverence the Gods, and attend to themselves, the more modest by the more modest, the braver by the more brave, and so in all the rest, according as each has fashioned their sons and grandsons, who, as we have said, will bring with them to this greater habitation the peculiar laws under which they have lived.

CLIN. How is it possible this should not be probable?

GUEST. It is likewise necessary that every one should be pleased with his own laws in the first place, and with those of others in the second place.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But we appear to be ignorant that we are entering as it were on the beginning of legislation.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. After these things, therefore, it is necessary that those who thus assemble together should choose among themselves in common some who know the legal institutions of all of them, and that they should openly show such of these as they most approve of, to the common rulers and guides of the people, as to kings, who themselves approving these institutions will be called legislators. But, having appointed their rulers, they will form in this mutation of their polity a certain aristocracy, composed from dynasties, or a certain kingdom.

CLIN. This will doubtless afterwards be the case.

GUEST. In the next place, therefore, let us speak of a third form of polity, in which all the forms and passions of polities, and at the same time of cities, happen to be found.

CLIN.

CLIN. Of what kind is this? That which Homer ſignifies, aſſerting that the third was thus produced after the ſecond:

> " Dardania's walls he rais'd; for Ilion then
> (The city ſince of many-languag'd men)
> Was not. The natives were content to till
> The ſhady foot of Ida's fount-full hill [1]."

Theſe verſes, and thoſe above, about the Cyclops, are in a certain reſpect divinely written, and are conformable to nature. For the poetic genus is divine, being agitated with ſacred fury, celebrating many things which have happened according to truth, and handling each of them with certain graces and muſes.

CLIN. And this very much ſo.

GUEST. We will therefore now proceed to conſider the preceding fable: for, perhaps, ſomething of our intention may be ſignified by it. Will it not be proper to do ſo?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We ſay then that Troy was built from elevated places, in a large and beautiful plain, upon a hill not very lofty, and having many rivers which ruſh from mount Ida.

CLIN. So it is ſaid.

GUEST. Muſt not we think that this happened a long time after the deluge?

CLIN. How could it be otherwiſe?

GUEST. A dreadful oblivion, therefore, of the devaſtation we are now ſpeaking of, muſt, as it appears, have been then preſent with them, as they thus built their city under many rivers, and which deſcended from lofty places, and were not afraid to truſt themſelves to hills of no great altitude.

CLIN. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that they exiſted a long time after this devaſtation.

GUEST. And I am of opinion that many other cities were at that time inhabited, in conſequence of the increaſe of mankind.

CLIN. Certainly.

[1] Il. xx. ver. 216.

GUEST.

GUEST. And theſe indeed fought againſt Troy; and perhaps by ſea, all of them now intrepidly uſing that element.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But the Achaians, who warred on Troy, ſubverted it in the tenth year.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. In this time, therefore, or the ſpace of ten years, in which Troy was beſieged, many evils happened to the beſiegers through the ſeditions of the young men, who received the commanders, when returning to their cities and houſes, neither in a becoming nor juſt manner, but ſo that many were ſlain, and many were exiled. Thoſe that were exiled, however, returned, changing their names, and being called Doriens inſtead of Achaians, through one Dorieus, who at that time collected together the exiles. And hence you Lacedæmonians mythologize about, and thoroughly diſcuſs, all theſe particulars.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. Hence, as, while diſcourſing about laws in the beginning of this converſation, we made a digreſſion to muſic and intoxication, ſo now we are led to the ſame thing as it were by divinity; and our diſcourſe preſents us as it were with a handle for this purpoſe. For it has brought us to that politic diſcipline which you ſaid was properly inſtituted both in Lacedæmon and Crete, as by fraternal laws. But now we obtain this prerogative from the wandering of our diſcourſe, that, while we paſs through certain polities and habitations, we behold a firſt, ſecond, and third city, following each other, according to our opinion, in immenſe extenſions of a certain time. But now this fourth city, or if you pleaſe nation, preſents itſelf to us, which was once inhabited, and is ſo at preſent; from all which, if we are able to underſtand what is beautiful or the contrary, reſpecting its being inhabited, and what laws of the inhabitants preſerve what is preſerved, or corrupt what is corrupted among them, and what change of political inſtitutions renders the city happy, we ſhall think, O Megillus and Clinias, that we have done enough. But all theſe particulars muſt be diſcuſſed by us from the beginning, unleſs we call to account what has been ſaid.

MEGIL. If, O gueſt, any God will promiſe us that, if we enter a ſecond time on the buſineſs of legiſlation, we ſhall hear neither worſe nor fewer

things than what have now been ſaid, I would make a long journey, and the preſent day would appear to me to be ſhort, though the God is now turning from the ſummer to the winter ſolſtice.

GUEST. It is proper, as it appears, to conſider theſe things.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Let us then be preſent in thought at that time when Lacedæmon, and Argos, and Meſſene, and the cities which were in alliance with them, were, O Megillus, in ſubjection to your anceſtors. For then, as it is ſaid in the fable, they thought proper, having triply divided their army, to inhabit three cities, Argos, Meſſene, and Lacedæmon.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And Temenus, indeed, was made king of Argos, but Creſphontes of Meſſene, and Euryſthenes in conjunction with Patrocles of Lacedæmon.

CLIN. They were ſo.

GUEST. But all theſe took an oath that they would give aſſiſtance, if any one ſhould deſtroy any of theſe dominions.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But inform me, by Jupiter, whether their kingdom or government was ever deſtroyed by any one; or whether it was not ſubverted by others, but by themſelves? or ſhall we ſay, that a little before, when we entered on this diſcourſe, we thought it was ſo, but have now forgotten it?

MEGIL. By no means.

GUEST. Now, therefore, we ſhall be more able to eſtabliſh a thing of this kind; for we are led to the ſame concluſion, as it appears, by the hiſtory of paſt tranſactions; ſo that we do not purſue in our diſcourſe any vain thing, but that which has happened and is true. But the following particulars have taken place: Three kingdoms, and three cities, having a kingly government, mutually ſwore, reſpecting the laws which they had eſtabliſhed about governing and being governed, that kings ſhould not reign by violence as time and race continued to advance, and that the people, while the kings obſerved their oath, ſhould not at any time deſtroy the kingdoms, nor endeavour that they might be ſubverted by others; but that kings ſhould defend both kings and the people when injured, and the people, both kings and the people. Was it not ſo?

MEGIL. It was.

GUEST. That therefore which is of the greateſt importance in the eſtabliſhments of polities was preſent with the legiſlators in theſe three cities, whether the kings themſelves gave laws, or any other perſons.

MEGIL. What was this?

GUEST. That two cities ſhould always riſe up againſt one which would not be perſuaded to obey the eſtabliſhed laws.

MEGIL. It is evident.

GUEST. This alſo many adviſe legiſlators, that they ſhould eſtabliſh ſuch laws as the people and the multitude will willingly admit; which is juſt as if ſome one ſhould adviſe the maſters of gymnaſtic exerciſes, or phyſicians, to take care of and cure the bodies under their direction in an agreeable manner.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It is, however, often a deſirable circumſtance, when with no great degree of pain any one is able to procure for bodies a good habit and health.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. This alſo was at that time preſent with them, and contributed in no ſmall degree to the facility of eſtabliſhing laws.

MEGIL. What was that?

GUEST. The legiſlators had not to procure an equality of poſſeſſions, which cauſes the greateſt of all accuſations, and which takes place in other cities eſtabliſhed by laws, when any one endeavours to diſturb the poſſeſſion of land, or to diſſolve what is due; perceiving that equality can never ſufficiently ſubſiſt unleſs theſe things take place. For againſt him who endeavours to diſturb every thing of this kind, all men exclaim, that he muſt not move things which are immoveable. Imprecations likewiſe are uttered againſt him who introduces diviſions of land, and the cancelling of debts; ſo that every man is involved in difficulty on this account. This, however, was not the caſe with the Doriens. For land was diſtributed to them, without envy or controverſy; and they had no large and antient debts.

MEGIL. True.

GUEST. How therefore came it to paſs, O moſt excellent men, that their ſettlement in houſes and legiſlation came to be ſo bad?

MEGIL. How do you mean? and of what is it you accuſe them?

GUEST. That three houſe-eſtabliſhments taking place, two of them ſwiftly corrupted the polity and the laws, and one alone, which was your city, remained.

MEGIL. You aſk a queſtion which it is not very eaſy to anſwer.

GUEST. But it is proper that, conſidering and exploring this at preſent, concerning laws, with aged and prudent ſport, we ſhould accompliſh the journey we have undertaken without moleſtation.

MEGIL. We ought certainly to do as you ſay.

GUEST. Can we therefore ſpeculate concerning laws in a more beautiful manner, than by conſidering the laws which adorned cities of this kind? or can we think of any cities and habitations more illuſtrious and larger than theſe?

MEGIL. It is not eaſy to ſpeak of others that are preferable to theſe.

GUEST. It is nearly evident, therefore, that, thus prepared, they would not only be able ſufficiently to defend Peloponneſus, but all Greece, if it ſhould be injured by any of the Barbarians; in the ſame manner as thoſe that dwelt about Ilion, who, truſting to the power of the Aſſyrians deſcended from Ninus, dared to excite war againſt Troy. For the form of that government, which was ſtill preſerved, was by no means deſpicable. And as we at preſent fear a mighty king [1], in like manner all at that time feared that collected coordination of people. For the deſtruction of Troy a ſecond time raiſed a great accuſation againſt them; becauſe the Trojan power was a portion of the Aſſyrian government. Againſt all theſe, therefore, the army at that time was divided into three cities, under the brother kings, the offspring of Hercules, and appeared to be beautifully regulated, and far more ſo than that which came againſt Troy. For, in the firſt place, they were of opinion that the commanders who deſcended from Hercules were better than thoſe that derived their origin from Pelops; and in the next place, that this army far ſurpaſſed in virtue that which came againſt Troy. For theſe conquered, but thoſe were vanquiſhed by

[1] Viz. the king of Perſia, who, as is well known, was uſually called *the great king*.

theſe,

theſe, the Achaians by the Doriens. Ought we not thus to think, and that at that time they prepared themſelves for battle with this intention?

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It is probable, therefore, that they would conſider this their conſtitution to be firmly eſtabliſhed, and that it would endure for a long time, in conſequence of their mutually undergoing many dangers and labours, and being under the orderly government of one race, their kings being brothers. And beſides this, it is further probable that they uſed many prophets, and among theſe the Delphic Apollo.

MEGIL. It is highly probable.

GUEST. But theſe particulars, which appear to be thus great, glided away, as it ſeems, at that time rapidly, except, as we juſt now ſaid, a ſmall part ſituated about the place of your abode; and this part has not ever ceaſed warring on the two other parts even to the preſent day. For, if the ſeveral parts of the conſtitution at that time had unanimouſly conſpired to one end, they would have poſſeſſed an irreſiſtible power in war.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. How, therefore, and on what account, was it diſſolved? Does it not deſerve to be conſidered what fortune ſubverted a conſtitution ſo great, and of ſuch a kind?

MEGIL. Indeed, he who conſiders any thing elſe will not be able to underſtand either other laws or polities, which preſerve beautiful and great concerns, or on the contrary deſtroy them, if he neglects theſe things.

GUEST. It ſeems, therefore, that we have been fortunately led to this conſideration, which is ſo well adapted to our purpoſe.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, all men ignorant, and at preſent we ourſelves, while each of us thinks that he beholds a certain beautiful thing, and which will produce admirable effects, when any one is not ignorant how it ſhould be properly uſed? But we ourſelves, perhaps, neither think rightly about this, nor according to nature. And ſhall we not ſay, that all men err reſpecting all other things about which they think in a ſimilar manner?

MEGIL. How do you ſay? And about what eſpecially are you now ſpeaking?

GUEST. O, good man, I now laugh at myſelf. For, looking to that army about

about which we have been ſpeaking, it appeared to me to be very beautiful, and that a wonderful poſſeſſion would fall to the lot of the Greeks, as I have ſaid, if any one ſhould at that time have uſed it in a proper manner.

MEGIL. Did you not ſay all theſe things well and prudently; and, did not we properly praiſe them?

GUEST. Perhaps ſo. But I think that every one who perceives any thing great, and which is endued with much power and ſtrength, will be immediately convinced, that if he knows it to be uſed by its poſſeſſor, being ſuch and ſo great, its poſſeſſor will be happy through accompliſhing many and admirable things.

MEGIL. Is not this therefore right? or, how do you ſay?

GUEST. Conſider now to what he looks, who, in praiſing every thing of this kind, ſpeaks rightly. And in the firſt place concerning that of which we are now ſpeaking, how will thoſe commanders of that time, who knew properly how to marſhal an army, fortunately make uſe of occaſion? Will it not be from their eſtabliſhing it in ſafety, and preſerving it perpetually, ſo that they themſelves may be free, and that they may rule over others whom they pleaſe? And, in ſhort, that both they and their progeny may obtain from all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, whatever they deſire? Will they not deſire it for the ſake of theſe things?

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. He, therefore, who beholding either great wealth, or the illuſtrious honours of a family, or any thing elſe of this kind, ſays the very ſame things, will he not ſay ſo looking to this, as if through this kind he ſhould obtain all thath e deſires, or the greater part, and ſuch as are of the moſt conſequence?

MEGIL. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But there is one common deſire of all men, which is ſignified by our preſent diſcourſe.

MEGIL. What is that?

GUEST. That all things ſhould eſpecially happen according to every one's mandate; but, if not all, at leaſt human affairs.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Since, therefore, all of us perpetually wiſh a thing of this kind, both when we are adults and advanced in years, we neceſſarily pray for this to the end of life.

MEGIL.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. But we alſo pray that our friends may obtain the ſame things as ourſelves.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. But the ſon is a friend to the father, viz. the boy to the man.

MEGIL. How can it be otherwiſe?

GUEST. But many of thoſe things which the boy prays may happen to himſelf, the father will beſeech the Gods to grant that they may not happen according to the prayers of his ſon.

MEGIL. Do you ſay that this will be the caſe when he who prays is fooliſh, and while he is yet a youth?

GUEST. Yes; and when he is a father, either very old or very young, while he knows nothing of things beautiful and juſt, but, being affected like Theſeus to the unfortunate Hippolytus, when dying, will pray with great alacrity. But if the ſon knows what is beautiful and juſt at the ſame time, does it appear to you that he will join in prayer with the father?

MEGIL. I underſtand what you ſay. For you appear to me to aſſert, that we ought not to pray, nor endeavour that all things may be conformable to our wiſh, but that our will rather may be obedient to our prudence; and that both cities and each of us ought to pray for, and endeavour to obtain, the poſſeſſion of intellect.

GUEST. Certainly. And that the politician who is a legiſlator ought always to eſtabliſh legal orders, looking to this, as I remember to have ſaid before, and as I now remind you. For, in the beginning of this converſation, you gave it as your opinion, that a good legiſlator ought to eſtabliſh all laws for the ſake of war; but I ſaid that this was to exhort him to compoſe laws according to one virtue only, when, at the ſame time, there are four virtues; and that he ought to look to every virtue, but eſpecially towards the firſt, which is the leader of them all, and which is prudence, intellect and opinion, with love and deſire attendant on theſe. But our diſcourſe returns again to the ſame thing; and what I then ſaid, I now again ſay, either if you pleaſe jeſting or ſeriouſly—I aſſert then, that it is dangerous to pray without the poſſeſſion of intellect, but that in this caſe it is better the contrary to what we aſk ſhould come to paſs. If you are of opinion that theſe things are aſſerted by me ſeriouſly, conſider them to be ſo. For I now entirely expect

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to find you conſenting to what we a little before advanced, that timidity was not the cauſe of the deſtruction of kings, and of the whole of that conſtitution, nor yet the ignorance in warlike concerns of the governors and governed, but the whole of depravity, and eſpecially ignorance about the greateſt of human affairs. That theſe things thus happened at that time, and muſt ſo happen now, if they any where ſubſiſt, and that in following times they will no otherwiſe happen, I will endeavour, if you pleaſe, to diſcover, taking reaſon for our guide, and unfold it to you as friends to the utmoſt of my ability.

CLIN. To praiſe you, O gueſt, in words, would be troubleſome, but we ſhall vehemently praiſe you in the thing itſelf. For we ſhall cheerfully follow you in what you have to ſay, and in ſo doing a liberal and true encomiaſt is particularly apparent.

GUEST. You ſpeak moſt excellently, O Clinias! and we ſhall do as you ſay.

CLIN. Theſe things will be ſo, if God pleaſes. Only ſpeak.

GUEST. We ſay then, proceeding according to the remaining road of our diſcourſe, that the greateſt ignorance deſtroyed that power at that time, and that at preſent the ſame thing is naturally capable of effecting this. So that, if this be the caſe, the legiſlator ought to endeavour as far as he is able to impart prudence to cities, and exterminate in the higheſt degree ignorance.

CLIN. It is evident.

GUEST. What then may be juſtly called the greateſt ignorance? Conſider whether you agree with me in what I am going to ſay. For I eſtabliſh it to be ſuch as this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. When any one does not love, but hates that which appears to him to be beautiful, or good; but loves and embraces that which appears to him to be baſe and unjuſt. I aſſert that this diſſonance of pain and pleaſure, with rational opinion, is *extreme* ignorance. But it is the *greateſt*, becauſe it belongs to *the multitude* of the ſoul. For that part of the ſoul which is converſant with pain and pleaſure correſponds to the common people and the multitude in a city. When, therefore, the ſoul oppoſes ſciences or opinions, or reaſon, all which naturally govern, this I call ignorance: and it then takes place in a city when the multitude will not be perſuaded by the rulers

and the laws. The ſame thing happens to one man, when though beautiful reaſons reſide in his ſoul, yet he does not at all act conformably, but does every thing contrary to them. I ſhould eſtabliſh all theſe moſt inordinate ignorances as belonging to a city, and to every citizen, but not as belonging to the artificers, if, O gueſt, you underſtand what I ſay.

CLIN. We underſtand you, my friend, and aſſent to what you ſay.

GUEST. Let this then be thus fixed, that to citizens who are after this manner ignorant, nothing pertaining to government is to be committed, but that they are to be reproached as ignorant, though they ſhould be very ſkilful in argument, and poſſeſs every thing pertaining to the elegance and celerity of the ſoul. On the other hand, that thoſe who are affected in a contrary manner are to be called wiſe, though, as it is ſaid, they ſhould neither know their letters, nor how to ſwim, and dominion ſhould be given to theſe as to prudent perſons. For how, O friends, can the leaſt form of prudence ſubſiſt without conſent?

CLIN. It cannot.

GUEST. But the moſt beautiful and greateſt of mutual agreements may be moſt juſtly called the greateſt wiſdom; of which he participates who lives according to reaſon. But he who is void of this, who deſtroys his own houſe, and is in no reſpect a ſaviour to the city, but every thing of a contrary nature,—ſuch a one appears to be ignorant with reſpect to theſe particulars. Theſe things, therefore, as I juſt now ſaid, muſt ſubſiſt in this manner.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But ought there not, neceſſarily, to be in cities governors and the governed?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Be it ſo. But of what kind, and how many, are the axioms reſpecting governing and being governed in great and ſmall cities, and in a ſimilar manner in families? Is not this one of them, that father and mother, and univerſally a begetter ſhould rule over the thing begotten? Will not this be every where a right axiom?

CLIN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But the next in order is this, that the ingenious ſhould rule over

the ignoble. The third, that the more aged ought to govern, and the younger to be governed.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But the fourth will be, that ſlaves ſhould be governed, and maſters govern.

CLIN. How can it be otherwiſe?

GUEST. The fifth will be, I think, that the better character ſhould rule over the worſe.

CLIN. You ſpeak of a dominion which is extremely neceſſary.

GUEST. And of a dominion, which for the moſt part ſubſiſts in all animals, and is according to nature, as the Theban Pindar ſays. But the greateſt axiom, as it appears, will be the ſixth, which orders the unſcientific to follow, but the prudent to lead and govern. And this government, O moſt wiſe Pindar, I ſhould nearly ſay was not contrary but according to the nature of law, ſubſiſting ſpontaneouſly and not by violence.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt rightly.

GUEST. The ſeventh government we ſhall produce to a certain allotment, ſpeaking of a thing grateful to divinity, and ſubſiſting with good fortune. And we ſhall ſay it is moſt juſt, that he who is choſen by lot ſhould govern, but that he who is rejected ſhould be governed.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. We ſhall ſay then jocoſely to ſome one of thoſe who proceed with great facility to the eſtabliſhment of laws, Do you ſee, O legiſlator, how many axioms there are reſpecting governors, and how they are naturally contrary to each other? For now we have diſcovered a certain fountain of ſeditions, which it is neceſſary you ſhould cure. But, in the firſt place, conſider with us how, and in what reſpect, the kings of Argos and Meſſene, acting contrary to theſe axioms, deſtroyed the power of the Greeks, which at that time was wonderful. Was it not becauſe they were ignorant of that which is moſt rightly ſaid by Heſiod, That the half is often more than the whole? That is to ſay, when the poſſeſſion of the whole is noxious, but that of the half is moderate: for, in this caſe, he conſidered the moderate as more than the immoderate, as being better than the worſe.

CLIN. Moſt right.

GUEST. But will this, when happening to kings, deſtroy each of them, prior to its happening to the people?

CLIN. It is probable that this is moſtly the diſeaſe of kings, who live proudly through luxuries.

GUEST. It is evident, therefore, in the firſt place, that the kings at that time arrogated to themſelves authority over the eſtabliſhed laws, and that their actions did not accord with what they had celebrated both in diſcourſe and by an oath. But diſſonance, as we have ſaid, being the greateſt ignorance, though appearing to be wiſdom, ſubverted all thoſe particulars through confuſion and bitter unſkilfulneſs.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Be it ſo then. But why is it neceſſary that the legiſlator of that time ſhould be fearful reſpecting the generation of this paſſion? Shall we ſay, by the Gods, that to know this is a thing of no great wiſdom, and that it is not difficult to aſſert; but that, if any one at that time had foreſeen it, he would have been more wiſe than we are?

MEGIL. How do you ſay?

GUEST. We may now, O Megillus, underſtand that which was formerly tranſacted by you, and, in conſequence of knowing this, eaſily relate what ought then to have been accompliſhed.

MEGIL. Speak yet more clearly.

GUEST. This then will be moſt clear.

MEGIL. What?

GUEST. If any one gives a greater power to leſſer things, ſo as to neglect mediocrity,—as, for inſtance, ſails to ſhips, food to bodies, and dominion to ſouls,—he would ſubvert all things. For, becoming inſolent, ſome of theſe would ruſh to diſeaſes, and others to injuſtice, the offspring of inſolence. What then do we mean to ſay? It is this, my friends, that the nature of a mortal ſoul is ſuch, that no one of theſe can, when young and unreſtrained, bear the greateſt dominion without having its dianoëtic power filled with folly, which is the greateſt diſeaſe; and that, beſides this, it will hate its neareſt friends; which circumſtance, when happening, will ſwiftly deſtroy it, and obſcure the whole of its power. To be afraid of this, in conſequence of knowing the moderate, is the province of great legiſlators. Hence, that which it is eaſy to ſee was at that time tranſacted appears to be this.

MEGIL. What?

GUEST. Some God, as it ſeems, took care of you; who, foreſeeing future events, planted for you a twofold generation of kings, from one, and by this mean more contracted you to the moderate. And further ſtill, after this a certain human nature, mingling with a certain divine power, and perceiving the effervescence of your government, conjoined the prudent power of old age with the proud ſtrength of noble birth, equalling the deciſion of men eighty years old, in affairs of the greateſt concern, with the power of kings. But your third ſaviour, perceiving your diſtended and raging government, hurled upon it, as a bridle, the power of the Ephori, and led it near the power which is determined by lot. Hence, your kingdom being mingled from ſuch things as are proper, and poſſeſſing meaſure, was both preſerved itſelf, and became the cauſe of ſafety to others. For the faction of Ariſtodemus had never taken place under the government of Temenus and Creſphontes, and other legiſlators of that time; for they were not then ſufficiently ſkilled in legiſlation. For, had they been ſo, they never would have thought that a juvenile ſoul, when receiving a dominion from which it might be poſſible to become a tyrant, ſhould be kept within the bounds of moderation by oaths. But now a God has ſhown you what kind of government is neceſſary; and ſuch a one ought eſpecially to ſubſiſt. But that theſe things ſhould be known by us, (as I ſaid before) now they have been accompliſhed, is not a thing replete with wiſdom. For it is not difficult to ſee from a paradigm a thing which has been tranſacted. But if any one could then have foreſeen theſe particulars, and had been able to moderate the governments, and to form one from the three, he would have preſerved all the beautiful conceptions of that time, and neither the Perſian fleet, nor any other which has been deſpiſed by us as of no account, would have ſailed with hoſtile intentions into Greece.

CLIN. You ſpeak the truth.

GUEST. Hence, O Clinias, they made a ſhameful reſiſtance. I ſay ſhameful, not becauſe thoſe who at that time vanquiſhed by ſea and land did not conquer in a becoming manner, but what I call ſhameful at that time is this: in the firſt place, becauſe one of thoſe three cities only fought in defence of Greece, but the other two were ſo baſely corrupted, that one of them hindered Lacedæmon from aſſiſting Greece, by warring againſt it with all its

its ſtrength; and the other obtaining the chief authority in thoſe times, reſpecting diſtribution, or about Argos, would neither hear, nor give any aſſiſtance when called upon to repell the Barbarian. But many things might be adduced relative to the tranſactions of thoſe times, about that war, by which the conduct of the two cities towards Greece might be accuſed as ſhameful. For thoſe who aſſert that they defended Greece do not ſpeak rightly; ſince, unleſs the common opinion of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had reſiſted the approaching ſlavery, all things would nearly have been mingled together, the race of Greeks with Greeks, the Barbarians with Greeks, and the Greeks with Barbarians; juſt as at preſent, in conſequence of the Perſians tyrannizing, Greece being ſeparated in a diſorderly manner is badly inhabited. Theſe are the things, O Clinias and Megillus, which we have to urge againſt antient politicians and legiſlators, and likewiſe thoſe of the preſent day, that, exploring the cauſes of theſe, we may diſcover what elſe ought to be done. Such as is that which we now aſſert, that it is not proper to eſtabliſh great nor unmingled governments; conſidering this, that a city ought to be free and prudent, and a friend to itſelf; and that a legiſlator ought to give laws looking to theſe particulars. But we muſt not wonder, if we often propoſe other things, and aſſert that the legiſlator ought to regard theſe in giving laws, though they are not the ſame with what we have previouſly delivered. But it is proper to infer, that when we ſay the legiſlator ought to look to temperance, or prudence, or friendſhip, our deſign is not different, but the ſame: and you muſt not be diſturbed on finding us uſing many other words of this kind.

Clin. We ſhall endeavour to do ſo by repeating your diſcourſe. But now inform us what you meant by ſaying that a legiſlator ought to look to friendſhip, liberty, and prudence.

Guest. You ſhall now hear. There are as it were two mothers of polities, from which he who ſays that others are produced will ſpeak rightly. It is neceſſary to call one of theſe a monarchy, but the other a democracy. The race of the Perſians poſſeſſes the ſummit of the one, but that of the other is poſſeſſed by us. But all other forms of polities are nearly, as I have ſaid, variouſly compoſed from theſe. It is proper, therefore, and neceſſary, that a city ſhould participate of both theſe, if it is to be free, and friendly in conjunction with prudence. But this our diſcourſe wiſhes to ordain, when

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it ſays, that a city can never be beautifully governed while it is deſtitute of theſe.

CLIN. For how can it?

GUEST. When, therefore, the one embraces monarchy, but the other liberty, more than is proper, neither will preſerve the mediocrity of theſe. Your cities however, Laconia and Crete, poſſeſs it more than others. And this was the caſe with the Athenians and Perſians formerly, but now they poſſeſs leſs of this mediocrity. But ſhall we diſcuſs the cauſes of this, or not?

CLIN. Entirely ſo, if we wiſh to accompliſh our propoſed deſign.

GUEST. Let us hear therefore. The Perſians under the reign of Cyrus, poſſeſſing more of the mediocrity of ſlavery and freedom, were in the firſt place themſelves free; and in the next place they were the lords of many others. For the governors imparted liberty to the governed, and by leading them to equality the ſoldiers had a greater friendſhip for the commanders, and conducted themſelves with alacrity in dangers. And if any one among them was prudent, and able to give advice, as the king was not envious, but permitted liberty of ſpeech, and honoured thoſe who were able to adviſe, he openly exhibited the common power of prudence. And at that time he gave them all things, through liberty, friendſhip, and a communion of intellect.

CLIN. It appears that the particulars which you have now mentioned thus ſubſiſted at that time.

GUEST. How then came that government to be almoſt deſtroyed under the reign of Cambyſes, and again nearly reſtored under that of Darius? Are you willing that we ſhould ſpeak as if we uſed divination?

CLIN. Certainly; for this will contribute to our deſign.

GUEST. Reſpecting Cyrus, therefore, I thus divine; that in other particulars he was a good commander, and a lover of his country, but that he did not at all apply himſelf to right diſcipline, nor attend to œconomy.

CLIN. But why muſt we ſay ſo?

GUEST. He appears from his youth to have paſſed his life in the army, and to have committed the education of his ſons to women. But theſe educated them as perſons happy and bleſſed from their childhood, and as indigent of nothing. Hence, as being ſufficiently happy, they forbade any one

one to oppoſe them in any reſpect, and compelled every one to praiſe all their words and actions. After this manner were they educated by certain women.

CLIN. You ſpeak, as it ſeems, of a fine education.

GUEST. Of a feminine one indeed, introduced by royal women, who became ſuddenly rich; and which took place during a ſcarcity of men, who through wars, and a multitude of dangers, had not leiſure to attend to the education of youth.

CLIN. It is probable that this was the caſe.

GUEST. But the father of theſe children poſſeſſed cattle and ſheep, and herds of men, and of many other animals; but he was ignorant that thoſe to whom he was to leave all theſe, were not inſtructed in their paternal or Perſian art (the Perſians being ſhepherds, the offspring of a rough country, and the methods being hard by which they rendered the ſhepherds very ſtrong, able to paſs the night out of doors, to be vigilant, and to fight if there was occaſion). But he ſuffered women and Median eunuchs to educate his ſons, who corrupted diſcipline through what is called felicity. Hence they came to be ſuch as it is likely thoſe muſt be who are educated without reproof. The ſons, therefore, on the death of Cyrus taking poſſeſſion of the government, and being full of luxury and unacquainted with reproof, in the firſt place, one ſlew the other in conſequence of indignantly bearing equality: and in the next place, Cambyſes, raging through intoxication and ignorance, deſtroyed the kingdom through the Medes, and a certain perſon who was then called the eunuch, and who deſpiſed his folly.

CLIN. Theſe things alſo are reported; and it appears that they nearly happened in this manner.

GUEST. And it is likewiſe ſaid, that the government came again to the Perſians through Darius and ſeven others.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But let us behold, following the order of diſcourſe. For Darius was neither the ſon of a king, nor educated in a luxurious manner. But coming to the government, and receiving it as the ſeventh, he divided it into ſeven parts, of which at preſent ſome ſmall dreams remain. He likewiſe was of opinion that men ſhould live under laws which contribute to a certain common equality; and made that diſtribution legitimate, which

Cyrus

Cyrus had promiſed the Perſians; thus imparting friendſhip and communion to all the Perſians, and alluring the vulgar among them by money and gifts. Being thus beloved by his ſoldiers, he ſubdued regions not leſs in number than Cyrus had left. After Darius, Xerxes reigned, who was again educated in a royal and luxurious manner. But, O Darius! we may, perhaps, moſt juſtly ſay you was not warned by the evil conduct of Cyrus, but educated Xerxes in the ſame manners in which Cyrus educated Cambyſes. He, therefore, as being the offſpring of the ſame diſcipline, acted in a manner ſimilar to Cambyſes. And, indeed, from this time ſcarcely any of the Perſian kings were truly great, except in name. But the cauſe of this, according to my reaſoning, was not fortune, but a vicious life, which the ſons of thoſe who were remarkably rich and tyrannical for the moſt part lived. For neither boy, nor man, nor old man, can ever become illuſtrious in virtue from ſuch an education: And theſe are the things which we ſay ſhould be conſidered by a legiſlator, and by us at preſent. But it is juſt, O Lacedæmonians, to confer this praiſe upon your city, that you never diſtribute any remarkable honour or nutriment to either a poor or rich man, to a king or a private perſon, which the oracle of ſome God has not from the firſt ordered you to diſtribute. For it is not proper that he who excels in riches, or ſwiftneſs, or beauty, or ſtrength, without the poſſeſſion of ſome virtue, ſhould obtain the higheſt honours in a city; nor even if he poſſeſſes ſome virtue, if it is not attended with temperance.

CLIN. What do you mean by aſſerting this, O gueſt?

GUEST. Is not fortitude one part of virtue?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, judge, on hearing what I ſhall advance. Would you be pleaſed with any domeſtic or neighbour who was exceſſively brave, yet not temperate, but the contrary?

CLIN. Predict better things of me.

GUEST. But what? Would you be pleaſed with one who was an artiſt, and wiſe in things of this kind, but at the ſame time unjuſt?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But juſtice is never produced without temperance.

CLIN. How can it be otherwiſe?

GUEST. But neither did he who was juſt now conſidered by us as wiſe, becauſe

cauſe he poſſeſſed pleaſures and pains, according with and following right reaſon, become ſo without temperance.

CLIN. Certainly not.

GUEST. But, further ſtill, we ſhould alſo conſider this, that we may behold how honours are properly or improperly diſtributed in cities.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. Whether temperance, if it ſubſiſts alone in the ſoul without every other virtue, can with juſtice become either honourable or diſhonourable?

CLIN. I know not what to anſwer.

GUEST. You ſpeak modeſtly. And I think you would reply, that in this caſe it would ſubſiſt inharmoniouſly.

CLIN. You have very properly anſwered for me.

GUEST. Be it ſo then. But the addition which we made uſe of, of honourable and diſhonourable, did not deſerve a reply, but ought rather to have been paſſed over in irrational ſilence.

CLIN. You appear to me to ſpeak concerning temperance.

GUEST. I do. But that which is of more advantage to us than other things, if it is eſpecially honoured with an addition, it will be moſt rightly honoured; that which is ſecond in utility, when honoured in a ſecondary manner; and thus every thing will be properly honoured when it receives conſequent honours in the order of ſucceſſion.

CLIN. This will be the caſe.

GUEST. What then? Shall we not ſay that it is the province of the legiſlator to diſtribute theſe?

CLIN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Are you willing that we ſhould inveſt him with the power of diſtributing all things, both pertaining to every work, and to trifling particulars? And ſhall we not endeavour to give a triple diviſion, ſince we alſo are in a certain reſpect deſirous of laws; dividing things greateſt, ſecond, and third, apart from each other?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We ſay then that a city, in order that it may be preſerved, and may be happy to the utmoſt of human power, ought neceſſarily to diſtribute honours and diſhonours in a proper manner.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Proper diſtribution, therefore, is this, to eſtabliſh the goods pertaining to the ſoul, as the moſt excellent and firſt in rank, temperance at the ſame time being preſent with the ſoul: but as ſecond in rank, things beautiful and good pertaining to the body; and in the third place, things pertaining to poſſeſſions and riches. If any legiſlator or city proceeds without theſe, and either cauſes riches to be honoured, or through honours renders ſomething which is poſterior, prior, they will act neither in a holy nor in a political manner. Shall theſe things be ſaid by us, or how?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. A conſideration of the Perſian polity cauſed us to ſpeak more copiouſly about theſe particulars. But we found that they became ſtill worſe; and we ſay that this was owing to their depriving the people of liberty in an immoderate degree. Likewiſe, by introducing the deſpotic more than was proper, they deſtroyed friendſhip and ſociety in the city. But, theſe being corrupted, the deliberation of the rulers is not directed to the governed and the people, but to the advantage of their own government. Indeed, for the ſake of a trifling benefit which might accrue to themſelves, cities have been entirely ſubverted, and friendly nations deſtroyed by fire. Hence, hating in an hoſtile manner, and without pity, they are alſo hated. And when there is occaſion for the people to fight for them, and they aſſemble for this purpoſe, they do not find in them a general conſent to undergo danger, and fight with alacrity. But though they poſſeſs myriads, and indeed innumerable ſubjects, yet they are all uſeleſs for the purpoſes of war. Hence, as if they were in want of men, they procure ſome for hire; and thus think they ſhall be ſafe under the protection of mercenary and foreign ſoldiers. Beſides all this, they are compelled to be unlearned, aſſerting ſeriouſly, that whatever is called honourable or beautiful in the city is a mere trifle when compared to ſilver and gold.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But we have ſpoken ſufficiently concerning the affairs of the Perſians, which do not ſubſiſt in a proper manner, through exceſſive ſlavery and deſpotiſm.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But, after this, it is proper in a ſimilar manner to diſcuſs the Attic polity,

polity, that it may appear how perfect liberty, exempt from all government, is in no ſmall degree worſe than that which is moderately in ſubjection to others. For at that time in which the Perſians invaded Greece, and perhaps nearly all Europe, our polity was antient, and we had certain governments compoſed of four diviſions. A certain ſhame, too, at that time was a deſpot, through which we were then deſirous to live in ſubjection to the laws. Beſides this, the magnitude of that military force, which ſpread itſelf over the land and ſea, produced an immenſe fear, and cauſed us to be in ſtill greater ſubjection to the governors and laws then exiſting. And from theſe cauſes the higheſt degree of friendſhip ſubſiſted between us. For nearly ten years before the naval battle in Salamis, Datis, being ſent by Darius, led a Perſian army againſt the Athenians and Eretrienſes in order to reduce them to ſlavery; Darius at the ſame time threatening him with death unleſs he enſlaved theſe nations. Datis, therefore, in a very ſhort time entirely ſubdued them with an innumerable multitude of forces; and a certain dreadful rumour reached our city, that not one of the Eretrienſes had eſcaped, but that the ſoldiers of Datis had bound the hands of the Eretrienſes together, and plundered all their city. This rumour, whether true or not, terrified both the other Greeks, and alſo the Athenians, who in conſequence of this ſending ambaſſadors to every part of Greece for the purpoſe of procuring aſſiſtance, no one aided them except the Lacedæmonians. And even they, indeed, whether they were hindered by being engaged in a war at that time againſt Meſſene, or by ſome other circumſtance (for we are unacquainted with the true reaſon), did not come till one day after the battle at Marathon. After this, mighty preparations and innumerable threats of the king are ſaid to have taken place. In the mean time Darius is ſaid to have died, who was ſucceeded in the government by his ſon, at that time extremely young, and who in no reſpect abandoned his father's undertaking. But the Athenians were of opinion, that the whole of his preparation would be directed againſt them, on account of the battle at Marathon. And hearing that mount Athos was dug through, the Helleſpont joined, and a great multitude of ſhips collected, they thought that there was no ſafety for them by land or by ſea. For they were unwilling to conſide in the aſſiſtance of any one, recollecting that, when on the firſt invaſion of the Perſians the Eretrienſes were vanquiſhed, no one gave them aſſiſtance, or expoſed themſelves

to danger by fighting in their defence. But it appeared to them that the ſame thing would then take place by land. And again, when they looked to the ſea, they ſaw that all ſafety was excluded there, ſince more than a thouſand ſhips were coming againſt them. They perceived, therefore, only one mean of ſafety, and that was ſlender and dubious. For, looking back upon former tranſactions, and conſidering how they had fought without any proſpect of ſucceſs,—being borne along by this hope, they found their only refuge was in themſelves and the Gods. This, therefore, united all of them in friendſhip with each other. I mean the fear which was then preſent, together with that which before this the laws had produced in thoſe that were obedient to them. This in our former diſcourſe we have frequently called ſhame, and to which we have ſaid all thoſe muſt be ſubſervient who deſire to become worthy characters. For he who is a ſlave to this is free and intrepid. Unleſs this fear, therefore, had been then preſent, they would never, collecting themſelves together, have defended their temples, their tombs, and their country, together with their other familiars and friends, as at that time they defended them, but we ſhould have been widely ſeparated from each other.

MEGIL. And very much ſo, O gueſt. You likewiſe ſpeak very properly, and in a manner becoming both yourſelf and your country.

GUEST. Be it ſo, O Megillus! For it is juſt to diſcourſe with you about the particulars which happened at that time, becauſe you retain the nature of your parents. But do you and Clinias conſider whether we ſay any thing accommodated to legiſlation. For I do not diſcuſs theſe things for the ſake of fables: but behold on what account I ſpeak. For, in a certain reſpect, the ſame thing happens to us which happened to the Perſians: for they led the people to every kind of ſlavery; but we, on the contrary, invite the multitude to every kind of freedom. But how and what we ſhall ſpeak reſpecting this affair, our former diſcourſes after a manner beautifully demonſtrate.

MEGIL. You ſpeak well. But endeavour to ſignify to us in a ſtill clearer manner what you have now ſaid.

GUEST. Be it ſo. The people, O friends, with us, according to antient laws, were not the lords of any thing, but after a manner they were voluntarily ſubſervient to the laws.

MEGIL.

MEGIL. What laws do you ſpeak of?

GUEST. Thoſe which were then eſtabliſhed about muſic, that we may ſhow from the beginning how liberty came to be beſtowed in an extreme degree. For then muſic was divided by us into certain ſpecies and figures; and one ſpecies of the ode conſiſted in prayers to the Gods, which are called by the name of hymns. But another ſpecies of the ode, contrary to this, may be ſaid eſpecially to conſiſt in lamentations. Again, another ſpecies conſiſts in pæons: another celebrates the generation of Bacchus, and is, I think, called dithyrambos: and another ſpecies is denominated laws pertaining to the harp. Theſe, and ſome others, being eſtabliſhed, it was not lawful to uſe one ſpecies of melody inſtead of another. But the authority of knowing theſe, and, at the ſame time, judging reſpecting them, and condemning them when improper, was not inveſted in the pipe, nor in the ignorant clamours of the multitude, as at preſent, nor yet in thoſe who expreſs their applauſe by clapping their hands,—but in men illuſtrious for their erudition, and who were permitted to hear to the end in ſilence. But boys, pædagogues, and the numerous vulgar, were admoniſhed to behave orderly by a rod. Theſe things being eſtabliſhed in ſo orderly a manner, the multitude of citizens willingly ſubmitted to be governed, and did not dare to judge in a tumultuous manner. But after this, in the courſe of time, the poets themſelves became the leaders of this unlawful privation of the muſe. Theſe, indeed, naturally poſſeſſed the poetic genius, but were unſkilled to a degree of folly in what is juſt and lawful reſpecting muſic. They likewiſe celebrated the orgies of Bacchus, and purſued pleaſure more than was becoming. Beſides this, they mingled lamentations with hymns, and pæons with dithyrambic compoſitions. They imitated with harps the ſound of the pipe, and mingled all things with all, involuntarily deceiving through their ignorance of muſic. For they aſſerted that it did not poſſeſs any rectitude whatever; but that any one, whether he was a worthy or a worthleſs man, might judge with the greateſt rectitude from the pleaſure which it produced in the hearer. Compoſing, therefore, poems of this kind, and thus ſpeaking publicly, they cauſed the multitude to act in an unlawful and daring manner with reſpect to muſic, by perſuading them that they were ſufficient judges of harmony. Hence theatres, from being ſilent, came to be noiſy, as if capable of hearing what in the muſes was beautiful, or the contrary:

and

and thus, inſtead of an ariſtocracy, a certain depraved theatrical dominion was produced. For, if only a democracy of free men had ſubſiſted, nothing very dire would have taken place: but now, through muſic, an opinion came to us of the wiſdom of all men in all things, and a tranſgreſſion of law in conjunction with liberty followed. For they became intrepid, as if endued with knowledge; and this privation of fear produced impudence. For when the opinion of a more excellent perſon, through confidence, is not dreaded, this is nearly baſe impudence, and is produced from a certain liberty vehemently daring.

MEGIL. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. An unwillingneſs to become ſubſervient to governors is the conſequence of this liberty: and this is attended with a deſertion of the ſervice and admonitions of father, mother, and elders. After this follows, as now being near the conſummation of the whole, diſobedience to the laws. When arrived at this extremity, oaths and faith, and the cultivation of the divinities, are neglected. Hence they exhibit and imitate that antient Titanic nature, which is celebrated by poets; and again returning to the manners of that period, they lead a life involved in difficulties, and find no end to their evils. But on what account have theſe things been ſaid by us? It appears to me that diſcourſe, like a horſe, ſhould be reſtrained on every ſide, leſt, having its mouth unbridled, and ruſhing onward, we ſhould at length, according to the proverb, fall from an aſs. It is proper therefore to aſk, on what account theſe things have been ſaid.

MEGIL. It is ſo.

GUEST. On what account, therefore, have we aſſerted theſe things?

MEGIL. On what account?

GUEST. We have ſaid that a legiſlator ought to give laws regarding three things; that the city which receives his laws be free, friendly to itſelf, and endued with intellect. Was not this what we ſaid?

MEGIL. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. For the ſake of theſe things we adduced two ſpecies of government, one moſt deſpotic, and the other moſt free; and we have conſidered which of theſe was rightly adminiſtered. But, receiving a certain mediocrity in each, in the one of deſpotiſm, and in the other of liberty, we have ſeen that a proſperous condition of affairs will by theſe means be produced; but

that the contrary will be the caſe when each is carried to an extreme, the one of ſlavery, and the other of liberty.

MEGIL. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. But, for the ſake of theſe things, we conſidered the nature of the Doric army, the roots of the Dardan mountains, and the maritime habitation. We likewiſe conſidered, on the ſame account, thoſe firſt men who eſcaped the devaſtation of the deluge; and diſcourſed about muſic and intoxication, and things yet prior to theſe. For all theſe particulars have been diſcuſſed, for the purpoſe of perceiving how a city may be inhabited in the beſt manner, and how every private individual in it may lead the moſt excellent life. But if by all this we have accompliſhed any thing of conſequence, what can be ſaid againſt us, O Megillus and Clinias?

CLIN. I ſeem to myſelf, O gueſt, to perceive ſomething. For it appears that we have fortunately diſcuſſed all theſe particulars. For I nearly am at preſent in want of them; and both you and Megillus here have very opportunely met with me. For I will not conceal from you that which has now happened to me, but I will make it ſerve as an omen. The greateſt part of Crete, then, endeavours at preſent to eſtabliſh a certain colony, and commits the management of it to the Cnoſſians. But the city of the Cnoſſians appoints me and nine others to manage this affair; and at the ſame time orders us to eſtabliſh thoſe laws which pleaſe us Cretans, and which may be collected from other nations. And if thoſe of other nations ſhall appear to be better than our own, it enjoins us not to reject them becauſe they are foreign. We ſhall now, therefore, beſtow this favour both upon ourſelves and you. For, making a ſelection out of what has been ſaid, we ſhall eſtabliſh a city in our diſcourſe, and conſider it from the firſt time of its being inhabited. For thus a conſideration of the object of our inquiry will take place, and which at the ſame time may be uſeful to me in the eſtabliſhment of my future city.

GUEST. You do not announce war, O gueſt. Unleſs, therefore, it ſhould not be agreeable to Megillus, be perſuaded that I ſhall give you every aſſiſtance in my power.

CLIN. You ſpeak well.

MEGIL. You may likewiſe depend on my aſſiſtance.

GUEST. You both ſpeak in the moſt becoming manner. Let us therefore endeavour, in the firſt place, to built a city in diſcourſe.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

THE LAWS,

BOOK IV.

COME then, what kind of a city is it proper to think this ſhould be? I do not now aſk about its preſent or future name (for this, perhaps, may be owing to its colonization, or ſome particular place; or, perhaps, the ſurname of ſome river or fountain, or of the Gods there reſident, may have given a denomination to the new city by its celebrity); but this is rather what I wiſh to aſk concerning it, whether it is ſituated near the ſea, or on the main land?

CLIN. The city, of which we are now ſpeaking, O gueſt, is diſtant from the ſea about eighty ſtadia.

GUEST. Are there any ports near it, or is it entirely without a port?

CLIN. It is furniſhed with ports, O gueſt, in the greateſt poſſible degree.

GUEST. Strange! What do you ſay? But is this region likewiſe all-prolific, or is it indigent of ſome things?

CLIN. It is nearly indigent of nothing.

GUEST. Is any city ſituated near it?

CLIN. Not very much ſo; on which account it became colonized. For, an antient expulſion of the inhabitants having taken place in this city, the country was rendered deſolate for an immenſe ſpace of time.

GUEST. But how is it circumſtanced with reſpect to plains, mountains, and woods?

CLIN. It is ſimilar to the whole of the reſt of Crete.

GUEST. Do you mean to ſay that it is more rough than plain?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It is not therefore incurably unfit for the acquiſition of virtue. For, if it was ſituated near the ſea, and abounded with ports, but was not all-prolific,

all-prolific, but indigent of many things, it would require for itſelf ſome mighty ſaviour, and certain divine legiſlators, that it might be preſerved from many various and depraved manners to which it would be naturally diſpoſed. But now its diſtance of eighty ſtadia becomes its conſolation. It is indeed ſituated nearer the ſea than is becoming, on which account it abounds as you ſay with ports; but, at the ſame time, this is a deſirable circumſtance. For the vicinity of the ſea to this region renders it every day pleaſant, though this proximity is in reality extremely ſalt and bitter. For, filling it with the deſire of gain, through merchandize, it produces in the ſouls of the inhabitants craft and unfaithfulneſs; and thus renders the city both unfaithful and unfriendly to itſelf, and in a ſimilar manner to other nations. As a conſolation, however, under theſe diſadvantages, it poſſeſſes an all-prolific ſoil; but, being rough, it is evident that it will not be abundantly, though it is all-prolific. For, if this were the caſe, in conſequence of great exportation, it would again poſſeſs gold and ſilver coin in abundance; a greater evil than which cannot, as I may ſay, exiſt, if one thing is compared with another, nor can any thing in a city be more adverſe to the poſſeſſion of generous and juſt manners, as, if we recollect, we ſaid before.

CLIN. We do recollect; and we allow that what was then and is now ſaid is right.

GUEST. But what? Does this region poſſeſs materials proper for building ſhips?

CLIN. It has not any fir-trees which deſerve to be mentioned, nor yet any pines. It likewiſe has not many cypreſs trees; and very few plane- or pitch-producing trees are to be found in it, which ſhipwrights neceſſarily uſe in conſtructing the interior parts of ſhips.

GUEST. In this reſpect likewiſe the nature of the country is not badly diſpoſed.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. Becauſe it is good for a city to be incapable of eaſily imitating its enemies in baſe imitations.

CLIN. On account of which of the things that have been advanced do you ſpeak in this manner?

GUEST. Obſerve me, O divine man! I am looking to that which was aſſerted in the beginning about the Cretan laws, which you ſaid regarded one particular, viz. war; but I ſaid that ſuch laws, becauſe they were eſta-

bliſhed with a view to virtue, were well eſtabliſhed; but becauſe they regarded only a part, and not the whole of virtue, I did not altogether approve of them. Do you therefore obſerve me in the preſent buſineſs of legiſlation, and conſider whether I legally eſtabliſh any thing tending to virtue, or to any part of virtue. For it is with me a fundamental poſition, that he only eſtabliſhes laws in a proper manner, who, like an archer, always directs his attention thither where alone ſomething of the beautiful in conduct will always follow, but who leaves all other things, whether riches or any thing elſe of this kind, when they ſubſiſt without beautiful manners. But I call the imitation of enemies then vicious, when any one reſiding near the ſea is injured by enemies, as in the following inſtance. For I will relate a circumſtance to you, though not with any intention of calling to mind a paſt injury. Minos, in conſequence of poſſeſſing great power by ſea, impoſed a heavy tribute on the Attic region. But the Athenians at that time had not ſhips of war as at preſent; nor did their country abound in wood well adapted for building ſhips. Hence they could not, through nautical imitation, becoming themſelves ſailors, immediately at that time defend themſelves againſt their enemies. And they would have done better if they had often loſt ſeven young men, inſtead of ſuffering that which happened to them. For, inſtead of fighting on land, and in a legal manner, in conſequence of becoming ſailors they were accuſtomed to leap running in cloſe array into the ſhips, and again rapidly to abandon them; and appeared to themſelves to act in no reſpect baſe, in not daring to die, and wait for the attacks of the enemy. But they had a plauſible pretext at hand, aſſerting that, by throwing away their arms, they could not be accuſed of ſhameful flight. They ſay, that language of this kind came to be adopted in conſequence of naval engagements; language by no means worthy of infinite praiſe, but the contrary. For it is never proper to be accuſtomed to baſe manners, and eſpecially for the beſt part of the citizens. But it appears from Homer, that a conduct of this kind is not beautiful. For Ulyſſes reproves Agamemnon for exhorting the Greeks, who at that time were engaged in fight againſt the Trojans, to draw their ſhips to the ſea. But Ulyſſes thus reproves him:

"Is this a general's voice, that calls to flight
While war hangs doubtful, while his ſoldiers fight?

What

What more could Troy? What yet their fate denies
Thou giv'ſt the foe: all Greece becomes their prize.
No more the troops (our hoiſted ſails in view,
Themſelves abandon'd) ſhall the fight purſue;
But thy ſhips flying, with deſpair ſhall ſee,
And owe deſtruction to a prince like thee [1]."

Homer therefore knew that three-banked galleys prepared for flight were bad in naval engagements. For lions, by uſing manners of this kind, might be accuſtomed to fly from ſtags. Beſides this, the naval powers of cities do not together with ſafety beſtow honours on the moſt beautiful of warlike concerns. For, in conſequence of naval affairs ſubſiſting through piloting, the government of fifty men, and rowing, men of all-various deſcriptions and of no great worth being employed for theſe purpoſes, no one can beſtow honours upon individuals in a proper manner. Though deprived of this, how can a polity be in a good condition?

CLIN. It is nearly impoſſible. But, O gueſt, we Cretans ſay that the naval battle at Salamis of the Greeks againſt the Barbarians preſerved Greece.

GUEST. And, indeed, many both of the Greeks and Barbarians aſſert the ſame thing. But we, my friend, viz. I and Megillus here, ſay, that the pedeſtrious battle at Marathon and Platææ was the one the beginning, and the other the end, of ſafety to the Greeks. And, in ſhort, that we may ſpeak of the battles which at that time preſerved us, ſome of them were advantageous, but others not ſo, to the Greeks. For to the battle at Salamis I add that at Artemiſium. But now, looking to the virtue of a polity, let us conſider the nature of the region, and the order of the laws; not thinking, with the vulgar, that to be preſerved, and to exiſt, is alone to mankind the moſt honourable of all things, but to become and continue to be the moſt excellent characters during the whole period of their exiſtence. And this I think has been ſaid by us in the former part of our diſcourſe.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We will therefore alone conſider this, if we are in that path which is beſt for a city, reſpecting habitations, and the eſtabliſhment of laws.

CLIN. And we are very much ſo.

GUEST. Inform me, therefore, as that which is conſequent to theſe things,

[1] Iliad. lib. xiv.

who the people are that are to inhabit your colony; whether ſuch as are willing from every part of Crete, ſo as that a great multitude will be collected from its ſeveral cities; or whether they are ſuch as are choſen for the purpoſe of cultivating the land? For you do not collect ſuch of the Greeks as are willing; though I ſee that ſome of you from Argos, and Ægina, and other parts of Greece, inhabit this region. But inform me at preſent whence you will derive this army of citizens.

Clin. I think it will be procured from the whole of Crete. And it appears to me that thoſe from Peloponneſus will be received for inhabitants, in preference to the other Greeks. For, what you ſaid juſt now you ſaid truly: I mean, that theſe are from Argos: for the race which is moſt celebrated here at preſent is Gortynic, becauſe it migrated hither from the Peloponneſian Gortyna.

Guest. This eſtabliſhment of a colony, therefore, is not ſimilarly eaſy to cities, ſince it does not take place after the manner of a ſwarm of bees, one race of friends proceeding from one region, and from friends, in order to form a ſettlement, being as it were beſieged by a certain narrowneſs of land, or forced by other inconveniences of a ſimilar nature. But it ſometimes happens that a part of a city, being violently urged by ſeditions, is compelled to ſettle in ſome other place. And ſometimes a whole city is forced to fly, in conſequence of being vanquiſhed in war. It is, therefore, partly eaſy for theſe to be colonized, and governed by laws, and partly difficult. For, when a colony is of one race, ſpeaking the ſame language, and obeying the ſame laws, it is united by a certain friendſhip, and has a communion of prieſts, and every thing elſe of a ſimilar kind; but it will not eaſily endure different laws, and a polity foreign to its own. But ſuch a colony, having been forced to ſedition through the badneſs of its laws, and ſtill deſiring through cuſtom thoſe priſtine manners by which it was corrupted, becomes, in conſequence of this, refractory and diſobedient to its colonizer and legiſlator. But when a colony is compoſed of all-various tribes, it will perhaps be more willingly obedient to certain new laws; but to conſpire together, and, like horſes under one yoke, to blow as it is ſaid the ſame blaſt, requires a long time, and is extremely difficult. But legiſlation and the eſtabliſhment of cities are the moſt perfect of all things with reſpect to the virtue of men.

Clin.

CLIN. It is probable; but inform me in a yet clearer manner why you aſſerted this.

GUEST. O good man, I appear to myſelf, while praiſing and ſpeculating about legiſlators, to have ſaid ſomething vile. But, if we have ſpoken opportunely, there will be no difficulty in the affair. Though, indeed, why ſhould I be diſturbed? for nearly all human affairs appear to ſubſiſt in this manner.

CLIN. Of what are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. I was about to ſay, that no man ever at any time eſtabliſhed laws, but that fortunes and all-various events, taking place in an all-various manner, gave us all our laws. For either war by its violence has ſubverted polities and changed laws, or the anxiety of ſevere poverty. Diſeaſes alſo have cauſed many innovations; and theſe have often been produced through peſtilences, and unſeaſonable times enduring for many years. He who conſiders all theſe things will think it fit to exclaim, as I juſt now did, that no mortal ever eſtabliſhed any laws, but that all human affairs are nearly governed by fortune. But he who aſſerts all this reſpecting navigation, piloting, medicine, and military command, will appear to ſpeak well. This alſo may be properly aſſerted reſpecting theſe things.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That divinity, and, together with divinity, fortune and opportunity, govern all human affairs. But a third of a milder nature muſt be admitted,—I mean, that art ought to follow theſe. For I am of opinion, that it would make a great difference, during a ſtorm, whether you poſſeſſed the pilot's art, or not. Or how do you ſay?

CLIN. That it would.

GUEST. Will not the ſame conſequence enſue in other things? But, indeed, we muſt attribute the ſame thing to legiſlation; that, other things concurring which are requiſite to the living happily in a country, a legiſlator endued with truth ought not to be wanting to ſuch a city.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Ought not, therefore, he who poſſeſſes art in each of the above-mentioned particulars, to pray that ſomething may be properly preſent with him through fortune, that he may not wholly truſt to art?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST.

GUEST. And would not all the reſt that we have juſt now mentioned ſpeak in this manner, if any one ſhould call upon them to diſcloſe their prayer?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And I think that a legiſlator alſo will do the ſame.

CLIN. So I think.

GUEST. Come then, legiſlator (for we will now addreſs him), What, and after what manner, ſhall we give you a city, ſo that from the things which are left in it you may be able ſufficiently to govern the city? What will he rightly aſſert after this? Shall we not ſay, that the legiſlator will thus ſpeak?

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Thus. Give me a city governed by a tyrant, he will ſay. But let the tyrant be a young man, of a good memory, docile, brave, and naturally magnificent. And let that which, we ſaid before, ought to follow all the parts of virtue, take place in the ſoul of the tyrant, in order that ſome advantage may be derived from other things being preſent.

CLIN. Our gueſt, O Megillus, appears to me to ſay that temperance ſhould follow the other virtues. Is it not ſo?

GUEST. I ſpeak, O Clinias, of popular temperance[1], and not of that which any one extolling would call prudence; but I mean that temperance which immediately and naturally bloſſoms forth in boys and ſavage animals, ſo that ſome are incontinent with reſpect to pleaſures, but others continent. And this temperance, when ſubſiſting ſeparate from the multitude of things which are called good, I do not conſider as worthy to be mentioned. Do you underſtand me?

CLIN. Perfectly.

GUEST. This nature, therefore, our tyrant muſt poſſeſs in addition to the other natures we have mentioned, if the city is to receive a polity, through which it may live moſt happily in the ſwifteſt and beſt manner poſſible. For no diſpoſition of a polity can ever be more rapid or more excellent than this.

[1] Plato here means that temperance which belongs to the phyſical virtues, or thoſe virtues which we poſſeſs from our birth, and may be ſaid to be the forerunners of the moral, political, cathartic, and theoretic virtues; for an account of which ſee the Notes to the Phædo.

CLIN.

CLIN. But how, O gueſt, and by what arguments, may any one who aſſerts this perſuade himſelf that he ſpeaks properly?

GUEST. It is eaſy to underſtand, O Clinias, that this is naturally ſo.

CLIN. How do you ſay? Do you not mean to aſſert, if the tyrant is a young man, temperate, docile, of a good memory, brave, magnificent, and fortunate?

GUEST. Add nothing elſe, except that he proves to be a legiſlator worthy of praiſe, and that a certain fortune leads him to this. For, this taking place, every thing will nearly be accompliſhed by a divine nature, which it brings to paſs when it is willing that any city ſhould be eminently proſperous. But this will happen in the ſecond degree, when two ſuch characters are the governors: in the third degree, when three: and the difficulty of a proſperous government will be increaſed in proportion to the number of ſuch governors. But, on the contrary, the facility will be increaſed in proportion to the paucity of ſuch governors.

CLIN. You appear to aſſert that the beſt city is produced from a tyranny, in conjunction with a moſt excellent legiſlator and a modeſt tyrant; and that it is eaſily and rapidly changed into the former from the latter: that the beſt city in the ſecond degree is produced from an oligarchy; and in the third degree, from a democracy. Or how do you ſay?

GUEST. Not this, by any means. But that the firſt is produced from a tyranny; the ſecond, from a royal polity[1]; the third, from a certain democracy; and in the fourth place, an oligarchy[2] will be able to receive a generation of this kind with the utmoſt difficulty. For, in this mode of government, the powerful are very numerous. But we ſay that theſe things will then take place, when a true legiſlator, and who is naturally ſuch, ſhall be found; and when a certain ſtrength ſhall happen to him in common with thoſe in the city, who are able to accompliſh that which is of the greateſt conſequence. But where the governors are the feweſt in number, and at the ſame time the moſt ſtrong, as in a tyranny, there this mutation is accuſtomed to take place in a rapid and eaſy manner.

[1] According to Plato, a *royal polity* is produced when every thing is adminiſtered according to reaſon, and the ſupreme governor is the beſt of men.

[2] An oligarchy takes place when a few only, and thoſe the worſt, govern the city. See the Republic.

CLIN. How do you mean? For I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. And yet I think you have heard this, not once, but often. But perhaps you never ſaw a city under the dominion of a tyrant.

CLIN. Nor am I deſirous of ſuch a ſpectacle.

GUEST. But you may ſee that in it which we have juſt now ſpoken of.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That a tyrant who wiſhes to change the manners of a city has no occaſion either of great labour, or a long time, for the accompliſhment of his purpoſe. For, if he wiſhes to exhort the citizens to the ſtudy of virtue, it is neceſſary that he ſhould be the firſt who proceeds in the road leading to it; but if to the contrary, he ſhould firſt ſet them the example. For he ought to expreſs all things in himſelf by acting; praiſing and honouring ſome things, but blaming others, and diſgracing thoſe who in their ſeveral actions are diſobedient to his commands.

CLIN. How is it poſſible not to be of opinion that the other citizens will rapidly follow him who is endued with ſuch perſuaſion and force?

GUEST. No one will be able to perſuade us, O friends, that a city will change its laws ſwiftly and eaſily by any thing elſe than the command of its governors. For this does not happen at preſent by any other means, nor ever will. Indeed, this is neither difficult for us, nor impoſſible to be accompliſhed. But another thing is difficult to be accompliſhed, and rarely takes place in a long time; though, when it happens, it produces in the city in which it is found ten thouſand advantages, and, indeed, every good.

CLIN. Of what are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. When a divine love of temperate and juſt purſuits is inherent in certain mighty authorities, whether they govern according to a monarchy, according to tranſcendency in wealth, or nobility of race. Or when any one reſtores the nature of Neſtor, who is ſaid to have excelled all men in ſtrength of ſpeaking, and ſtill more in the temperance of his life. This man, therefore, they ſay, was born in the Trojan times, but by no means in ours. If, then, ſuch a man either formerly was, or will be, or at preſent ſubſiſts among us, he muſt himſelf live in a bleſſed manner, and thoſe muſt be bleſſed who hear the words proceeding from his temperate mouth. In a ſimilar manner we muſt reaſon reſpecting all power; as that, when the greateſt power in a man falls into the ſame with acting prudently and temperately,

rately, then the generation of the beſt polity and the beſt laws is produced, but never otherwiſe. Theſe things, therefore, which are ſpoken as if they were a certain fable, have been uttered in an oracular manner: and it has been ſhown, that it is partly difficult for a city to have good laws; and that partly, if what we have ſpoken of ſhould take place, it would happen the moſt rapidly of all things, and in the ſhorteſt time.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us therefore now endeavour, adapting theſe things to your city, like old men to boys, to faſhion laws in diſcourſe.

CLIN. Let us endeavour to do this, and no longer delay.

GUEST. But let us invoke Divinity in conſtituting the city. And may he hear, and hearing be preſent with us, in a propitious and benevolent manner, adorning, in conjunction with us, the city and the laws!

CLIN. May he, therefore, come!

GUEST. But what kind of polity have we in our mind to impart to the city?

CLIN. Inform me yet more clearly what you wiſh to ſay; whether it is a certain democracy, or oligarchy, or ariſtocracy, or a royal government. For we do not think that you will ſpeak of a tyranny.

GUEST. Come, then, which of you is willing firſt to anſwer me, and declare which of theſe is the government of his country?

MEGIL. Is it more juſt that I, who am the elder, ſhould ſpeak firſt?

CLIN. Perhaps ſo.

MEGIL. When I conſider then, O gueſt, the polity in Lacedæmon, I cannot tell you what it ought to be called; for it appears to me to be ſimilar to a tyranny. For the power of the ephori in it is wonderfully tyrannical. Though ſometimes it appears to me to be the moſt ſimilar of all cities to a democracy. But yet, again, not to ſay that it is an ariſtocracy is perfectly abſurd. There is alſo a kingdom for life in it, and which is ſaid to be the moſt antient of all kingdoms, both by all men and by us. I therefore, being thus ſuddenly aſked, cannot, as I have ſaid, definitely inform you which of theſe polities it is.

CLIN. I too, O Megillus, appear to be affected in the ſame manner as yourſelf. For I am perfectly doubtful which of theſe I ſhould call the polity in Cnoſſus.

GUEST. For you, O most excellent men, truly participate of polities; but those which are now so called are not polities, but habitations of cities, in which one part is subject to the dominion of another, and each is denominated from the power of the despot. But if a city ought to be denominated after this manner, it is fit that it should be called by the name of a divinity, who is the true ruler of those that are endued with intellect.

CLIN. But who is this God?

GUEST. Shall we then for a little while make use of a fable, in order that we may unfold in a becoming manner the object of our inquiry? Will it not be proper to do so?

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. A long time then prior to those habitations of cities which we have before discussed, a certain government and habitation is said to have subsisted under Saturn [1]; a government extremely happy, and of which the present aristocracies are an imitation.

MEGIL. It is proper, as it appears, to attend to this vehemently.

GUEST. It appears so to me; and on this account I have introduced it into our discourse.

MEGIL. It is well done: and you will act very properly by proceeding with the fable as far as is necessary to your design.

GUEST. I shall do as you say. We learn, then, from the report of the blessed life of the inhabitants of that time, that they possessed all things in abundance, and spontaneously produced; of which the following is said to be the cause: Saturn, well knowing (as we have already observed) that no human nature, when endued with absolute dominion, is so sufficient to itself as not to be filled with insolence and injustice, in consequence of understanding this, placed over our cities, as kings and governors, not men, but dæmons of a more divine and excellent kind; just as we do at present with flocks of sheep and herds of tame cattle. For we do not make oxen governors of oxen, nor goats of goats; but we ourselves rule over them, as being of a better race. In a similar manner this God, who is a lover of mankind, placed over us the race of dæmons, as being more excellent than our species. But these taking care of our concerns, with great facility both

[1] Saturn is a deity with an intellectual characteristic.—See the Notes to the Cratylus.

to themſelves and us, imparted to us peace and ſhame, liberty and abundance of juſtice, and rendered the human race exempt from ſedition, and happy. This our preſent diſcourſe, therefore, employing truth, aſſerts, that ſuch cities as are not governed by a divinity, but by ſome mortal, will never be exempt from evils and labours: but it is of opinion that we ought, by all poſſible means, to imitate the life which is ſaid to have been under Saturn; and that, being obedient to as much of immortality as is inherent in our nature, we ſhould govern both publicly and privately our houſes and cities, calling law the diſtribution of intellect. For, if one man, or a certain oligarchy, or democracy, poſſeſſing a ſoul aſpiring after pleaſures and deſires, and requiring to be filled with theſe, but not being able to retain them, ſhould be tormented with an inſatiable vicious diſeaſe;—ſuch a one, when governing either a city or an individual, would trample on the laws; and, as we juſt now ſaid, under ſuch a dominion there could be no poſſibility of obtaining ſafety. But it is neceſſary to conſider, O Clinias, whether we ought to be perſuaded by this diſcourſe, or not.

CLIN. It is neceſſary that we ſhould be perſuaded.

GUEST. You underſtand, therefore, that they ſay there are as many ſpecies of laws as of polities. But we have already related how many ſpecies of polities there are ſaid to be by the multitude. Nor ſhould you think that our preſent inquiry is about ſomething vile, but that it is about a thing of the greateſt moment. For, to what the juſt and the unjuſt ought to look, again becomes to us a thing of an ambiguous nature. For they ſay that the laws ought not to look either to war, or to the whole of virtue, but rather to that which is advantageous to the ſubſiſtence of a polity, ſo that it may always govern, and never be diſſolved: and they ſay that the definition of the juſt will thus be naturally beautiful.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Becauſe it is advantageous to that which is more excellent.

CLIN. Speak yet more clearly.

GUEST. That which has dominion, ſay they, always eſtabliſhes the laws in a city. Is not this what they ſay?

CLIN. You ſpeak truly.

GUEST. Do you think, therefore, ſay they, that ever at any time, whether the people are victorious, or any other polity, or a tyranny, he who

eſtabliſhes the laws will voluntarily eſtabliſh them, looking to any thing elſe in the firſt place than his own advantage, viz. the ſtability of his dominion?

CLIN. For how ſhould he?

GUEST. He, therefore, who tranſgreſſes theſe laws when eſtabliſhed, will be puniſhed by the legiſlator (who will denominate his laws juſt) as acting unjuſtly.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. This, therefore, will always be the caſe, and in this manner the juſt will ſubſiſt.

CLIN. According to this doctrine it will be ſo.

GUEST. For this is one of thoſe iniquities which take place about government.

CLIN. What iniquities?

GUEST. It is one of thoſe which we then conſidered when we diſcourſed about governors and the governed. And we then ſaid, that parents ought to rule over their progeny, the older over the younger, the noble over the ignoble; and other things, in ſhort, ſome of which, if you remember, were a hindrance to others, among which this was one. We likewiſe mentioned that Pindar ſaid, it was both according to nature and juſt that the moſt powerful ſhould lead.

CLIN. Theſe things, indeed, were then ſaid.

GUEST. But conſider to what perſons our city ought to be committed. For a circumſtance of this kind takes place ten thouſand times in certain cities.

CLIN. Of what kind?

GUEST. When a conteſt about dominion happens, thoſe who are victorious ſo vehemently uſurp the affairs of the city, as not to communicate any part of the government to the vanquiſhed, nor to their progeny; always being careful leſt any one of theſe, if inveſted with authority, ſhould cauſe an inſurrection, through a remembrance of the evils which he had formerly ſuffered. At preſent, we doubtleſs ſay, thoſe are neither polities, nor upright laws, which are not eſtabliſhed in common for the ſake of the whole city. But thoſe who eſtabliſh theſe for the ſake of any parts of the city, we denominate ſeditious, but not citizens; and we ſay that the things

things which they call juſt are called ſo by them in vain. But theſe things are aſſerted by us on this account, becauſe we ſhall not give your city any magiſtrate who is rich, or who poſſeſſes any thing elſe of this kind, ſuch as ſtrength or magnitude, or illuſtrious birth; but we ſhall give it one who will be moſt obedient to the legiſlator, and who will ſurpaſs all in the city in this reſpect. We likewiſe ſay that the greateſt attention to the worſhip of the Gods muſt be attributed to the firſt in power; the ſecond degree of attention to him who is ſecond in authority; and that every thing conſequent to this muſt be diſtributed in an orderly manner. But thoſe that are called governors I have now denominated ſervants to the laws, not for the ſake of innovation with reſpect to names, but becauſe I think that the city will obtain ſafety from this more than from any thing; and that by neglecting it the contrary will take place. For I ſee that deſtruction hangs over that city in which law does not govern the magiſtrates, but magiſtrates the law. But in that city in which the law poſſeſſes abſolute dominion over the governors, and the governors are ſlaves to the law, I behold ſafety, and ſuch other goods as the Gods impart to cities.

CLIN. By Jupiter, it is ſo, O gueſt! For, through your age, you perceive acutely.

MEGIL. For every man, while he is young, perceives theſe things obtuſely; but, when old, moſt acutely.

CLIN. Moſt true.

GUEST. But what is next to be done? Ought we not after this to conſider the inhabitants of our city as having arrived, and being preſent, and to finiſh the remaining part of our diſcourſe to them?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, thus addreſs them: Divinity [1], O men, according

[1] Plato here, as it is well obſerved in the Greek Scholium on this place, by *Divinity*, means the Demiurgus of the univerſe; and, by the *antient ſaying*, appears to allude to theſe Orphic verſes:

Ζευς αρχη, Ζευς μεσσα, διος δ' εκ παντα τετυκται.
Ζευς πυθμην γαιης τε και ουρανου αστεροεντος.

i. e. "Jupiter is the beginning and the middle; and all things were fabricated from Jupiter. Jupiter is the profundity of the earth, and of the ſtarry heavens." He is the beginning, indeed,

as

cording to an antient ſaying, containing in himſelf the beginning, end, and middle of all things, bounds by a circular progreſſion that which is direct according to nature. But juſtice always follows him, the puniſher of thoſe who deſert the divine law, and which will be followed in a humble and compoſed manner by him who intends to be happy in future. But he who is elevated by arrogance, either becauſe he excells in riches or honours, or in the form of his body, having his ſoul inflamed with inſolence in addition to his youthfulneſs and privation of intellect, as one who is not in want either of a governor or a leader, but is himſelf ſufficiently able to lead others,—ſuch a one is left deſtitute of divinity. But being thus left deſtitute, and meeting with others ſimilar to himſelf, he exults, at the ſame time cauſing a general confuſion. And to many, indeed, he appears to be a perſon of conſequence; but in no long time afterwards, ſuffering an unblameable puniſhment from juſtice, he entirely ſubverts himſelf, his houſe, and his country. Since theſe things, therefore, are thus diſpoſed, what ought a prudent man to do, or to think, and from what ought he to abſtain, both in action and thought?

CLIN. It is evident, that every man ought to think how he may be of the number of thoſe who follow divinity.

GUEST. What action, therefore, is friendly to and attendant on divinity? One indeed, and which poſſeſſes an antient reaſon, is this, that the ſimilar will be friendly to the ſimilar which is moderate; but that the immoderate are neither friendly to each other nor to the moderate. But divinity, indeed, is in the moſt eminent degree the meaſure to us of all things, and much more, as it is ſaid, than any man. He, therefore, who becomes friendly to a nature of this kind muſt neceſſarily become ſuch to the utmoſt of his power. But, according to this reaſoning, every temperate man is a friend to divinity, for he is ſimilar to him. But the intemperate man is diſſimilar, different, and unjuſt; and other things from the ſame

as the producing cauſe; but the end, as the final cauſe of the univerſe. He is the middle, as being equally preſent to all things, though all things participate him differently. But by *that which is direct according to nature*, Plato ſignifies deſert according to juſtice, and undeviating energy, and as it were by one rule. And by a *circular progreſſion*, he ſignifies the eternal, and that which is perpetually after the ſame manner, and according to the ſame; for circulation in ſenſibles poſſeſſes this property. See the Notes on the Cratylus, for a further account of Jupiter.

reaſoning

reaſoning will take place in a ſimilar manner. But we ſhould underſtand that which is conſequent to theſe things, and which in my opinion is *the moſt beautiful*, and THE MOST TRUE [1] of all aſſertions, that for a good man to ſacrifice to and be converſant with the GODS, is of all things the moſt beautiful, the beſt, and the moſt uſeful to the poſſeſſion of a happy life; and that, beſides this, it is *in the higheſt degree becoming;* but the contraries of theſe things naturally happen to the vicious man. For the vicious man is unpurified in his ſoul, but the contrary character is pure. But to receive gifts from one who is defiled, can never become either a good man or a God. In vain, therefore, do the unholy beſtow much labour about the Gods; but ſuch labour is moſt opportune to all holy men. Such then is the ſcope which we ought to regard. What therefore ſhall we ſay the arrows are, and what the impulſe by which they will be moſt properly directed? In the firſt place we muſt ſay, that he who after the Olympian Gods, and thoſe who preſide over the city, honours the terreſtrial Gods, by attributing to them things even, ſecondary, and on the left hand, will in the moſt proper manner reach the mark of piety. But to the Gods ſuperior to theſe he will attribute things according to the odd number, and diſſonant to the particulars we have juſt now mentioned. But after theſe Gods a wiſe man will celebrate the orgies of dæmons, and after theſe of heroes. In the next place, ſtatues muſt follow of the houſehold Gods, which muſt be ſeverally ſacrificed to according to law. After theſe things, ſuch honours as are lawful muſt be paid to living parents. For to theſe the firſt, greateſt, and moſt antient of all debts are to be paid. For every one ought to think, that the whole of his poſſeſſions belongs to thoſe by whom he was begotten and educated, and that he ought to ſupply their wants from theſe to the utmoſt of his power; beginning in the firſt place from his external poſſeſſions; in the ſecond place, ſupplying them from thoſe of his body; and, in the third place, from thoſe of his ſoul: imparting all theſe, in order to diſcharge the debt which he owes his parents for the care they have be-

[1] This paſſage, among many others in the writings of Plato, ſufficiently proves that philoſopher to have been a firm believer in the religion of his country; and that he did not ſecretly deſpiſe it, as has been aſſerted with no leſs impudence than ignorance by certain ſophiſtical prieſts, whoſe little ſoul (in the language of Julian) was indeed acute, but ſaw *nothing* with a viſion healthy and ſound.

ſtowed

ſtowed upon him, and the pangs of labour which his mother formerly endured on his account. He muſt ſupport them too in old age, when they want aſſiſtance in the higheſt degree. It is likewiſe requiſite through the whole of life to ſpeak of our parents in the moſt honourable manner, becauſe there is a moſt heavy puniſhment for light and winged words. For Nemeſis, the angel of juſtice, is the inſpector of all men in things of this kind. It is neceſſary, therefore, to be ſubmiſſive to them when they are angry and full of rage, whether their anger ſhows itſelf in words or in deeds, as not being ignorant that a father may very properly be angry with his ſon, when he thinks that he has been injured by him. But, on the death of parents, the moſt decent and beautiful monuments are to be raiſed to them; not exceeding the uſual magnitude, nor yet leſs than thoſe which our anceſtors erected for their parents. Every year, too, attention ought to be paid to the decoration of their tombs. They ought likewiſe to be continually remembered and reverenced—and this with a moderate expenſe, adapted to the condition of our fortune. By always acting, therefore, and living in this manner, we ſhall each of us be rewarded according to our deſerts, both by the Gods and thoſe natures ſuperior to our own, and ſhall paſs the greateſt part of our life in good hope. But the courſe of the laws themſelves will ſhow in what manner we ought to behave towards our offspring, relations, friends, fellow-citizens, and ſtrangers, ſo as to conduct ourſelves piouſly towards all theſe, and render our life pleaſant, and adorned according to law; and this it will accompliſh, partly by perſuading, and partly by puniſhing through violence and juſtice, ſuch manners as will not ſubmit to perſuaſion; and thus, through the favouring will of the Gods, will render our city bleſſed and happy. But what a legiſlator whoſe conceptions are the ſame as mine ought neceſſarily to ſay of theſe things, but which cannot be adapted to the form of law, it appears to me an example ſhould be preſented, both to the legiſlator and thoſe to whom he gives laws; and that, having diſcuſſed what remains to the utmoſt of our ability, we ſhould after this commence the theſis of laws. Such things, indeed, cannot be eaſily comprehended in one deſcription, ſo as to explain the manner in which they ſubſiſt; but we may thus be able to aſſert ſomething ſtable reſpecting them.

CLIN. Inform me how.

GUEST. I ſhould wiſh them to be obedient to virtue: and it is evident that the legiſlator ſhould endeavour to accompliſh this in the whole of legiſlation.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What has been ſaid, therefore, appears to me to contribute ſomething to that end; ſo that, if the ſoul of the hearer is not perfectly ſavage, it will attend with greater mildneſs and benevolence: hence, though we ſhould not accompliſh any great but a ſmall matter, by rendering the hearer more benevolent, and by this means more docile, we ought to be perfectly ſatisfied. For facility is rare, nor is there an abundance of thoſe who endeavour to become the moſt worthy characters in the greateſt degree, and in the ſhorteſt time. But many proclaim Heſiod to be wiſe for aſſerting that the road to vice was ſmooth, and eaſy to be paſſed through, as being very ſhort: "but (ſays he) the immortal Gods have placed ſweat before virtue, and the road which leads to it is long and arduous, and, at firſt, rough; but, when we arrive at the ſummit, the path which before was difficult becomes eaſy [1]."

CLIN. And it appears to be well ſaid.

GUEST. Entirely ſo. But I am willing to explain to you the intention of my diſcourſe.

CLIN. Explain it then.

GUEST. We will thus therefore direct our diſcourſe to the legiſlator. Inform us, O legiſlator, whether, if you knew what we ought to do and ſay, you would not ſay ſo?

CLIN. He neceſſarily would.

GUEST. Did we not a little before hear you ſaying, that a legiſlator ought not to ſuffer poets to ſay juſt what they pleaſed? For they are ignorant that, when they aſſert any thing contrary to the laws, it will injure the city.

CLIN. You ſpeak truly.

GUEST. But if we ſhould thus ſpeak to him reſpecting the poets, ſhall we have ſpoken moderately?

CLIN. On what account do you aſk this queſtion?

GUEST. There is an antient ſaying, O legiſlator, which is common among

[1] Heſiod. Op. et Di. lib. i.

us, and is confirmed by all other nations, that a poet, when he ſits on the tripod of the muſe, is not in his right ſenſes, but, like a fountain, readily pours forth the influx which he has received: and that, his art being imitative, he is often compelled, when repreſenting men that are contrary to each other, to contradict himſelf; and does not know whether theſe things, or thoſe, are true. But a legiſlator muſt not act in this manner in law, viz. he muſt not aſſert two different things about one thing, but always make one aſſertion about one thing. And you may perceive the truth of this from what you have juſt now ſaid. For, ſince of ſepulchres ſome exceed, others are deficient, and others are moderate, you, having choſen the laſt of theſe, have ordered them to be adopted, and have ſimply praiſed them. But I, if my wife was remarkably rich, and ſhould order me to bury her, I would celebrate in a poem her magnificent ſepulchre: but a parſimonious and poor man would praiſe a tomb which was, in ſome reſpect or other, deficient; and he who is moderately rich would praiſe a moderate ſepulchre. But it is not proper that you ſhould only ſpeak of the moderate as you did juſt now, but that you ſhould inform us what the moderate is, and how far it extends; for otherwiſe you will not as yet underſtand that a diſcourſe of this kind is a law.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, will he who preſides for us over the laws order nothing of this kind in the beginning of the laws, but immediately inform us what ought to be done, and what not, and, having appointed a fine, will turn himſelf to the eſtabliſhing of another law, adding nothing of exhortation and perſuaſion to the promulgators of the laws? Juſt as different phyſicians cure in a different manner. But we will recall to our mind the methods which they employ; that, as boys entreat the phyſician to cure them in the gentleſt manner, ſo we may implore the legiſlator to cure us by the mildeſt means. That I may explain, however, what I mean—we ſay that ſome are phyſicians, and others the ſervants of phyſicians; and theſe laſt we likewiſe call, in a certain reſpect, phyſicians. Do we not?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And do we call them ſo, whether they are free, or ſervants, who, through the orders of their maſters, have acquired the art of medicine, both according to theory and experience, but are not naturally phyſi-

cians like thoſe who are free, who have both learnt the art from themſelves, and inſtructed their children in it? Or do you conſider theſe as forming two kinds of phyſicians?

CLIN. Why ſhould I not?

GUEST. Do you, therefore, underſtand, that when in a city both ſervants and thoſe who are free are ſick, ſervants are for the moſt part cured by ſervants, who viſit the multitude of the ſick, and are diligently employed in the diſpenſatories; and this without either aſſigning or receiving any reaſon reſpecting the ſeveral diſeaſes of the ſervants, but what they have found by experience to be efficacious they tyrannically preſcribe for their patients, as if they poſſeſſed accurate knowledge; and thus, in an arrogant manner, hurry from one diſeaſed ſervant to another; by this mean facilitating their maſter's attention to the ſick? But the freeborn phyſician, for the moſt part, heals and conſiders the diſeaſes of thoſe who are freeborn; and this, by exploring the diſeaſe from the beginning, and proceeding according to nature; converſing both with the ſick man and his friends, and, at the ſame time, learning ſomething himſelf from the ſick, and teaching him ſomething, ſo as not to order him to do any thing till he has perſuaded him of its propriety. But after this he always endeavours, in conjunction with perſuaſion, to lead him in a gentle manner to health. Which of theſe appears to be the better phyſician and exerciſer, he who in this manner heals and exerciſes, or he who in that? He who accompliſhes one power in a twofold manner, or he who accompliſhes it in one way, and this the worſe and more ruſtic of the two?

CLIN. The twofold method, O gueſt, is by far the more excellent.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that we ſhould conſider this twofold and ſimple method as taking place in the eſtabliſhment of laws?

CLIN. How is it poſſible I ſhould not be willing?

GUEST. Inform me then, by the Gods, what the firſt law will be which the legiſlator will eſtabliſh. Will he not firſt of all adorn by his mandates the principle of the generation of cities?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But are not the mutual mixture and communion of marriages the principle of generation to all cities?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Nuptial laws, therefore, being firſt of all eſtabliſhed, they will appear to be well eſtabliſhed with reſpect to the rectitude of every city.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We will, therefore, firſt of all ſpeak of the ſimple law, which, perhaps, will ſubſiſt in the following manner. Every one ſhould marry from thirty to thirty-five years of age; but he who did not ſhould be fined both with money and diſgrace; with money to a certain amount, and with diſgrace of this or that particular kind. Let this then be the ſimple law reſpecting marriages; but let the following be the twofold law. Every one ſhould marry from thirty to thirty-five, conſidering, at the ſame time, that the human race participates from a certain nature of immortality, of which every one is naturally deſirous in the extreme. For the endeavour of mankind not to remain after death without a name is a deſire of this kind. The human race, therefore, is ſomething connate with the whole of time, following and being conjoined with it to the end, becoming immortal by leaving children of children, and participating of immortality through being one and the ſame by generation. For a man willingly to deprive himſelf of this, is by no means holy. But he intentionally deprives himſelf of this who neglects children and wife. He, therefore, who is perſuaded by this law ſhall be liberated from the puniſhment of a fine. But he who is not obedient to it, and who is not married when he is thirty-five years of age, ſhall be fined every year a certain ſum of money, that his ſolitary life may not appear to be profitable and pleaſant to him; and that he may not partake of thoſe honours which the younger in a city pay to the elder. Theſe laws being compared with each other, it will be poſſible to judge of every particular law, whether it ought to be double, and of the ſmalleſt extenſion, on account of mingling threats with perſuaſions; or whether, alone employing threats, it ſhould become ſimple in length.

MEGIL. Agreeably to the Laconic mode, O gueſt, the ſhorter ought always to be preferred. But if any one ſhould order me to become a judge of theſe writings, I ſhould, if it were left to my choice, adopt the longer law for a city. And according to this paradigm, if theſe two laws were propoſed, I ſhould chooſe the ſame reſpecting every law. It is, however, proper that the laws which we have now inſtituted ſhould be approved by

Clinias;

Clinias; for the city belongs to him for whoſe uſe theſe laws have been conceived by us.

CLIN. You ſpeak well, O Megillus.

GUEST. To pay great attention, therefore, either to prolixity or brevity of writing is fooliſh in the extreme. For I think that the beſt writings, and not the longeſt or the ſhorteſt, are to be preferred. But, in the laws which we have juſt now ſpoken of, the one is not by the double alone more conducive to virtue than the other; but that which we ſaid reſpecting the twofold kind of phyſicians was moſt properly adduced. This, however, no legiſlator appears at any time to have conſidered. For, as it is poſſible to uſe two things in the eſtabliſhment of laws, viz. perſuaſion and force, they alone employ one of theſe in managing the crowd who are void of erudition. For they do not mingle perſuaſion with force, but alone employ unmingled violence. But I, O bleſſed man, perceive that a third thing alſo ſhould take place reſpecting laws, but which is not at preſent adopted.

CLIN. Of what are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. Of ſomething ariſing, through a certain divinity, out of things which we have now diſcuſſed. For we began to ſpeak about laws in the morning, and it is now noon; and, repoſing in this all-beautiful retreat, we have diſcourſed of nothing elſe than laws. And we appear to me to have entered juſt now on the buſineſs of legiſlation; but all that has been ſaid before by us was nothing more than a preface to laws. But to what purpoſe do we ſay this? It is becauſe I wiſh to ſay, that of all diſcourſes, and other things which participate of ſound, that is the preface, and, as it were, prelude, which poſſeſſes any artificial argumentation, and is uſeful to the intended diſcuſſion. And, indeed, of the laws, as they are called, of the ode belonging to the harp, and of every muſe, prefaces precede which are wonderfully elaborate. But of true laws, which we ſay are political, no one has ever at any time led forth into light a preface either ſpoken or written; as if there were not naturally any ſuch thing. But our preſent converſation appears to me to ſignify that there is one. The laws, however, which we juſt now called twofold, are not ſimply ſo; but the law, and the preface of the law, are a certain two. However, that which we aſſimilated to a tyrannic mandate, and to the mandates of ſervile phyſicians, is mere, or unmingled, law. But that which was ſaid prior to this, and was called perſuaſive, was

in reality perſuaſive, but, with reſpect to diſcourſe, had the power of a preface. For, that the mandate of the legiſlator, which is law, might be received more benignantly, and, through this, in a more docile manner, the whole of that diſcourſe, which was calculated to perſuade, was introduced by me. Hence, according to my deciſion, that diſcourſe is a preface, and cannot properly be called a diſcuſſion of law. But, after this, what is it I am deſirous ſhould be ſaid by me? It is this: that a legiſlator ought to introduce prefaces prior to all laws, and prior to each particular law, ſo far as they differ from each other, in the ſame reſpect as the two which we have juſt now mentioned.

CLIN. For my part, I ſhould never exhort a man ſkilled in theſe things to eſtabliſh laws in any other manner.

GUEST. You appear, therefore, to me, O Clinias, to ſpeak well, ſo far as you ſay there ſhould be a preface to all laws; and that, on commencing the buſineſs of legiſlation, it is requiſite to prefer to every diſcourſe an exordium naturally accommodated to the ſeveral laws. For that which is to be ſaid after this is not a thing of ſmall importance, nor is the difference trifling, whether ſuch things are commemorated in a clear, or in an obſcure, manner. If, therefore, we ſhould order legiſlators to preface in a ſimilar manner about great and ſmall laws, we ſhould not act properly. For this is not to be done either in every ſong or in every diſcourſe; becauſe, though it may naturally belong to all, yet it is not uſeful to all. A thing of this kind, however, is to be allowed the rhetorician, the ſinger, and the legiſlator.

CLIN. You appear to me to ſpeak moſt true. But let us make no longer delay, but return to our propoſed diſcourſe, and begin, if it is agreeable to you, from thoſe things which, not as prefacing, were aſſerted by you above. Again, therefore, as thoſe that are engaged in ſports ſay, let us revolve better things from a ſecond beginning, as finiſhing a preface, and not a caſual diſcourſe, as was the caſe juſt now. Let us begin, then, acknowledging that we preface. And the particulars, indeed, reſpecting the honour of the Gods, and reverence of our anceſtors, have been ſufficiently diſcuſſed. Let us, therefore, endeavour to ſpeak about what follows, till it ſhall appear to you that our preface is complete. And after this you may enter on the buſineſs of laws.

GUEST. About the Gods, therefore, and the attendants on the Gods, together with parents both when living and dead, we then ſufficiently prefaced,

as

as we now ſay. With reſpect to what remains, you appear to me to order that it ſhould be led forth into light.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But, after theſe things, it is proper to diſcourſe in common about our ſouls, bodies, and poſſeſſions, together with ſerious purſuits and remiſſions of labour, in ſuch a manner that both the ſpeaker and the hearers may, to the utmoſt of their power, be partakers of diſcipline. After what has been ſaid, therefore, theſe things are to be truly ſpoken and heard by us.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK V.

LET every one then hear who has already heard what we have ſaid reſpecting the Gods, and our dear progenitors. For, after the Gods, a man's ſoul is the moſt divine of all his poſſeſſions, as being his moſt intimate property. But a man's poſſeſſions are in every reſpect twofold. And the more excellent, and the better, poſſeſs dominion, but the inferior, and worſe, are ſubject to command. The former, therefore, are always to be honoured before the latter. Hence, I properly exhort every man, when I ſay that he ought to honour his own ſoul in the ſecond place, after our lords, the Gods, and their attendants. But, in ſhort, no one honours his ſoul properly, though he appears to do ſo. For honour is, in a certain reſpect, a divine good: but nothing evil is honourable. He, therefore, who thinks that he enlarges his ſoul by certain diſcourſes or gifts, when, at the ſame time, he does not render it better than it was before, appears indeed to honour it, but by no means does ſo. For every man, from his very childhood, thinks himſelf ſufficient to know all things, and that he honours his ſoul by praiſing it, and by freely permitting it to do whatever it pleaſes. But we now ſay that he who acts in this manner injures, and does not honour, his ſoul. And yet it is neceſſary, as we have ſaid, that it ſhould be honoured in the ſecond place after the Gods. Nor does he honour it who does not conſider himſelf as the cauſe of his own errors, and of his numerous and mighty vices, but lays the blame upon others, and is always careful to exonerate himſelf. Such a one appears, indeed, to honour it, though this is far from being the caſe: for he injures it. Nor does he in any reſpect honour his ſoul who gratifies himſelf with pleaſures contrary to reaſon, and the praiſe of the legiſlator: for he diſhonours it, by filling it with vice and repentance. Nor yet does a man honour

honour his ſoul, when he does not ſtrenuouſly endure labours that are praiſed, fear and pain, but ſinks under them: for by doing all theſe things he diſhonours his ſoul. Nor, again, does he honour his ſoul, who thinks that to live is a thing in every reſpect good: for by ſuch a conception he diſhonours it. For he aſſents to him who thinks that every thing in Hades pertaining to the ſoul is bad; nor does he oppoſe and teach him, that he is ignorant whether, on the contrary, the things about the Gods that dwell there are not the greateſt of all goods. Nor yet, when any one honours a certain corporeal beauty before virtue, is it at all different from truly and entirely diſhonouring the ſoul. For ſuch a one falſely aſſerts, that the body is more honourable than the ſoul. For nothing earth-born is more honourable than things Olympian. But he who entertains an opinion different from this, reſpecting the ſoul, is ignorant that he neglects this admirable poſſeſſion. Nor, again, does he adorn his ſoul with gifts, who deſires to poſſeſs riches in an unbecoming manner, or who is not grieved when he poſſeſſes them unjuſtly; but ſuch a one entirely fails of accompliſhing this. For he gives up that which is honourable, and at the ſame time beautiful, in his ſoul, for the ſake of a little gold; when at the ſame time all the gold, which is both upon and under the earth, is in no reſpect of equal worth with virtue. In ſhort, he who is not willing, by all poſſible means, to abſtain from ſuch things as the legiſlator ranks among the baſe and vicious, and to purſue to the utmoſt of his power ſuch things as he places among the good and beautiful, does not perceive that, in all theſe things, he renders his ſoul, which is a moſt divine poſſeſſion, in the higheſt degree diſhonourable and baſe. For, in ſhort, no one conſiders what is the greateſt puniſhment of evil conduct; which is the becoming ſimilar to vicious men. But he who becomes ſimilar to them avoids good men and good aſſertions, ſeparates himſelf from the good, becomes agglutinated to the vicious, and earneſtly deſires their converſation. But, in conſequence of intimately aſſociating with theſe, he muſt neceſſarily do and ſuffer ſuch things as they naturally do and ſay to each other. Such a paſſion, therefore, is not juſtice (for the juſt and juſtice are beautiful), but puniſhment; this being a paſſion attendant on injuſtice, of which both he who is a partaker, and he who does not partake, are miſerable:—the one, becauſe he is not cured; but the other, becauſe, while many are ſaved, he periſhes. But, that I may ſum

up the whole, our honour conſiſts in following things of a more excellent nature, and in rendering ſuch things as are worſe, but yet are capable of being made better, as good as poſſible. No poſſeſſion, therefore, belonging to a man is more naturally adapted to fly from evil, and to inveſtigate and chooſe that which is the beſt of all things, than ſoul; nor, when it has choſen, to aſſociate with it in common for the remainder of life. On this account, it muſt be honoured in the ſecond degree. But every one will underſtand, that the third honour according to nature is that of the body. It is however requiſite to contemplate theſe honours, and to conſider which of them are true, and which adulterated. And this is the buſineſs of a legiſlator. But he appears to me to announce, what, and what kind of honours theſe are; as, that the body is honourable, not when it is beautiful, or ſtrong, or ſwift, nor yet when it is large or healthy, (though under theſe circumſtances i appears to be ſo to many,) nor when it has the contraries of theſe. But thoſe things which, being in the middle, touch upon the whole of this habit, are by far more moderate and ſafe. For the former render the ſoul arrogant and confident, but the latter humble and ſervile. The like takes place with reſpect to the poſſeſſion of riches and property of every kind. For the poſſeſſion of each of theſe, in a tranſcendent degree, produces hatred and ſedition, both among cities and individuals. But ſlavery is for the moſt part the conſequence of a deficiency of theſe. No one, therefore, ſhould apply himſelf to the acquiſition of wealth for the ſake of his children, that he may leave them rich in the extreme: for this will neither be better for them, nor for the city. For the property of young men, which is neither attended with adulation, nor indigent of things neceſſary, is the moſt harmonious, and the beſt of all. For, ſymphonizing and harmonizing with us in all things, it renders our life free from pain. It is proper, therefore, to leave children, not abundance of gold, but of modeſty. But we think that we ſhall accompliſh this by reproving impudent young men. This, however, is not to be accompliſhed by exhorting young men in the manner adopted at preſent,—I mean, by telling them that they ought to be modeſt in every thing; but a prudent legiſlator will rather adviſe old men to behave modeſtly before youth, and above all things to take care that no young man, at any time, either ſees or hears them doing or ſaying any thing baſe. For, where old men are void of ſhame, there young men

men muſt neceſſarily be moſt impudent; ſince the moſt excellent diſcipline, both of young and old, conſiſts, not in admoniſhing, but in acting through the whole of life agreeably to the admonitions of others. But he who honours and venerates the whole of his kindred, who participate of the ſame blood, and the ſame houſehold Gods, will deſervedly find thoſe Gods propitious to him in the procreation of children. And beſides this, he will obtain the benevolence of his friends and aſſociates through life, who conſiders the attention which they pay him greater and more venerable than they do, but his own kindneſs towards them leſs than they do. But he will by far behave in the beſt manner, both towards his country and fellow citizens, who prefers the glory of being ſubſervient to the laws of his country, to conqueſt in the Olympian games, and to all warlike and peaceful conteſts; and who is ſubſervient to them in the moſt becoming manner through the whole of life. The aſſociations, too, with ſtrangers ſhould be conſidered as things moſt holy. For nearly all the crimes of ſtrangers towards ſtrangers are more noticed by avenging Deity than thoſe of citizens towards each other. For, a ſtranger being deſtitute both of companions and kindred is an object of greater commiſeration both to men and Gods. He, therefore, who is more capable of taking vengeance is more readily diſpoſed to give aſſiſtance. But the hoſpitable dæmon and divinity of every one, being the attendants of hoſpitable Jupiter, are capable of taking vengeance in the moſt eminent degree. Every one, therefore, who is endued with the leaſt portion of conſideration, ſhould be very fearful through the whole of life of acting in an inhoſpitable manner. But, of all crimes which are committed both towards ſtrangers and natives, thoſe are the greateſt which are committed towards ſuppliants. For the Divinity with whom the ſuppliant forms a covenant, becomes eminently the guardian of him in his affliction. So that no one who injures ſuppliants will go unpuniſhed. And thus far we have nearly diſcuſſed the duties of children towards their parents, of a man towards himſelf, and the things belonging to himſelf; likewiſe of his duty towards his country, friends, kindred, ſtrangers, and fellow citizens. It now follows that we ſhow what qualities a man ought to poſſeſs ſo as that he may paſs through life in the moſt becoming manner; and ſo that, not law, but praiſe and blame, inſtructing every one, they may by theſe means be rendered more benevolent and obedient to thoſe who are about to eſtabliſh laws. And theſe are the things

which after this muſt be ſubjects of our diſcourſe. But *truth is the leader of every good both to Gods and men:* of which he who in futurity will be bleſſed and happy, muſt participate from the beginning, that for the greateſt part of time he may paſs through life in truth. For ſuch a one is faithful. But he is unfaithful who is a friend to voluntary falſehood. And he who is a friend to involuntary falſehood is deprived of intellect: neither of which is an object of emulation. For he who is unfaithful and void of diſcipline is unfriendly. And in progreſs of time, his character being known, near the end of life there is prepared for him the grievous ſolitude of old age. So that, whether his aſſociates and children live or not, he nearly leads, in either caſe, an orphan life. Indeed, he is honourable who acts in no reſpect unjuſtly: but he who does not ſuffer the unjuſt to act unjuſtly, deſerves more than double the honour of the former character. For the former is of equal worth with one man, but the latter, with many men; ſince he announces to the governors the injuſtice of others. But he who puniſhes injuſtice, in conjunction with the governors, to the utmoſt of his power, ſuch a one will be proclaimed a great and perfect man in the city; for he will be victorious in virtue. It is proper alſo to give the ſame praiſe to temperance and prudence. And he who poſſeſſes other goods, and is not only able to poſſeſs them himſelf, but to impart them to others, is to be honoured as one who has attained the ſummit of excellence. But he who is not able to accompliſh this, and yet is willing, is to be ranked in the ſecond place: and the envious man, and he who will not impart any good for the ſake of friendſhip, are to be blamed. We ought not, however, to diſhonour the poſſeſſion on account of the poſſeſſor, but ſhould endeavour to obtain it with all our might. Every one too ſhould contend with us for virtue, without envy. For every character of this kind enlarges cities, in conſequence of ſtriving himſelf, and not impeding others through calumny. But the envious man, while he thinks to ſurpaſs others by detraction, tends leſs himſelf to true virtue, and renders thoſe who mutually tend to it deſpondent, by blaming them unjuſtly. Hence, depriving the city of ſtrenuous exertions in the acquiſition of virtue, he, at the ſame time, leſſens its renown. It is proper, beſides, that a man ſhould be ardent in every thing, and particularly that he ſhould be mild. For it is impoſſible to avoid the unjuſt actions of others, which are either difficult to be cured, or are entirely incurable by any other means than con-

teſt, defence, victory, and by ſuffering no remiſſion in puniſhment. But it is impoſſible for any ſoul to accompliſh this without generous ardour.

With reſpect to ſuch unjuſt actions as are curable, it is requiſite to know, in the firſt place, that no unjuſt man is voluntarily unjuſt. For no one would, at any time, willingly poſſeſs any of the greateſt evils, and much leſs in thoſe things reſpecting himſelf which are moſt honourable. But ſoul, as we have ſaid, is in reality in all things the moſt honourable. No one, therefore, would at any time voluntarily receive the greateſt evil in that which is moſt honourable, and live through the whole of life poſſeſſing it. But the unjuſt man, and he who is vicious, are in every reſpect miſerable. It is proper, however, to pity him who is capable of being cured, and to reſtrain our anger againſt him, leſt, by an effeminate effervescence of anger, we ſhould exhibit all the bitterneſs of wrath. But it is requiſite to employ anger againſt thoſe who are incontinently and incurably bad. Hence, we have ſaid that every good man ought to be ardent, and at the ſame time mild. But an evil, which is the greateſt of all evils, is implanted in the ſouls of many men, which (every one pardoning himſelf) they do not deviſe any means of avoiding. And this is what is uſually ſaid, that every man is naturally a friend to himſelf, and that it is proper a thing of this kind ought to be. But, *in reality, a vehement love of ſelf is to every man the cauſe of all his errors.* For he who loves is blind with reſpect to the object of his love. So that he who thinks he ought always to be honoured in preference to truth, judges of things juſt, good, and beautiful, in a depraved manner. For it is proper that he who is deſtined to be a great man ſhould neither love himſelf, nor the things pertaining to himſelf, but that he ſhould love juſt actions, whether they are accompliſhed by himſelf or by another. In conſequence of this error, every man's ignorance appears to himſelf to be wiſdom. Hence, in ſhort, though we do not know any thing, we are of opinion that we know all things. But, not permitting others to do that of which we ourſelves are ignorant, we are compelled to err from their conduct. On this account every man ought to avoid the vehement love of himſelf, and to follow one better than himſelf, without paying any attention to ſhame. There are alſo certain leſſer things, which are often ſaid, and which, as they are not leſs uſeful than what has been already aſſerted, it is proper, recollecting ourſelves, to mention. For, as if ſomething was always

always flowing away from us, it is neceſſary that, on the contrary, there ſhould be a perpetual influx of ſomething. But recollection is an influx of prudence which had deſerted us. It is proper, therefore, to reſtrain unbecoming laughter, and that every man ſhould announce to every man the propriety of concealing all joy and ſorrow, and of keeping the body in a becoming habit, whether the dæmon of any one eſtabliſhes him in felicity, *or whether his fortune is ſuch that he is obliged, with dæmons oppoſing him, to engage in actions of an elevated and arduous nature.* But it is proper always to hope for thoſe things which divinity imparts to the good; and when we are oppreſſed with heavy labours, we ſhould hope that Divinity will diminiſh their weight, and change the preſent condition of our circumſtances into one more favourable; and with reſpect to good things, the contraries of theſe, that they will always be preſent with us, with good fortune. With theſe hopes every one ought to live, and with the recollection of all theſe things; not with a parſimonious recollection, but always, both ſeriouſly and in ſport, perſpicuouſly reminding each other and ourſelves of theſe particulars. And now we have nearly ſaid all that is proper reſpecting thoſe divine duties which every one ought to perform, but we have not yet ſpoken concerning human duties. It is, however, neceſſary ſo to do: for we ſpeak to men, and not to Gods. But pleaſures, pains, and deſires, are naturally in the higheſt degree human, from which it is neceſſary that the whole mortal animal ſhould, with the greateſt earneſtneſs, be ſuſpended. And it is requiſite to praiſe the moſt becoming life, not only becauſe in its form it excels in glory, but becauſe, if any one is willing to taſte of it, and not when a youth to fly from it, he will alſo excel in that which we all are in ſearch of, I mean the poſſeſſion of more joy than ſorrow through the whole of life. That this will clearly be the caſe, if any one taſtes of it in a proper manner, will readily and vehemently be apparent; but how this may be accompliſhed, and whether it is inherent in us naturally, or contrary to nature, it is requiſite now to conſider. We ought, however, to conſider one life compared with another, the more pleaſant and the more calamitous, in this manner. We wiſh that pleaſure may be preſent with us, but we neither chooſe nor wiſh for pain. And we never wiſh for a middle condition inſtead of pleaſure, but we deſire it in preference to pain. We alſo wiſh for leſs pain with more pleaſure, but we do not deſire leſs pleaſure with greater pain. But we can clearly ſhow

that

that we are unwilling to poſſeſs each of theſe in an equal manner. All theſe both differ and at the ſame time do not differ in multitude and magnitude, in intenſity, equality, and ſuch things as are contrary to all theſe, with reſpect to the choice of each. And as theſe particulars are thus circumſtanced, we wiſh for that life in which many of both theſe greatly and vehemently ſubſiſt, but in which pleaſures tranſcend; but we do not deſire that life in which the contraries to theſe are inherent. Nor, again, do we wiſh for that life in which a few of theſe, of a trifling and ſolitary nature, ſubſiſt, and in which afflictive circumſtances tranſcend; but we deſire that life in which the contraries to theſe are found. However, as we have ſaid before, we ought to conſider that life as ſubſiſting in an equilibrium, in which theſe poſſeſs equal power. For we deſire the life which ſurpaſſes in the things with which we are pleaſed; and we are unwilling to poſſeſs that which exceeds in the contraries to theſe. But it is neceſſary to conſider all our lives as naturally bound in theſe; and beſides this, what the things are which we naturally deſire. If, therefore, we ſhould ſay that we wiſh for any thing beſides theſe, we muſt ſay that it is through an ignorance and unſkilfulneſs in lives. What then, and of what kind are thoſe lives, in preferring which it is neceſſary that he who perceives what is the object of deſire, and voluntary, and what are the contraries to theſe, ſhould preſcribe a law to himſelf, that thus having choſen that which is friendly, pleaſant, the beſt, and the moſt beautiful, he may lead the moſt bleſſed life poſſible to man? We call then one life temperate, another prudent, another brave; and we rank in the fourth place a healthy life. We likewiſe eſtabliſh four other lives contrary to theſe, viz. the imprudent, the timid, the intemperate, and the diſeaſed. He, therefore, who knows what a temperate life is, will aſſert that it is mild in all things, and that it imparts quiet pains, quiet pleaſures, placid deſires, and loves not inſane; but that an intemperate life is impetuous in all things, ſo that it imparts vehement pains, vehement pleaſures, ſtrenuous and furious deſires, and the moſt inſane loves. But in a temperate life the pleaſures ſurpaſs the pains, and in an intemperate life the pleaſures are ſurpaſſed by the pains, in magnitude, multitude, and denſity. Hence, the one of theſe lives is neceſſarily more pleaſant to us, according to nature, but the other is more painful. And nature does not permit him, who wiſhes to live pleaſantly, to live voluntarily in an intemperate manner. But it is evident,

evident, if what we have now aſſerted is right, that every intemperate man is neceſſarily unwillingly ſo. For the vulgar every where live indigent of temperance, either through the privation of diſcipline, or through incontinence, or through both. The ſame things are to be conſidered reſpecting a diſeaſed and healthy life: as, that they poſſeſs pleaſures and pains, but that the pleaſures ſurpaſs the pains in a healthy life, but the pains the pleaſures in diſeaſes. Our will, however, in the choice of lives, does not conſent that pain may tranſcend pleaſure; but we judge the life in which it is ſurpaſſed to be more pleaſant. And we ſay that the temperate man poſſeſſes in every reſpect things fewer, leſs, and more attenuated than the intemperate, the prudent than the imprudent, the brave than the timid; and that the one ſurpaſſes in pleaſures, but the other in pains; ſo that the brave man ſurpaſſes the timid in pleaſures, and the prudent the imprudent. And, in ſhort, the life which participates of virtue, either pertaining to the body or the ſoul, is more pleaſant than the life which participates of depravity; and beſides this, it tranſcends other lives in beauty and rectitude, in virtue and glory; ſo that he who poſſeſſes it lives more happily than he who poſſeſſes the contrary life, in every reſpect, and totally. Here then let the preface to laws end.

But, after the preface, it is neceſſary that law ſhould follow; or rather, according to truth, the laws of a polity are to be written. As, therefore, things which are woven are not all woven from the ſame threads, but there is a difference in the quality of the threads, for ſome are more firm and ſtrong, but others ſofter and of a more yielding nature; in like manner it is neceſſary to judge of thoſe that have great dominion in cities, and thoſe that act only in every thing from trifling diſcipline. There are, however, two forms of a polity: the one, the eſtabliſhment of governors; the other, that which gives laws to the governors themſelves. But prior to all theſe things it is neceſſary to conſider as follows: When a ſhepherd and herdſman, one who takes care of horſes, and others of this kind, engage in their reſpective offices, they never attempt to take any care of them till they have firſt adminiſtered a purification adapted to each of them. And, beſides this, chooſing out the healthy and the ſick, the noble and the ignoble, they ſend the former to other herds, but take care of the latter; conſidering that otherwiſe their labour would be vain about thoſe bodies and ſouls which a depraved nature

and

and aliment have corrupted; ſince, without ſeparating in each of theſe herds the healthy and diſeaſed manners and bodies from each other, they would periſh by contagion. The attention, however, which is paid to other animals is indeed leſs, and is alone worthy to be mentioned for the ſake of an example. But the legiſlator ought to pay the greateſt attention to men, and ſhould inveſtigate and aſſert that which is accommodated to every one, both reſpecting purification and all other actions. For that which concerns the purification of a city ſhould ſubſiſt as follows: As there are many purifications, ſome of them are eaſy, but others difficult; and he who is both a tyrant and a legiſlator may be able to uſe ſuch purifications as are difficult, and ſuch as are the beſt. But the legiſlator who eſtabliſhes a new polity and laws without the aſſiſtance of a tyrant, may rejoice, if he is able to purify with the mildeſt of purifications. The beſt purification is however painful; juſt as thoſe medicines which unite juſtice with puniſhment, produce at length in the offending party either exile or death. For it is cuſtomary to free the city from thoſe men who have perpetrated the greateſt crimes, when they are found to be incurable, and have in the greateſt degree injured the city; but with us the following is a milder purification. For thoſe that through want of food readily offer themſelves to certain leaders, in order to aſſault thoſe that are not in want, theſe, as being naturally the diſeaſe of a city, ſhould be benignantly ſent away [1], under the honourable appellation of a colony. Every legiſlator, therefore, ſhould do this in the beginning of his legiſlation. But more difficult things than theſe happen to us at preſent. For it is not neceſſary to deviſe at preſent either a colony or any ſelect purification: but as if there was a conflux of water, partly from fountains and partly from torrents, into one lake, it is neceſſary to obſerve how the confluent water will be moſt pure; partly by drawing, partly by deducing it into another channel, and partly by diverting its courſe. But labour and danger, as it appears, are to be found in every political eſtabliſhment. However, ſince we are now engaged in diſcourſe, and not in action, our ſelection is accompliſhed, and purification

[1] The laws of Plato, being perfectly equitable, conſider the good of the offender in the puniſhments which they enjoin, and not the good of the community alone; but our laws, eſpecially in crimes pertaining to money, alone conſider the good of the community. This is one among many of the baneful effects of commerce.

takes place according to our deſire. For, having by every kind of perſuaſion, and for a ſufficient length of time, examined thoſe evil men who endeavour to enter our city in order to govern it, we ſhall forbid their entrance. But we ſhall admit the good, rendering them benevolent and propitious to the utmoſt of our power. The felicity, however, which has happened to us ought not to be concealed. For, as we ſay that the colony of the Heraclidæ was happy, becauſe it eſcaped the dire and dangerous ſtrife reſpecting the diviſion of land and the diſcharge of debts, about which a city of the antients being compelled to give laws, it did not permit any thing to be immoveable, nor yet after a manner was it poſſible for any thing to be moved; in like manner, the ſame thing appears nearly to have happened to us. But, in ſhort, prayer alone remains, and a trifling mutation cautiouſly and ſlowly made in a great length of time; ſo that, in theſe mutations, the citizens, together with many debtors, will poſſeſs abundance of land, with which they will give aſſiſtance to many, humanely imparting their land to the indigent, and contenting themſelves with moderate poſſeſſions. They will likewiſe conſider poverty as conſiſting, not in a diminution of property, but in an inſatiable deſire of acquiring more. For this is the greateſt beginning of ſafety to a city; and upon this, as a ſtable foundation, every politic ornament, which is accommodated to an eſtabliſhment of this kind, may be raiſed. But when this mutation is debile, no political action will afterwards be eaſily accompliſhed by the city. This, indeed, as we have ſaid, we ſhould avoid; but, at the ſame time, it may more properly be ſaid, that, if we do not avoid it, we ſhould ſhow by what means this flight may be accompliſhed. We ſay then, that it is to be accompliſhed by cultivating juſtice, and baniſhing the deſire of gain: but, beſides this, there is no other, either broad or narrow, paſſage for flight. Let this then be eſtabliſhed by us as a prop of the city. For it is neceſſary that the poſſeſſions which the citizens prepare for themſelves ſhould be blameleſs; or, that thoſe ſhould deſiſt from advancing any further in the acquiſition of property, who have an antient enmity towards each other, and who participate but a ſmall degree of intellect. But thoſe to whom Divinity imparts, as it does to us at preſent, the eſtabliſhment of a new city, in which the inhabitants have no enmity towards each other,—if through the diſtribution of land and habitations hatred ſhould ariſe among them,—in this caſe it will not be human ignorance, but

ignorance

ignorance accompanied with every vice. What then will be the mode of proper diſtribution? In the firſt place, the quantity of the number ought to be determined. In the next place, it ſhould be agreed into how many and what kind of parts the diſtribution to the citizens ſhould be made. In the third place, the land and habitations ſhould be diſtributed equally, in the moſt eminent degree. But the quantity of the multitude cannot otherwiſe be properly aſſigned than by paying attention to the land and cities of the neighbouring inhabitants. And the land, indeed, ſhould be as much as is ſufficient to afford nutriment for ſo many moderate men; but of more than this there is no occaſion. But the number of theſe moderate perſons ſhould be ſufficient to defend themſelves againſt the incurſions of their unjuſt neighbours, and likewiſe to give aſſiſtance to their neighbours when injured. Having then conſidered theſe things, we may be able to define both actually and verbally the land and the neighbouring inhabitants. But now, for the ſake of a ſcheme and deſcription, that the thing itſelf may be accompliſhed, our diſcourſe proceeds to legiſlation. The number of the huſbandmen, and thoſe that defend the diſtribution of the land, ſhould be five thouſand and forty, this being a number adapted for the purpoſe. In like manner the land and the habitation ſhould be diſtributed into the ſame parts, ſo that the man and his portion of land may accord in diſtribution. And in the firſt place, indeed, the whole number ſhould be divided into two parts, and afterwards into three. It is likewiſe naturally capable of a diviſion into four, five, and ſo in ſucceſſion as far as to ten. Thus much, indeed, ought to be underſtood by every legiſlator reſpecting numbers; I mean, that he ſhould underſtand what, and what kind of number will be moſt uſeful to all cities. But we ſay that that number is beſt adapted for this purpoſe, which poſſeſſes in itſelf many diſtributions, and theſe orderly diſpoſed. For every number is not allotted ſections into all things. But the number five thouſand and forty, both for the purpoſes of war and peace, for all conventions and communions, for tributes and diſtributions, cannot be cut into more than one of ſixty parts; but you may continue the diviſion of it from one as far as to ten. Theſe things, however, ought to be more firmly conſidered at leiſure, by thoſe to whom they are committed by the law; for they cannot ſubſiſt otherwiſe than in this manner. But it is neceſſary that they ſhould be mentioned to the founder of a city, for the ſake of what

follows. For, whether any one eſtabliſhes a new city from the beginning, or whether he reſtores an antient one that has periſhed,—if he is endued with intellect, he will not attempt to make any alterations in any thing which ought to be performed reſpecting the Gods, their temples, and their ſacred concerns, or the names of certain Gods or dæmons, which ought to be given to temples; whether theſe ceremonies are derived from Delphi, or Dodona, or Ammon, or from certain antient diſcourſes, by which ſome perſons have been perſuaded; or whether they have been the reſult of divine viſions and inſpiration. For, in conſequence of being perſuaded of their truth, the antients eſtabliſhed ſacrifices mixed with myſtic ceremonies; whether theſe originated from the natives themſelves, or whether they are of Tyrrhene, or Cyprian, or of any other origin. But, from theſe antient diſcourſes and rumours, they conſecrated ſtatues, altars and temples, and placed each in a ſacred grove. In all theſe the legiſlator ſhould not make the ſmalleſt innovation; but ſhould attribute to each of the parts, a God, a dæmon, or a certain hero. And in the diſtribution of the land, he ſhould in the firſt place ſelect a portion for illuſtrious groves and other ſacred purpoſes, ſo that the inhabitants of each of the parts, aſſembling at ſtated times, may with facility prepare themſelves for their reſpective employments, ſo as during the ſacrifices to aſſociate benevolently with and recognize each other. For *nothing is more advantageous to a city than for the citizens to be known to each other; ſince, where each has no light in the manners of each, but darkneſs* [1], *there neither honours nor governors are properly appointed, nor can any one obtain, in a becoming manner, the juſtice which is due to him.* But every man, one towards one, ought earneſtly to endeavour in all cities, that he may never appear inſincere to any one, but may be always artleſs and true, and that, being ſuch, no other perſon may deceive him. But the throw which follows this, in the eſtabliſhment of laws, like that of cheſs-men, according to the proverb, from a temple, ſince it is unuſual, may perhaps cauſe him who hears it at firſt to wonder. But to him who has reaſoned upon, and tried it, it will appear that the city will thus, in the ſecond place, be inhabited in the beſt manner. Some one, however, perhaps, will not approve of this city, becauſe it does not employ a tyrannic legiſlator. It

[1] As in London, and all great modern cities.

will,

will, indeed, be moſt proper to ſpeak of the beſt polity, and likewiſe of a ſecond and third, and then leave it to every one's option to chooſe that which pleaſes him the moſt. We therefore ſhall act in this manner; and, after we have ſpoken of a polity which is firſt, of one which is ſecond, and of another which is the third in virtue, we ſhall leave it to the option of Clinias, and any other who may be preſent at the ſelection of theſe, to attribute to his country whichever of them he pleaſes. The firſt city and polity, therefore, and the beſt laws, ſubſiſt there where through the whole city that antient proverb takes place in the moſt eminent degree, that all things are common among friends. This then muſt be aſſerted, whether it now is or ever was adopted, that women, children, and all poſſeſſions ſhould be common; and that private property ſhould by all poſſible means be exterminated from life. Things too which are private by nature ſhould every where, as much as poſſible, become common; ſuch as the eyes, the ears, and the hands. For ſeeing, hearing, and acting, ſhould be employed for common advantage. In like manner, all men ſhould praiſe and blame the ſame things, rejoice in and be afflicted with the ſame circumſtances, and as much as poſſible adopt ſuch laws as will unite the city in the moſt eminent degree. No one can eſtabliſh any bound of virtue more tranſcendently proper than this. The inhabitants of ſuch a city, whether they are Gods [1] or ſons of the Gods, by living together in this manner, will lead a joyful life. On this account it is not proper to conſider any other paradigm of a polity, but, inſpecting this, we ought to explore ſuch a one to the utmoſt of our power. But this, which is the ſubject of our preſent diſcuſſion, if it ſhould ſubſiſt, would moſt nearly approach to immortality. And if it does not rank in the firſt, it certainly will in the ſecond place. However, if Divinity is willing, we will after this diſcuſs the polity, which is the third in order. Let us now then conſider the nature of this polity, and how it may be eſtabliſhed. In the firſt place, land and houſes ſhould be diſtributed to them, and they ſhould not be ſuffered to cultivate the ground in common; ſince a thing of this kind is greater than their generation, nutrition, and education will admit. Land, however, and houſes, ſhould be diſtributed to

[1] Viz Gods according to ſimilitude. For, as intellect is called a God by Plato, according to union, and ſoul according to participation, ſo the moſt exalted characters among men are called by him Gods according to ſimilitude.

them

them with this intention, that each may conſider the portion allotted him, as common to the whole city. But, this region being their country, they ought to reverence it in a greater degree than children their mother; for, being a goddeſs, ſhe is the ſovereign miſtreſs of mortals. The ſame ſhould be our conceptions of the indigenous Gods and dæmons. But that theſe things may ſubſiſt in this manner, through the whole time, the following particulars are to be conſidered: As many Veſtal hearths as are diſtributed to us at preſent, ſo many ought always to be diſtributed, and neither more nor fewer in number. But a thing of this kind will be firmly eſtabliſhed in every city, if every one always leaves that child to whom he is moſt attached, the only heir of his allotted portion, his ſucceſſor, and cultivator of the Gods, of his race, his country, of the living, and the dead. But thoſe who have more children than one ſhould for this purpoſe portion the females according to the eſtabliſhed law, but commit the males to the care of thoſe citizens that have no children of their own, and this in a very benevolent manner. However, if benevolence is wanting, or each of the citizens has a numerous progeny of male or female children, or on the contrary but a few children, owing to the barrenneſs of the women, then that greateſt and moſt honourable governor whom we have eſtabliſhed, muſt conſider what is proper to be done in either of theſe caſes, and, whether there is an abundance or a defect of children, muſt deviſe ſome method by which five thouſand and forty habitations alone may always remain. But there are many methods by which this may be accompliſhed. For procreation may be reſtrained, which is the cauſe of this abundance; and, on the contrary, by diligent attention, an increaſe of offspring may be obtained, when it is requiſite. For what we are ſpeaking of may be accompliſhed by honour and diſgrace, and by the admonitory diſcourſes of the old to the young. Laſtly, every defect ariſes from the number of five thouſand and forty houſes not being preſerved. But, if our city ſhould have a ſuperabundance of citizens, through the familiarity of thoſe that dwell together, and by this means it ſhould be oppreſſed with poverty, that antient device muſt be adopted which we have often mentioned, that a friendly colony ſhould be ſent from friends; for it appears that this will be advantageous to the city. But if, on the contrary, at any time an inundation of diſeaſes, or the ravages of war, ſhould reduce the citizens to a leſs than the eſtabliſhed number, ſuch

citizens as have been educated in an adulterated manner are not to be voluntarily admitted to ſupply the place of thoſe that are wanting. But it is ſaid that even Divinity is not able to force neceſſity. We ſhould ſay, therefore, that our preſent diſcourſe ſpeaks in an exhortatory manner as follows: O beſt of all men, who honour according to nature ſimilitude and equality, ſameneſs, and general conſent, never relax in honouring theſe, both according to the number, and all the power of things beautiful and good. And, in the firſt place, preſerve through the whole of life the above-mentioned number. In the next place, do not deſpiſe the moderate elevation and magnitude of the poſſeſſions which were firſt diſtributed to you, by buying and ſelling with each other. For, if you act in this manner, neither Divinity, the diſtributor of your allotted portion, nor the legiſlator will be your aſſociate in war. For now the law announces in the firſt place, that he who is willing to receive the allotted portion ſhall receive it, but that he who is unwilling ſhall be deprived of it: and this, becauſe in the firſt place the land is ſacred to all the Gods; and in the next place, becauſe the prieſts and prieſteſſes pray during the firſt, ſecond, and third ſacrifices, that both the buyers and ſellers of allotted houſes and lands may be properly diſpoſed in ſuch tranſactions. But they ſhould write on cypreſs monuments in temples, for the benefit of poſterity. And beſides this, for the purpoſe of preſerving theſe, they ſhould commit them to the care of that magiſtrate who appears to have the moſt acute viſion, that thoſe may be detected who act fraudulently, and that he who is diſobedient both to law and divinity may be puniſhed. But, according to the proverb, no vicious man will ever underſtand how much all cities will be benefited by acting in the manner we have preſcribed, but he only who is ſkilful and of equitable manners. In this city there is no ardent purſuit of gain; nor is it lawful for any one to apply himſelf to the acquiſition of illiberal wealth, becauſe the diſgraceful mechanic art, as it is called, which is employed for this purpoſe, ſubverts liberal manners. Riches, therefore, are not to be accumulated by any ſuch means. Beſides this, another law follows all theſe, which forbids any private perſon the poſſeſſion of either ſilver or gold. But becauſe there is daily occaſion for money for the ſake of commutation, which is nearly neceſſary to artificers, and to all thoſe that have ſimilar wants, in order to pay the wages of mercenaries, ſervants, and huſbandmen—for the ſake of theſe things

things we permit the uſe of money in the city, but order it to be ſuch as may be honoured by our citizens, but deſpiſed by other men. For the ſake of war, indeed, and travelling to other countries, as when ambaſſadors are ſent to foreign nations, or for ſome other neceſſary purpoſe, the city ſhould poſſeſs a quantity of the common coin of Greece. But when any neceſſity obliges a private perſon to leave the city, having begged permiſſion of the magiſtrates, he ſhall be ſuffered to depart; but the foreign coin, which he poſſeſſes on his return, he ſhall change for that of his own country. And if any one is detected converting the money of another city to his own private uſe, ſuch money ſhall become public property. He who has been an eye witneſs of ſuch conduct, but has not divulged it, ſhall be diſgraced, and pay the ſame fine as he who endeavoured to enrich himſelf with foreign coin. Beſides, no one ſhall be permitted to give or receive a marriage portion, nor to depoſit money with a man who cannot be truſted, nor to put money out to uſe. And it ſhall be lawful for him with whom money is depoſited at intereſt, to pay neither intereſt nor principal. That a conduct of this kind is beſt for a city, will be rightly judged by him who always refers theſe particulars to the intention of the legiſlator. But we ſay that the intention of a politician who is endued with intellect, is not that which the multitude ſay is the intention of a good legiſlator,—I mean, that the city may be greater and richer than others, and that it may for the moſt part have dominion over the land and ſea. To which they add, that he who eſtabliſhes laws properly, ought to wiſh that the city may be the beſt, and the moſt happy. But of theſe, ſome are capable of taking place, but others not. The legiſlator, therefore, will wiſh that the poſſible, but he will not wiſh that the impoſſible, may take place. For in the latter caſe his wiſh would be vain; neither, therefore, would he attempt it. For it is nearly neceſſary that they ſhould be happy, and at the ſame time worthy. This then will be the object of his wiſh. But it is impoſſible that they ſhould be rich in the extreme, and at the ſame time good; I mean rich in the vulgar acceptation of the word. For the vulgar call thoſe rich, who being few in number poſſeſs a great quantity of money, which even a bad man may poſſeſs. If this be the caſe, I ſhould never grant them, that a rich man, who is not at the ſame time worthy, can be truly happy. But I aſſert that it is impoſſible a man can be at the ſame time eminently good, and eminently rich. Some

one,

one, however, may perhaps ſay, Why not? Becauſe we ſay, The poſſeſſion which is obtained both from juſt and unjuſt conduct is more than double of that which is alone juſtly obtained; and that the expenſes which are neither becoming nor baſe are doubly leſs than thoſe which are becoming, and which are performed in a becoming manner. He, therefore, who acts in a contrary manner will never be richer than him who acquires more than double, and ſpends leſs than half. But of theſe, the one is worthy, but the other not worthy, becauſe he is parſimonious. Sometimes, indeed, this latter character is perfectly vicious; but, as we have juſt now ſaid, is never good. For he who receives both juſtly and unjuſtly, and ſpends neither juſtly nor unjuſtly, is indeed rich, becauſe he is parſimonious: but he who is perfectly vicious, as being for the moſt part prodigal, is extremely poor. And he who ſpends in a becoming manner, and alone acquires juſtly, will never at any time become remarkably rich, nor yet exceſſively poor; ſo that our aſſertion is right, that very rich are not good men. But, if they are not good, they are not happy. With us, however, the eſtabliſhment of laws looks to this, that the citizens may become moſt happy, and in the higheſt degree friends to each other. But the citizens will never be friends where there is much judicial controverſy and unjuſt tranſactions with each other, but where the leaſt of theſe is found. We have ſaid too, that there ought to be neither gold nor ſilver in the city, nor yet an anxious purſuit of gain through mechanical arts and uſury, or baſe cattle, but that wealth ſhould be acquired from ſuch things as agriculture imparts and affords; yet in ſuch a manner, as that it may not compel the citizens to neglect thoſe things for the ſake of which riches are deſired: but theſe are the ſoul and body, which without gymnaſtic and the other diſciplines will never be of any worth. On this account, we have ſaid more than once, that an attention to money ought to be honoured in the laſt place. For, ſince all the concerns in which every man is ſeriouſly engaged are three, an attention to riches properly ranks in the laſt and third place: but the concerns of the body poſſeſs the middle; and thoſe of the ſoul the firſt place. And, indeed, the polity which we are now conſidering will be governed by proper laws, if it diſtributes honours in this manner. But if any one of the laws which are eſtabliſhed in it ſhall appear to prefer the health of the body to temperance, or riches to both health and temperance, it will appear to be improperly eſtabliſhed. A legiſlator, therefore,

ought often to ſignify his intention to the people in this manner: I am deſirous that this particular thing ſhould take place, which if it does, my intentions will ſucceed; but if it does not, they will be rendered fruſtrate. And thus, perhaps, he might both liberate himſelf and others from the burthen of legiſlation; but never by any other means. He, therefore, who receives an allotted portion ſhould poſſeſs it on the conditions we have mentioned. But this will take place in a becoming manner, when each perſon who becomes an inhabitant of the colony poſſeſſes every thing elſe equally. Since, however, this is not poſſible, but one coming to ſettle in it will poſſeſs more money, and another leſs, it is requiſite, for the ſake of many advantages, and of equality in the city, that property ſhould be unequally poſſeſſed: that, in conſequence of each receiving magiſtracies, tributes, and diſtributions, according to the honour annexed to each, and not according to his own virtue only, and that of his anceſtors, nor yet according to the ſtrength or beauty of his body, but receiving theſe equalized as much as poſſible, viz. unequally, but commenſurably diſtributed, they may not diſagree with each other. For the ſake of theſe things, it is requiſite that there ſhould be four diviſions in magnitude of poſſeſſions; and that theſe ſhould be called firſt, ſecond, third, and fourth diviſions, or ſhould receive ſome other appellations: ſo that, both when they remain in poſſeſſion of the ſame property, and when they become moſt rich from being poor, or poor from being rich, each may paſs to the poſſeſſion of property accommodated to each. For this purpoſe, I ſhall lay down the following ſcheme of law:

We ſay, that in a city which in future is to be void of that greateſt diſeaſe, which may be more properly called diſcord, or ſedition, none of the citizens ſhould either be extremely poor, or extremely rich: for both theſe produce both. It is therefore now requiſite that a legiſlator ſhould ſay what is the bound of each. Let, then, the bound of poverty be the honour of the allotted diſtribution, which ought to be ſtable, and which no magiſtrate, nor any one who loves honour for the ſake of virtue, will ever ſuffer to become leſs to any one. The legiſlator, eſtabliſhing the meaſure of theſe diſtributions, will permit the double, triple, and quadruple of this to be poſſeſſed. But, if any one poſſeſſes more than theſe, whether they are found, or beſtowed, or procured by mechanical arts, or poſſeſſed by any other ſuch like fortune,—if he imparts what remains to the city, and to the Gods, the guardians of the

city, he will act in a blameleſs and laudable manner. But he who accuſes one that is not obedient to this law ſhall obtain the half of his poſſeſſions; and, at the ſame time, the half of the accuſer's property ſhall be dedicated to the Gods. An account too ſhall be openly given, in writing, of all ſuch property as ſurpaſſes the allotted portion, to the magiſtrates who are appointed guardians by law, that all the judgments reſpecting riches may be eaſy and extremely clear. In the next place, the city ought to be built as much as poſſible in the middle of the country, and in a place poſſeſſing other things accommodated to the city, which it is not difficult to underſtand and relate. After this, it ſhould be divided into twelve[1] parts, the temple of Veſta, Jupiter, and Minerva, being firſt of all raiſed under the appellation of the Acropolis, or tower of the city. This temple ſhould be circularly encloſed; and from this encloſure, the city and all the region ſhould be divided into twelve parts. But the twelve parts ought to be equalized in ſuch a manner, that the portion of the prolific land may be ſmall, but that of the unprolific great: and the allotted portions ſhould be five thouſand and forty. Again, each of theſe ſhould receive a twofold diviſion. The two diviſions, likewiſe, ſhould be aſſociated allotments, and each ſhould participate of the near and remote diſtributions, viz. the diviſion near the city ſhould communicate with that which is ſituated in its extremity; that which is at the ſecond diſtance from the city, with that which is the ſecond from its extremity; and after this manner with all the reſt. It ſhould likewiſe be ſo contrived in the twofold diviſions of which we are now ſpeaking, reſpecting the fecundity and barrenneſs of the region, that there ſhould be an equality of diſtribution in multitude and paucity. It is likewiſe neceſſary that the ſtreets ſhould be divided into twelve parts, and, indeed, every other poſſeſſion, equality being preſerved in the greateſt degree, and a deſcription made of every particular. After this, the twelve allotments ſhould be attributed to the twelve Gods; each allotted portion being denominated after, and conſecrated to, its preſiding deity, and called a tribe. The twelve ſections too of the city ought to be divided in the ſame manner as the reſt of the region, viz. ſo that each ſection ſhall have two habitations, one near the middle, and the other near

[1] The reaſon why Plato adopts this diviſion is, becauſe the number 12 is an image of all-perfect progreſſion, being compoſed from the multiplication of 3 by 4, both which numbers, according to the Pythagoreans, are images of perfection.

the extremity. And thus much reſpecting the habitations. This, however, we ought by all means to conſider, that all the particulars which we have juſt now ſpoken of will never ſo opportunely concur as they have happened to do in our diſcourſe; and that the inhabitants will not be indignant at living together in this manner, but will be ſatisfied with their allotted and moderate portion of wealth through the whole of life. The procreation too of children will take place with each in the manner we have mentioned: and they will be deprived of ſilver and gold, and other things, which it is evident, from what has been ſaid, the legiſlator will forbid. Beſides this, the habitations will be circularly encloſed in the middle of the city and the region, as we have mentioned above. All which particulars have nearly been aſſerted by us as dreams: and we have faſhioned, as it were, from wax a certain city and citizens. But theſe particulars in a certain reſpect have not been badly aſſerted. It is now proper, therefore, to attend to the legiſlator, addreſſing us in the following manner:—You muſt not conſider me, O friends, as ignorant that what has been now ſaid has been after a manner truly aſſerted. But I think it will be moſt juſt in each of the following particulars, that he who exhibits a paradigm, according to whoſe ſimilitude that which he wiſhes to accompliſh ſhould be formed, ought not to omit any thing which is moſt beautiful and true. And he to whom it is impoſſible ſomething of theſe ſhould happen, ſhould deſiſt from attempting to accompliſh this; but he ſhould deviſe ſome means by which he may produce that which is moſt proximate and allied to theſe; and ſhould permit the legiſlator to bring his wiſh to an end. This being done, he ſhould conſider, in common with him, which of the abovementioned particulars contributes, and which is adverſe, to legiſlation. For even an artificer of the moſt trifling thing ought every where to produce a work in conſent with itſelf, if he wiſhes to obtain praiſe for its execution. But now, after the diſtribution of the twelve parts, we ſhould conſider, that ſince theſe twelve parts contain in themſelves many diſtributions, and things conſequent to, and produced from, theſe, as far as to five thouſand and forty; whence they poſſeſs tribes, and towns, and ſtreets, warlike orders and diſcipline, money, dry and wet meaſures, and weights;—all theſe the law ſhould eſtabliſh commenſurate and according with each other. Beſides this, we ought not to fear leſt we ſhould be thought to beſtow too much attention on things of a trifling nature, when we order

that

that no one ſhall poſſeſs furniture of any kind which is deſtitute of the proper meaſure, and conſider the diviſions and varieties of the numbers as uſeful to all things; to ſuch particulars as are various in themſelves, and ſuch as receive a variety in length and depth, or in ſounds and motions, whether the motions are upwards and downwards, in a right line, or circular. For the legiſlator, looking to all theſe, ſhould enjoin all the citizens to preſerve this order to the utmoſt of their power. For no one diſcipline belonging to youth poſſeſſes ſuch a mighty power, in œconomies, polities, and all arts, as the ſtudy of numbers. And that which is greateſt of all is, that this diſcipline excites even the ſleepy, and thoſe that are naturally ruſtic, and renders them docile, of a good memory, and ſagacious; benefiting them, by a divine art, beyond what their own nature is able to accompliſh. All which things, when they are poſſeſſed ſufficiently and uſefully, illiberality and avarice being extirpated from the mind of their poſſeſſor, become beautiful and properly adapted ſtudies: but, when theſe are not extirpated, inſtead of wiſdom they ſecretly produce that which is called craft; as we ſee at preſent is the caſe with the Egyptians, Phœnicians, and many other nations, through the illiberality of their purſuits and poſſeſſions; whether things of this kind were occaſioned by a depraved legiſlator, or by adverſe fortune, or by any other ſimilar nature. For, O Megillus and Clinias, this ought not to be concealed from us, that there is a great difference in places [1], with reſpect to producing men of a more or leſs excellent character; and that laws ſhould be eſtabliſhed accommodated to ſuch places. For ſome places, through all-various winds and

[1] It is well obſerved by Proclus, "that a change is produced in different nations from the places themſelves which each inhabits; from the temperament of the air, and from habitude to the heavens; and ſtill more partially from ſpermatic reaſons. But they moſt eſpecially differ according to the gregarious government of the Gods, and the diverſities of inſpective guardians; through which (ſays he) you will find colours, figures, voices, and motions changed in different places. Hence emigrants often change their colour and their voice, when they ſettle in other countries; juſt as plants are changed with the quality of the region, if they happen to be tranſplanted into a foreign land." Δει γινωσκειν ὁτι τοις διαφοροις εθνεσιν ἡ εξαλλαγη γινεται μεν και παρα τους τοπους αυτους ὁυς εκαστα κατοικει, και παρα τας των αερων κρασεις, και παρα την προς τον ουρανον σχεσιν, και ετι μερικωτερον, ει βουλει, παρα τους σπερματικους λογους· πολυ δ' αν μαλιστα διαφερειν ειποις αυτα, κατα την αγελαιονομικην των Θεων επιστασιαν, και τας των εφορων διαφοροτητας, παρ' ὰς και χρωματα, και σχηματα, και φωνας, και κινησεις εξαλλαττομενας ευροις αν εν τοις διαφοροις τοποις, ὡς τε και του ἀποικους πολλακις μεταβαλλειν, το τε χρωμα και την φωνην, ωταν εις αλλους αφικωνται τοπους· καθαπερ τα φυτα τη ποιοτητι της χωρας συμμεταβαλλονται, κἀν εις αλλοτριαν γην μεταβληθεντα τυγχανη· Procl. in Tim. p. 31.

ſtorms,

ſtorms, are inhabited with difficulty; others through water; others through nutriment from the earth, which not only imparts to bodies food of a more and leſs excellent nature, but is no leſs able to accompliſh this, with reſpect to ſouls. But thoſe places in a country poſſeſs the greateſt difference, in which there are a certain divine inſpiration, and allotments of dæmons who are either always propitious to the inhabitants, or the contrary. Which things the legiſlator, who is endued with intellect, conſidering as much as it is poſſible for man to ſpeculate things of this kind, will thus endeavour to eſtabliſh laws. And this muſt be done by you, O Clinias! for, before you cauſe the city to be inhabited, you muſt direct your attention to theſe particulars.

CLIN. But, O Athenian gueſt! you ſpeak in an all-beautiful manner: and, therefore, this muſt be done by me.

END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK VI.

AFTER all that has now been ſaid, the next thing that remains for you to do will be the eſtabliſhment of magiſtrates in the city.

CLIN. It will ſo.

GUEST. Theſe two ſpecies are found to ſubſiſt reſpecting the ornament of a polity. In the firſt place, the eſtabliſhment of magiſtrates, how many there ought to be, and in what manner they ought to be appointed. In the next place with reſpect to the laws, which are to be given to the ſeveral magiſtrates, what, how many, and what kind will be accommodated to each. But, previous to chooſing the magiſtrates, let us mention ſome particulars pertaining to the election of them.

CLIN. What particulars are theſe?

GUEST. Theſe. It muſt be perfectly evident that, ſince legiſlation is a great work, he who does not appoint proper magiſtrates in a well regulated city, though the laws are well eſtabliſhed, will find no advantage derived from them, but abundance of ridicule; and ſuch a one will be the mean of oppreſſing the city with the moſt weighty injuries and calamities.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We will therefore conſider this, as now happening to you, O friend, reſpecting this polity and city. For you ſee it is neceſſary, that thoſe who undertake in a proper manner the office of magiſtrates ſhould from their youth have been ſufficiently tried, as likewiſe their race, till the time of election. In the next place, that thoſe who are to chooſe the magiſtrates ſhould be educated in legitimate manners, ſo that they may be able to judge in a proper manner, who ſhould be admitted, and who rejected. But with

reſpect

reſpect to thoſe that have recently met together, as they are unacquainted with each other, and, beſides this, are void of erudition, how can they ever be able to chooſe magiſtrates in a blameleſs manner?

CLIN. They nearly never will be able.

GUEST. But the conteſt, as they ſay, does not eaſily admit of excuſes. This then muſt now be accompliſhed both by you and me; ſince you have willingly undertaken the office of eſtabliſhing a city for the Cretans, and are, as you ſay, the tenth in this employment; and I have promiſed to aſſiſt you in the preſent fabulous narration. I ſhall not therefore willingly leave this diſcourſe without a head. For, wandering every where in this condition, it would appear deformed.

CLIN. You have ſpoken moſt excellently, O gueſt.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, accompliſh this to the utmoſt of our power.

CLIN. Let us, indeed, do by all means as we have ſaid.

GUEST. Be it ſo, if Divinity is willing, that in this reſpect we may vanquiſh old age.

CLIN. But it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that he is willing.

GUEST. It is reaſonable. Following him, therefore, let us attend to this.

CLIN. To what?

GUEST. In how bold, and at the ſame time dangerous, a manner our city will at preſent be eſtabliſhed.

CLIN. To what circumſtance adverting do you thus ſpeak?

GUEST. To the eaſy and intrepid manner in which we have given laws to unſkilful men, and have ordered them to receive ſuch laws. Thus much, indeed, O Clinias, is nearly perfectly evident, even to one who is not very wiſe, that no one will eaſily admit theſe laws at firſt. But if we wait ſo long till boys taſting of, and being ſufficiently diſciplined in, the laws, and accuſtomed to them, are able to give their votes in conjunction with the whole city, and this by a certain manner and device is properly accompliſhed, I then ſhould think that a city ſo diſciplined would remain after the preſent time abundantly ſecure.

CLIN. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe this will be the caſe.

GUEST. Let us conſider, therefore, whether we can afford aſſiſtance ſufficient for this purpoſe. For I ſay, O Clinias, that the Cnoſſians, far more than

than the other Cretans, ought not only to make an expiation about the region which you have now cauſed to be inhabited, but ſhould be ſtrenuouſly careful that the firſt magiſtrates may be appointed as much as poſſible in the moſt ſecure and beſt manner. In appointing others, indeed, there will be leſs labour; but it will be moſt neceſſary that the guardians of the laws ſhould be choſen with the utmoſt attention.

CLIN. What method then ſhall we adopt in order to accompliſh this?

GUEST. The following. I ſay, O ſons of Crete, that the Cnoſſians, ſince they are the moſt antient of many cities, ought to chooſe in common from themſelves, and thoſe that ſettle with them in the ſame habitation, thirty-ſeven men in all; nineteen indeed of theſe from the inhabitants, but the reſt from Cnoſſus itſelf. The Cnoſſians ſhould give theſe to your city, and ſhould cauſe you to be a citizen of this colony, and one of the eighteen men; and this, either by employing perſuaſion or moderate force.

CLIN. But what? Will not you, O gueſt, and Megillus, partake with us of this polity?

GUEST. The Athenians, O Clinias, are men of lofty thought, and ſo alſo are the Spartans, and each dwell at a great diſtance. But, both by you and the other inhabitants, every thing will be elegantly poſſeſſed, conformably to what you have juſt now ſaid. However, in the courſe of time, and the polity remaining, the magiſtrates ſhould be choſen in the following manner: All ſuch as are capable of bearing arms, whether horſemen or footmen, and when age has given them ſufficient ſtrength to engage in war, all theſe ſhould give their vote; and the election ſhould be made in that temple which is conſidered by the city as the moſt honourable. But every one, from whatever part of the country he may come, ſhould place the name which he derived from his father, and that of his tribe and nation, written on a ſmall table on the altar of the God. He ſhould likewiſe, in a ſimilar manner, write on it his own name. But it ſhall be lawful for every one to take away that table which does not appear to him to be properly written, and place it in the forum, where it ſhall remain for not leſs than thirty days. After this, the magiſtrates ſhall expoſe to the view of the whole city three hundred approved tables; and in a ſimilar manner the city ſhall approve out of theſe whichever it pleaſes. In the ſecond place, they ſhall again ſhow to every one a hundred choſen out of theſe: and, in the third

place, every one ſhall name out of the hundred men that perſon whom he moſt approves. But the thirty-ſeven men ſhall declare thoſe to be the magiſtrates who are choſen by the greateſt number of votes. Who, therefore, O Clinias and Megillus, will eſtabliſh all theſe things for us in the city, reſpecting magiſtrates, and the examination of them? Do we, therefore, underſtand, that in cities ſo conſtituted from the firſt, there ought to be ſuch perſons, but that they will never be found among thoſe that are choſen for magiſtrates? It is however neceſſary that theſe ſhould not be men of a depraved character, but of the moſt exalted virtue. For the beginning, according to the proverb, is the half of the whole work; and all men praiſe him who begins a thing well. But, as it appears to me, the beginning is more than the half, and that no one has ſufficiently praiſed it when properly accompliſhed.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt properly.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we know this, we ſhould not paſs over it in ſilence, and leave it involved in obſcurity. Indeed, at preſent, I have nothing to ſay reſpecting it, except this one neceſſary and advantageous thing.

CLIN. What is it?

GUEST. I ſay, that no one is the father or mother of this city which we are about to eſtabliſh, except the city which gives it inhabitants. Nor am I ignorant that there often has been, and will be, ſtrife between colonies and their parent countries. At preſent, therefore, as a child, who, though he ſometimes oppoſes his parents, yet, through his indigence of education, loves and is beloved by them, and, always flying to his own, finds in them alone protection; in like manner, I ſay, the Cnoſſians will be readily diſpoſed to give aſſiſtance to the new city, and the new city to the Cnoſſians. I repeat then what I have juſt now ſaid (for there is no harm in twice ſaying that which is well ſaid), that the Cnoſſians ought carefully to attend to all theſe particulars, and chooſe no fewer than a hundred of the oldeſt and beſt men out of the colony, and another hundred from the Cnoſſians themſelves. I ſay too, that theſe coming to the new city ſhould be careful that the magiſtrates are eſtabliſhed according to the laws, and that they are approved of when eſtabliſhed. When theſe things are accompliſhed, the Cnoſſians ſhould return to Cnoſſus, but the new city ſhould endeavour to preſerve

preſerve and render itſelf proſperous. But the thirty-ſeven men, whom we have choſen, ſhould both at preſent and in futurity attend to the following particulars: In the firſt place, they ſhould eſtabliſh guardians of the laws; and, in the next place, of thoſe writings in which every one muſt give an account to the magiſtrates of the multitude of his poſſeſſions. The greateſt eſtate ſhould be that of four minæ; the ſecond, of three; and the third of two minæ; but the fourth ſhould conſiſt of one mina. But if any one ſhall be found to poſſeſs more than he has given an account of in writing, all ſuch overplus ſhall become public property; and, beſides this, it ſhall be lawful for any one to accuſe him as acting in neither a becoming nor legal manner, when he is found to deſpiſe the laws, through the love of gain. He likewiſe who is deſirous of accuſing ſuch a one ſhall accuſe him to the guardians of the laws, under the appellation of one addicted to baſe gain. And he who happens to be condemned ſhall not partake of the public property; but, when any diſtribution is made in the city, he ſhall poſſeſs nothing but his firſt allotment. It ſhall likewiſe be ſignified in writing, that ſuch a one is condemned as long as he lives; and the writing ſhall be placed where any one who is willing may read it. The guardian of the laws ſhall not govern more than twenty years, and ſhall not hold this office if he is leſs than fifty years of age. But, if he is ſixty years old when he enters on this employment, he ſhall only govern for ten years. It ſhall likewiſe be eſtabliſhed, that he who has lived more than ſeventy years ſhall not hold an office of ſuch great importance. Theſe three mandates, therefore, are to be attended to, reſpecting the guardians of the laws. But, as the laws advance, any one may order theſe men what they ought to attend to, in addition to what we have already ſaid.

Let us now, therefore, ſpeak about the election of other magiſtrates. For, after theſe, it is neceſſary that the commanders in chief of the army ſhould be choſen, and ſuch as are miniſtrant to theſe in war, as, for inſtance, the maſters of the horſe, the military tribunes, and thoſe who orderly arrange the foot; and who may very properly be called, as they are in common, governors of tribes. The guardians of the laws, therefore, ſhould draw out of the city the commanders of all theſe, and ſhould approve all ſuch as, being of a proper age, either have been, or now are, engaged in war. But if it ſhall appear that any one of thoſe who are not drawn out is better

than ſome one of thoſe that are, it ſhall be lawful to chooſe the former in preference to the latter, on condition that this preference is confirmed by an oath; and the choice, when he is named, ſhall be determined by the greater number of votes. Three amongſt theſe, who are found to have the moſt votes, ſhall be choſen as the commanders of the army, and as thoſe that are to take care of warlike concerns, juſt in the ſame manner as the guardians of the laws were choſen. Theſe ſhall appoint twelve præfects of the military orders, and aſſign one to each tribe. It ſhall likewiſe be here lawful to prefer one who is not nominated, to one who is, in the ſame manner as was obſerved reſpecting the election of the commanders in chief. But this aſſembly, before the præfects are deliberately choſen, ſhall be held by the guardians of the laws in a place the moſt holy and beſt adapted for the purpoſe. Here the foot and the horſe ſhall be ſeated ſeparate from each other; and in the third place, after theſe, the reſt of thoſe who are employed in warlike concerns. And every one, indeed, ſhall give his vote in the choice of commanders in chief and maſters of the horſe. The præfects of the bands ſhall be choſen by thoſe alone that carry ſhields, but the commanders of tribes by all the horſe. The commanders in chief ſhall chooſe for themſelves the light-armed ſoldiers, the archers, and the reſt of this kind. In the next place there remains for us the eſtabliſhment of the maſters of the horſe. Theſe, therefore, muſt be appointed by thoſe who appoint the commanders in chief; and the election muſt be conducted in a ſimilar manner. But the horſe ſhall give their vote, the foot being placed oppoſite to them; and thoſe two that have the moſt votes ſhall be the commanders of all the horſe. Diſputes about votes ſhall be allowed to take place twice; but, if any one doubts about them a third time, the votes ſhall be determined by thoſe whoſe province it is to fix the meaſure of voting. The council ſhall conſiſt of thirty twelves; for the number three hundred and ſixty will be found accommodated to the diſtributions. And it is capable of being diſtributed into four parts by ninety, ſo that ninety counſellors may be obtained from each of the diviſions of land. And in the firſt place all the counſellors will neceſſarily be obtained from the largeſt poſſeſſions; and he who is unwilling to be choſen ſhall be fined; and after information has been given reſpecting him, he ſhall be noted. On the following day the ſame method ſhall be adopted with poſſeſſions of the ſecond rank. And

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on the third day, whoever is willing ſhall be obtained from poſſeſſions of the third order. This mode with reſpect to three orders of poſſeſſions is neceſſary; but the fourth and ſmalleſt poſſeſſion ſhould be exempt from fine, if any one whoſe property is of this order is unwilling to act as a counſellor. On the fourth day all ſhall be obtained from the fourth and ſmalleſt order of poſſeſſions; but he who is unwilling to be choſen from third and fourth poſſeſſions ſhall be exempt from fine. But he who refuſes from poſſeſſions of the ſecond and firſt order ſhall be fined, ſo as that he who belongs to the ſecond rank ſhall undergo a fine triple of the firſt fine, and he who belongs to the firſt quadruple. On the fifth day the magiſtrates ſhall exhibit to the view of all the citizens the names of the counſellors. Every man belonging to theſe ſhall act as a counſellor; or, if any one refuſes to act in that capacity, he ſhall be fined the firſt fine. But the half of thoſe that are elected out of all the poſſeſſions, viz. one hundred and eighty, ſhall be choſen by lot as counſellors for a year. The election, therefore, ſubſiſting in this manner, will be a medium between a monarchical and democratic polity, which medium a polity ought always to preſerve. For ſlaves and deſpots can never become friends, nor the depraved and worthy, when they are equally honoured. For, by unequal things, ſuch as are equal will become unequal, unleſs they partake of meaſure; becauſe, through both theſe, polities are filled with ſeditions. That antient ſaying, indeed, being true, that equality produces friendſhip, is aſſerted with the greateſt propriety and elegance. But, as it is not very evident what the equality is which is able to accompliſh this, we are on this account vehemently diſturbed. For, as there are two equalities which have the ſame appellation, but are in reality nearly contrary to each other in many reſpects, every city and every legiſlator may ſufficiently employ one of theſe in the diſtribution of honours by lot, viz. the equality conſiſting in meaſure, weight, and number [1]; but it is not eaſy for every one to perceive the moſt true and the beſt equality. For it is the judgment of Jupiter, and but little of it is at all times employed by men; though as much of it as is employed either by cities or private perſons produces every good. For it diſtributes more to the greater, and

[1] Viz. arithmetical equality, which takes place when a ſerics of numbers have the ſame common difference; as 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. or 1, 3, 5, 7, &c.

things

things ſmaller to the leſs [1]; imparting to each that which is moderate according to the nature of each. It likewiſe always attributes greater honours to thoſe who are greater in virtue, but leſs to ſuch as are leſs in virtue and diſcipline; and imparts to each the becoming according to reaſon. For this is, doubtleſs, always with us the politically juſt itſelf; which we ought at preſent to aſpire after, and, looking to this equality, O Clinias, eſtabliſh our now riſing city. Whoever, likewiſe, eſtabliſhes any other city ought to give laws with his eye directed to this, and not to a few tyrants, or to one, or to any ſtrength of the people, but always to the juſt itſelf. And this is what has juſt now been ſaid by us, viz. a diſtribution of the equal, according to nature, to unequal particulars. But it is, indeed, neceſſary, that every city ſhould make uſe of theſe two equalities, which are ſimilar in denomination, if it wiſhes to continue entirely free from ſedition. For the equitable and the lenient judgment of the perfect and accurate, when it takes place contrary to upright judgment, is broken. On this account it is, perhaps, neceſſary to uſe election by lot, for the ſake of avoiding the moroſeneſs of the multitude, and to invoke on this occaſion divinity and good fortune, and beſeech them to direct the lot to that which is moſt juſt. In this manner, then, it is neceſſary to uſe both the equalities; but that equality which is indigent of fortune ought to be uſed on very few occaſions. Theſe things, O friends, muſt be accompliſhed by the city which is to be eſtabliſhed on a ſure foundation. But as a ſhip, while ſailing on the ſea, requires a perpetual guard both night and day; in like manner a city, while ſituated in the tempeſt of other cities, ſubject to all-various ſtratagems, and in danger of captivity, is continually indigent of protection. Hence, the magiſtrates and guardians of a city ought mutually to ſucceed each other from night to day, and from day to night, ſo as that this interchange of office may never ceaſe. But the multitude is not able to accompliſh any of theſe things with celerity. It is, however, neceſſary that the multitude of the counſellors ſhould be permitted to employ the greateſt part of their time in properly managing their own private affairs; but that a twelfth part of them,

[1] The true equality which Plato here ſpeaks of is geometric equality, which is identity of ratio, and according to which the merits of individuals are to be eſtimated; ſo that as merit is to merit, ſo ſhould gift be to gift. The equality, therefore, here is that of ratio, and not of number; as, for inſtance, in the numbers 2, 4, 6, 12, which form a geometric proportion.

a diſtri-

a diſtribution being made into twelve months, ſhould ſucceed each other, one by one, in the office of guardians. Theſe ſhould readily attend to every one, whether coming from the city or elſewhere, whether he wiſhes to give any information, or to aſk reſpecting thoſe particulars about which a city ought either to aſk or anſwer other cities, or receive anſwers from them. And this, for the ſake of thoſe all-various innovations which are always accuſtomed to happen; ſo as to prevent them, as much as poſſible, from not happening; and that, when they do happen, the city may perceive them with the utmoſt celerity, and apply a remedy. This ought always to be accompliſhed by an aſſembly of the governors of the city, together with a diſſolution of the difficulties which ſuddenly happen to the city and the laws. All theſe particulars muſt be under the direction of the twelfth part of the council, who are to ceaſe from their office eleven parts of the year. But this part of the council ought always to defend the city in common with the other magiſtrates. And the particulars, indeed, reſpecting the city, when ſubſiſting in this manner, will be orderly diſpoſed. But what care, and what order, muſt there be of all the reſt of the region? Will it not be neceſſary, ſince all the city, and the whole region, is diſtributed into twelve parts, that there ſhould be inſpectors of the roads, habitations, edifices, ports, forum, fountains, ſacred groves, and temples, and other things of this kind belonging to the city?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, then, that there ought to be purifiers of the temples, and prieſts and prieſteſſes. But that three ſpecies of magiſtrates ought to be choſen for the purpoſe of taking care of the roads and buildings, and the ornaments belonging to things of this kind, and of preventing men from being injured by each other, or by wild beaſts; and that, both within the walls and in the ſuburbs of the city, every thing may be conducted in a proper manner. And thoſe that take care of the abovementioned particulars ſhould be called ædiles; but thoſe that attend to the ornament of the forum, præfects of the market; and thoſe that take care of the ornament of the temples, prieſts. But the prieſthood which is paternal, whether ſuſtained by men or women, is by no means to be moved. If nothing of this kind happens to none, or but to a few, which is likely to be the caſe with the inhabitants of a new city, then prieſts, prieſteſſes, and the purifiers of temples are to be appointed.

But

But all theſe things are to be inſtituted partly by election, and partly by lot. In every region too, and city, the common people, and thoſe that are not common, ſhould mingle in a friendly manner with each other, that they may be concordant in the higheſt degree. The particulars, therefore, pertaining to the prieſts are to be committed to the care of Divinity, that, as it pleaſes him, ſo the lot may be referred to a divine fortune. But he who is allotted the prieſthood ought always to be examined, and proved to be in the firſt place a man of integrity, and legitimately begotten; in the next place, one from a pure habitation, and who is free from ſlaughter, and all crimes of this kind againſt divine natures, and whoſe father and mother have lived with ſimilar purity. The laws too relative to divine concerns ought to be procured from Delphi; and, interpreters of them being appointed, theſe ſhould be uſed. But the prieſthood ſhould not be of longer continuance than a year; nor ſhould he be leſs than ſixty years of age who is to attend to divine concerns for us, ſufficiently, according to ſacred laws. The ſame things are to be eſtabliſhed reſpecting prieſteſſes. The four tribes ſhould appoint thrice four interpreters; three being taken from each tribe: and three being approved, that are choſen by the greateſt number of votes, the other nine muſt be ſent to Delphi, that one may be choſen out of each triad. But the examination and approbation of theſe, and their age, muſt be ſuch as that of the prieſts which was mentioned above. Theſe ſhould be eſtabliſhed as interpreters for life; and, on the deceaſe of any one of them, the four tribes to which he belonged muſt chooſe another in his place. There ought likewiſe to be, in each of the temples, diſpenſators of the ſacred money, who ſhould poſſeſs abſolute authority over the ſacred groves, and their fruits, and over things let out to hire: and three ſhould be choſen for the greateſt temples out of the three largeſt poſſeſſions; but two for the ſmaller temples, and one for ſuch as are the moſt elegant. The choice, too, and examination of theſe ſhould be made in the ſame manner as in the election of the leaders of the army. And ſuch are the particulars which ſhould take place reſpecting ſacred concerns. But the utmoſt care ſhould be taken that nothing is left without a guard. The guards of the city, too, ſhould be theſe: the commanders in chief of the army, the præfects of the military orders, the maſters of the horſe, the governors of tribes, the diſpenſators, the inſpectors of roads and buildings, and the magiſtrates who preſide over

the markets, when all theſe are properly choſen. The reſt of the region ſhould be defended as follows:—The whole region was divided by us, as much as poſſible, into twelve parts. But one tribe being allotted to each diviſion, it ſhould chooſe every year five, as it were, inſpectors of the lands, and governors of tribes. Each of theſe ſhould chooſe out of his own tribe twelve young men, not leſs than five-and-twenty years of age, and not more than thirty. Each of theſe ſhould be allotted each part of the region for the ſpace of a month, that all of them may be ſkilful and knowing in every part of the region. But the guardians and governors ſhould defend and govern the city for the ſpace of two years. And when firſt they are allotted their reſpective diviſions, they ſhould change their places every month, and the governors of the guard ſhould lead them to the places next in order, and to the right hand parts in a circular progreſſion. But I mean by the right hand parts, thoſe which are towards the eaſt. Afterwards, in the ſecond year, they ſhould change to the left hand parts, that they may not only be ſkilled in the nature of the country for one part of the year, but may know, for the moſt part, what happens in every ſeaſon, to every part of the country. In the third year, five other inſpectors of the land, and governors of the guard, ſhould be choſen, as curators of the twelve young men. But the following care ſhould be beſtowed in the ſeveral occupations in each place. Firſt, that the region may be, in the higheſt degree, well fortified againſt the incurſions of the enemy; trenches being dug where they are requiſite, and buildings raiſed for the purpoſe of reſtraining thoſe who may endeavour to injure the country and its poſſeſſions. Animals ſubject to the yoke, and the ſervants belonging to each place, ſhould be employed for this purpoſe, when they are not engaged in their uſual reſpective employments; thoſe that preſide over theſe diſpoſing every part of the country in ſuch a manner, that it may be difficult of acceſs to the enemy, but eaſy to friends, animals ſubject to the yoke, and cattle. They ſhould likewiſe take care that the waters from Jupiter[1] do not injure the country, but that they may rather be uſeful to it, when deſcending from lofty mountains into hollow valleys; and this by reſtraining their courſe in edifices and ditches; ſo that, being received and imbibed by theſe places, they may produce ſtreams and fountains for all the

[1] Viz. rain.

ſubject lands and places, and may thus render the moſt dry parts of the country moiſt, and abounding with water. They ſhould likewiſe adorn fountains and rivers with trees and edifices; and, conducting ſtreams through metal pipes, ſhould cauſe them to be diſtributed in great abundance. In like manner, they ſhould ſend theſe ſtreams into thickets and ſacred groves, as an ornament to the temples of the Gods. But every where, in things of this kind, young men ought to procure gymnaſtic exerciſes, both for themſelves and the aged, preparing ſenile hot baths, and placing dry wood in abundance; that an eaſy remedy may by theſe means be obtained for the diſeaſed, and the bodies of huſbandmen, when wearied with labour, may be refreſhed; which remedy is, indeed, far better than any which can be adopted by a phyſician who is not very ſkilful in his art. Theſe things, therefore, and every thing of this kind, ſhould be introduced into theſe places, as both ornamental and uſeful, in conjunction with ſport by no means unpleaſant. But let the attention which is to be paid to things of this kind be as follows:—Sixty men ſhould each of them defend their own place, not only on account of enemies, but for the ſake of thoſe who call themſelves friends. And if any one, whether he is a ſervant or free, injures his neighbour, or any other citizen, if the offence is ſmall, he ſhall be judged by thoſe five governors, but if great, by ſeventeen men, together with the twelve, and ſhall be fined as far as to three minæ. But no judge or magiſtrate ought to be exempt from giving an account of his conduct when called upon, except ſuch as like kings bring things to a concluſion. Beſides this, the præfects of the land, if they behave inſolently towards the ſubjects of their care, by enjoining them unequal taſks, or taking any thing by force from the huſbandmen, or if they receive any thing which is given through flattery, or diſtribute juſtice unjuſtly, in conſequence of yielding to adulation;—in any of theſe caſes, they ſhall be diſgraced by the whole city. But for other injuries which they may commit in their office, they ſhall voluntarily be fined by the inhabitants of the ſame village, and by their neighbours, as far as to one mina. If, however, they are unwilling, either for greater or ſmaller injuries, to pay the proper fine, in conſequence of believing that, during their tranſitions from place to place every month, they ſhall eſcape puniſhment,—in this caſe, they ſhall be ſentenced by a common judgment to pay the injured perſon the double of his loſs. But both the governors and the præfects of the land

land ſhall live for the ſpace of two years in the following manner: In the firſt place, the convivial aſſociations in the different places ſhall be in common. But he who is abſent from theſe for one day or night, without orders from the governors, and without being compelled by any neceſſity,—if the five men condemn him, and write in the forum that he has abandoned his guard, he ſhall be diſgraced, as betraying his part of the polity. He ſhall likewiſe be chaſtiſed with ſtripes by any one who may meet him; and whoever is willing to puniſh him ſhall do it with impunity. All the ſixty men, likewiſe, ſhould carefully obſerve whether any one of the governors acts in this manner: and he who perceives or hears that any one of theſe does ſo, but yet does not accuſe him, ſhall be ſubject to the ſame puniſhment as the offending governor; and, being more ſeverely puniſhed by the young men, ſhall be deſpiſed by all their magiſtrates. The guardians of the laws too ſhould diligently attend to all theſe particulars, either that they may not take place, or that, when they do, the offenders may be properly puniſhed. But every man ought to think reſpecting all men, that he who has never been a ſervant will never be a maſter worthy of praiſe. So that he who has acted in a becoming manner as a ſervant, ought to glory in his conduct more than he who has properly exerciſed the authority of a maſter:—in the firſt place, as having been properly ſubſervient to the laws, which is the ſame as being a ſervant to the Gods; and in the next place, to old men who have conducted themſelves in an honourable manner towards youth. After this, the præfects of the lands ſhould, during the ſpace of theſe two years, live on humble and poor food. For, when the twelve magiſtrates think proper to aſſemble together with the five, they ſhould not join with themſelves the other ſervants and ſlaves, nor employ huſbandmen, and the inhabitants of the ſame village, for their own private concerns, but alone for public utility. In other particulars, they may attend to their own advantage. Beſides this, they ſhould explore every part of the region in ſummer and winter, armed, for the ſake of perpetually defending and becoming acquainted with every place. For it appears, that for all men to have an accurate knowledge of every place is a diſcipline inferior to no ſtudy. And for the ſake of this, young men ought to apply themſelves to hunting with dogs, and the capture of wild beaſts, no leſs than for the ſake of any other pleaſure or advantage which is derived from purſuits of this kind. Every man too ſhould, to the

utmoſt of his power, apply himſelf to that ſtudy, which may either be called concealments, or inſpection of the lands, or by any other name at pleaſure, if he is deſirous that the city ſhould be ſufficiently ſecure.

After this, it follows that we ſhould ſpeak concerning the election of the governors of the markets, and the præfects of cities. Three præfects of cities, therefore, ſhould follow the governors of markets, who are to be ſixty in number; and ſhould preſide over the twelve parts of the city according to a triple diſtribution, in imitation of thoſe twelve parts. Theſe ſhould inſpect the roads about the city, and the public ways which lead from the country to the city: likewiſe the buildings, taking care that all of them are raiſed according to law; and the ſtreams of water which are ſent by the guardians into the city, that they may be deduced into pure fountains, and ſuch as are ſufficient for uſe, and may become both an ornament and advantage to the city. Theſe too ought to be ſuch as are capable, when at leiſure, of employing their attention on public affairs. On this account, every man ſhould nominate from the largeſt eſtate him whom he wiſhes to be a præfect of the city. And out of ſix that have the moſt votes, three ſhall obtain this office by lot. Laſtly, when they have been examined and approved, they ſhall diſcharge the duties of their office according to the laws which are preſcribed to them. After this, the governors of markets ſhall be choſen, five in number, from poſſeſſions of the ſecond and firſt order; and they ſhall be elected in the ſame manner as the præfects of the city. For out of ten that have the moſt votes, five ſhall be choſen by lot, and, when they are approved, ſhall be declared to be governors. But every individual ſhall give his vote. And he who is unwilling to vote, if he is brought before the magiſtrates, ſhall be fined fifty drachms, and ſhall, beſides this, be conſidered as a bad man. Likewiſe, every one ſhall be permitted to enter into the aſſembly and common convention; and all thoſe ſhall be compelled to do this whoſe poſſeſſions are of the firſt and ſecond order. And he who is abſent from theſe ſhall be fined ten drachms. But thoſe whoſe poſſeſſions are of the third and fourth order ſhall not be compelled to be preſent at the common convention. Hence, if any one is abſent from theſe, he ſhall not be fined, unleſs the governors ſhall find it neceſſary to order all the citizens to aſſemble. But the office of the governors of markets conſiſts in preſerving the forum in that order which is eſtabliſhed by law; and in taking care of

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the temples and fountains about the forum, and that no one acts unjuſtly with reſpect to them: likewiſe in puniſhing him who acts unjuſtly, with ſtripes and bonds if he is a ſlave and a ſtranger; but if it is a native who acts in a diſorderly manner, with reſpect to things of this kind, he ſhall be condemned by theſe governors to a fine of one hundred drachms: but they ſhall not be allowed to condemn him to a greater fine, as far as to the double of this, unleſs the governors of the city are preſent on the occaſion. The governors of the city too ſhould adopt the ſame mode of fining and puniſhing in their department; fining offenders as far as to a mina by their own authority, but the double of this in conjunction with the governors of markets. After this it will be proper that the governors of muſic and gymnaſtic ſhould be eſtabliſhed, ſo as that there may be a twofold order of each of theſe; ſome of them being appointed for the ſake of diſcipline, and others for the ſake of exerciſe. And the law is deſirous of aſſerting with reſpect to thoſe who preſide over diſcipline, that they ſhould be careful of the ornament pertaining to exerciſes and doctrines, erudition, and the attention requiſite to things of this kind; and likewiſe of the conduct of males and females, both at home and abroad. Thoſe who reward the athletæ ſhould have the care of gymnaſtic exerciſes and muſic. And theſe ſhould be twofold; one kind being employed about muſic, and the other about gymnaſtic exerciſe. The ſame perſons ſhould preſide over the agoniſtic exerciſes of both men and horſes. But, with reſpect to muſic, ſome ſhould preſide over the monody, and the imitative art, viz. over the rhapſodiſts, harpers, pipers, and all of this kind, but others over the ſinging of the choir. And in the firſt place, with reſpect to the ſport of the choir, where men, boys, and girls are exerciſed in the dance, and in the whole order of muſic, the governors of this ought to be properly choſen. But one governor will be ſufficient for theſe, who is not leſs than forty years of age. One alſo will be ſufficient for the monody, who is not leſs than thirty years old, and who muſt perform the office of an introducer, and be able to judge ſufficiently the merits of the contending parties. But the governor and moderator of the choir ought to be choſen in the following manner: Thoſe who are attached to things of this kind ſhould go to the aſſembly, and, if they did not go, ſhould be fined: and the guardians of the law ſhould be the judges in this caſe. No one, however, ſhould compel others to join this aſſembly if they are not willing. The candidates ſhould

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be choſen from among ſkilful perſons; and the ſkilfulneſs or unſkilfulneſs of the candidate ſhould be the only thing attended to in his examination. But he who, out of ten that have the moſt votes, is approved of on being examined, ſhall, according to law, preſide for one year over the choir. The election and approbation reſpecting the monody, and the melody of the pipe, ſhould be accompliſhed in a ſimilar manner; and he who is finally choſen ſhould preſide over theſe for a year; his election at the ſame time being confirmed by the judges. After theſe things, it is proper that the diſpenſators of rewards to the gymnaſtic exerciſes, both of horſes and men, ſhould be choſen in the following manner from poſſeſſions of the third and ſecond order. Three eſtates ſhould be compelled to the election of theſe, but the ſmalleſt eſtate ſhould be exempt from fine; and three being ſelected out of twenty that have the moſt votes, are after examination to be choſen as diſpenſators. But if any one happens to be rejected, according to any election by lot, and judgment of the magiſtrate, another ſhall be choſen in his place, and the examination of him performed in a ſimilar manner. There now remains the governor, who is to take care of the whole of the above-mentioned diſcipline, both of males and females. Let there then be but one governor of this kind eſtabliſhed by law. Let him be not leſs than fifty years of age; one who is the father of lawful children of both ſexes, but, if not of both, at leaſt of one ſex. But both he who chooſes and he who is choſen ought to think that this magiſtrate is by far the greateſt of the chief magiſtrates in the city. For the firſt bloſſom of every plant, when it tends in a becoming manner to the virtue of its nature, poſſeſſes the higheſt power of arriving at its proper end; and this is true, both with reſpect to other plants, and to tame and ſavage animals. But we ſay that man is a tame animal; who, when he partakes of proper diſcipline, in conjunction with a proſperous nature, is wont to become a moſt divine and mild animal: but when he is not ſufficiently or not properly educated, he is the moſt ſavage of all the animals which the earth produces. On this account the legiſlator ought not to ſuffer the education of youth to be a ſecondary thing, or to be attended to in a careleſs manner. But, in the firſt place, he who is deſirous of beſtowing a proper attention upon youth, ought to chooſe out of the citizens him who is the moſt excellent in all things, and eſtabliſh him as one who is to educate children with the utmoſt attention and care. All

the magiſtrates, therefore, except the counſellors and præfects, coming into the temple of Apollo (the guardians of the laws privately receiving the votes), ſhall each of them chooſe him whom they conſider as calculated to educate youth in the beſt manner. And he who has moſt votes, after he has been approved of by the magiſtrates that chooſe him (the guardians of the laws being excepted), ſhall act in this capacity for five years. And in the ſixth year another ſhall be choſen to ſucceed him in a ſimilar manner. But if any public magiſtrate dies before he has governed more than thirty days, another ſhall be ſimilarly choſen by thoſe to whom this province belongs. And, when any one who is the guardian of orphans dies, the kindred of both father and mother, as far as to couſins, who may at that time be preſent, ſhall appoint another within the ſpace of ten days, or each ſhall be fined every day a drachma till they have appointed another guardian. But every city will become a privation of a city, in which courts of juſtice are not properly eſtabliſhed; and a mute judge, and who in his interrogations does not ſpeak more than the litigants, will never be ſufficient to us for the purpoſe of deciding juſtly. On this account, neither can judges when they are many judge well, nor when they are few and of a depraved character. But it is proper that the object of inquiry ſhould be clearly enunciated by both parties. Time however, delay, and frequent interrogation contribute to the reſolution of doubts. On this account litigants ought firſt of all to betake themſelves to their neighbours and friends, and diſcuſs with them the ſubject of their complaints. But, if they are not able to determine their cauſe ſufficiently by the aſſiſtance of theſe, they ſhould go to another court of juſtice. And, if they cannot be reconciled by the two former, a third ſhall bring the affair to a concluſion. In a certain reſpect, indeed, the eſtabliſhments of courts of juſtice are the elections of magiſtrates; for every magiſtrate is neceſſarily a judge of certain things. But every judge is not a magiſtrate; though, in a certain reſpect, a judge on the day in which he acts as a judge, is no contemptible magiſtrate. Conſidering, therefore, the judges as magiſtrates, let us ſhow which of them will be adapted to our purpoſe, of what things they are to be judges, and how many for every particular. Let then the moſt principal court of juſtice be that which they exhibit among themſelves, when they chooſe certain judges by common conſent. But let there be two criteria of the reſt: the one, when, any private

vate perſon accuſing another of acting unjuſtly, and leading him to juſtice, he is willing that he ſhould be judged; the other, when any one thinks that the public miniſter has been injured by ſome one of the citizens, and is willing to aſſiſt the community at large. Let us ſay then who are the judges, and what kind of men they ought to be. In the firſt place, there ſhould be a common court of juſtice for all thoſe that contend the third time with each other; and this ſhould ſubſiſt in the following manner: All the magiſtrates, as well thoſe that govern for a year as thoſe that govern for a longer time, ought to aſſemble into one temple, on the day before the firſt day of that month in which after the ſummer ſolſtice the new year begins. Here taking an oath, and making a firſt-fruit offering as it were, out of every order of magiſtrates, they ſhould chooſe one judge, who appears likely to be the beſt in every magiſtracy, and to judge the citizens on the following year in the beſt and moſt holy manner. When the judges are choſen, the examination and approbation ſhould be made by thoſe that choſe them. And if any one is rejected, another ſhall be choſen in a ſimilar manner. But the perſons approved ſhall judge thoſe that fled from other courts of juſtice, and give their deciſion openly. The counſellors, however, and the other magiſtrates that choſe theſe, muſt neceſſarily be hearers and ſpectators of theſe deciſions. With reſpect to men of another deſcription, any one of theſe who is willing may be preſent. But, if any perſon accuſes any one of theſe judges, as voluntarily judging unjuſtly, he ſhall accuſe him before the guardians of the law; and he who is condemned in conſequence of ſuch accuſation ſhall pay the half of the fine to the injured party. But if he ſhall appear to deſerve a greater fine, the judges by whom he is condemned ſhall determine what he ought to ſuffer, or to reſtore, either to the community, or to the perſon who has ſuffered the injury. With reſpect to public accuſations, it is neceſſary in the firſt place that the multitude ſhould participate of the deciſion. For, when any one acts unjuſtly towards a city, all the citizens are injured; and hence the multitude will juſtly be indignant, when they are excluded from ſuch judgments. The beginning likewiſe and end of ſuch a deciſion ought to be referred to the people, but the examination of the particulars in which the litigants accord, to the three greateſt magiſtrates. But if they cannot agree, the council itſelf ſhall judge the election of each of them. It is requiſite likewiſe that all men ſhould participate to the utmoſt of their

power of private judgments. For he who is deprived of the power of judging with others muſt be conſidered as in no reſpect participating of the city. On this account courts of juſtice muſt neceſſarily ſubſiſt in the tribes, and the judges ſhould immediately give ſentence by lot, uncorrupted by entreaties. And, finally, that court of juſtice ſhould judge of all theſe particulars which we have ſaid ſhould be eſtabliſhed incorrupt to the utmoſt of human power, for the purpoſe of determining thoſe diſputes which can neither be decided by neighbours nor by the courts of juſtice belonging to the tribes. And thus, concerning courts of juſtice, which we ſay can neither eaſily be indubitably called magiſtrates, nor yet denied to be ſuch, this deſcription, which is as it were externally induced, has aſſerted ſome things, and nearly left others undiſcuſſed. For, towards the end of legiſlation, the accurate poſition, and at the ſame time diviſion of judicial laws, will be by far moſt properly diſcuſſed. We ſhall, therefore, till then defer the conſideration of theſe. But the eſtabliſhment of other magiſtrates has nearly taken up the greateſt part of legiſlation. The accurate, however, reſpecting all civil and politic adminiſtrations will not become perſpicuous, till the diſcuſſion, receiving from the beginning things ſecondary, middle, and all its parts, has arrived at the end. For at preſent, indeed, proceeding as far as to the election of magiſtrates, it becomes a ſufficient end of what has been previouſly delivered, ſo that the beginning of the poſition of laws is no longer indigent of ſluggiſhneſs and delay.

CLIN. All that you have aſſerted above is entirely, O gueſt, agreeable to my ſentiments; but your diſcourſe will be ſtill more pleaſing to me, when you have conjoined the beginning of what is now to be ſaid, with the end of what has been already aſſerted.

GUEST. Thus far then we have played in a becoming manner the game of prudent old men.

CLIN. You appear to have evinced a beautiful purſuit of men.

GUEST. It is probable. But do we underſtand whether this appears to you as it does to me?

CLIN. What do you allude to?

GUEST. Do you know that the art of painting has no boundary with reſpect to the ſeveral animals, but never ceaſes adorning, either by inumbrating or deumbrating, or by whatever name a thing of this kind may be

called by painters, that the picture may continually become more beautiful and conſpicuous?

CLIN. I ſcarcely underſtand what you ſay, ſince I am by no means converſant with this art.

GUEST. This will be no detriment to you. But we will employ this ſimilitude which fortune has preſented to us. If then ſome one ſhould deſign to paint a moſt beautiful animal, and which might not become worſe but better by length of time, do you not perceive that in conſequence of ſuch a one being a mortal, unleſs he leaves behind him a ſucceſſor who may prevent the damages which the picture might ſuſtain from time, by frequently retouching the piece, or who may ſupply what was omitted by the artiſt, through the imbecility of his art, and thus daily render the picture more ſplendid, the laboured piece will laſt but a ſhort time?

CLIN. True.

GUEST. What then? Does not this appear to you to be the wiſh of the legiſlator? In the firſt place, that laws may be written for him as accurate as poſſible? In the next place, can you think that in the courſe of time, and after having made an actual trial of the thing, any legiſlator can be ſo inſane as not to know that many things muſt neceſſarily be left, which will require amendment from ſome ſucceſſor; that a polity may by no means become worſe, but always better and more adorned?

CLIN. It is probable. For how is it poſſible he ſhould not wiſh a thing of this kind?

GUEST. If then any legiſlator poſſeſſes any method by which both in words and in reality he can teach another, whether he is a man of greater or of leſs conſequence, how laws ought to be preſerved and corrected, he will not ceaſe ſpeaking about a thing of this kind till he has accompliſhed his purpoſe.

CLIN. For how is it poſſible he ſhould?

GUEST. Ought not this, therefore, to be done, both by you and me, at preſent?

CLIN. Of what are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. As we are about to eſtabliſh laws of which we have choſen the guardians, but we ourſelves are in the decline of life, and the guardians are with reſpect to us young men, it will, as we have ſaid, be neceſſary that at

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ſame time we ſhould both eſtabliſh laws, and endeavour to make theſe very men, as much as poſſible, both legiſlators and guardians of the laws.

CLIN. Undoubtedly, ſince we are ſufficient for the purpoſe.

GUEST. Let us then cheerfully endeavour to effect this.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. We will, therefore, thus addreſs them: O friends, ſaviours of the laws, we have neceſſarily left many things unfiniſhed, reſpecting the ſeveral particulars of which we have eſtabliſhed laws, and which are not indeed inconſiderable; and we have endeavoured to the utmoſt of our power not to leave the whole unexplained by a certain circumſcription. This deficiency it is your buſineſs to ſupply. But it is proper you ſhould hear where you ought to look in order to accompliſh a thing of this kind. For Megillus, I, and Clinias, have often ſaid the ſame things to each other, and we are agreed among ourſelves that we have ſpoken in a becoming manner. We are likewiſe deſirous that you ſhould both be favourable to our undertaking, and become our diſciples; at the ſame time looking to thoſe things which, we have agreed among ourſelves, a guardian of the laws and a legiſlator ought to make the objects of his conſideration. But this agreement, which has one head or ſummit, is this: That we ſhould endeavour to find the means by which a man may become a worthy character, poſſeſſing that virtue of the ſoul which is accommodated to his nature, either from a certain ſtudy, or certain manners, or from ſome kind of poſſeſſion or deſire, or opinion; or, laſtly, from certain diſciplines; and this, whether the nature of the inhabitant of our city is male or female, youthful or aged. Likewiſe, that every one, through the whole of life, ſhould tend with all poſſible earneſtneſs to this of which we are now ſpeaking; neglecting at the ſame time every thing which may become an impediment to this acquiſition. Beſides this, too, he ſhould be diſpoſed to die for his country if it is neceſſary, rather than either to ſee it entirely ſubverted, and becoming ſubject to the yoke of bondage, governed by bad men, or deſert it by flight. For every thing of this kind is to be endured rather than the polity ſhould be changed, which men of a worſe character are naturally diſpoſed to effect. Theſe things have been already mutually aſſented to by us, and do you now, looking to both theſe, praiſe and blame the laws; blaming ſuch as are not able to accompliſh theſe particulars, but, embracing and receiving in a benevolent

manner ſuch as are, live in them. But it is proper that you ſhould bid farewell to other ſtudies which tend to other things that are called good. Let this, then, be the beginning to us of the ſubſequent laws, commencing from ſacred concerns. For we ought in the firſt place to reſume the number five thouſand and forty, becauſe it had, and now has, convenient diſtributions, both the whole number, and that which was aſſigned to the tribes; which we eſtabliſhed as the twelfth part of the whole, this producing with the greateſt rectitude the number four hundred and twenty. And as the whole number has twelve diſtributions, ſo alſo that of the tribes. But it is proper to conſider each diviſion as a ſacred gift of divinity, as following both the order of months and the period of the univerſe. On this account, that which is connate ſhould lead every city, rendering them ſacred. Some, indeed, are perhaps more properly diſtributed than others, and more proſperouſly dedicate their diſtributions to the Gods. But we now ſay, that the number five thouſand and forty is moſt properly choſen, as that which has all diſtributions as far as to twelve, beginning from one, except that into eleven parts. This, however, has the eaſieſt remedy. For it will be reſtored to health, if two houſes are diſtributed to the other part. But that theſe things are true, may be evinced with facility when at leiſure. Believing, therefore, in the preſent conception and diſcourſe, let us diſtribute this number; and aſcribing a God, or a ſon of the Gods, to each part, likewiſe dedicating altars, and things pertaining to theſe, let us make two conventions for the purpoſe of ſacrificing every month; accommodating twelve to the diſtribution of the tribes, and twelve to the diviſion of the city. But all this ſhould be done, in the firſt place, for the ſake of the Gods, and things pertaining to the Gods; in the ſecond place, for the ſake of our familiarity with, and knowledge of, each other; and likewiſe for the ſake of every kind of aſſociation. For it is neceſſary, in the communion and mixture of marriages, that ignorance ſhould be taken away, ſo as that every one may know with whom he is connected, and that all deception in things of this kind may, as much as poſſible, be taken away. For the ſake of this, therefore, it is neceſſary that ſports ſhould be inſtituted, boys and girls together forming a choir, mutually beholding and being beheld by each other, being properly paired, as to their age, and having as much of their bodies naked as modeſty will permit. All theſe ſhould be taken care of, and properly or-

namented by the governors of choirs, and likewiſe by the legiſlators, in conjunction with the guardians of the laws, that they may ſupply what we have left deficient. But it is neceſſary, as we have ſaid, reſpecting all ſuch things as are ſmall and numerous, that ſome particulars ſhould be omitted by the legiſlator, in which the magiſtrates becoming every year ſkilful, and being admoniſhed by experience, they may be able every year to ſupply what is deficient; till it ſhall appear that theſe diſcuſſions and legal inſtitutes have obtained a ſufficient bound. The ſpace of ten years, therefore, will be a length of time both moderate and ſufficient for obtaining an experience in ſacrifices and choirs, and every other particular. But in order to accompliſh this, he who ſupplies theſe deficiencies ſhould live in common with the legiſlator: and on his death, the ſeveral magiſtrates having informed the guardians of the laws of his deceaſe, muſt ſupply his place in correcting what is amiſs, till every thing ſhall appear to have attained the conſummation of excellence. When this period arrives, having given ſtability to theſe inſtitutes, they are to be uſed in conjunction with other laws which the legiſlator has ordained from the beginning; reſpecting which, nothing ſhould ever be voluntarily changed. But if any neceſſity ſhall, at any time, appear to urge a mutation, all the magiſtrates ought to conſult together on this occaſion, all the people ſhould be aſſembled, and all the oracles of the Gods explored. If all theſe accord, then a change in the laws may be made, but by no means unleſs this is the caſe; but that which impedes, ſhall always obtain dominion according to law. Whenever, therefore, any one who has arrived at five-and-twenty years of age, beholding and being beheld by others, believes that he has found one of his own diſpoſition, and adapted for the communion and procreation of children, he ſhall marry within thirty-five years of age. But, in the firſt place, let him hear how the becoming and adapted are to be inveſtigated. For it is requiſite, as Clinias ſays, prior to the laws, to give a preface accommodated to each.

Clin. You very properly remind us, O gueſt; and your diſcourſe appears to me to be both ſeaſonable and highly fitting.

Guest. You ſpeak well. Let us, therefore, ſpeak as follows: O young man, born of good parents, it is proper to contract thoſe marriages which appear honourable to prudent men. But theſe exhort neither to avoid marriage with the poor, nor to purſue with avidity marriage with the rich, but, cæteris paribus, always honouring the inferior, to enter into communion with it.

it. For, both to the city and the families which are united, this will be advantageous. For the equable and commenſurate infinitely ſurpaſſes the immoderate with reſpect to virtue. He, therefore, who in all his actions is more raſh and haſty than is becoming, ſhould deſire that the daughter of parents of more compoſed manners may be united to him in marriage: but he who is naturally of a contrary diſpoſition ſhould enter into alliance with a contrary character. And in every marriage this one thing ſhould be obſerved, that every one ſhould enter into ſuch a matrimonial connexion as is advantageous to the city, and not ſuch a one as is moſt pleaſant to himſelf. For every one always naturally tends to that which is moſt ſimilar to himſelf; whence the whole city becomes anomalous both in wealth and manners, when it partakes in the higheſt degree of thoſe things which we are unwilling ſhould happen to ourſelves. If, then, in our diſcourſe we ſhould order by law that the rich ſhould not marry with the rich, nor the powerful with the powerful, but ſhould compel thoſe whoſe manners are more haſty to marry thoſe whoſe manners are more ſlow, and the more ſlow to marry with the more haſty, we ſhould not only appear ridiculous to, but excite the anger of, the multitude. For it is not eaſy to underſtand that a city ought to be like a cup, in which the mad wine, when firſt poured forth, efferveſces; but, being corrected by another deity [1], who is a ſober God, and thus obtaining a beautiful conjunction, it becomes a good and moderate drink. But no one, as I may ſay, is able to ſee this taking place in the formation of children by the mingling of the ſexes. On this account, therefore, we ſhould not compel the citizens to things of this kind by law, but endeavour to charm them into the perſuaſion, that they ought to prefer equability in the natural diſpoſition of their children to the equality of the moſt opulent alliance; and that we ought to deter, by diſgrace, him who makes riches the object of his purſuit in marriage, and not compel him to a contrary mode of conduct by a written law. Let theſe, then, be the exhortations reſpecting marriages, together with what we have previouſly aſſerted,—I mean, that we ought to aſpire after perpetuity of nature, by always leaving behind us children of children, as ſervants of divinity, inſtead of ourſelves. All theſe particulars, therefore, and ſtill more than theſe, ſome one may with propriety preface, reſpecting the manner in which marriages

[1] Viz. water.

ought

ought to be conducted. But he who cannot willingly be perſuaded to act in this manner, but lives in the city alienated, without connexion, and unmarried, for five-and-thirty years, ſuch a one ſhall be fined every year. And if he poſſeſſes the largeſt eſtate, he ſhall be fined one hundred drachms; if that which is ſecond in order, ſeventy; if that which is third, ſixty; and if that which is fourth in order, thirty drachms. Let all theſe fines be ſacred to Juno. And let him who does not pay his fine every year be made a debtor of ten times that ſum. Let this money too be exacted by the diſpenſator of the Goddeſs; which unleſs he exacts, he himſelf ſhall be the debtor. He, therefore, who is unwilling to marry, ſhall be thus puniſhed with reſpect to a fine; but with reſpect to honour as follows: In the firſt place, let him be deprived of all honour from his juniors, nor let any young man voluntarily obey him in any thing. In the next place, if he ſhould attempt to chaſtiſe any one, every one ſhall be permitted to aſſiſt and defend the injured perſon. And he who does not in this caſe give aſſiſtance, ſhall be conſidered by the law as a timid and vicious citizen. Concerning the marriage portion we have ſpoken before, and we again ſay, that equal things are to be given for equal things, ſince neither he who receives, nor he who beſtows, will grow old in the want of money. For in this city every one is ſupplied with neceſſaries. Beſides, women will be leſs inſolent, and men will have leſs of humble and illiberal ſlavery, through riches. And he who is obedient to this law will accompliſh one among the number of things beautiful; but he who is diſobedient to it, and either gives or receives more than the worth of fifty drachms for the ſake of a garment, ſhall either pay one mina, or three half minæ, or two minæ, according to the magnitude of his poſſeſſions. He who poſſeſſes the largeſt eſtate ſhall pay another ſuch ſum to the public treaſury: and whatever is given or received ſhall be ſacred to Juno and Jupiter. But the exactors of this money ſhould be the diſpenſators of theſe divinities, juſt as we ſaid, when we ſpoke of thoſe that refuſed to marry, that their fine ſhould be exacted by the diſpenſators of Juno, who, if they neglected to exact it, ſhould pay it themſelves. With reſpect to ſuretiſhip, the firſt ſhall be that of a father, the ſecond, that of a grandfather, and the third, that of brothers by the ſame father. If no one of theſe ſurvives, the ſuretiſhip ſhall, in a ſimilar manner, be equally valid on the mother's ſide. But if, through an unuſual fortune, none of theſe ſhould ſurvive, the

authority in this affair muſt always be veſted in the neareſt kindred, in conjunction with the guardians. If any thing preparatory to initiation, or other ſacred operation, ſhall be found neceſſary for things future, preſent, or paſt, pertaining to marriage, it will be proper to interrogate the interpreters of ſacred concerns; and each perſon, being perſuaded by theſe, ſhould think that he has accompliſhed every thing ſufficiently. With reſpect to nuptial feaſts, not more than five male and five female friends ſhould be invited; and as many of both ſexes of kindred and familiars. But the expenſes on this occaſion ſhould not exceed the poſſeſſions. He, therefore, who has the largeſt eſtate ſhall ſpend one mina, another half a mina, and ſo on in ſucceſſion, according to every one's reſpective property. And he who is obedient to the law in this reſpect ought to be praiſed by all men; but he who is diſobedient ſhall be chaſtiſed by the guardians of the laws, as one who is ignorant of the becoming, and unſkilled in the laws reſpecting the ſponſal muſes. To drink, however, to intoxication, is never at any time becoming, nor ſafe, except in the feſtivals of that God who is the giver of wine. Neither, therefore, is it proper that this ſhould take place at the nuptial feaſt, when the bride and bridegroom ought particularly to be in a ſound ſtate of mind, as having changed the former condition of their life in no ſmall degree; and in order, at the ſame time, that offspring may always be produced as much as poſſible from prudent parents. For it is nearly immaniſeſt what night or day may generate offspring in conjunction with divinity. Children, therefore, ought not to be begotten when the body is in a relaxed and diffluent ſtate through ebriety, but when it is compact, ſtable, and quiet. But he who is filled with wine hurries and is hurried away every where, being agitated with inſane fury both in body and ſoul. Hence, he who is intoxicated, as being delirious, muſt diſſeminate in a vicious manner. So that it is probable ſuch a one will beget offspring anomalous, unfaithful, and void of rectitude, both in their manners and corporeal frame. Hence, it is requiſite to guard againſt intoxication, both through the whole year, and through the whole of life, but eſpecially at the time of procreation, and neither to do ſuch things as ſpontaneouſly introduce diſeaſe, nor ſuch as participate of inſolence or injuſtice. For, theſe being neceſſarily impreſſed in the ſouls and bodies of the offspring in a fœtal ſtate, the impreſſions become worſe than their originals. But eſpecially on the wedding day and

night

night it is requiſite to abſtain from all ſuch things. For the principle and divinity [1] eſtabliſhed in men preſerves all things, when he is allotted that honour which is accommodated to his nature by the reſpective individuals by whom he is employed. But it is proper that the bridegroom ſhould conſider one of the two houſes aſſigned by lot as ſet apart for the procreation and education of children; and that he ſhould celebrate his nuptials in that houſe, and reſide there with his children ſeparate from his father and mother. For, where there is a certain deſire in friendſhip, it agglutinates and binds together all the manners; but where aſſociation is attended with ſatiety, and has not any deſire through time, it cauſes a mutual ſeparation through tranſcendency of repletion. Hence, leaving his parents and kindred, the bridegroom ſhould depart as it were to a colony, obſerving, and being at the ſame time obſerved by, them; procreating and educating children; tranſmitting to others, like a lamp, the life which he received from others, and always honouring the Gods according to law. In the next place, it is requiſite to conſider which among the number of poſſeſſions is the moſt elegant. With reſpect to many of theſe, therefore, it is neither difficult to underſtand nor to poſſeſs them; but with reſpect to ſervants the difficulty is extreme. But we may aſſign the cauſe of this in a certain reſpect properly, and in a certain reſpect not properly. For our aſſertions concerning ſlaves are contrary to, and yet conformable to, uſe.

MEGIL. How do you mean? For we do not, O gueſt, underſtand what you aſſert at preſent.

GUEST. And it is very reaſonable, O Megillus, to ſuppoſe you do not. For that ſervitude of the Lacedæmonians which is called Hilotia is nearly the ſource of the greateſt doubt and contention to all Greece; becauſe it appears to ſome to be well inſtituted, and to others not. But the ſlavery of the Heraclidæ is a ſubject of leſs contention than that of the Mariandyni [2]. And beſides this, the nation of the Theſſalians is ſervile. However, looking to theſe, and all ſuch particulars as theſe, what ought we to do reſpecting

[1] Plato, by the divinity in men, means intellect; for this is the divine part of our nature.

[2] Mariandynum was a place near Bithynia, where, according to the poets, Hercules dragged Cerberus out of Hades. Perhaps, therefore, the contention which Plato alludes to, was that of the inhabitants of Mariandynum reſpecting the particular ſpot where Hercules performed this achievement.

the poſſeſſion of ſervants? As the ſubject, therefore, is ſo ambiguous, you very properly aſked me what I meant. But my meaning is this:—We know that we all ſay that it is requiſite to poſſeſs ſlaves of the moſt benevolent and beſt diſpoſitions. For many ſlaves, conducting themſelves in every reſpect with more virtue towards certain perſons than brothers and ſons, have preſerved their maſters, together with their poſſeſſions and the whole of their habitations. We know that theſe things are ſaid of certain ſlaves.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The contrary to this, likewiſe, is aſſerted, viz. that nothing in the ſoul of a ſlave is in a healthy condition, and that the race of ſlaves is not to be believed in any particular. The wiſeſt of the poets too ſeems to be of this opinion, when he ſays reſpecting Jupiter:

> "Jove fixed it certain, that whatever day
> Makes man a ſlave takes half his mind away[1]."

In conſequence of theſe different conceptions, ſome place no confidence in ſlaves, but with ſpurs and whips, as if they had to manage wild beaſts, not thrice but often, enſlave the ſouls of their ſervants; but others act entirely contrary to theſe.

CLIN. Undoubtedly. Since, then, the opinions reſpecting ſlaves are ſo different, how ſhall we act in our region as to the poſſeſſion and correction of them?

GUEST. It appears to me, O Clinias, ſince man is an animal difficult to be managed, and one that by no means patiently endures that the neceſſary diſtinction between a ſlave and one who is free and a maſter ſhould be made in reality,—that on this account he is a difficult poſſeſſion. The truth of this is actually evinced in the frequent rebellions of the Meſſenians, and by the mighty evils which happen to thoſe cities that poſſeſs many ſervants of the ſame language; and further ſtill, by the all-various thefts which are committed by pirates about Italy. All which particulars, when they are conſidered, may render it doubtful what ought to be done in things of this kind. Two methods, therefore, alone remain to be adopted, namely, that thoſe who are to act with eaſe in the capacity of ſlaves ſhould not be of the ſame

[1] Odyſſ. lib. ii.

country,

country, and that as much as poſſible they ſhould be diſcordant with each other. And in the ſecond place, that they ſhould be properly educated, not only for their own ſakes, but much more for the ſake of their maſters. But the proper education of theſe conſiſts in not behaving inſolently, but in acting leſs unjuſtly towards them, if poſſible, than towards our equals. For he is perfectly manifeſt who reverences juſtice naturally and not fictitiouſly, and who truly hates to act unjuſtly towards thoſe men whom he might eaſily injure. He, therefore, who is never defiled by acting in an unjuſt and unholy manner, with reſpect to the manners and actions of ſlaves, will be moſt ſufficient to ſow the ſeeds of virtue. The ſame thing may with rectitude be aſſerted of a deſpot, and a tyrant, and of all authority, when exerciſed by the more powerful over the more imbecil. But ſlaves ought juſtly to be always puniſhed, and not to be made effeminate by admoniſhing them like thoſe that are free. Every thing too that is ſaid to a ſlave ſhould nearly be a command, nor ſhould they ever in any reſpect be jeſted with, whether they are of the male or of the female ſex. Many, however, very fooliſhly jeſt with their ſlaves; and, thus making them effeminate, render it more difficult to their ſlaves to be governed, and to themſelves to govern.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. After this manner, therefore, ſervants may be acquired as much as poſſible ſufficient both in multitude and aptitude to aſſiſt in the neceſſary employments of life. But, after this, it is requiſite to deſcribe the habitations.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. In a new city, therefore, and which had never before been inhabited, edifices are in the firſt place to be attended to, and particularly the temples and walls of the city. The buildings too of the city, O Clinias, ought to precede the marriages. But, now ſince the city is raiſed in diſcourſe, we may very properly admit theſe particulars to ſubſiſt in the manner we have delivered them. When, indeed, the city is raiſed in reality, we ſhall attend to the buildings prior to the marriages, if divinity is willing, and afterwards accompliſh every thing pertaining to matrimonial connections. We ſhall now, therefore, in a curſory manner, diſcuſs theſe particulars.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. The temples, therefore, ought to be built round all the forum,

and the city ſhould be built in a circle, in elevated places, for the ſake of defence and purity. The houſes of the governors and judges ſhould be ſituated near the temples; and in theſe, as moſt holy places, ſentence ſhould be given and received; partly, as about holy concerns, and partly becauſe the temples of the judicial Gods are there ſituated. Courts of judgment too ſhould be built in this place, in which proper ſentence ſhall be paſſed on murder and other crimes which deſerve death. With reſpect to the walls, O Megillus, I agree with the Spartans, that they ſhould be permitted to lie ſleeping on the earth, and not be raiſed. For that poetical aſſertion reſpecting them is deſervedly praiſed, that walls ought to be of braſs and iron, rather than of earth. With us, indeed, the cuſtom of ſending young men every year into the fields to dig trenches and raiſe buildings, for the purpoſe of reſtraining the incurſions of the enemy, may juſtly be conſidered as extremely ridiculous. We likewiſe incloſe our city with walls, which in the firſt place by no means contributes to the health of the citizens; and, in the next place, it uſually produces an effeminate diſpoſition in the ſouls of the inhabitants. For it incites them to fly within theſe for ſhelter, and not repel the enemy; and leads them to think that the ſafety of the city does not conſiſt in guarding it perpetually both night and day, but that, ſleeping under the protection of walls and gates, they ſhall be truly ſafe; as if they were born for ſloth, and not to labour. They are, indeed, ignorant that eaſe is truly produced from labour; and, as it appears to me, labour is again the natural reſult of baſe eaſe. But, if there is any occaſion of walls for men, the houſes of individuals ſhould be ſo raiſed from the firſt, that the whole city, by its equality and ſimilitude, may be one wall, and that all the houſes may have a ſufficiently ſecure paſſage to the different roads of the city. And in this caſe, indeed, the city, having the form of one houſe, will be no unpleaſant ſpectacle, and will be in every reſpect adapted to the eaſe of its guards and the ſafety of the whole. The citizens who are to inhabit this region ſhould be particularly careful that theſe things are conſtructed in this manner from the firſt. They ſhould alſo take care that ædiles are provided, compelling them to be choſen, and puniſh with fines thoſe that neglect this office. Attention too ſhould be paid to the purity of every thing in the city; and that no private perſon occupies any public property, either by building or digging. They ſhould likewiſe take care that the waters from

Jupiter

Jupiter may be imparted with facility to the inhabitants; and that every part, both within and without the city, may be fit to be inhabited. But all theſe particulars the guardians of the law, becoming ſkilled in by experience, muſt legally eſtabliſh, together with ſuch others as the law omits, through its incapacity of providing for all things. But ſince theſe things, the buildings about the forum, the particulars reſpecting gymnaſia, theatres, and all that pertains to diſcipline, are inſtituted, let us now proceed to marriages, as following next in the buſineſs of legiſlation.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. Marriages, therefore, O Clinias, muſt be inſtituted for us in the manner we have deſcribed above. But, after this, the mode of living which ſhould be adopted prior to the procreation of children muſt not continue a leſs time than a year. However, it is by no means eaſy to ſay, after what manner a bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which tranſcends the multitude of cities. But, as many things that have been already advanced are difficult, this will appear to the vulgar ſtill more difficult to determine. Nevertheleſs, O Clinias, that which appears to be right and true muſt be aſſerted.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is of opinion that things public and common only, in a city, ſhould be eſtabliſhed by law, but does not think it requiſite that the neceſſary concerns of private perſons ſhould be attended to, but that they ſhould be permitted to live as they pleaſe; and that it is not neceſſary every thing ſhould ſubſiſt in an orderly manner; but that, private affairs being neglected by the law, men ſhould only live legally in public and common concerns;—he who thinks in this manner does not think rightly. But on what account are theſe things aſſerted by us? On this: Becauſe we ſay that the bridegrooms in our city ought to live at public tables, at other times no leſs than prior to their nuptials. And, indeed, when firſt eating in public was inſtituted by you, Lacedæmonians, it appeared a wonderful thing; being legally eſtabliſhed, in conſequence of a certain war, or ſomething elſe endued with the ſame power, and which the paucity of men rendered neceſſary. But this mode of eating in public having been adopted by neceſſity, when it was found to contribute greatly to the ſafety of the city it was eſtabliſhed by law.

CLIN.

CLIN. It appears that this was the caſe.

GUEST. As I ſaid, therefore, this was at firſt a thing of a wonderful nature, and dreadful to enjoin; but, at preſent, the legal eſtabliſhment of it would not be attended with the like difficulty. But that which follows this is both arduous to relate and accompliſh. It is a thing which is naturally capable of taking place in a proper manner, but which by no means ſubſiſts at preſent, and in eſtabliſhing which the legiſlator would appear like jugglers to pluck fire, and to accompliſh ten thouſand other impoſſible things.

CLIN. What is this, O gueſt, which you appear to be ſo vehemently afraid of mentioning?

GUEST. You ſhall hear, that I may not any longer needleſsly detain you. For every thing in the city that participates of order and law produces every good. But ſuch things as are deprived of order, or are badly diſpoſed, diſſolve the multitude of thoſe things which are orderly diſpoſed. And this happens with reſpect to the ſubject of our preſent diſcuſſion. For, O Clinias and Megillus, the public banquets of the men are inſtituted for you in a beautiful, and, as I ſaid, wonderful manner, from a certain divine neceſſity; but thoſe of the women are by no means properly left uneſtabliſhed by law, and not led forth into light. For the female ſex is another kind of men, more occult and fraudulent than we are, through the imbecility of its nature. But the legiſlator did not act rightly in omitting it, on account of the difficulty of managing it in an orderly manner. For, this being neglected, many things in your city will be diſſolved, which would ſubſiſt far better than at preſent if it was regulated by law. For the particulars relative to women are not only the half (as they may appear to be) of human concerns, if they are left in a diſordered manner; but, by how much the feminine is worſe than the maſculine nature with reſpect to virtue, by ſo much it ſurpaſſes in multitude the double. This, therefore, muſt be reſumed and corrected; and all employments and ſtudies ſhould be eſtabliſhed as common, both to men and women, as that which will more contribute to the felicity of the city. But at preſent mankind are ſo unhappily circumſtanced in this reſpect, that no prudent man would even mention a thing of this kind, in other places where eating in common is by no means approved. How then can any one attempt, without rendering himſelf ridiculous, to force women to eat and drink openly? For there is not any thing which the ſex would more difficultly

difficultly endure than this. For, being accuſtomed to live timorouſly, and obſcurely, when forced into light they will make every poſſible reſiſtance, and greatly overpower the legiſlator. Women, therefore, as I have ſaid, will not elſewhere endure even the moſt rational diſcourſe, without extreme vociferation; but here perhaps they will. If then it is agreeable to you, for the ſake of converſation, leſt our diſcourſe about every kind of polity ſhould be incomplete, I am deſirous of informing you, how good and becoming a thing this is,—if, as I ſaid, it is agreeable to you to hear it:— if not, I ſhall diſmiſs it.

CLIN. But, O gueſt, we are wonderfully deſirous of hearing it.

GUEST. Let us then hear it. But you muſt not wonder if I appear to you to derive what I ſhall ſay from an elevated ſource. For we are now at leiſure, and there is nothing to prevent us from conſidering every thing pertaining to laws.

CLIN. Rightly ſaid.

GUEST. Again, therefore, we will recur to what was firſt aſſerted by us. For it is highly proper that every man ſhould know, that the generation of men either never had any beginning, nor ever will have an end, but always was and always will be; or that, if it had a beginning, the length of time from its commencement is immenſe.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What then? Should not we think that there have been all-various eſtabliſhments and ſubverſions of cities, ſtudies and employments of every kind, ſome attended with and others without order, and all-various deſires of food and drink, in every part of the earth; likewiſe all-various revolutions of ſeaſons, in which animals have undergone a prodigious number of mutations?

CLIN. It is reaſonable to think ſo.

GUEST. What then? Shall we believe that vines at a certain period roſe into exiſtence, and in a ſimilar manner olives, and the gifts of Ceres and Proſerpine; and that a certain Triptolemus ſupplied things of this kind? And ſhall we not think that during the time in which theſe had no exiſtence animals devoured each other, as at preſent?

CLIN. We ought doubtleſs to think ſo.

GUEST. But we ſee at preſent that men ſacrifice each other in many

places; and we hear, on the contrary, that there was a time when we did not dare to taſte the fleſh of oxen, and when we did not ſacrifice animals to the Gods, but cakes, and fruits moiſtened with honey, and other pure offerings of a ſimilar kind: but we entirely abſtained from fleſh; conſidering it as neither holy to feed on it, nor to defile the altars of the Gods with blood. But we then lived an Orphic[1] life, feeding on all inanimate ſubſtances, but on the contrary abſtaining from all animals.

CLIN. Theſe things, as you ſay, are every where reported, and perſuade belief.

GUEST. But ſome one may ſay, What is the meaning of all this?

CLIN. You very properly conjecture what is likely to be the caſe, O gueſt.

GUEST. I ſhall endeavour, therefore, if I am able, O Clinias, to unfold what is conſequent to this.

CLIN. Speak then.

GUEST. I behold all things ſuſpended to men, from a triple indigence and deſire, through which virtue is produced if they are properly conducted, but the contrary if they are improperly burdened. Theſe are, from the very period of their birth, meat and drink, of which every animal having an innate love, it is full of fury, and refuſes to liſten to him who ſays that ſomething elſe is to be done beſides repleniſhing the pleaſures and deſires, with which all ſuch things as theſe are converſant, and perpetually avoiding every kind of pain. But a third, and this the greateſt indigence, and the moſt acute deſire, afterwards excites us, producing in mankind the moſt fiery furies. This is the deſire of propagating the ſpecies, which burns with unbounded inſolence. Theſe three diſeaſes ſhould be turned from that which is called moſt pleaſant, to that which is beſt, by three the greateſt of all things; viz. *fear*, *law*, and *true reaſon*; at the ſame time employing the muſes, and the agoniſtic Gods, in order to extinguiſh this influx and increaſe. But after marriages we ſhould place the procreation of children, and, after this, education and diſcipline. For, our diſcourſe proceeding in this manner, the law will perhaps at length lead us to public banquets, when we have arrived at aſſociations of this kind; and then perhaps we ſhall ſee more clearly than before, whether this mode of eating in public ought to be adopted by women

[1] The Orphic ſacrifices were unbloody, as the hymns of Orpheus which are now extant abundantly teſtify.

alone,

alone, or by men, together with the particulars preceding this mode, and which are not yet legally eſtabliſhed. Theſe things, as I juſt now ſaid, we ſhall then behold more accurately, and eſtabliſh reſpecting them more becoming and convenient laws.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the greateſt rectitude.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, preſerve in our memory what we have juſt now ſaid: for perhaps we ſhall have occaſion for it hereafter.

CLIN. What are the things which you exhort us to remember?

GUEST. Thoſe which we defined by three words; viz. meat, drink, and the aſtoniſhment about venereal concerns.

CLIN. We ſhall by all means, O gueſt, be careful to remember theſe things.

GUEST. It is well. But let us proceed to matrimonial concerns, and inſtruct the bride and bridegroom in what manner children ought to be procreated; and if we cannot perſuade them to comply with our inſtructions, we will threaten them with certain laws.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. It is proper that the bride and bridegroom ſhould conſider, that children are to be exhibited to the city, as much as poſſible, the moſt beautiful and the beſt. But all men who produce any thing in common, when they attend both to themſelves and the work, produce the whole beautiful and good: but when they do not attend, or are not endued with intellect, the contrary takes place. The bridegroom, however, ſhould attend both to the bride and to the procreation of children: and in a ſimilar manner the bride ſhould attend to the bridegroom, eſpecially at that time when children are not yet begotten by them. Certain women choſen by us ſhall be inſpectors of this particular, whether many or few, juſt as it may ſeem fit to the governors. Theſe ſhall aſſemble every day in the temple of Lucina, and continue there for the third part of an hour. Here they ſhall inform each other, if they have ſeen any married man or woman looking to any thing elſe than what the ſacrifices and ſacred ceremonies pertaining to marriage order to be done. Let the procreation of children and the inſpection of the women above mentioned continue for ten years, but not for a longer time, when there is an eaſy flux of generation. But if ſome continue unprolific for this ſpace of time, after having conſulted

with their kindred, and the women that ſuperintend them, they ſhall be divorced in ſuch a manner as is advantageous to both. However, if any altercation enſues reſpecting what is proper and advantageous to each, ten guardians of the law, choſen by the contending parties, ſhall take cognizance of and determine the affair. After this, the inſpecting women ſhall enter into the houſes of the young men, and, partly by admonitions and partly by threats, liberate them from their error and ignorance. But if they are unable to accompliſh this, they ſhall ſpeak to the guardians of the law, who ſhall then take the affair into conſideration. If they too are incapable of applying a remedy, they ſhall make the people acquainted with the caſe; at the ſame time giving in the offenders' names in writing, and affirming by an oath that they are unable to render them better. But let him whoſe name is committed to writing be diſgraced, unleſs he can confute his accuſers in the court of judgment. If he is unable to do this, he ſhall neither engage in a matrimonial connection, nor in the procreation of children. And in caſe he attempts it, any one that pleaſes ſhall puniſh him with impunity. The ſame laws too muſt be eſtabliſhed reſpecting women. For ſuch ſhall not participate of female egreſſions and honours, and ſhall not be permitted to go to weddings, and labours, if they are in a ſimilar manner condemned in a court of juſtice. But when children are begotten according to law, if any one has connection with another man's wife, or a woman with any man but her huſband, while children are begotten by them, let them be puniſhed in the manner mentioned above when they did not beget children. In the next place, let the married men and women that live temperately with reſpect to all ſuch things as theſe, be honoured, but thoſe that live in a contrary manner be diſgraced. And if the greater part of the citizens conduct themſelves with moderation in things of this kind, let theſe particulars be paſſed over in ſilence, without being eſtabliſhed by law. But if the conduct of the greater part is diſordered in things of this kind, let them be legally eſtabliſhed, and a judgment made of ſuch conduct according to the eſtabliſhed laws. The firſt year is the beginning of the whole of life to every one. This ought to be written in paternal temples, as the beginning of life, both to boys and girls. In every tribe, too, the number of the governors that are reckoned by years ſhould be written on a white wall. Next to theſe, the names of thoſe that are living

in the tribe ſhould always be written; and on their deceaſe their names ſhould be blotted out. The boundary of marriage for girls ſhould be from ſixteen to twenty years of age; and this ſhould be the longeſt definite time: but for boys, from thirty to thirty-five. The time for acting in the capacity of magiſtrates ſhould be limited: for women, to forty years of age; but for men, to thirty. With reſpect to war, men ſhould engage in it from twenty to ſixty years of age; but women, when it ſhall appear neceſſary to employ them for warlike purpoſes, and after they have brought forth children, to the fiftieth year of their age: at the ſame time being mindful to preſcribe the poſſible and the becoming to each.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK VII.

CHILDREN, therefore, both male and female, being begotten, we ſhall act with the greateſt propriety in ſpeaking in the next place about their education and diſcipline; for to paſs this over in ſilence is perfectly impoſſible. However, when it is diſcuſſed, it will appear to us to be rather ſimilar to a certain doctrine and admonition than to laws. For the numerous ſmall and unapparent circumſtances which happen privately, and in every houſe, ſince they eaſily take place through the pain, pleaſure and deſire of the reſpective individuals, contrary to the intention of the legiſlator, render the manners of the citizens all-various, and not ſimilar to each other. But this is an evil to cities. For, on account of their ſmallneſs and frequency, to puniſh them by a legal fine would be unbecoming, and at the ſame time unſeemly. It would likewiſe be the means of deſtroying written laws, in conſequence of men being accuſtomed to act contrary to law in things ſmall and numerous. So that it is difficult indeed to eſtabliſh laws concerning them, and impoſſible to paſs them over in ſilence. But I will endeavour to render what I ſay manifeſt, leading forth an example, as it were, into light; for what is ſaid at preſent ſeems to be involved in obſcurity.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. That a proper education, therefore, appears to be capable of rendering both ſouls and bodies moſt beautiful and excellent, has been rightly aſſerted by us.

CLIN. Undoubedly.

GUEST. But I think that the moſt beautiful bodies are ſimply thoſe which immediately from infancy grow in the moſt proper manner.

CLIN.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what? Do we not underſtand this, that the firſt bloſſom of every animal is by far the greateſt and moſt abundant; ſo that it is the ſource of contention to many, that human bodies at twenty do not receive twice the increaſe in length which they had at five years of age?

CLIN. True.

GUEST. What then? When there is an influx of abundant increaſe without many and moderate labours, do we not know that it produces ten thouſand maladies in bodies?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Many labours, therefore, are then neceſſary, when abundant nutriment is introduced into bodies.

CLIN. What do you ſay, O gueſt? Shall we order thoſe who are but juſt born, and the youngeſt, to undergo the greateſt labours?

GUEST. By no means: but ſtill prior to theſe, thoſe that are nouriſhed in their mother's womb.

CLIN. How do you ſay, O beſt of men? Do you really ſpeak of thoſe that are yet carried in the womb of their mother?

GUEST. I do. But it is not at all wonderful that you ſhould be ignorant of the exerciſe of ſuch as theſe; which, though it appears to be abſurd, I am willing to unfold to you.

CLIN. By all means, do ſo.

GUEST. By us, indeed, a thing of this kind can be more readily comprehended, becauſe children there engage in certain ſports more than is proper. For, with us, not only children, but certain old men, nouriſh the young of birds, and exerciſe them in fighting with each other; but they are far from thinking that the labours, in which by exerciſing they excite them, are moderate. For, beſides this, taking each of them by the wing, they walk many ſtadia with the leſſer young in their hands, and the larger under their arms; and this, not for the ſake of the good habit of their own bodies, but for that of the birds. And by this, indeed, they ſignify thus much to him who is capable of underſtanding what is ſaid, that all bodies are benefited by motion and agitation when not continued to wearineſs, whether theſe are produced from themſelves, or by carriages, or by the ſea, or horſes, or by whatever other means bodies are moved. Hence, through

theſe

theſe vanquiſhing the nutriment of food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, beauty, and ſtrength. This being the caſe, what ſhall we ſay we ought to do in the next place? Are you willing that we ſhould ſay, laughing, while we are eſtabliſhing laws, that the pregnant woman ſhould take the exerciſe of walking, and, after ſhe is delivered, faſhion the infant like wax, while he is moiſt, and during the ſpace of two years bind him with rollers? Likewiſe, that we ſhould compel the nurſes, by legal fines, to carry the children either into the fields, or to the temples, or their acquaintance, till they are ſufficiently able to ſtand alone? And that then they ſhould be careful leſt their legs become diſtorted through the violence of reſting on them; and, for this purpoſe, ſhould carry them in their arms till they are three years old? That the nurſes, likewiſe, ought to be as ſtrong as poſſible; and that there ſhould be more than one for each child? And, laſtly, that a puniſhment ſhall be ordained by a written law for neglect in each of theſe particulars? Or ſhall this by no means be the caſe? For that which we juſt now mentioned will happen to us in great abundance.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. We ſhall expoſe ourſelves to abundant laughter, becauſe the effeminate and ſervile manners of the nurſes will be unwilling to obey us.

CLIN. For whoſe ſake, therefore, ſhall we ſay theſe things ought to be aſſerted?

GUEST. For the ſake of the manners of the maſters and free perſons in the city, who, perhaps, when they hear theſe things, will rightly conceive, that unleſs private affairs are properly conducted in cities, it is in vain to expect that ſuch as are common can have any ſtability by the promulgation of laws; and who, in conſequence of ſuch a conception, will uſe as laws what we have juſt now advanced. And further ſtill, by a proper uſe of theſe aſſertions they will govern both their families and the city in ſuch a manner as to render them happy.

CLIN. What you ſay is very likely to be the caſe.

GUEST. We ſhould not, therefore, deſiſt from a legiſlation of this kind till we have delivered the particulars of thoſe ſtudies which pertain to the ſouls of very young children, and thus bring our diſcourſe to a concluſion in the ſame manner as when we ſpoke concerning their bodies.

CLIN. Perfectly right.

GUEST.

GUEST. Let us receive this, therefore, as an element with reſpect to both the body and ſoul of very young children, that nutrition and motion, when applied every night and day, are profitable to all juvenile bodies and ſouls, but eſpecially to the moſt youthful; ſo that, if it were poſſible, they ſhould be in ſuch a condition as if they were always ſailing on the ſea. But as this is impoſſible, it is requiſite to approach as near to this as we are able in our treatment of infants. Indeed, that we ought to do ſo, may be conjectured from this, that both the nurſes of infants, and thoſe who are initiated in the remedies of the Corybantes, know experimentally that it is uſeful. For, when mothers are deſirous that their children who ſleep with difficulty may ſleep ſoundly, they do not attempt to accompliſh this by quiet, but, on the contrary, by gently moving them in their arms; nor yet by ſilence, but by ſinging to them. And, in ſhort, they charm their children by the melody of their voice, as if by that of a pipe; juſt in the ſame manner as the remedies of mad Bacchanalians employ this choir, and, at the ſame time, Muſe of motion.

CLIN. What then, O gueſt, is eſpecially the cauſe of this to us?

GUEST. It is not very difficult to know.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. Both theſe paſſions conſiſt in fear: and they are certain terrors ariſing from a depraved habit of the ſoul. When, therefore, any one externally cauſes an agitation in paſſions of this kind, the exterior vanquiſhes the interior dreadful and inſane motion: but, being vanquiſhed, a tranquil quiet takes place in the ſoul, and the leaping of the heart, which was troubleſome to endure, ſubſides. And thus it entirely cauſes ſome to receive the benefit of ſleep; but it recalls others, who are awake, from inſane to prudent habits, by dancing and the melody of the pipe, in conjunction with thoſe divinities to whom ſuppliants ſacrifice. And theſe things, in ſhort, poſſeſs a certain probable reaſon.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But if theſe things poſſeſs ſuch a power, this ought to be underſtood concerning them, that every ſoul that has been familiar with fear from infancy will have been more accuſtomed to endurance. Every one, however, will acknowledge that this is an exerciſe of timidity, and not of fortitude

CLIN.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, on the contrary, we ſhould ſay that he is exerciſed in fortitude who, from his infancy, has made it his ſtudy to vanquiſh all the fears and terrors which befall us.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. We may ſay, therefore, that this one thing greatly contributes to a part of the virtue of the ſoul, viz. the all-perfect gymnaſtic exerciſe of children in motions.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And beſides this, a placid or moroſe diſpoſition becomes no ſmall part of goodneſs or depravity of ſoul.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we ſhould endeavour to relate to the utmoſt of our ability, after what manner we ſhould wiſh that each of theſe may be implanted in infants.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. This, then, is a dogma with us, that luxury renders the manners of youth moroſe, iraſcible, and vehemently agitated by things of a trifling nature; but that, on the contrary, exceſſive and ruſtic ſervitude cauſes them to be abject, illiberal, haters of mankind, and unfit for ſociety.

CLIN. But how will the whole city be able to educate infants, who are incapable of underſtanding what is ſaid to them, and who cannot taſte of any diſcipline whatever?

GUEST. Thus. Every animal, as ſoon as it is born, is accuſtomed to utter certain ſounds with a loud voice: and this is particularly the caſe with the human ſpecies, which to vociferation adds weeping.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Nurſes, therefore, being deſirous to know what infants are in want of, conjecture this by the things which they offer to them. For that which cauſes them to be ſilent they conſider as offered to them in a becoming manner, but that as improperly offered at which they cry and make a noiſe. For, in children, vociferation and tears are indications by no means fortunate of the things which they love and hate. But the time in which this takes place is not leſs than the ſpace of three years, which is no ſmall portion of life to paſs through well or ill.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Does not a child at that period appear to you to be moroſe, and by no means kind, and for the moſt part full of lamentation and tears, more than becomes one that is good?

CLIN. It appears ſo to me.

GUEST. What then? If ſome one ſhould endeavour, by all poſſible means, that during this period of three years the child may in as ſmall a degree as poſſible be affected with ſorrow, fear, and pain, ſhould we not think that by this means his ſoul would be rendered more cheerful and kind?

CLIN. It is evident it would, O gueſt, and eſpecially if the child ſhould be ſupplied with many pleaſures.

GUEST. This I cannot grant you, O wonderful Clinias. For with us an action of this kind would be the moſt pernicious of all things. But let us ſee whether we may aſſert a certain thing.

CLIN. Inform us what it is.

GUEST. Our diſcourſe, at preſent, is about a thing of no ſmall importance. Do you, O Megillus, attend and decide for us. For my diſcourſe aſſerts that an upright life ought neither to purſue pleaſures, nor entirely avoid pain, but ſhould embrace the medium between theſe, which we juſt now denominated benignity; and which, from a certain oracular rumour, we all of us aptly call the habit of divinity. We ſay too, that he who is deſirous of becoming a divine man ought to purſue this habit, ſo that he may neither be wholly hurried away to pleaſures in a raſh manner (for in this caſe he would not be free from pain), nor yet ſuffer any other to act in this manner, whether he is an old or a young man, of the male or female ſex. But he will leaſt of all ſuffer this to be the caſe with infants. For all the manners then, through cuſtom, inhere in every one in the moſt firm and powerful manner. And further ſtill, if it were not that I ſhould appear to jeſt, I ſhould ſay that pregnant women ought more than other women ſo to be managed, that during the year of their pregnancy they may neither be engaged in certain numerous and inſane pleaſures, nor be agitated by pain, but lead a benignant, benevolent, and mild life.

CLIN. There was no occaſion for you, O gueſt, to aſk Megillus, which of us ſpoke in the more proper manner; for I agree with you, that all men ought to fly from a life of unmingled pleaſure and pain, and that they ſhould

always purſue a certain middle condition. You have, therefore, both ſpoken and heard in a becoming manner.

GUEST. With very great rectitude, therefore, O Clinias. But, beſides theſe things, let us all three conſider this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That all theſe particulars which are now diſcuſſed by us are called by many unwritten laws, and that thoſe which are denominated the laws of a country are no other than all theſe. And further ſtill, that what we juſt now ſaid, that theſe particulars ought neither to be called laws, nor yet ſuffered to be paſſed over in ſilence, was beautifully aſſerted. For theſe are the bonds of every polity, ſubſiſting between all laws that are as yet and will be hereafter written, and being as it were altogether the laws of a country, and ſuch as are in every reſpect antient. Theſe, when eſtabliſhed in a becoming manner, and rendered familiar, will inveſt the written laws with every kind of ſafety. But when they are eſtabliſhed in an unbecoming manner, confuſion will be the conſequence: juſt as in edifices, when the pillars by which they are ſupported are taken away, the whole falls to the ground, ſome things lie under others, and thoſe parts of the ſtructure which were beautifully raiſed on the pillars become a heap of ruins, through the falling of their ſupporters. In conſequence of conſidering this, O Clinias, it is proper that you ſhould bind your city on all ſides, as being a new city, and that to the utmoſt of your power you ſhould not omit any thing either great or ſmall, which may be called laws, or manners, or ſtudies: for by all theſe a city is bound together; but no one of theſe can be ſtable without the reſt. So that it is not proper to wonder, if, in conſequence of many and at the ſame time ſmall things appearing to us to be legal, or this being the caſe with a conflux of cuſtoms, the laws ſhould become more extended.

CLIN. You ſpeak properly; and we ſhall think in this manner.

GUEST. If any one, therefore, accurately accompliſhes theſe things, in both male and female children of three years old, and does not negligently make uſe of what has been ſaid, he will procure no ſmall advantage to ſuch as are recently educated. But theſe things will be accommodated to the diſpoſition of children of three, four, five, and ſix years of age. Luxury too ſhould be removed from them; and they ſhould be chaſtized, but not in an ignominious manner. But, as we ſaid reſpecting ſlaves, that they ſhould neither

neither be chaſtized with inſolence, as this would excite them to anger, nor yet be ſuffered to go unpuniſhed, as this would render them delicate; the ſame mode of conduct ſhould be obſerved towards thoſe that are free. Sports, however, are to children certain ſpontaneous things, which when they engage in, they nearly of themſelves invent. All children then of this age ſhould aſſemble in the temples of the reſpective diſtricts, from three to ſix years of age; the nurſes of theſe ſtill keeping a watchful eye over their orderly behaviour and incontinence. But one out of each of the twelve women ſhould be placed over the nurſes, and the whole herd, for the ſpace of a year; and her province muſt conſiſt in taking care that every thing preſcribed by the guardians of the law is executed in an orderly manner. Theſe ſhould be choſen by the women that preſide over marriages; one out of each tribe, and of the ſame age with themſelves. She who is eſtabliſhed in this office ſhould go every day to a temple, and always puniſh the perſon that acts unjuſtly, viz. a male and female ſlave and a ſtranger of either ſex, herſelf, by means of certain ſervants of the city; but a citizen, when ſhe is doubtful reſpecting his puniſhment, muſt be taken by her to the ædiles to receive his ſentence. But when the puniſhment which a citizen deſerves is not dubious, ſhe herſelf ſhall inflict it. After children are ſix years of age, the males ſhould be ſeparated from the females; boys ſhould aſſociate with boys, and girls in a ſimilar manner with each other. It is likewiſe proper that the attention of each ſhould be directed to diſciplines; the males being ſent to the maſters of equeſtrian exerciſes, of bows, darts, and ſlings; likewiſe the females, if diſcipline of this kind is allowed them; and eſpecially that they may become acquainted with the uſe of arms. But now almoſt all men are ignorant how things of this kind are circumſtanced.

CLIN. What do you mean?

GUEST. That things on the right hand ſeem to differ naturally from thoſe on the left, with reſpect to the ſeveral actions of the hands. For the feet, and the inferior parts of the body, do not appear to poſſeſs any difference with reſpect to labour. But in the hands we each of us become as it were lame, through the ignorance of our nurſes and mothers. For each of the members naturally poſſeſſes nearly equal power; but they not properly uſing them, through cuſtom we make a difference between them. For, indeed, in certain employments there is no great difference in the uſe of the hands.

Thus, uſing the lyre with the left hand, and the plectrum with the right, is a thing of no conſequence; and ſo in other things of a ſimilar nature. But not to uſe theſe examples in other particulars is nearly folly. The law of the Scythians, indeed, evinces the truth of theſe obſervations. For they not only hold the bow in their left hand, and the arrow in the right, but ſimilarly employ both hands for both theſe. And there are many other examples of this kind in charioteers and others. From all which we may learn, that thoſe who render the left hand more imbecil than the right act contrary to nature. This, as I have ſaid, is a thing of no great conſequence in horned plectra, and ſuch-like inſtruments; but in battle, where it is neceſſary to uſe iron, bows, and ſpears, it is of great conſequence. But it is by far of the greateſt importance when it is requiſite to uſe arms againſt arms. There is, indeed, a great difference between one that learns and one that does not learn, and between him who is exerciſed and him who is not exerciſed. For, as he who is perfectly exerciſed in the pancratium, or in boxing, or wreſtling, is not incapable of fighting from his left-hand parts, but becomes lame and confuſed in his motions when any one, cauſing him to change his poſition, compels him to exerciſe himſelf from his right-hand parts;—the ſame thing, in my opinion, ought to appear proper in arms, and in every thing elſe. For he who poſſeſſes a twofold power, viz. of defending himſelf, and vanquiſhing others, ought not to ſuffer, to the utmoſt of his power, either of theſe to remain indolent and without ſkill. And if any one had the nature of Geryon or Briareus, ſince in this caſe he would be capable of uſing a hundred hands, he ought with all theſe hands to hurl a hundred darts. All theſe particulars ought to be under the direction of the male and female governors; the female governors inſpecting the ſports and nutriment of the children, but the male their diſciplines, that, all the boys and girls having the perfect uſe of both their feet and both their hands, they may as much as poſſible in no reſpect injure nature by cuſtom. But it will happen that twofold diſciplines muſt be uſed; gymnaſtic, for particulars pertaining to the body; and muſic, for ſuch as pertain to the good condition of the ſoul. Again, however, gymnaſtic is twofold; dancing and wreſtling. And of dancing, one kind imitates the diction of the muſe, preſerving the magnificent in conjunction with the liberal; but another kind, for the ſake of the good habit, lightneſs, and beauty of the parts and members of the body,

body, aptly bends and ſtretches each, imparting to them rhythmical motion, diſſeminating, and at the ſame time following the whole order of dancing. With reſpect to wreſtling, that which Antæus or Cercyon adopted among their arts, for the ſake of uſeleſs contention, or the boxing employed by Epeus [1] or Amycus [2], ſince they are of no uſe in battle, they do not deſerve to be mentioned. But the particulars reſpecting proper wreſtling, by clinging round the neck, or with the hands, or round the ſides, when deſire of victory and a good habit of body are applied for the ſake of ſtrength and health,—theſe, as they are uſeful to every purpoſe, are not to be omitted; but both maſters and diſciples are to be enjoined, that, when we eſtabliſh the laws reſpecting theſe, all ſuch particulars may be benevolently imparted to the one, and gratefully received by the other. Nor muſt ſuch imitations in choirs as are fit to be imitated be omitted; in this place, indeed, the armed ſports of the Curetes; but, in Lacedæmon, of the Dioſcuri. Our virgin too and miſtreſs Minerva, being delighted with the ſport of the choir, does not think it fit to play with empty hands; but, being perfectly adorned with complete armour, ſhe in this manner completes the dance. It will be proper that all the boys and girls ſhould imitate the goddeſs in this reſpect, honouring her benevolence, in the neceſſity of war, and for the ſake of feſtivals. It will likewiſe be proper that boys, immediately before they go to battle, ſhould ſupplicate and make ſacred proceſſions in honour of all the Gods, being at the ſame time adorned with arms and horſes, and performing their ſupplications to the Gods and the ſons of the Gods, ſometimes ſwifter, and ſometimes ſlower in dancing, and as they proceed to battle. Conteſts too, and preludes of conteſts, ſhould be uſed, for no other purpoſe than for the ſake of theſe things. For theſe, both in peace and war, are uſeful to a city and to private families. But other labours, ſports, and exerciſes reſpecting the body are not, O Megillus and Clinias, liberal. And thus that gymnaſtic, which I ſaid in our former diſcourſe ought to be diſcuſſed, is nearly now abſolved. But, if you have any thing better than this, ſpeak, and do not withhold it.

[1] Epeus was the ſon of Endymion, and brother to Pæon, who reigned in a part of Peloponneſus. His ſubjects were called from him Epei. He conquered in boxing at the funeral games in honour of Patroclus.

[2] Amycus was the ſon of Neptune, by Melia, and was famous for his ſkill in the management of the ceſtus.

CLIN.

CLIN. It is not eaſy, O gueſt, omitting theſe, to have any thing better to ſay about gymnaſtic and conteſt.

GUEST. It follows, therefore, that we ſhould ſpeak about the gifts of the Muſes and Apollo, which we formerly thought we had ſo ſufficiently diſcuſſed, that the particulars about gymnaſtic alone remained; but now it is evident that there is ſomething reſpecting theſe which ſhould be mentioned before every thing elſe. Of this, therefore, we will in the next place ſpeak.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. Hear me, therefore; for you have heard me in what has been already diſcuſſed. But at the ſame time it is requiſite that both the ſpeaker and hearer ſhould be cautious in mentioning that which is vehemently wonderful and unuſual. This alſo ſhould be the caſe at preſent. For I am now going to aſſert ſomething which cannot be mentioned without fear; but at the ſame time, aſſuming courage, I ſhall not deſiſt.

CLIN. What is this, O gueſt?

GUEST. I ſay, that all cities are ignorant that the ſtability or mutation of ſports is the principal thing reſpecting the promulgation of laws. For when it is ſo ordered, that the ſame perſons always uſe, and are delighted with, the ſame ſports, according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner, legal inſtitutions are then permitted to remain eſtabliſhed in quiet. But when ſports are changed, and innovations made in them, ſo that young men are perpetually engaged in new ſports, both in the figures of their bodies and other apparatus; continually form a different opinion of the becoming and unbecoming in theſe particulars; and in the higheſt degree honour the inventors of new figures, colours, and every thing elſe of this kind;—when this is the caſe, we ſay, and ſay with the greateſt rectitude, that a greater miſchief cannot befall the city. For it ſecretly changes the manners of the youthful part of the inhabitants, and cauſes them to deſpiſe that which is antient, and honour that which is new. But I again ſay, that there is not any thing more detrimental to all cities than this aſſertion and dogma. Hear, however, what a mighty evil I ſay it is.

CLIN. Do you ſpeak of blaming antient inſtitutions in cities?

GUEST. Entirely ſo.

CLIN. You ſhall not, therefore, find us depraved auditors of this diſcourſe, but as much as poſſible moſt benevolent.

GUEST.

GUEST. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that you will be ſo.

CLIN. Only ſpeak, therefore.

GUEST. Come then, let us hear this with greater attention, and thus ſpeak among ourſelves. We find then, that mutation in all things, except ſuch as are evil, is in the higheſt degree pernicious at all times in the diet of bodies, in the manners of ſouls, and, in ſhort, in every thing except, as I juſt now ſaid, in things evil. So that, if any one directs his attention to bodies, and conſiders them as accuſtomed to certain kinds of food, drink, and labours, he will find that at firſt they are diſturbed by them, but afterwards by the long continued uſe of theſe acquire fleſh, become friendly, accuſtomed, and familiar to all this diet, and are diſpoſed in the beſt manner with reſpect to health and pleaſure. He will likewiſe find, that if at any time they are forced to change any part of their approved diet, at firſt they are diſturbed by diſeaſe, and do not recover their health till they are accuſtomed to the new food. The ſame thing muſt be conſidered as taking place in the thoughts of men, and the natures of ſouls. For every ſoul reverences and fears to make any change in the laws in which it has been educated, when by a certain divine good fortune thoſe laws have remained for a long time unmoved, ſo that no one either recollects or has ever heard that they ſubſiſted otherwiſe than at preſent. The legiſlator, therefore, ought to deviſe ſome method by which this may be accompliſhed in the city. But I have diſcovered the following method: All men, as I have ſaid before, conſider the ſports of youth when changed, as nothing more than mere ſports, and are far from thinking that they are of the greateſt conſequence. Hence, they do not reſiſt this mutation, but comply with it. Nor do they conſider, that the children who engage in theſe new ſports neceſſarily become different men from what they would have been if their old ſports had remained; but, becoming different, that they will purſue a different life, and thus be accuſtomed to different ſtudies and laws. Hence, no one fears that what I juſt now called the greateſt evil will by theſe means happen to cities. Mutations, therefore, reſpecting figures are leſs noxious. But frequent innovations in praiſing and blaming manners are, in my opinion, the greateſt of all evils, and the moſt to be dreaded.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What then? Shall we believe in our former diſcourſe, in which we

we ſaid that the particulars reſpecting rhythm, and every kind of muſic, were imitations of the manners of better and worſe men? Or how ſhall we ſay?

CLIN. Our opinion is in no reſpect different from this.

GUEST. We ſay, therefore, that we ſhould endeavour, by every poſſible contrivance, that neither children in our city may deſire other imitations in dancing and ſinging, nor any one may perſuade them to this innovation by introducing all-various pleaſures.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. Has any one then of us any art better calculated for this purpoſe than that of the Egyptians?

CLIN. What art are you ſpeaking of?

GUEST. That every kind of dancing and melody ſhould be conſecrated; inſtituting, in the firſt place, feſtivals at certain times of the year, in honour of the ſeveral Gods, the ſons of Gods, and dæmons; and after this, the ſacrifices to the different divinities, together with the ode and choirs with which the ſacrifices are to be honoured. After theſe things are eſtabliſhed, all the citizens in common ſhould ſacrifice to the Fates, and to all the other Gods, and dedicate their ſeveral odes to each of the Gods and their attendants. But if any one introduces other hymns and choirs in honour of the Gods than thoſe which are inſtituted by law, the prieſts and prieſteſſes, together with the guardians of the laws, ſhall, in a holy and legitimate manner, repulſe him in his undertaking. And he who is repulſed, if he is not willingly reſtrained, ſhall ſuffer the puniſhment of his impiety through the whole of life, from any one who is willing to inflict it.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But ſince we are arrived thus far in our diſcourſe, we ſhould be affected in a becoming manner.

CLIN. About what are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. All men, not only the old but the young, when they ſee or hear any thing unuſual, do not immediately aſſent to that which is dubious reſpecting it, directly, as it were, running to embrace it; but, ſtanding ſtill, as if ſituated in a place where three roads meet, and not very much ſeeing the right way, inquire, and do not proceed any further till they have a firm aſſurance reſpecting the road they ſhould take. We too ſhould act in a

ſimilar manner at preſent. For, as we have now fallen upon an unuſual and wonderful diſcourſe reſpecting laws, we ought neceſſarily to make every poſſible inquiry, and not readily decide, being ſuch men as we are, on things of ſuch great importance, or attempt to aſſert any thing immediately, as if the ſubject was perfectly clear.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. We will, therefore, give the ſubject time, and then firmly decide upon it, when it has been ſufficiently conſidered by us. But leſt we ſhould in vain leave the order conſequent to laws unfiniſhed, let us proceed to the end of them. For, perhaps, if divinity is willing, and this diſcuſſion obtains its completion, what is at preſent dubious may become ſufficiently clear.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt excellently, O gueſt, and we ſhall do as you ſay.

GUEST. We ſay, then, that this wonderful thing muſt be granted,—I mean, that odes muſt be eſtabliſhed for us by law; juſt as the antients, as it appears, proclaimed reſpecting ſinging to the harp. So that they, perhaps, did not entirely diſſent from what is ſaid by us at preſent; but in a dream, as it were, or rouſed to a vigilant ſtate, they either dreamt or propheſied this. Let this then be the decree reſpecting it:—No one ſhall dare to ſing any thing beſides the public and ſacred ſongs, or make any alteration in the whole choir of the young men, or utter any thing contrary to the other laws. And he who complies with this decree ſhall be liberated from fine; but he who does not comply, as we ſaid juſt now, ſhall be puniſhed by the guardians of the laws, and by the prieſts and prieſteſſes. Let theſe things, therefore, be now eſtabliſhed for us in diſcourſe.

CLIN. Let them be eſtabliſhed.

GUEST. But after what manner can any one ſo eſtabliſh them by law as that he may not appear perfectly ridiculous? It appears to me that it will be the ſafeſt way to faſhion them firſt of all in our diſcourſe like certain images. I ſay, then, that one of the images is as follows: The ſacrifice being performed, and the victims burnt according to law, if ſome private perſon, a ſon for inſtance, or a brother, ſhould approach the altars and ſacred rites blaſpheming with every kind of blaſphem, uld we not ſay that he uttered a ſorrowful and bad omen and prophecy, both to his father and the reſt of his kindred?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. This, therefore, in ſhort, muſt nearly take place in all our cities. For, when any magiſtrate performs any ſacrifice in common, not one choir, but a multitude of choirs aſſemble on the occaſion; and ſtanding not far from the altars, but ſometimes cloſe to them, they utter every kind of blaſphemy reſpecting the ſacred concerns, exciting the ſouls of the hearers with words, rhythms, and the moſt lamentable harmonies: and he who cauſes the city to weep moſt abundantly immediately after the ſacrifice is finiſhed, bears away the palm of victory. Shall we not abrogate this law? And if, at any time, it is neceſſary that the citizens ſhould hear lamentations of this kind, it ſhould not be on certain ſacred, but rather on inauſpicious days: and then it will be proper that rather certain foreign choirs, conducted by hire, ſhould ſing on this occaſion, as is the caſe at funerals, where thoſe who are hired for the purpoſe walk before the dead with a certain *Caric Muſe* [1]. A thing of this kind may very properly be adopted about ſuch odes as theſe. A long robe too will be proper for funeral odes, and not crowns or golden ornaments. But, in ſhort, every thing of a nature contrary to theſe ſhould be employed on this occaſion, that I may diſmiſs all further diſcourſe about theſe particulars with the utmoſt celerity. I again, therefore, aſk if it is agreeable to you, that this firſt image ſhould be eſtabliſhed for odes?

CLIN. What kind of image?

GUEST. A good omen. And, indeed, the genus of the ode ſhould every where, and in every reſpect, be employed in prognoſticating well. Or ſhall I not at all aſk your opinion, but thus eſtabliſh it?

CLIN. By all means, eſtabliſh it: for this law will vanquiſh by the unanimous votes of all men.

GUEST. What then, after good omination, will be the ſecond law of muſic? Will it not be, that prayers ſhould be offered to the reſpective Gods to whom we ſacrifice?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But the third law, I think, will be, that ſince poets know that

[1] That is, ſays the Greek Scholiaſt, a lamentable Muſe: for the Carians appear to be of a mournful diſpoſition, and for hire lament over the dead bodies of foreigners.

prayers

prayers are petitions addreſſed to the Gods, they ought to be careful in the higheſt degree, leſt they ſhould ignorantly requeſt what is evil, as if it were good. For I think the condition of him who prays in this manner would be ridiculous.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Did we not a little before agree, that neither ſilver nor gold ought to be conſidered as riches in our city?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Of what then ſhall we ſay this diſcourſe is the paradigm? Is it not of this, that not every genus of poets is ſufficient to know, in the higheſt degree, things good and evil? If, therefore, any poet, either in proſe or verſe, ſhall compoſe for us improper prayers, he ſhall be made by the citizens to pray for the contrary to what he aſked in his prayers, in things of the greateſt importance: though, as we have already ſaid, we ſhall not find many offences greater than this. But we ſhall eſtabliſh this as one of the laws and forms reſpecting the Muſe.

CLIN. Which? Speak to us more clearly.

GUEST. That a poet ſhall not compoſe any thing, either beautiful or good, different from the legal and juſt inſtitutions of the city. Nor ſhall he be permitted to ſhow what he has compoſed to any private perſon, before the judges and guardians of the law, appointed for this purpoſe, have ſeen and approved it. But it has nearly been ſhown by us, who thoſe are whom we have choſen to preſide over muſic and diſcipline. Shall I then, as uſual, aſk whether this law, formula, and third image, is to be eſtabliſhed for us? Or how does it appear to you?

CLIN. That it ſhould be eſtabliſhed, undoubtedly.

GUEST. After theſe things, it will be moſt proper that hymns, and encomiums of the Gods, ſhould be ſung mingled with prayers; and after the Gods, in a ſimilar manner, that proper prayers, with encomiums, ſhould be offered to dæmons and heroes.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, after this law, the following will take place without envy. It will be proper that thoſe citizens who have accompliſhed beautiful and laborious works, pertaining either to bodies or ſouls, and who have been obedient to the laws, ſhould after their deceaſe be celebrated.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But to honour thoſe who are yet alive, with encomiums and hymns, and before, having completely run the race of life, they have arrived at a beautiful end, is not ſafe. Let all theſe particulars be eſtabliſhed for us, common both to men and women that have been illuſtriouſly good. But it will be proper that odes and dancings ſhould be eſtabliſhed in the following manner:—There are many antient and beautiful poems about muſic, and in a ſimilar manner about dancing. Out of theſe to chooſe that which is becoming and adapted to an eſtabliſhed polity, cannot be the means of exciting envy. The electors of theſe ſhall not be leſs than fifty years old. Theſe ſhall chooſe that poem out of the antient poems which appears to be ſufficient for the purpoſe. But that which is inſufficient, or altogether unfit, they ſhall either entirely reject, or commit to poets and muſicians to be properly corrected, employing for this purpoſe their poetical abilities. They ſhall not apply to theſe for the gratification of deſire, or for pleaſures, except in a very few caſes; but, the will of the legiſlator being made known, all dancing, every ode, and every choir, ſhall be inſtituted according to their determination. For every employment about a Muſe, which is conducted in an orderly manner, though a ſweet Muſe is not added, is ten thouſand times better than every diſorderly purſuit of a Muſe. The pleaſant, however, is common to all the Muſes. For every one conſiders that to be pleaſant with which he has been converſant from infancy to mature age. And if he has been familiar with a prudent and orderly Muſe, when he hears one of a contrary character, he hates, and calls it illiberal. But he who has been educated in familiarity with a common and ſweet Muſe, calls the contrary to this frigid and unpleaſant. So that, as I juſt now ſaid, neither the pleaſant nor the unpleaſant has any peculiar privilege. But the caſe is different with reſpect to emolument and detriment: for the one renders thoſe who are educated in it better, and the other worſe.

CLIN. It is well ſaid.

GUEST. Further ſtill, it will be proper to ſeparate the ſongs which are adapted to the women from thoſe which are adapted to the men, defining them by a certain formula, and accommodating them to harmonies and rhythms. For to be diſſonant from the whole of harmony, or foreign from rhythm, attributing to melodies nothing adapted to each of theſe, is a dire circumſtance.

circumſtance. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the figures of theſe ſhould be eſtabliſhed by law, and both be properly attributed to both. But that which is accommodated either to men or women ought to be rendered manifeſt from the difference of the nature of each. That which is magnificent, therefore, and verges to fortitude, muſt be called virile: but that which more inclines to the ornamental and the moderate muſt be delivered, both in law and in diſcourſe, as of a more feminine nature. This, then, is the order. In the next place, let us declare after what manner, by whom, and when, each of theſe are to be accompliſhed. But as a ſhipwright, when he lays down that which is the principle in the conſtruction of a ſhip, deſcribes the form of the keel; in like manner, I appear to myſelf to do the ſame thing. For, while I endeavour to diſtinguiſh the figures of lives according to the manners of ſouls, I in reality lay down the keels of them, and very properly conſider by what device, and after what manner, we may tranſport in the beſt manner life over this ſea of life. Human affairs, indeed, are not worthy of great attention; yet it is neceſſary that they ſhould be attended to. But this is not an unfortunate circumſtance. Since, however, we are here, if we can in a certain reſpect accompliſh this in a convenient manner, it will, perhaps, be ſufficient for us. But ſome one may, perhaps, very properly inquire what it is that I now ſay.

CLIN. Some one may.

GUEST. I ſay, then, that a thing of a ſerious nature ought to be ſeriouſly ſtudied, but that this ought by no means to be the caſe with that which is not of a ſerious nature. And that divinity, indeed, is naturally worthy of every bleſſed ſtudy, but that man, as I ſaid before, was faſhioned to be a certain ſport[1] of divinity. This, indeed, is truly the moſt excellent thing which he poſſeſſes. It is neceſſary, therefore, that every man and woman, purſuing this mode, and engaging in the moſt beautiful ſports, ſhould thus paſs through life, thinking, in a manner, entirely contrary to what they do at preſent.

CLIN. How?

[1] Antient theologiſts and intellectual philoſophers were accuſtomed to call the energy of divinity proceeding into the ſenſible univerſe ſport, on account of the deluſive, fictitious, and ever-gliding nature of matter, and the forms which it contains. So that in this ſenſe man, conſidered as connected with body, may be ſaid to be the ſport of divinity.

GUEST.

GUEST. Now, indeed, they think that ſerious purſuits ought to ſubſiſt for the ſake of ſports. For they conſider that warlike concerns, which are things of a ſerious nature, ought to be well diſpoſed for the ſake of peace. But neither does ſport naturally belong to war, nor was there ever any diſcipline in it which deſerves to be mentioned, nor is there at preſent, nor will be. But we ſay that this is a thing of a moſt ſerious nature,—I mean, that every one ought to paſs through life, for the moſt part, and in the moſt excellent manner, in peace. What the proper manner, therefore, is of ſporting through life, and what the ſports are which ſhould be employed in ſacrifices, in ſinging and dancing, ſo that the Gods may be rendered propitious, and enemies oppoſed and vanquiſhed in battle; likewiſe, by what ſongs and dances both theſe may be accompliſhed;—of all theſe particulars we have delivered the formulæ, and, as it were, cut the paths in which we ſhould proceed. The poet too appears to ſpeak well when he ſays: "You will conceive, O Telemachus, ſome things from yourſelf, but others the dæmon will ſuggeſt to you. For I do not think that you were born and nouriſhed with unfavourable Gods [1]." Such too ought to be the conceptions of our pupils. For they ſhould think that what we have already ſaid has been ſufficiently ſaid; and that the dæmon and divinity will ſuggeſt other things to them reſpecting ſacrifices and choirs, viz. what divinities they ought to render propitious in their ſports, and when; at the ſame time living in a natural manner, and being themſelves, for the moſt part, prodigies, but participating certain ſmall portions of truth.

MEGIL. You vilify, O gueſt, in every reſpect the human race.

GUEST. You ſhould not wonder at this, O Megillus, but pardon me. For, looking to divinity, and being affected with the view, I have ſaid that which I juſt now ſaid. But let our race not be any thing deſpicable (if it is agreeable to you), but worthy ſerious attention. After theſe things the public buildings for gymnaſtic exerciſes and diſciplines have been ſpoken of, and placed in a tripartite manner in the middle of the city. The gymnaſia too of the horſes have, in a ſimilar manner, been aſſigned a tripartite diſtribution in the ſuburbs of the city, together with ample places adorned for the ſake of the young men, that in theſe they may exerciſe themſelves with

[1] Odyſſ. lib. iii.

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the bow and arrow, and in other jaculations; and may be properly diſciplined and attended to. If, therefore, we did not then ſufficiently ſpeak about theſe particulars, let us now diſcourſe about them in conjunction with the laws.

Of all theſe, then, foreign maſters ſhould be hired, who reſiding in theſe ample places may teach every one that ſhall come to be inſtructed, the warlike and muſical diſciplines; not only inſtructing thoſe whom their parents wiſh to be taught, and rejecting others, but, as it is ſaid, teaching every man and boy to the utmoſt of their power, as being thoſe who from neceſſity diſcipline the city rather than children. My law too aſſerts the ſame things about females as about males; and ſays, that the former ought to be equally exerciſed with the latter. Nor ſhall I be afraid to ſay, that both the gymnaſtic and equeſtrian diſciplines are adapted to women as well as to men. For I am perſuaded of this through hearing antient fables. But, in ſhort, even at preſent, I know that there are innumerable myriads of women about Pontus, called Sauromantides, who are ordered equally to uſe, and equally to be exerciſed in, horſes, bows, and other arms, in common with the men. But beſides this I reaſon in the following manner about theſe particulars: I ſay, if it is poſſible that theſe things may ſubſiſt in this manner, the cuſtom of our country, which excludes women from engaging with all their ſtrength in the ſame purſuits as men, is the moſt fooliſh of all cuſtoms. For thus every city is nearly rendered half inſtead of double, from the ſame effects and labours. Though, indeed, this is a wonderful error of the legiſlator.

CLIN. So it appears. Yet, O gueſt, many of the things aſſerted by us at preſent are contrary to the cuſtom of a polity.

GUEST. But we ought to permit the ſubject of our diſcourſe to be well diſcuſſed; and, when diſcuſſed, it is requiſite to ſelect that which appears to be beſt.

CLIN. You have ſpoken very elegantly, and you have made me reprove myſelf for what I juſt now ſaid. Speak, therefore, after this, whatever is agreeable to yourſelf.

GUEST. That is agreeable to me, O Clinias, which I ſaid above; that, if it ſhould appear theſe things could not be ſufficiently accompliſhed, they

may perhaps be contradicted in diſcourſe. But now, if ſome one is by no means diſpoſed to admit this law, he ought to inquire after ſomething elſe. Nevertheleſs our exhortation will not ceaſe to aſſert that women ought in the higheſt degree, in our city, to participate in common with the men of diſcipline and other particulars. For in a certain reſpect it is requiſite to think as follows on this ſubject. Admit that women are not to participate in common with men, in every thing pertaining to life, will it not be neceſſary that another order ſhould be aſſigned to them?

CLIN. It will be neceſſary.

GUEST. What other order then among thoſe which exiſt at preſent, ſhall we aſſign them in preference to that of our communion? Shall we adopt that of the Thracians and many other nations, who uſe women for the purpoſes of agriculture, and in the place of herdſmen and ſhepherds, in the very ſame manner as they uſe their ſlaves? Or ſhall we adopt the cuſtom of our country, and that of all our neighbouring cities? For, with us, all poſſeſſions, as they are called, are collected together into one habitation, and the care of proviſions, ſhuttles, and every thing pertaining to the manufacture of wool, is committed to women. Or ſhall we, O Megillus, chooſe a medium between theſe, the Laconic mode? ſo that virgins ſhall engage in gymnaſtic exerciſes and muſic; but women, during the time of peace, ſhall take care of the manufacture of wool, at the ſame time leading an active, but by no means a depraved and abject life? And further ſtill, ſhall they beſtow a certain kind of middle attention to the care of proviſions and the education of children, but ſhall not engage in war; ſo that, if it ſhould be neceſſary at any time to defend the city and their children, they may neither be able to uſe bows like certain Amazons, nor be ſkilled in any other kind of jaculation, nor yet to imitate the Goddeſs with ſpear and ſhield, and make a generous reſiſtance for their beſieged country, ſo as to be able, when beheld in a certain order, at leaſt to terrify the enemy, if they can accompliſh nothing greater than this? But, if they live in this manner, they will by no means dare to imitate the Sauromantides, who will appear to theſe women to be men. Let him, therefore, who is willing to praiſe your legiſlators for theſe things, praiſe them: but my opinion reſpecting them will never alter. For a legiſlator ought to be a perfect and not a half character,

racter, who ſuffers the female ſex to be loſt in luxury, and to uſe improper diet, but takes conſummate care of the male ſex, and thus nearly leaves for the city the half inſtead of the double of a happy life.

MEGIL. What ſhall we do, O Clinias? Shall we ſuffer our gueſt thus to cenſure the Spartans?

CLIN. Certainly. For, ſince liberty of ſpeech is given to him, he muſt be ſuffered to go on, till laws have in every reſpect been ſufficiently diſcuſſed.

MEGIL. You ſpeak very properly.

GUEST. It is, therefore, nearly my province to endeavour to diſcuſs what is ſubſequent to this.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What then will be the mode of life by which neceſſaries may be moderately procured for men? ſo that arts may be left to others, but agriculture committed to ſlaves, who may procure the firſt fruits of the earth, ſo as to be ſufficient for men that live in a moderate manner; likewiſe, that eating in common may be adopted, the men being placed apart, and their domeſtics ſituated near them; alſo the female offspring, together with their mothers. Further ſtill, that male and female governors may be placed over theſe public banquets, ſo as to diſſolve them every day, and inſpect the behaviour of all thoſe that eat in common; and who may return home after the governor and the reſt have made libations to thoſe Gods to whom that day or night is dedicated. To men governed in this orderly manner, will no neceſſary work, and which is in every reſpect adapted to them, be left? But is it neceſſary that each of them ſhould live after the manner of cattle, paying attention to nothing but growing fat? This therefore, we ſay, is neither juſt nor beautiful: nor is it poſſible that a man who lives in this manner can obtain that which is adapted to his nature. But to a ſluggiſh animal, and which grows fat through indolence, it belongs to be torn in pieces by another animal who is vehemently exerciſed by fortitude and labours. If, therefore, we inveſtigate theſe things with the accuracy which we employ at preſent, we ſhall perhaps find that they will never take place as long as women and children, private houſes, and every thing elſe of this kind, are made to be private property. But thoſe particulars which are ſecondary to theſe, and have juſt now been mentioned by us, if they take place, ſhould be eſtabliſhed in a very moderate manner. We ſay then that a work remains

for thoſe that live in this manner, which is neither the ſmalleſt nor the moſt vile, but the greateſt of all things which are ordained by a juſt law. For, as he who aſpires after victory, in the Pythian or Olympian games, neglects every other purſuit, ſo his ſoul is filled with a double, or more than a double employment, who devotes himſelf in the moſt proper manner to the virtue of the ſoul and body. For no other employment ought to become an impediment to a proper attention to the body, and to the diſciplines and manners of the ſoul. But, indeed, every night and every day are ſcarcely ſufficient for him who does this, to accompliſh his end in a perfect and ſufficient manner. Since theſe things, therefore, naturally ſubſiſt in this manner, the whole time of employment ought to be always orderly aſſigned to liberal men, in a continued ſucceſſion, from one riſing of the ſun to another. The legiſlator, indeed, will appear ungraceful, who ſays many and trifling things about domeſtic government, and among theſe about the neceſſity of nocturnal vigilance, in order that the whole city may be continually defended with accuracy. For it ought to be conſidered as baſe, and not liberal, by all men, for any citizen to paſs the whole night in ſleep, and not to be always the firſt that is rouſed and ſeen by all his domeſtics; whether it is proper to call a thing of this kind a law or an inſtitute. Beſides this, it ought to be reckoned baſe by female ſlaves, for the miſtreſs to be rouſed by them, inſtead of being herſelf the firſt to rouſe the reſt, viz. both male and female ſlaves, her children, and in ſhort, if poſſible, the whole houſe. All free perſons, therefore, riſing by night, ſhould perform the many neceſſary political and œconomic duties of their ſtations; the governors, thoſe pertaining to the city, and maſters and miſtreſſes, thoſe pertaining to their families. For much ſleep is neither naturally adapted to bodies nor to ſouls, nor to the actions of theſe. For he who is aſleep is of no more worth than that which is deſtitute of life; but, whoever among us is careful in the higheſt degree that he may live and be wiſe, will be vigilant for the greateſt part of his time, ſleeping no longer than is neceſſary to the preſervation of health. But much of this will not be requiſite for him who is familiar with good habits. Magiſtrates, indeed, who are vigilant by night in cities, are a terror to evil men, whether they are enemies or citizens, but are admired and honoured by the juſt and the wiſe; and are both uſeful to themſelves and the whole city. The night being paſſed through in this manner, beſides all the above-mentioned

tioned advantages, produces likewiſe a certain fortitude in the ſouls of the citizens. On the dawn of day it will be proper that boys ſhould go to their maſters. For neither cattle nor any thing elſe ſhould live without a ſhepherd; nor boys without certain teachers, nor ſlaves without maſters: but *a boy is the moſt difficult to manage of all wild beaſts.* For, in conſequence of the fountain of prudence in him not being yet perfect, he becomes inſidious and vehement, and the moſt inſolent of wild beaſts. On this account it is neceſſary to bind him with a multitude of chains: and as ſoon as he is freed from his nurſe and mother, he ſhould be committed to the care of pedagogues, on account of his childiſhneſs and infancy, and afterwards to preceptors, that, as a free-born animal, he may be inſtructed in proper diſciplines. But if the boy is born a ſlave, let it be lawful for any free-born man to puniſh the child, pedagogue, and preceptor, whenever he detects them acting improperly. But whoever is preſent on this occaſion, and does not juſtly puniſh the offenders, ſhall in the firſt place be ſubject to the greateſt reproach; and, in the next place, he who was choſen by the guardians of the law to preſide over boys, ſhall take notice whether he whom we have mentioned does not chaſtize theſe offenders, when it is fit they ſhould be chaſtized, or does not chaſtize them in a proper manner. For he muſt be an acute inſpector, and one who diligently attends to the education of boys, and regulates their natures, always converting them to that which is legally good. But in what manner will the law furniſh us with ſufficient inſtruction in this particular? For this has not yet been delivered either clearly or ſufficiently, but only in a partial manner. It is however neceſſary, that to the utmoſt of our power nothing ſhould be left incomplete, but that every thing ſhould be unfolded, that our diſcourſe may be to others both an interpreter and a nouriſher. We have, therefore, already ſpoken concerning the form of a choir of ſinging and dancing, which among theſe are to be choſen, corrected, and dedicated to divinity. But we have not yet ſpoken concerning proſe compoſitions, which of theſe, and in what manner, O moſt excellent ſuperintendant of boys, they are to be delivered to thoſe under your tuition. Though you have in our diſcourſe the particulars which they ought to learn and ſtudy, reſpecting war. For the things, my friend, pertaining to letters have in the firſt place been ſufficiently diſcuſſed by the legiſlator. In the next place, thoſe pertaining to the lyre, and ſuch as are of a memorable

nature, which we ſaid it was neceſſary to mention, together with warlike and œconomical concerns. After this, the legiſlator diſcuſſed thoſe particulars reſpecting the periods of divine bodies, viz. of the ſtars, the ſun, and the moon, which ought to be eſtabliſhed by every city. But of what particulars are we ſpeaking? I anſwer, Of the order of days with reſpect to the periods of months, and of months with reſpect to years, that ſeaſons, ſacrifices, and feſtivals, receiving that which is accommodated to them, and being diſpoſed in a natural order, may render the city alive and vigilant, attributing proper honours to the Gods, and cauſing men to be more wiſe about the worſhip of divinity. Theſe things, O friend, have thus been ſufficiently diſcuſſed for you by the legiſlator. Attend, therefore, to what follows: We ſay that all has not been ſaid about letters that might be ſaid, becauſe it has not yet been determined whether he who is to become a moderate citizen ought to poſſeſs an accurate knowledge of diſcipline, or by no means apply to it. In a ſimilar manner, too, reſpecting the lyre. Boys, therefore, of ten years of age ſhould apply to letters for nearly the ſpace of three years. And thoſe who are thirteen years old ſhould beſtow in like manner three years on the ſtudy of the lyre. Nor ſhall it be lawful for a father to keep his children to theſe ſtudies for a ſhorter or longer ſpace of time, nor for a child to apply to them, whether he is a lover or a hater of diſcipline. But he who is not obedient to the law in this reſpect, let him be deprived of thoſe youthful honours which we ſhall ſhortly mention. However, in the firſt place, hear what maſters ought to teach, and youth to learn, during this period. They ſhould labour at letters till they are able to read and write. But we ſhould not be at all concerned that thoſe who are not naturally quick make neither rapid nor beautiful advances in allotted portions of time. With reſpect to thoſe monuments of the poets deſtitute of the lyre, which are partly written in meaſure, and are partly without the ſections of rhythm, O ye beſt of all guardians of the laws, what uſe will ye permit to be made of thoſe writings, which, being deſtitute of rhythm and harmony, are deceitful compoſitions, and are left us by certain men of this deſcription? It appears to me, that the legiſlator himſelf will very much doubt what is to be done in this caſe.

CLIN. What is this, O gueſt, which you appear to ſay, doubting with yourſelf?

GUEST.

GUEST. Your queſtion is very pertinent, O Clinias. But to you, who ſpeculate in common with me reſpecting laws, it is neceſſary that I ſhould ſpeak both that which appears certain, and that which appears dubious.

CLIN. What, therefore, do you now ſay reſpecting theſe? And what is it that moves you to ſpeak in this manner?

GUEST. I will tell you. For it is by no means eaſy to ſpeak contrary to what has been often ſaid by ten thouſand mouths.

CLIN. But what? Does it appear to you that the few and inconſiderable particulars which have been above mentioned by you reſpecting laws, are contrary to the ſentiments of the multitude?

GUEST. You have ſpoken this with the greateſt truth. For, as it appears to me, you exhort me to proceed confidently in this road, though it is arduous and odious to many, and advance through the path of laws which our preſent diſcourſe has unfolded, without omitting any particular. And, perhaps, a journey of this kind will be pleaſing to no leſs a multitude of a different deſcription; but, if to a leſs, it will not be a worſe multitude.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. I ſhall not therefore deſiſt. I ſay, indeed, that we have many poets who have written in hexameter, and many who have written in trimeter [1] verſe; among which the intention of ſome has been ſerious in theſe compoſitions, but of others jocoſe. An innumerable multitude too of ſuch as are ſkilled in theſe writings have often ſaid, that children who are properly educated muſt be abundantly nouriſhed with thoſe poetical compoſitions by often hearing them read; and, in ſhort, muſt be made learned by committing all the poets to memory. But others ſay, that a ſelection ſhould be made of the principal things in all the poets, and that certain entire ſentences collected for this purpoſe ſhould be committed to memory, if any one among us is deſirous of becoming a wiſe and good man through much experience and ſkill in a multitude of particulars. Do you, therefore, now order me to explain what is beautifully ſaid, and what not, among theſe aſſertions?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Shall I, in one word, therefore ſay what I think ſufficient about all theſe? I am of opinion, indeed, that every one will allow me to ſay,

[1] A trimeter is an Iambic verſe of three meaſures, or ſix feet.

that

that many things are beautifully aſſerted by the poets, and many things quite the contrary. But, if this be the caſe, I ſay that polymathy is dangerous to youth.

CLIN. How then, and what would you adviſe the guardian of the law to do?

GUEST. Of what are you ſpeaking?

CLIN. Of the paradigm, by looking to which the guardian of the laws may permit ſome things to be learnt by all boys, and may forbid others. Speak, and do not be remiſs in anſwering this queſtion.

GUEST. O good Clinias, I appear in a certain reſpect to be fortunate.

CLIN. About what?

GUEST. Becauſe I am not entirely deſtitute of a paradigm. For, now looking to the particulars which we have diſcuſſed from the riſing of the ſun to the preſent hour, *but not in my opinion without divine inſpiration*, it appears to me that they are ſimilar to a certain poeſy. Nor perhaps is it wonderful that I ſhould be very much delighted, on beholding our aſſertions collected as it were together in one. For, of all thoſe above-mentioned numerous ſentences which I have learnt and heard, thoſe which we have collected in the preſent diſcourſe appear to me to be the moſt moderate, and moſt fit to be heard by youth. So that I think I cannot propoſe a better paradigm to the guardian of the laws, and to the preceptor of youth, than this, that they ſhould exhort the maſters to teach boys theſe things, together with ſuch particulars as are conſequent and ſimilar to theſe, whether they are written in proſe or verſe, or are ſimply aſſerted without being written, but are conformable to theſe laws, and are, therefore, by no means to be neglected, but committed to writing. And, in the firſt place, the teachers themſelves ſhould be compelled to learn and praiſe theſe aſſertions: but thoſe teachers muſt not act in the capacity of teachers by whom they are not approved. And, finally, boys muſt be committed to the care of thoſe preceptors by whom theſe aſſertions are approved and praiſed. And thus much concerning letters, and the maſters of letters.

CLIN. We do not appear to me, O gueſt, to have wandered from the deſign of our diſcourſe: but whether or not we are right upon the whole, is perhaps difficult to determine.

GUEST. But this, O Clinias, will become more apparent (as it is proper

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it ſhould) when, as we have often ſaid, we arrive at the end of this diſcuſſion of laws.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Should we not, after having diſcuſſed the particulars about letters, ſpeak concerning the maſter of the harp?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If we call to mind what has been already ſaid by us, we aſſigned to the maſters of the harp the province of imparting diſcipline and every kind of inſtruction about things of this ſort.

CLIN. Of what kind of things are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. We ſaid, I think, that the Dionyſiacal ſingers of ſixty years of age ought to become remarkably acute in their perception of rhythms, and the compoſitions of harmonies; ſo that, in thoſe melodies which imitate the paſſions of the ſoul, they may be able to diſtinguiſh good from bad imitations,—rejecting the latter, but ſinging to and enchanting the ſouls of youth with the former, and thus inciting them through imitations to the poſſeſſion of virtue.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt truly.

GUEST. It is requiſite, therefore, for the ſake of theſe things, that both the harper and his pupil ſhould uſe the ſounds of the lyre, and likewiſe for the ſake of the diſtinction of the chords; rendering ſounds conſonant to ſounds. But it ſhall not be lawful to exhibit to thoſe who, through the quickneſs of their apprehenſion, would in three years experience the utility of muſic, the different ſounds, and variety of the lyre; the chords themſelves producing certain melodies, and others being produced by the poet who compoſes the melody, ſo as to connect the denſe with the rare, the ſwift with the ſlow, the acute with the grave, and the conſonant with the diſſonant, and in a ſimilar manner harmonizing to the ſounds of the lyre all the varieties of rhythms. For contraries when confuſed with each other are difficult to be learnt. But it is proper that youth ſhould be taught with the greateſt poſſible facility. For the neceſſary diſciplines which they muſt acquire are neither ſmall nor few. However, our diſcourſe as it advances in conjunction with time will ſhow what theſe are. And ſuch are the particulars reſpecting muſic, which muſt be attended to by the maſter of youth. But the particulars reſpecting thoſe melodies and words which

which ought to be taught by the maſters of choirs, we have already diſcuſſed. Theſe we ſaid ought to be conſecrated in feſtivals, in an accommodated manner, ſo as that they may be advantageous to the city, in conjunction with proſperous pleaſure.

CLIN. Theſe things too have been delivered by you, conformable to truth.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is choſen as governor reſpecting the Muſe, muſt attend to theſe particulars in conjunction with benevolent fortune. But, as we have delivered what remained to be diſcuſſed reſpecting muſic, we ſhall do the ſame reſpecting dancing, and the whole of gymnaſtic pertaining to the body. For it is neceſſary that both boys and girls ſhould learn to dance, and to be exerciſed. Is it not?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Dancing-maſters therefore muſt be choſen for boys, and dancing-miſtreſſes for girls, that they may not be unaptly exerciſed in this art.

CLIN. Be it ſo.

GUEST. Again, we call that man who engages in a variety of employments, the curator of youth, and who, ſince he attends to both muſic and gymnaſtic, cannot have much leiſure.

CLIN. How is it poſſible that, being advanced in years, he can attend to ſo many things?

GUEST. Eaſily, my friend. For the law has permitted, and will permit him to chooſe, as his aſſociates in theſe employments, ſuch men and women among the citizens as he pleaſes. But he knows who ought to be choſen, and will deſire to chooſe worthy aſſociates, as prudently knowing and reverencing the magnitude of government, and being well convinced that all our affairs will ſail proſperouſly over the ſea of life when youth are properly educated. But, when this is not the caſe, the conſequence neither deſerves to be mentioned, nor ſhall we mention it, as in the higheſt degree venerating the lovers of prophets in a new city. Much, therefore, has been ſaid by us reſpecting dancing and all gymnaſtic motions. For we conſider as gymnaſtic, all corporeal exerciſes in war, ſuch as that of the bow, and every kind of hurling, likewiſe with the ſhield, and all the battles with arms; together with tactic evolutions, the conducting of armies, the poſitions of camps, and ſuch particulars as pertain to equeſtrian diſciplines. For it is proper that there ſhould be common teachers of all theſe, procured by hire

hire for this purpoſe by the city, and that both boys and girls, men and women, ſhould be their diſciples, that they may be ſkilled in all theſe particulars. And girls indeed ſhould apply themſelves to every kind of dancing and fighting in armour; but women to military evolutions, and the taking up and laying down of arms, if on no other account, yet that, if at any time there ſhould be occaſion for all the men leaving the city to march to battle, the women may be able ſufficiently to defend the children and the reſt of the city. Or, on the contrary, that they may take up arms for the city, if it ſhould be attacked by foreign enemies, with a certain mighty ſtrength and violence, whether they are Greeks or Barbarians; this being an event that may eaſily happen. For it is certainly a great fault in a polity, to educate women in ſo ſhameful a manner as to be inferior even to birds, who fight for their offspring with the ſtrongeſt of ſavage animals, are willing to die, and expoſe themſelves to every danger in their defence. But women, according to the preſent mode of education, in time of danger immediately run to ſacred places, and fill all the altars and temples, and thus give riſe to an opinion that man is naturally the moſt timid of all animals.

CLIN. By Jupiter, O gueſt, this is both diſgraceful and detrimental to a city.

GUEST. We will, therefore, eſtabliſh this as a law, that women ſhall not neglect warlike concerns, but that all the citizens, both male and female, ſhall pay attention to them.

CLIN. I agree with you that it ſhould be ſo.

GUEST. With reſpect to wreſtling, therefore, we have ſaid ſome things, but we have not diſcuſſed that which I ſhould call the greateſt thing, nor is it eaſy to diſcuſs it without uniting geſticulation to the diſcuſſion. This, therefore, we ſhall then determine when our diſcourſe, following things, indicates ſomething clear about other particulars of which we have ſpoken, and ſhows that ſuch a wreſtling is, in reality, of all motions moſt allied to contention in battle: and, beſides this, that ſuch wreſtling ought to be ſtudied for the ſake of war, but not war for ſuch wreſtling.

CLIN. This aſſertion of yours is beautiful.

GUEST. Thus much, therefore, may ſuffice at preſent concerning wreſtling. But with reſpect to every other motion of the body, the greateſt part of which may be properly denominated a certain dancing, it muſt be divided into

into two ſpecies; one of which imitates that which is venerable in more beautiful bodies, but the other, that which is depraved in baſer bodies. And again, of each of theſe there are two ſpecies. For, of the worthy motion, one kind takes place when beautiful bodies and brave ſouls are entangled in war and violent labours: but the other, in the proſperous condition of the temperate ſoul in moderate pleaſures. And he who calls a dancing of this kind pacific, denominates it according to nature. But of theſe, the dancing in battle, which is different from the pacific, may be properly called Pyrrhic; which imitates the avoiding of all blows and hurlings by declinations, every kind of yielding, leaping on high, and dropping on the ground; and likewiſe attempts to imitate the motions contrary to theſe, tending to efficacious figures, in the hurling of bows and ſpears, and in all kinds of blows. But the rectitude and proper tone both of good bodies and ſouls takes place for the moſt part when an imitation is employed which is advantageous to the members of the body. This, therefore, ſhould be admitted as proper, but the contrary to this, as improper. This alſo ſhould be conſidered in the pacific dancing of every one, viz. whether, engaging in beautiful dancing, according to nature, he conducts himſelf in the choirs in a manner conformable to thoſe who are ſubſervient to good laws. In the firſt place, therefore, it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh the ambiguous from the unambiguous dancing. What then is this, and how is each to be diſtinguiſhed? The ambiguous dancing is Bacchic, and belongs to thoſe that follow the Bacchuses, viz. the Nymphs, Pans, Silenuses, and Satyrs, who, as they ſay, imitate thoſe that are intoxicated with wine, and perform purifying and certain myſtic ceremonies. The whole of this kind of dancing cannot eaſily be defined, either as pacific, or adapted to war; nor, in ſhort, is it eaſy to ſay what is the intention of it. But it appears to me that it may with the greateſt rectitude be diſtinguiſhed as follows: We muſt place the military dancing ſeparate from that which is pacific, and aſſert that this kind of dancing is not adapted to war. Leaving it, therefore, thus ſituated, let us return to the military and pacific dancing, which may be praiſed as indubitably ours. But that kind of the pacific Muſe which ſubſiſts in an opinion of a proſperous condition, and which honours the Gods and the ſons of the Gods, in dancing, may receive a twofold diviſion. For one kind is adopted when we have eſcaped certain labours and dangers, and have obtained good;

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and this contains greater pleaſures. But the other kind ſubſiſts when the goods which we before poſſeſſed continue to be ſafe, and become increaſed; in which caſe the pleaſures are of a milder nature. But in things of this kind every man, with reſpect to the motions of the body, is moved in a greater degree when the pleaſures are greater, but in a leſs degree when they are leſs. And he who is more modeſt, and more exerciſed in fortitude, is moved in a leſs degree. But he who is timid, and unexerciſed in temperance, ſuſtains greater and more vehement mutations of motion. And, in ſhort, every one that emits a ſound, whether in ſinging or in ſpeaking, is not entirely able to accompliſh this with a quiet body. On this account the imitations of words by figures of the body produced the whole of the art of dancing. Some of us, therefore, in all theſe move elegantly, but others inelegantly. And as many of the antient names ought to be praiſed by us as poſited well, and according to nature; in like manner, it is proper to believe that he, whoever he was, rightly and muſically denominated the dancings of proſperous men, who conduct themſelves moderately with reſpect to pleaſures; and that, aſſigning all of them a name according to reaſon, he denominated them *modulations*. Likewiſe, that he eſtabliſhed two kinds of beautiful dancing; calling the military dancing *Pyrrhic*, and the pacific *modulation*, giving to each a becoming and adapted name. Theſe things, indeed, the legiſlator ought to explain by repreſentations: but the guardian of the laws ought to inveſtigate dancing; when he has diſcovered it, unite it with the reſt of muſic; and in all feſtivals diſtribute that which is adapted to each of the ſacrifices; ſo conſecrating every thing in order, that no innovation may be made either in dancing or ſinging, but that, both the city and citizens perſevering as much as poſſible after the ſame manner in the ſame pleaſures, they may live well and happily. And thus we have determined what the particulars reſpecting the choirs of beautiful bodies and generous ſouls ought to be. But it is neceſſary to contemplate and know the motions of baſe bodies and thoughts, and thoſe motions which are converſant with the defamations of laughter, in words, ſinging, dancing, and the reviling imitations of all theſe. For it is not poſſible that ſerious things can be learnt without ſuch as are ridiculous, or contraries without all contraries, if any one is deſirous of becoming prudent. But it is impoſſible to do both, if we wiſh to participate even a ſmall portion of virtue. Theſe

things, however, ought to be learnt, leſt through ignorance we ſhould either do or ſay ſomething ridiculous, which is at all times unbecoming. Servants, therefore, and hired ſtrangers, ſhould be appointed to imitate things of this kind: but no free perſon ſhould ever ſtudy, or be ſeen learning them, neither woman nor man; but ſome novelty of imitation about them ſhould always preſent itſelf to the view. And thus let the ſports pertaining to laughter, which we all denominate comedy, be eſtabliſhed both in diſcourſe and law. But if any of the tragic poets, who, as they ſay, write about things of a ſerious nature, ſhould thus interrogate us:—O gueſts, will you allow us, or not, to come to your city and region, and preſent you with our poeſy? or how are you determined to act about things of this kind? what anſwer, then, ſhall we give to theſe divine men about theſe particulars? For it appears to me that we ſhould reply as follows: O moſt excellent of ſtrangers, we ourſelves are, to the utmoſt of our power, poets of the moſt beautiful and beſt tragedy. For the whole of our polity is an imitation of the moſt beautiful and moſt excellent life, which we ſay is, in reality, the moſt true tragedy [1]. You, therefore, are poets, and we alſo are poets of the ſame deſcription, being your competitors and antagoniſts in the moſt beautiful drama, which, as we hope, true law alone is naturally capable of effecting. But do not think that we ſhall eaſily ſuffer you to fix your ſcenes in the market-place, and, introducing players of elegant utterance, who ſpeak louder than we do, to diſcourſe to our children, wives, and the vulgar, about things for the moſt part different from thoſe which they have heard from us. For we ourſelves, and the whole city, would be nearly perfectly inſane, if we ſhould permit you to do what we have juſt now mentioned, before the magiſtrates have ſeen what you have compoſed, and have judged whether it is fit or not to be ſpoken before the people. Now, therefore, O boys, offſpring of ſoft Muſes, we ſhall, in the firſt place, ſhow your odes, together with ours, to the governors; and if the things ſaid by you ſhall appear to be the ſame, or better than thoſe which are ſaid by us, we will give the choir to you: but if this ſhould not be the caſe, we ſhall never, O friends, be able to give you the choir. Let theſe particulars, therefore, be inſtituted by law

[1] For he who leads the moſt excellent life will, like another Ulyſſes, purify his ſoul from the dominion of the paſſions, thoſe baneful ſuitors, whoſe aim is to dethrone reaſon and debauch philoſophy. He who deſtroys theſe ſecret foes may be juſtly ſaid to perform the moſt true tragedy.

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reſpecting every choir, together with the diſcipline and manners of choirs, thoſe pertaining to ſlaves being ſeparated from thoſe pertaining to maſters, if it is agreeable to you.

CLIN. How is it poſſible it ſhould not be ſo?

GUEST. Three diſciplines, however, ſtill remain for the freeborn. One of theſe is computation, and the particulars reſpecting numbers. But the ſecond is that which meaſures length, breadth, and depth. And the third is that which contemplates the circuit of the ſtars, and the order in which they are naturally formed to move with relation to each other. With reſpect to all theſe particulars, it is not proper that the multitude ſhould labour in obtaining an accurate knowledge of them, but a certain few, of whom we ſhall ſpeak when we arrive at the end of our diſcuſſion. But it is ſhameful for the multitude not to know ſuch particulars among theſe as are neceſſary, and which, in a certain reſpect, are aſſerted with the greateſt rectitude. However, it is neither eaſy, nor altogether poſſible, to inveſtigate all things accurately: but whatever is neceſſary among them muſt not be rejected. Indeed, it appears that he who firſt ſpoke proverbially reſpecting divinity, looking to theſe things, ſaid, that God was never at any time ſeen contending with neceſſity; which I think muſt be underſtood of ſuch neceſſities as are divine. For, if this was aſſerted of human neceſſities, to which the multitude looking ſpeak in this manner, it would be by far the moſt ſtupid of all aſſertions.

CLIN. What are thoſe neceſſities of diſciplines, O gueſt, which are not human, but divine?

GUEST. It appears to me that they are thoſe, which he who does not practiſe, nor in any reſpect learn, will never become either a God, a dæmon, or a hero among men, ſo as to be able to be a conſummately diligent curator of mankind. But he will be very far from becoming a divine man who is neither able to know one, nor two, nor three, nor, in ſhort, the even and the odd, nor in any reſpect knows how to number, nor is capable of numbering night and day, but is unſkilled in the revolutions of the moon, the ſun, and the other ſtars. He, therefore, who is of opinion that all theſe are diſciplines not neceſſary for one who is about to know the moſt beautiful diſciplines, will think in a very ſtupid manner. But what the nature is of each

each of theſe, how many they are, and when they are to be learnt; likewiſe, what that is which is to be learnt with ſome other, and what without others, together with all the mixture of theſe,—theſe are the things which ought in the firſt place to be learnt; and, with theſe diſciplines as leaders, a tranſition is to be made to other things. For, thus neceſſity ſubſiſts naturally, which we ſay no divinity oppoſes at preſent, nor ever will oppoſe.

CLIN. What you aſſert at preſent, O gueſt, appears to be truly aſſerted, and according to nature.

GUEST. So it is, O Clinias: but it is difficult to eſtabliſh laws reſpecting theſe things, when previouſly diſpoſed in this manner. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, we will eſtabliſh laws concerning them in a more accurate manner at ſome other time.

CLIN. You appear to me, O gueſt, to be afraid of our ignorance in things of this kind; and, indeed, not improperly. However, endeavour to ſpeak, and do not conceal any thing on this account.

GUEST. I fear, indeed, what you now ſay: but I am much more afraid of thoſe who have, indeed, touched upon theſe diſciplines, but in a depraved manner. For, the being ignorant of all things is by no means a circumſtance vehemently dire, nor yet the greateſt evil; but much ſkill and great erudition, when improperly employed, are much more pernicious.

CLIN. True.

GUEST. Freeborn men, therefore, ought to learn thoſe things which a great multitude of boys in Egypt learn, together with their letters. For, in the firſt place, with the Egyptians the art of reckoning is ſo inartificially deviſed for children, that they learn it in ſport, and with pleaſure. For a diſtribution is made of apples and crowns to many, and at the ſame time to a few, the ſame numbers being adapted for the purpoſe. The fitting together too of the pugiliſts and wreſtlers, and the alternate and conſequent order of their conjunction, are determined by numbers. Likewiſe, when they play, mingling together veſſels of gold, braſs, and ſilver, and other things of this kind, or diſtributing them ſeparate, they adapt, as I ſaid before, to their ſports the uſe of neceſſary numbers; and thus render their pupils fit to conduct armies, to fix camps, and become good œconomiſts; and, in ſhort, to be more uſeful and vigilant than other men. In the next

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place, ſince a certain ridiculous and baſe ignorance reſpecting the meaſures of length, breadth, and depth, is naturally inherent in all men, they take care to liberate them from this.

CLIN. Of what kind of ignorance are you now ſpeaking?

GUEST. O friend Clinias! I formerly heard, but after a long time began to wonder at, the manner in which we are affected about theſe things; and it appears to me, that it is not human, but rather the paſſion of certain ſwine and cattle. I therefore not only bluſh for myſelf, but for all the Greeks.

CLIN. About what? Inform us, O gueſt, what it is you mean.

GUEST. I will tell you. Or, rather, I will point it out to you interrogating. And do you anſwer me a trifling queſtion. Do you know what length is?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And what breadth is?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And do you know that theſe are two things, and that the third of theſe is depth?

CLIN. How is it poſſible that I ſhould not?

GUEST. Does it not, therefore, appear to you that all theſe may be meaſured by each other?

CLIN. It does.

GUEST. I mean length by length, and breadth by breadth; and that, in a ſimilar manner, depth is naturally capable of being meaſured by depth.

CLIN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. But, if ſome among theſe can neither do this vehemently, nor remiſsly, but ſome are able, and others not [1], and yet you think it can be effected by all, in what manner are you circumſtanced with reſpect to theſe?

CLIN. Badly, it is evident.

GUEST. But again, do not all the Greeks, after a manner, think that length, breadth, and depth, can be mutually meaſured by each other?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

[1] That is to ſay, ſome quantities are incommenſurable, and others not.

GUEST. But if this is by no means poſſible, and yet all the Greeks, as I have ſaid, think that it is poſſible, is it not fit, that, being aſhamed of all them, we ſhould thus addreſs them: O beſt of the Greeks, this is one of the things which we ſaid it was baſe not to know; but is it not in every reſpect beautiful to know things neceſſary to be known?

CLIN. How is it poſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe?

GUEST. And further ſtill, there are other things allied to theſe, in which many errors are produced in us, the ſiſters of the above-mentioned errors.

CLIN. What are theſe?

GUEST. The reaſon why ſome things are commenſurate and others incommenſurate with each other. For it is neceſſary that theſe things ſhould be known, or that he ſhould be in every reſpect depraved who is ignorant of them. In theſe things, therefore, we ſhould always be mutually engaged. For this aged game will be much more pleaſant, and more worthy of a free-born man, than that of cheſs.

CLIN. Perhaps ſo. It appears, therefore, that the game of cheſs, and theſe diſciplines, are very different from each other.

GUEST. Theſe things, then, I ſay, O Clinias, ought to be learnt by youth. For they are neither noxious nor difficult: and when they are learnt in conjunction with ſport, they will be advantageous, but never detrimental to the city. But, if any one ſays otherwiſe, let us hear him.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If, then, it ſhould appear that theſe things are ſo, it is evident that we ſhould embrace them; but if it ſhould appear that they are not ſo, that we ſhould reject them.

CLIN. Evidently ſo. Ought not, therefore, O gueſt, theſe to be now eſtabliſhed by us as neceſſary diſciplines, that the particulars pertaining to laws may not be diſcuſſed by us in vain?

GUEST. Let them, indeed, be eſtabliſhed, but as pledges from another polity, which may be diſſolved if they ſhould in no reſpect pleaſe us who eſtabliſh them, or you for whom they are eſtabliſhed.

CLIN. The condition you propoſe is juſt. But, conſider after this the diſcipline of the ſtars, whether this being choſen for youth pleaſes us, or the contrary.

CLIN.

CLIN. Only ſpeak.

GUEST. A great prodigy takes place in theſe, and which can by no means be endured.

CLIN. What is this?

GUEST. We ſay that the greateſt God, and the whole world, ought not to be inveſtigated, and that the cauſes of things ought not to be diligently and anxiouſly explored; becauſe a conduct of this kind is not holy. It appears, however, that the very contrary to this is proper.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. What I have ſaid is a paradox, and ſome one may think it is not adapted to old men: but when any one is of opinion that a diſcipline is beautiful, true, and advantageous to a city, and likewiſe in every reſpect friendly to divinity, it is perfectly impoſſible he ſhould not mention it.

CLIN. You ſpeak probably. But ſhall we find a thing of this kind about the diſcipline of the ſtars?

GUEST. O good man, all we Greeks, as I may ſay, conceive falſely of THOSE MIGHTY DIVINITIES THE SUN AND MOON.

CLIN. Of what kind of falſehood are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. We ſay that the ſun and moon never move in the ſame path, and that this is likewiſe the caſe with certain other ſtars which move together with theſe, and therefore we denominate them planets.

CLIN. By Jupiter, O gueſt, what you ſay is true. For, in the courſe of my life, I have often ſeen the morning and the evening ſtar, and certain other ſtars, by no means moving in the ſame track, but entirely wandering. But we all know that the ſun and moon perpetually wander.

GUEST. Theſe are the things, therefore, O Megillus and Clinias, which we ſay our citizens and boys ought to learn reſpecting the celeſtial Gods, ſo far as this, that they may not blaſpheme in ſpeaking of them, but may celebrate them in a proper manner, by piouſly ſacrificing and praying to their divinities.

CLIN. This indeed is right, if in the firſt place it is poſſible to learn that which you ſpeak of; and in the next place, if we ſhould not at preſent ſpeak properly about theſe particulars, yet we ſhall when we are inſtructed in them. This being admitted, I grant that a thing of this kind ſhould be

thus far learnt. Do you, therefore, endeavour to evince that theſe things are ſo, and we will follow you as your diſciples.

GUEST. It is not eaſy to learn what I ſay, nor is it again in every reſpect difficult, nor does it require a great length of time. As a proof of this, I myſelf have heard theſe things, neither recently nor formerly, and yet I am able to render them manifeſt in a ſhort time; though, if they were difficult, I who am aged ſhould not be able to explain them to you, who are likewiſe aged.

CLIN. True. But what is this diſcipline which you call admirable, which you ſay it is fit youth ſhould learn, but we are ignorant of? Endeavour to ſpeak about it with the utmoſt perſpicuity.

GUEST. I will endeavour. The dogma then, O beſt of men, reſpecting the ſun and moon and the other ſtars, that they have at any time wandered, is not right; but the very contrary of this is true. For each of them perpetually paſſes through, in a circle, one and the ſame path, and not many paths; though they appear to paſs through many. But that which is ſwifteſt in them is not rightly conceived to be ſloweſt, nor contrarily the contrary. And theſe things, indeed, naturally ſubſiſt in this manner; but we are of opinion that they ſubſiſt otherwiſe. If then, beholding in the Olympic games the courſe of horſes or of men that run the longeſt race, we ſhould call the ſwifteſt the ſloweſt, and the ſloweſt the ſwifteſt, and, making our encomiums, ſhould celebrate the vanquiſhed as the victor, I do not think that we ſhould adapt our encomiums properly, nor in a manner agreeable to the racers. But now, when we err in the ſame manner reſpecting the Gods, ſhall we not think that, as ſuch a conduct in the inſtance juſt alleged is ridiculous and not right, this is likewiſe true in the preſent caſe?

CLIN. It is ridiculous indeed.

GUEST. We are not, therefore, acceptable to divinity, when in hymning the Gods we celebrate them falſely.

CLIN. Moſt true, if theſe things are ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, we can ſhow that they are ſo, all theſe particulars as far as to this are to be learnt; but, if we cannot ſhow it, they muſt be diſmiſſed. Let theſe things then be thus determined.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST.

GUEST. It is proper, therefore, now to ſay, that the legal inſtitutions reſpecting the diſciplines of erudition have obtained their conſummation. But it is requiſite to conceive in a ſimilar manner reſpecting hunting, and every thing elſe of this kind. For it appears that the office of a legiſlator is ſomething more than that of merely eſtabliſhing laws, and that he ought to make uſe of that medium which naturally ſubſiſts between admonition and the laws, and which has often occurred to us in the courſe of our diſcuſſion, and eſpecially when we ſpoke concerning the education of children. For we ſaid there were many things pertaining to this which could not be eſtabliſhed by law, and that it was folly to attempt it: but laws being thus written, and the whole of a polity eſtabliſhed, that is not the perfect praiſe of a citizen excelling in virtue, which ſays that he ſubmits to the laws in the beſt manner, and is perſuaded by them in the higheſt degree; but the praiſe is more perfect which aſſerts that he is one who leads a pure life, in conſequence of being obedient to the writings of the legiſlator, in which he eſtabliſhes, praiſes, and blames laws. For this is the moſt proper praiſe of a citizen. And the legiſlator, in reality, ought not only to write laws, but ſhould ſubjoin to them what appears to him to be beautiful and not beautiful. The citizen too, that has arrived at the ſummit of virtue, ſhould no leſs obſerve theſe, than thoſe particulars which are puniſhable by the laws. But we will adduce for this purpoſe, as a witneſs, the ſubject of our preſent diſcuſſion; for it will render our intention more manifeſt. For hunting is a thing of a great extent, and which is now nearly comprehended in one name. For there is much hunting of aquatic, much of aërial, and ſtill more of terreſtrial animals, not only of wild beaſts but of men; and, of this laſt, one kind reſpects war, and another friendſhip; and the one is laudable, but the other blameable. The thefts too of robbers and camps are huntings. The legiſlator, therefore, who eſtabliſhes laws about hunting, can neither leave theſe unnoticed, nor impoſe fines and menacing laws on each, in a certain order. What then is to be done reſpecting things of this kind? The legiſlator ought to praiſe and blame what is laudable and blameable in hunting, with a view to the labours and ſtudies of youth. And young men, when they hear, ſhould be obedient to him, and ſhould not ſuffer either pleaſure or labour to prevent them from acting contrary to the directions of the legiſlator. But they ſhould rather honour what is ſaid and

enjoined with praiſe, than what is eſtabliſhed with threatenings and fines. Theſe things being premiſed, the praiſe and blame of hunting will follow in a becoming manner. For that hunting is to be praiſed which improves the ſouls of young men, but that which has a contrary tendency is to be blamed. Let us therefore diſcuſs what follows, calling as follows upon young men through prayer: O friends, may never any deſire or love of marine fiſhing, or of fiſhing with a hook, ſeize you; nor, in ſhort, of labouring to catch any aquatic animals with a bow net, either by day or by night! May you likewiſe be void of all inclination to piracy, by which you would become unjuſt and atrocious hunters of men on the ſea! And may you never in the leaſt deſire to commit theft in the region and city to which you belong, or to hunt birds, which, though a faſcinating, is not a very liberal purſuit! The hunting, therefore, of pedeſtrial animals alone remains for our athletæ. But, of this, that kind which is performed by ſleeping in turns, and is called nocturnal, as it belongs to ſluggiſh men, is not worthy of praiſe. Nor yet that which during a remiſſion of labours vanquiſhes the fierce ſtrength of wild beaſts by nets and ſnares, and not by patient endurance. That hunting, therefore, of wild beaſts alone remains as the beſt of all, which is accompliſhed by horſes, dogs, and corporeal ſtrength and ſkill. For thoſe that are anxious to obtain divine fortitude will vanquiſh ſavage animals by hunting them in the courſe, and with wounds, darts, and their own hands. And thus much may ſuffice reſpecting the praiſe and blame of all theſe particulars. However, let the law be this: No one ſhall impede theſe truly ſacred hunters from hunting wherever they pleaſe. But no one ſhall ſuffer any perſon to engage in nocturnal hunting with nets and dogs. Fowling ſhall be permitted in uncultivated places and in mountains; but any one who may happen to be preſent ſhall forbid it in cultivated and ſacred places. A fiſherman ſhall not be ſuffered to hunt, either in ports or ſacred rivers, marſhes, or pools; but in other places he may be permitted to hunt ſo long as he does not uſe a mixture of juices. Now, therefore, it is proper to ſay, that the legal inſtitutions reſpecting diſcipline have obtained their completion.

Clin. You ſpeak well.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK VIII.

IT now follows that we ſhould legally eſtabliſh feſtivals, in conjunction with the Delphic oracles, and ſhow what are the ſacrifices, and who the divinities to whom it will be better for the city to ſacrifice. But when and what number of ſacrifices ſhould be performed, it is perhaps nearly our buſineſs to eſtabliſh by law.

CLIN. Perhaps ſo, as to the number.

GUEST. Let us therefore firſt ſpeak as to the number. I ſhould eſtabliſh then three hundred and ſixty-five; ſo that ſome one of the magiſtrates may always ſacrifice to ſome God or dæmon for the city, and for their poſſeſſions. But, the interpreters being aſſembled together with the prieſts, prieſteſſes, prophets, and guardians of the laws, all theſe ſhall ordain ſuch particulars as were neceſſarily omitted by the legiſlator. For it is requiſite that theſe ſhould take notice of things omitted. For the law indeed ſays that there ſhould be twelve feſtivals to the twelve Gods, from whom each tribe is denominated, and that the citizens ſhould perform ſacred rites to each of theſe monthly, together with choirs, muſical conteſts, and gymnaſtic exerciſes, in ſuch a manner as is properly adapted both to the Gods themſelves and the ſeveral ſeaſons. Female feſtivals too muſt be orderly diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, that it may appear which ſhould be celebrated with, and which without men. Further ſtill, the feſtivals of the terreſtrial, and ſuch as are denominated celeſtial Gods, together with the attendants on theſe, muſt not be mingled with each other, but muſt be ſeparated in the twelfth month, which is ſacred to Pluto, that they may be legitimately celebrated. For a God of this kind muſt not be indignantly treated, but honoured by warlike men,

men, as always being the beſt of divinities to the race of men. For *the communion between, is not better than the ſolution of ſoul and body, as I affirm, ſpeaking ſeriouſly.* Beſides, it is requiſite that thoſe who intend to diſtinguiſh theſe things ſufficiently, ſhould think that this our city is ſuch with reſpect to vacation of time, and the poſſeſſion of things neceſſary, as no other city is found to be at preſent. But it is requiſite that it ſhould live well in the ſame manner as an individual of the human ſpecies. To thoſe however that live happily, this muſt neceſſarily be preſent the firſt of all things,—I mean, that they neither injure others, nor are injured by others. But, of theſe, the former is not very difficult; but the latter is difficult in the extreme, and cannot be perfectly acquired otherwiſe than by becoming perfectly good [f]. The ſame thing alſo takes place in a city. For, when it is good, its life is pacific; but, when depraved, it is infeſted with external and internal war. But, this being nearly the caſe, cities ſhould not exerciſe themſelves in war during the time of war, but in a life of peace. It is neceſſary, therefore, that a city endued with intellect ſhould every month exerciſe itſelf in war, for not leſs than the ſpace of one day, but more frequently as it may ſeem fit to the magiſtrates, and this without fearing either heat or cold; and that the magiſtrates, together with women and boys, ſhould be exerciſed in it, that every inhabitant of the city may be prepared when it ſhall appear to the governors proper to lead forth all the people. For this purpoſe, too, certain beautiful games are to be deviſed, together with ſacrifices, that certain feſtive battles may take place, perſpicuouſly imitating in the higheſt degree the contentions of war. It is likewiſe neceſſary that the rewards of valour ſhould be diſtributed to each of theſe; and that the victors ſhould be praiſed, and the vanquiſhed blamed, in a degree correſponding to the manner in which they have conducted themſelves in the conteſts, and through the whole of life. However, let not every one be a poet of things of this kind. But in the firſt place let him be a poet who is not leſs than fifty years of age; and in the next place who not only ſufficiently poſſeſſes the poetic muſe, but who has accompliſhed ſomething beautiful and illuſtrious. The poems, therefore, of good and honourable

[f] For a perfectly good man cannot be injured; becauſe he who is injured is deprived of ſome good: but virtue is the proper good of a truly worthy man, and this cannot be taken away.

men

men in the city, and who have performed illuſtrious actions, ſhould be ſung, though they may not be naturally muſical. But let the judgment of theſe be given to the inſtructors of youth, and to the other guardians of the laws. Theſe ſhall attribute this honour to worthy men, that they alone ſhall be allowed freedom of ſpeech in the Muſes; but they ſhall not grant this liberty to others. No one, therefore, ſhall dare to ſing a Muſe which is not approved by the guardians of the laws, though it ſhould be ſweeter than the hymns of Thamyris and Orpheus: but ſuch ſacred poems ſhall be ſung as have been examined and approved, and are dedicated to the Gods; together with the poems of worthy men, in which certain perſons are praiſed or blamed, and which are judged to do this with moderation. The ſame things ought in a ſimilar manner to take place, both among men and women, reſpecting war, and poetic liberty of ſpeech. But it is requiſite that the legiſlator ſhould thus reaſon with himſelf: In properly arranging the whole city, what citizens ſhall I educate? Ought they not to be the athletæ of the greateſt conteſts, who have ten thouſand antagoniſts? Entirely, ſome one ſpeaking with propriety may ſay. But what? If we ſhould educate pugiliſts, or pancratiaſts, or others of this kind, ſhall we lead them forth to the conteſt before they have contended with any one? Or, if we were pugiliſts, ſhould we not have learned to fight, and laboured in it, many days prior to the conteſt, imitating all ſuch particulars as we ſhould adopt in a real conteſt when we contend for victory? And ſhould we not, as approaching in the neareſt manner poſſible to a ſimilitude of real contention, inſtead of thongs, gird ourſelves with the ceſtus, that we may be able ſufficiently both to give wounds and with premeditation avoid them? And if it ſhould happen that there are none with whom we can contend, ſhould we not, without dreading the laughter of the fooliſh, dare to ſuſpend an inanimate image, and exerciſe ourſelves againſt it? And if we were in want both of animate and inanimate adverſaries, ſhould we not venture to contend even with our own ſhadows? Or, would any one ſay that this particular motion of the hand was deviſed for any other purpoſe?

CLIN. For nearly no other purpoſe, O gueſt, than that which you have juſt now mentioned.

GUEST. What then? Will the warlike part of the city dare to engage in the greateſt of conteſts, worſe prepared than combatants of this kind? I mean,

mean, when they are to fight for life for their children, poſſeſſions, and the whole of the city. Will not, therefore, the legiſlator be afraid leſt theſe mutual gymnaſtic exerciſes ſhould appear to certain perſons ridiculous? And will he not eſtabliſh by law, that military concerns ſhould be engaged in every day in an inferior degree, without arms, exciting to this purpoſe the choirs, and the whole of gymnaſtic exerciſe? Will he not likewiſe order, that both greater and leſſer gymnaſtic exerciſes ſhould be performed every month at leaſt, that each may contend in taking poſſeſſion of places, or acting on the defenſive in every part of the city; truly imitating every thing pertaining to war, and fighting with balls and with darts, which approach as near as poſſible to true and dangerous darts? And this, that the ſportive conteſts of the citizens with each other may not be entirely deſtitute of fear, but may excite terror, and thus, after a manner, evince who is magnanimous, and who is not? For, thus he may be able in a proper manner to honour ſome, and diſgrace others, and render the whole city through the whole of life uſeful for true contention. But, if any one ſhould happen to die in theſe conteſts through involuntary ſlaughter, let it be eſtabliſhed that the homicide, when he has made an expiation according to law, ſhall be conſidered in future as pure. For the legiſlator ought to think that, in the place of a few who may happen to die, others again will ſucceed not worſe than the ſlain: but that fear becoming, as it were, extinct in all theſe, he will no longer be able to diſtinguiſh the better from the worſe; which is, in no ſmall degree, a greater evil to the city than the involuntary deſtruction of a few individuals.

CLIN. We agree with you, O gueſt, that theſe things ought to be legally eſtabliſhed, and attended to by all the city.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, all of us know the reaſon, why in cities at preſent there is ſcarcely any ſuch choir and conteſt, or, at leaſt, in a very ſmall degree? Shall we ſay that this happens through the ignorance of the multitude and of the legiſlators?

CLIN. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. By no means, O bleſſed Clinias! But it is proper to ſay that there are two cauſes of this, and thoſe very ſufficient.

CLIN. What are they?

GUEST. One is, that, through the love of riches every thing elſe being at all

all times neglected, the ſoul of every citizen is incapable of applying to any thing but the daily accumulation of wealth. Hence every one with the greateſt alacrity learns and exerciſes himſelf in that diſcipline or ſtudy which leads to this, but ridicules other things. It is proper therefore to ſay, that this is one reaſon why citizens are unwilling to engage ſeriouſly in this, or any other beautiful and excellent purſuit; but, through an inſatiable deſire of ſilver and gold, every man willingly embraces every art and artifice, both the more beautiful and the more baſe, that he may become rich, acts both in a holy and unholy manner, and is not indignant at any kind of conduct, however baſe, by which he may be able like a wild beaſt to eat and drink abundantly, and enjoy venereal pleaſures to ſatiety.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. This, therefore, I aſſign as one reaſon why cities are prevented from being ſufficiently exerciſed in any thing elſe beautiful, and in warlike particulars: but thoſe that are naturally modeſt have their attention directed to merchandize, navigation, and ſervile offices; and thoſe that are naturally brave, to theft, houſe-breaking, ſacrilege, warlike ſtratagems, and tyranny. Theſe indeed are naturally well diſpoſed, but become unfortunate through this pernicious cuſtom.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Why ſhould I not call thoſe in every reſpect unfortunate, who are compelled by hunger through the whole of life to torment their own ſoul?

CLIN. This, therefore, is one reaſon. But what do you aſſign, O gueſt, as the ſecond reaſon?

GUEST. You have very properly admoniſhed me.

CLIN. One reaſon, as you ſay, is the inſatiable deſire of riches, in the accumulation of which all men are ſo buſily engaged, that they have not leiſure to attend in a proper manner to warlike concerns. Let it be ſo. But inform us what is the ſecond reaſon.

GUEST. Do I appear to you to have dwelt too long upon the firſt reaſon, through an incapacity of aſſigning the ſecond?

CLIN. You do not. But you appear to us to reprobate through hatred a cuſtom of this kind more than is becoming.

GUEST. You accuſe me, O gueſts, in a moſt proper manner. You ſhall therefore hear what is conſequent to this.

CLIN. Only ſpeak.

GUEST. I ſay, therefore, that thoſe polities which we have often mentioned in the preceding part of our diſcourſe are the cauſes of this, viz. a democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. For no one of theſe is a polity, but all of them may with the greateſt rectitude be called ſeditions; becauſe in theſe the willing never rule over the willing, but over the unwilling, and this always with a certain violence. And as in theſe the governor fears the governed, he never at any time ſuffers men to become voluntarily good, rich, ſtrong, brave, or altogether warlike. Theſe two reaſons are nearly the cauſes of all things in cities, but particularly of thoſe which we have enumerated. But the polity to which we are now giving laws avoids both theſe. For it poſſeſſes the greateſt leiſure; its inhabitants are free, and I think will from theſe laws be lovers of money in the ſmalleſt degree. So that it ſeems probable, and may reaſonably be concluded, that ſuch an eſtabliſhment of a polity alone of all that exiſt at preſent can bring to perfection that warlike diſcipline, and warlike ſport, which we have already rightly diſcuſſed.

CLIN. It is well ſaid.

GUEST. Does it not follow, therefore, that we ſhould now ſpeak concerning all gymnaſtic conteſts; ſo that ſuch of them as are conducive to war may be ſtudied, and the rewards of victory aſſigned them; but ſuch as are not, may be diſmiſſed? But it is better to relate from the beginning what theſe are, and eſtabliſh them by law. And, in the firſt place, ſhould we not eſtabliſh the particulars pertaining to the courſe, and to ſwiftneſs?

CLIN. We ſhould eſtabliſh them.

GUEST. The celerity of the body, therefore, is univerſally the moſt warlike of all things; one kind being of the feet, and the other of the hands; that of the feet conſiſting in flying and purſuing; but that of the hands being indigent of ſtrength and vigour in fighting and wreſtling.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But neither of them without arms poſſeſſes the greateſt utility.

CLIN. For how ſhould they?

GUEST. The crier, therefore, muſt firſt announce to us the race of the ſtadium in the conteſts, as at preſent: but he who runs the ſtadium muſt enter armed. For we do not place rewards for one that contends unarmed. In the firſt place, therefore, he that runs the ſtadium muſt enter armed. In the

the ſecond place, he that runs the twofold courſe, viz. from the barriers to the goal, and from the goal to the barriers. In the third place, the equeſtrian racer. In the fourth place, he who runs twenty-four ſtadia. And, in the fifth place, he who is lighter armed, whom we ſhall order to run for the ſpace of ſixty ſtadia to a certain temple of Mars. Afterwards we ſhall enjoin another, who is heavier armed, to run a ſhorter and ſmoother ſpace of ground. And again, another who is an archer, and has all the apparatus belonging to archery, ſhall, contending, proceed through mountains and all-various places, for a hundred ſtadia, to the temple of Apollo and Diana. Having eſtabliſhed the conteſt, therefore, we muſt wait for theſe till they arrive, and beſtow on the ſeveral victors the rewards of victory.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Theſe conteſts we muſt conceive to have a tripartite diviſion: one of boys; another of beardleſs youths; and a third of men. And for the beardleſs youths we ſhall eſtabliſh two out of three parts of the courſe: but for boys the halves of theſe, who ſhall contend with archers and armed men. With reſpect to females, for naked girls not yet fit for marriage, we ſhall eſtabliſh the ſtadium, the twofold courſe, the equeſtrian courſe, and the long courſe, or that of four-and-twenty ſtadia. But thoſe that are thirteen years of age ſhall not, prior to their marriage, contend in the courſe longer than their twentieth; nor ſhorter than the eighteenth year of their age. At the ſame time care muſt be taken that their clothing is adapted for the purpoſe. And thus much concerning the conteſts of men and women in the courſe. As to the particulars reſpecting ſtrength, inſtead of wreſtling, and ſuch things as are adopted at preſent, ſuch as are more difficult muſt be inſtituted. And one ſhould contend with one, two with two, and ſo on, as far as to ten with ten. But the things which the victor ought neither to ſuffer nor do, and the number of theſe, muſt be legally eſtabliſhed by thoſe that are ſkilled in the conteſts of arms; in the ſame manner as, in wreſtling, thoſe that preſide over this exerciſe determine what is beautifully performed in wreſtling, or the contrary. Let the ſame things too be legally eſtabliſhed reſpecting women till they are married. But it is requiſite that the whole of the peltaſtic [1] ſhould be oppoſed to the pancratian conteſt; and that thoſe who

[1] Viz. fighting with bucklers.

engage in this conteſt ſhould uſe bows, half-mooned ſhields, darts, and the hurling of ſtones both from the hand and ſlings. Laws too ſhall be eſtabliſhed reſpecting theſe particulars, by which the rewards of victory ſhall be given to thoſe that behave well in theſe conteſts. After theſe things, it is requiſite we ſhould eſtabliſh laws reſpecting equeſtrian conteſts. But we have not much occaſion for horſes in Crete; ſo that the Cretans muſt neceſſarily pay leſs attention to the rearing of horſes, and conteſts with them. For no one of you is in any reſpect a curator of chariots, or ambitious of acquiring renown through them. So that it would be fooliſh to eſtabliſh conteſts of this kind. We muſt, however, eſtabliſh an equeſtrian ſport with ſingle horſes, with colts that have not yet ſhed their teeth, with thoſe that are ſituated between theſe, and with thoſe that have attained the perfection of their nature, according to the condition of the country. Let, therefore, contention and deſire of victory with theſe be according to law; and let a common judgment of all theſe conteſts, and of thoſe that contend with arms, be attributed to the governors of tribes, and the maſters of horſes. But it will not be proper to give laws to the unarmed, neither in gymnaſtic exerciſes nor in theſe conteſts. However, he who hurls an arrow or a dart on horſeback is not uſeleſs for Crete. So that let there be ſtrife and contention with theſe for the ſake of ſport. But it is not fit to force women by law to engage in this conteſt. However, if nature is not averſe to girls or virgins contending in this manner, in conſequence of their former diſciplines and habits, it may be admitted. And thus much may ſuffice for gymnaſtic conteſt and diſcipline, whether it is ſuch as takes place in conteſts, or ſuch as we daily engage in under proper maſters. We have likewiſe, in a ſimilar manner, diſcuſſed the greater part of muſic. But the particulars reſpecting rhapſodiſts, and thoſe that follow theſe, together with thoſe conteſts of choirs which muſt neceſſarily take place in feſtivals, days, months and years being aſſigned to the Gods and their attendants,—how all theſe are to be diſpoſed, and whether they are to be inſtituted for three or for five years, muſt be referred to the conceptions imparted by the Gods reſpecting their order. Then alſo it is proper that the conteſts of muſic ſhould alternately take place, according as the athletæ, the inſtructor of youth, and the guardians of the laws, aſſembling together for this purpoſe, ſhall determine. For theſe ſhall order when, and with whom, the ſeveral conteſts in all

dancing

dancing and ſinging aſſemblies ſhall take place. But of what kind each of theſe ought to be, both with reſpect to the odes and harmonies mingled with rhythms and dancing, has been often ſaid by the firſt legiſlator; conformably to which, ſucceeding legiſlators ſhould eſtabliſh conteſts in ſuch a manner that they may be properly adapted to the ſeveral ſacrifices and ſtated times; and ſhould ordain ſacred feſtivals for the city. With reſpect to theſe, therefore, and other ſuch particulars, it is not difficult to know what legitimate order they ſhould be allotted; nor would the transferring of them be greatly advantageous or detrimental to the city. There are, however, ſome particulars of no ſmall conſequence, which it is ſo difficult to eſtabliſh, that divinity alone is equal to the taſk; but now they require ſome bold man who, honouring in the higheſt degree liberty of ſpeech, will declare what appears to be beſt for a city and citizens, and will eſtabliſh it in ſuch a manner, as to introduce into the corrupted ſouls of the citizens that which is becoming and conſequent to the whole polity. He will, likewiſe, aſſert things contrary to their moſt ardent deſires; and this without any human aſſiſtance, and ſingly following reaſon alone.

CLIN. What is it you now ſay, O gueſt? for I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. It is likely. But I will endeavour to ſpeak to you in a yet clearer manner. For, when my diſcourſe led me to diſcipline, I ſaw the youth of both ſexes aſſociating in a benevolent manner with each other. But I was alarmed, as it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe I ſhould, when I conſidered who would uſe a city in which young men and women are delicately educated, and never engage in thoſe vehement and ſordid labours which in the higheſt degree extinguiſh petulance, but through the whole of life are at leiſure for ſacrifices, feſtivals, and choirs. How, therefore, in this city will they abſtain from thoſe deſires which hurl many of both ſexes into the extremity of danger, ſo that thoſe things may be forbidden by law which reaſon orders us to abſtain from? Indeed, it is not wonderful if the laws which were above eſtabliſhed vanquiſh a multitude of deſires. For the law which forbids the poſſeſſion of riches in an immoderate degree, contributes not a little to the acquiſition of temperance: and the whole of diſcipline poſſeſſes laws accommodated to this purpoſe. And, beſides this, the eye of the governors is compelled not to look elſewhere, but always to obſerve youth. Theſe things, therefore,

therefore, poſſeſs meaſure with reſpect to ſuch other deſires as are human. But the unnatural connexion with boys and girls, with women as if they were men, and with men as if they were women, whence innumerable evils ariſe both to individuals of the human ſpecies and to whole cities, how can any one prevent? And what medicine can be found by which the danger in each of theſe may be avoided? This is by no means eaſy, O Clinias. For, in other things, and theſe not a few, all Crete and Lacedæmon will afford us no ſmall aſſiſtance in eſtabliſhing laws foreign from the manners of the multitude; but, with reſpect to amatory affairs, they will entirely oppoſe us. For, if any one, following nature, ſhould eſtabliſh the law which exiſted prior to the times of Laius [1], and ſhould aſſert it was proper not to have connexion with men and boys as if they were females, adducing as a witneſs the nature of wild beaſts, and ſhowing that, among theſe, males are not connected with males, becauſe this is unnatural, perhaps he would uſe a probable reaſon, but he would by no means accord with our cities. In addition to this, likewiſe, he would not agree with them in that particular which we have ſaid ought always to be obſerved by a legiſlator. For he ought always to obſerve among legal inſtitutions, what contributes to virtue, and what does not contribute. Thus, for inſtance, he ſhould conſider whether what we have juſt now aſſerted would, when legally eſtabliſhed, be beautiful, or at leaſt not baſe, and how far it would contribute to the acquiſition of virtue. Whether, when it takes place, it will produce the habit of fortitude in the ſoul of him who is perſuaded, or a ſpecies of temperance in the ſoul of him who perſuades? Or ſhall we ſay that no one will be perſuaded of theſe things, but rather of every thing contrary to them? For every one will blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleaſures, and is incapable of endurance. But will not every one reprobate the ſimilitude of the image in him who imitates the female ſex? What man, therefore, will legally eſtabliſh ſuch a thing as this? Scarcely no one who has true law in his mind. How, therefore, do we ſay it is true, that the nature of friendſhip, deſire, and the love which we have ſpoken of, muſt be neceſſarily beheld by him who would properly conſider theſe things? For,

[1] A ſon of Labdacus, and king of Thebes. He was the father of Œdipus, by whom he was ſlain.

ſince

ſince they are two, and there is another third ſpecies ariſing from both, and which is comprehended in one name, the greateſt doubt and darkneſs are produced.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. We call a friend one who is ſimilar to the ſimilar according to virtue, and equal to the equal. We likewiſe denominate him a friend who is indigent of a rich man, though he is contrary to him in genus. But, when each of theſe friendſhips becomes vehement, we call it love.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. The friendſhip, therefore, which ariſes from contraries is dire and ruſtic, and is not often mutual: but that which ariſes from ſimilars is mild and mutual through life. But as to that which is mixed from theſe, in the firſt place, it is not eaſy to learn what his wiſh may be who poſſeſſes this third love: and, in the next place, being drawn by both to that which is contrary, he himſelf is doubtful what he ſhould do; the one exhorting him to uſe the flower of his age, and the other diſſuading him from it. For, he who is a lover of body, and hungers after its flower, as if it were ripe fruit, endeavours to be ſatiated with it, and confers no honour on the manners of the ſoul of his beloved. But he who poſſeſſes a careleſs deſire of body, and rather beholds than loves it with his ſoul, ſuch an one, ſince he is a lover of ſoul in a becoming manner, conſiders the ſatiety of body, with reſpect to body, as diſgraceful; but, reverencing and cultivating temperance, fortitude, magnificence, and prudence, he always wiſhes to live chaſtely with a chaſte lover. But the love which is mixed from both theſe is the love which we juſt now diſcuſſed, as ranking in the third place. Since, therefore, there are three kinds of love, ought the law to forbid all of them, and prevent them from ſubſiſting in us? Or, is it not manifeſt we ſhould be willing that the love which is of virtue, and which deſires that youth may arrive at the ſummit of excellence, ſhould ſubſiſt in the city; but that, if poſſible, we ſhould expel the other two? Or how ſhall we ſay, O friend Megillus?

MEGIL. You have ſpoken, O gueſt, about theſe particulars in a manner perfectly beautiful.

GUEST. I was right in my conjecture, O friend, that you would accord with me in ſentiment. But it is not proper that I ſhould inquire what your

law conceives about things of this kind, but that I ſhould receive what you admit; and, after this, that I ſhould endeavour to perſuade Clinias to be of our opinion. Let, however, that which you have granted me be admitted, and let us now diligently diſcuſs the laws.

MEGIL. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. I poſſeſs an art at preſent relative to the eſtabliſhment of this law, which is partly eaſy, and partly in every reſpect difficult.

MEGIL. How do you ſay?

GUEST. We know even at preſent many men, who, though they act illegally, yet in a becoming manner and diligently abſtain from a connection with beautiful perſons, and this not involuntarily, but for the moſt part willingly.

MEGIL. When does this take place?

GUEST. When any one has a beautiful brother or ſiſter. The ſame law too, though unwritten, ſufficiently defends a ſon or a daughter, and prevents their parents from having any connection with them, either openly or ſecretly. Indeed, it prevents the vulgar from even deſiring a connection of this kind.

MEGIL. True.

GUEST. A ſmall word, therefore, extinguiſhes all ſuch pleaſures.

MEGIL. What word is that?

GUEST. That which ſays theſe things are by no means holy, but that they are odious to divinity, and the moſt baſe of all baſe things. But does not this take place, becauſe the contrary to this is never aſſerted, but each of us from our childhood hears the ſame things ſaid both jocoſely and ſeriouſly; and often in tragedies, when a Thyeſtes [1] or Œdipus is introduced, or a certain Macareus [2], who being ſecretly connected with their ſiſters, but detected, immediately ſuffered death, as the puniſhment of their offence?

MEGIL. This is ſaid with the greateſt rectitude. For rumour poſſeſſes a certain wonderful power; ſince no one attempts even to breathe in a manner contrary to law.

GUEST. That which we juſt now ſaid, therefore, was right; that it was

[1] A ſon of Pelops and Hippodamia, and grandſon of Tantalus. He debauched Ærope, the wife of his brother Ægeus.

[2] A ſon of Æolus, who debauched his ſiſter Canace, and had a ſon by her.

eaſy for a legiſlator, who wiſhed to enſlave ſome one of thoſe deſires which in a remarkable degree enſlave men, to know in what manner this muſt be accompliſhed. For, if this rumour becomes conſecrated among ſlaves and the free-born, men and women, and the whole city, it will cauſe this law to be moſt firm and ſtable.

MEGIL. Entirely ſo. But how can it be brought to paſs that all men ſhall willingly ſpeak in this manner?

GUEST. Your queſtion is a very proper one. For this is what I ſaid, that I had an art relative to this law, by which men might be induced to uſe copulation according to nature, and in order to produce offspring. Let them, therefore, abſtain from connection with males, and not deſignedly cut off the race of men, nor diſſeminate in rocks and ſtones, where the prolific nature of that which is ſown can never take root. Let them, likewiſe, abſtain from every feminine field in which the ſeed is unwilling to germinate. This law, if it was eſtabliſhed, and poſſeſſed the ſame authority in other things as in the connection of parents, would produce innumerable benefits. For, in the firſt place, it would be eſtabliſhed according to nature. And, in the next place, it would reſtrain men from amatory fury and madneſs, from all adulteries, and the immoderate uſe of meats and drinks. It would likewiſe cauſe men to be familiar and friendly with their wives; and many other benefits would ariſe if this law was diligently obſerved by every one. But, perhaps, ſome very young man, and who is full of ſeed, on hearing that this law is to be eſtabliſhed, will immediately revile us, as framing laws which are fooliſh, and impoſſible to be obſerved, and will fill every place with his vociferations. It was in conſequence of looking to this, that I ſaid I poſſeſſed a certain art, which was partly eaſy and partly difficult, by which this law might be firmly eſtabliſhed. For it is eaſy to underſtand that this is poſſible, and in what manner it is poſſible. For we have ſaid that, when this legal inſtitution is ſufficiently conſecrated, it will ſubdue every ſoul, and entirely cauſe them, through fear, to be obedient to the eſtabliſhed laws. But at preſent it appears to be impoſſible that it ſhould ever take place: juſt as the inſtitution of eating in common is conſidered as a thing impoſſible to be perpetually obſerved by a whole city; yet it is adopted by you, though it appears impoſſible to perſuade women to this, nor does it ſeem to be naturally

adapted to your cities. Hence, through the ſtrength of this belief, I ſaid that both theſe could not without great difficulty be legally eſtabliſhed.

MEGIL. And you was right in ſaying ſo.

GUEST. Are you, therefore, willing that I ſhould endeavour to mention to you a thing endued with a certain perſuaſive power, and which is not beyond human ability to accompliſh?

CLIN. Undoubtedly, we are willing.

GUEST. Will, therefore, any one more eaſily abſtain from venereal concerns, and be willing to obſerve in a moderate manner, and not like the vulgar, the order impoſed on him, when his body is in a good condition, or when it is badly affected?

CLIN. Doubtleſs, when his body is in a good condition.

GUEST. Have we not, therefore, heard of the Tarentine Iccus, who, for the ſake of Olympic and other conteſts which he applied himſelf to, through a deſire of victory and art, and in conjunction with temperance and fortitude, never had any connection either with a woman or boy during the whole time of his exerciſe? The ſame thing too is reported of Cryſſon, Aſtyllus [1], Diopompus, and many others; though their ſouls were much worſe diſciplined than thoſe of your and my fellow citizens, O Clinias, and their bodies much more luxurious.

CLIN. You give a true account of what the antients ſay reſpecting the conduct of theſe athletæ.

GUEST. What then? Could they for the ſake of victory in wreſtling, in the courſe, and ſuch like things, have the courage to abſtain from that affair which is called bleſſed by the multitude; and ſhall our youth be incapable of a ſimilar continence, for the ſake of a far more excellent victory, which we ſing to them from their very childhood, as a thing moſt beautiful, in fables, in proſe and in verſe, and charm them into a perſuaſion of this, as it is fit we ſhould?

CLIN. What victory are you ſpeaking of?

GUEST. Of the victory over pleaſure,—that, being continent in this, they may live happily: for, if they are vanquiſhed by pleaſure, the very contrary

[1] Aſtyllus is mentioned by Pauſanias as a victor in the Olympic repeated courſe. See vol. ii. of my tranſlation, p. 119.

will

will take place. Beſides this, will not the dread leſt it ſhould be a thing by no means holy, enable them to ſubdue thoſe things which others worſe than themſelves ſubdue?

CLIN. It is probable it will.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we have arrived thus far about this law, and have fallen into doubt through the depravity of many, we now ſay with confidence, that our citizens ought not to be worſe than birds, and many wild beaſts: for many herds of theſe live a ſingle, pure, and incorrupt life till the time of procreating offſpring; and when they arrive at this age, the male benevolently uniting with the female, and the female with the male, they live for the remainder of their time in a holy and juſt manner, firmly abiding in the firſt compacts of friendſhip. But it is requiſite that our citizens ſhould be better than wild beaſts. If, therefore, they are corrupted by other Greeks, and the greater part of Barbarians, and are incapable of reſtraining themſelves when they ſee and hear that the Venus which is called inordinate is capable of accompliſhing in them that which is greateſt,—in this caſe, it is requiſite that the guardians of the laws, becoming legiſlators, ſhould deviſe for them a ſecond law.

CLIN. What law would you adviſe ſhould be eſtabliſhed for them, if they reject the preſent?

GUEST. Evidently that which follows this, O Clinias.

CLIN. What law do you mean?

GUEST. That they ſhould eſpecially cauſe the ſtrength of pleaſures to be unexerciſed, altering the courſe of its infuſion and aliment through labours of the body. But this will take place if the uſe of venereal pleaſures is not attended with impudence. For, theſe being more rarely uſed through ſhame, the miſtreſs of them will poſſeſs a more imbecil dominion. Cuſtom, therefore, and an unwritten law, ſhould privately perſuade them to act in this manner, and diſſuade them from a contrary mode of conduct as baſe. For thus, in the ſecond place, we ſhall preſerve the becoming; and one race of men comprehending three genera, will compel thoſe of a depraved nature, and who, we have confeſſed, are their inferiors, not to act in an illegal manner.

CLIN. What three genera are theſe?

GUEST. Thoſe that venerate divinity, the lovers of honour, and thoſe that

do not desire corporeal beauty, but are lovers of the beautiful manners of the soul. And these things, perhaps, which are now asserted by us, are like prayers in a fable. But they will by far subsist in the most excellent manner, if they should be adopted by all cities. Perhaps, too, if divinity pleases, we may by force accomplish one of the two in amatory affairs: either that no one shall dare to touch any free and well-born woman besides his wife, or have any connection with concubines, or disseminate contrary to nature in the barren soil of males: or else we must entirely take away connection with males; and if any one has connection with other women than those which came to his house in conjunction with the Gods, and sacred marriages, whether such women are bought, or acquired by any other means,—such an one, unless he is concealed from all men and women, may perhaps with propriety be deprived by law of all the honours in the city, as being one who is truly a foreigner. This law, whether it is proper to call it simple or twofold, should be established respecting all venereal and amatory concerns, which are transacted by us with each other through such-like desires, and this both in a proper and improper manner.

MEGIL. I very much approve, O guest, of this law: but let Clinias here inform us what is his opinion respecting these things.

CLIN. I shall do so, O Megillus, when it appears to me that a proper opportunity presents itself for this purpose: but let us now permit our guest to proceed forward in his discussion of laws.

MEGIL. Right.

GUEST. But we have now proceeded so far, that we are nearly arrived at the establishment of eating in common; which in other places we have said it is difficult to establish, but no one will suppose but that it ought to be adopted in Crete. After what manner, however, must it be established? Shall we say as here, or as in Lacedæmon? or is there a third mode better than both these? It appears to me to be difficult to discover this third mode, and that when found it will not be productive of any great good. For what we have now instituted appears to have been accomplished in an elegant manner. After this, it follows that we should speak respecting the apparatus of food, and show in what manner it should be procured for our citizens. Food then in other cities is all-various, and procured from many places, but especially from two places. For food is obtained for the greatest

greateſt part of the Greeks from the earth and ſea; but to our citizens from the earth alone. This, therefore, will be eaſy for the legiſlator. For much leſs than half of the laws will be ſufficient; and theſe will be more adapted to free-born men. For the legiſlator of this city will have nothing to do with naval and mercantile affairs, or with inn-keepers, publicans, victualling-houſes, miners, borrowing money, uſury, and ten thouſand other things of this kind. But he will only have to give laws to huſbandmen, ſhepherds, the curators of bees, and the guardians and ſuperintendants of things of this kind: and his principal buſineſs as a legiſlator will conſiſt in attending to marriages, the procreation, education, and diſcipline of children, and the eſtabliſhment of magiſtrates in the city. It is, therefore, now neceſſary that we ſhould direct our attention to nutriment, and to thoſe who by their own labour procure it. Let the laws, therefore, called georgic be firſt eſtabliſhed. And let this be the firſt law of Jupiter Terminalis[1]: No one ſhall move the boundaries of land, neither that of a neighbouring fellow-citizen, nor of a neighbouring ſtranger, if he ſhould poſſeſs the extremities of the land; but he ſhould conſider that the ſaying, 'This is to move things immoveable', is true. And every one ſhould rather wiſh to move a mighty rock, than a boundary, or ſmall ſtone, which terminates friendſhip and hatred by an oath. For Omophylus[2] Jupiter is a witneſs of the one, and Hoſpitable Jupiter of the other; and theſe divinities are rouſed in conjunction with the moſt hoſtile battles. He, too, who is obedient to the law ſhall be free from condemnation: but he who deſpiſes it ſhall be obnoxious to a twofold puniſhment; one, and that the firſt, from the Gods; but the ſecond from the law. For the law ſays that no one ſhall voluntarily move the boundaries of his neighbour's land. But of him who does move them, any one that is willing may inform the huſbandmen, who ſhall lead him to the court of judgment. Here he ſhall be condemned by the judges to make reſtitution, as one who diſtributes land privately and by force, and ſhall be otherwiſe puniſhed in ſuch manner as the judges ſhall determine. But, in the next place, many and ſmall injuries of neighbours, when often taking place, produce great enmities, and render vicinity difficult and vehemently bitter. On this account a neighbour ought to be extremely cautious of injuring his

[1] i. e. Jupiter the guardian of bounds. [2] i. e. Jupiter the guardian of a tribe or kindred.

neighbour, both in other things, and in every thing pertaining to agriculture. For to do an injury is by no means difficult, but is in the power of every man; but to profit is not in the power of every one. But he who, paſſing beyond his own boundaries, cultivates his neighbour's land, ſhall make a reſtitution, and, ſuffering the puniſhment of his impudence and illiberality, ſhall pay the injured perſon the double of his loſs. Of all ſuch like particulars, huſbandmen ſhould be the judges and cenſors. And of ſuch as are greater, as I have ſaid before, the whole order of the twelfth part; but of the leſſer, thoſe that preſide over the guardians of theſe. And if any one diſtributes cattle, the huſbandmen, conſidering the injury, ſhall judge and condemn accordingly. Likewiſe, if any one uſurps a ſwarm of bees belonging to another, alluring the bees by the ſound of braſs, and thus rendering them familiar to him, he ſhall make a reſtitution to the injured perſon. And if any one ſets fire to certain materials, without paying any attention to his neighbour's property, he ſhall pay that fine which the magiſtrates think fit to impoſe. In like manner, he who in planting does not leave the meaſure of his neighbour's land, ſhall be puniſhed in ſuch a manner as would be ſaid to be ſufficient by many legiſlators; whoſe laws we ought to uſe, and not think that the many and trifling particulars which are inſtituted by any caſual legiſlator are to be adopted by a greater moderator of a city. For antient and beautiful laws reſpecting water are eſtabliſhed for huſbandmen, which yet do not deſerve to be recited. But he who wiſhes to deduce water to his own place, ſhould ſo deduce it from common fountains as not to cut off the apparent fountain of any private perſon. He may likewiſe be permitted to conduct the water where he pleaſes, except through houſes, or certain temples, or ſepulchres, at the ſame time being cautious not to do any damage, except what may ariſe from the derivation of the ſtream. But if the natural dryneſs of the ground in certain places ſhould be incapable of retaining the waters from Jupiter, and there ſhould be a defect of neceſſary drink, any one may dig in his own ground till he comes to chalky earth. And if in this depth he meets with no water, he may draw as much from his neighbours as his neceſſities require. But if there ſhould be a ſcarcity of water with his neighbours, the quantity that ſhould be daily uſed muſt be determined by the præfects of the land. However, if the waters from Jupiter abound, and thoſe that inhabit or cultivate the lower places reſtrain the flux

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of the water, ſo as to injure thoſe in the higher grounds; or, on the contrary, if the inhabitants of the higher places, inconſiderately permitting the waters to flow, injure the inhabitants of the lower grounds, and diſagreement ariſes between the two reſpecting this particular,—then, in the city, the city ſurveyor, but, in the country, he who preſides over the land, ſhall order what each ought to do in this caſe. But he who is not obedient to this order ſhall ſuffer the puniſhment of his envy and moroſeneſs, and ſhall give the injured perſon the double of his loſs. A participation of the fruits of autumn ſhould be made by all men as follows:—The God of autumn imparts to us two gracious gifts; one Dionyſiacal, which does not require to be concealed; but another, to which concealment is natural. Let this law then be eſtabliſhed reſpecting autumnal fruits. Whoever taſtes of the ruſtic fruit of grapes, or of figs, before the time of vintage, which concurs with Arcturus, ſhall be fined fifty drachms ſacred to Bacchus, if he has gathered theſe fruits from his own land; but if from that of his neighbour's, a mina; and if from other lands, two parts of a mina. Grapes and figs, which we denominate generous, may be gathered by any one, after what manner and when he pleaſes, if they are his own; but not when they belong to another, unleſs he obtains leave of the poſſeſſor; and this in conformity to the law which ſays that no one ſhall move that which he has not depoſited, and that he who does ſo ſhall be fined. But if a ſlave, not complying with the orders of his maſter, gathers fruits of this kind, he ſhall receive as many laſhes with a whip as the number of the grapes and figs which he gathered. When a native has bought any generous autumnal fruits, he may eat them if he pleaſes; but if a ſtranger as he paſſes along deſires to eat theſe autumnal fruits, whether he is alone or with one companion, he may eat them as hoſpitable property: but the law forbids ſtrangers from eating thoſe fruits which are called ruſtic. If any one ignorantly gathers theſe, or if they are gathered by a ſlave, the ſlave ſhall be puniſhed with ſtripes; but the free perſon ſhall be diſmiſſed with an admonition that he may gather other autumnal fruits, but that thoſe from which raiſins, wine, and dry figs are made, are not fit to be gathered. With reſpect to pears, apples, pomegranates, and all ſuch fruits, let it not be conſidered as baſe to gather them ſecretly. But if any one who is leſs than thirty years of age is detected gathering them, let him be chaſtiſed, but without wounds; and let not the free-born

man

man ſuffer any puniſhment for inflicting this chaſtiſement. Let it likewiſe be lawful for a ſtranger to partake of theſe fruits in the ſame manner as of generous autumnal fruits. If any perſon more advanced in years taſtes of theſe, but does not take them away, let him, in the ſame manner as a ſtranger, be permitted to partake of all theſe: but if he is not obedient to the law, let him be conſidered as one who does not contend for virtue;—if any one gives information of this to the judges of theſe particulars. Again, water is the moſt nutritive of every thing pertaining to gardens, but it is eaſily corrupted. For neither the earth, the ſun, nor the air, which together with water nouriſh things germinating from the earth, can be eaſily corrupted either by medicaments, turnings aſide, or thefts: but all ſuch things as theſe are able to take place reſpecting the nature of water; and on this account it requires the aſſiſtance of law. Let this, then, be the law reſpecting it: If any one voluntarily corrupts water belonging to another perſon by medicaments, or ditches, or thefts, whether ſuch water is fontal or collected, he ſhall be taken before the ædiles; and, if convicted, he ſhall be puniſhed adequately to his offence. With reſpect to the conveyance of all ſeaſonable fruit, let it be lawful for any one who is willing, to carry his own fruit any where, ſo long as he does not injure any one, or ſo long as a gain ariſes to himſelf triple of the damage which his neighbour has ſuſtained. Let the magiſtrates be the inſpectors of theſe things, and of all ſuch injuries as are either committed by violence or ſecretly, againſt a perſon himſelf, or his property. Let all ſuch particulars be laid before the magiſtrates, if the injury does not exceed three minæ; but if it does, let the caſe be brought before the common courts of juſtice, and let him who has committed the injury be puniſhed. But if any magiſtrate ſhall be found to condemn an accuſed perſon unjuſtly, let him be conſidered as a debtor to the injured perſon of twice the loſs which he ſuſtained. And, in ſhort, let the unjuſt conduct of the magiſtrates be brought before the common courts of juſtice by any perſon that is willing. But as there are ten thouſand ſmall legal inſtitutions, according to which puniſhments ought to be inflicted reſpecting the allotments of juſtice, citations, and the perſons cited, whether the citation ought to be made between two, or between many;—all ſuch particulars as theſe muſt not be left deſtitute of law, nor yet do they ſeem worthy to be noticed by an aged legiſlator. Let young men, therefore, give

laws

laws reſpecting theſe, imitating prior legal inſtitutions, underſtanding ſmall things from ſuch as are great, and becoming experienced in the neceſſary uſe of them till every thing ſhall appear to be ſufficiently eſtabliſhed. After this, cauſing theſe inſtitutions to be immovable, let them be uſed as ſuch.

With reſpect to other artificers, it is requiſite to act as follows: In the firſt place, let no citizen labour about artificial works, nor yet a ſervant of any citizen. For a citizen who preſerves the common ornament of the city, is engaged in an art which requires long continued exerciſe, and, at the ſame time, many diſciplines, and the poſſeſſion of it is not to be obtained by indolent application. But to labour accurately in two ſtudies, or two arts, nearly ſurpaſſes the ability of human nature. Nor can any one ſufficiently exerciſe one art, and at the ſame time direct his attention to one who exerciſes another. This, therefore, ought firſt of all to take place in the city, that no one ſhall at the ſame time be a copperſmith and a builder; and that a builder ſhall not attend more to the copperſmith's, than to his own, art, under a pretext that, becauſe he has many ſervants who work for him, he very properly beſtows more attention upon them, that greater gain may thence accrue to him from his own art: but every artiſt in the city ſhall exerciſe one art only, and from this derive his ſupport. This law the ædiles ſhould particularly attend to; and ſhould puniſh with diſgrace and infamy any one who inclines a citizen to a certain art more than to the ſtudy of virtue, till they have converted the citizen to his right courſe. But, if any ſtranger is found to apply himſelf to two arts, he ſhall be puniſhed with bonds, fines, and expulſions from the city, and ſhall be compelled to exerciſe one art alone. With repect to the wages of workmen, and the deſtruction of works, and the injuries which workmen may either ſuffer or commit, the ædiles ſhall judge of theſe as far as to fifty drachms. Offences which merit a greater fine than this, ſhall be judged according to law in the common courts of juſtice. There ſhall, likewiſe, be no revenue in the city ariſing from the exportation and importation of goods. But, with reſpect to frankincenſe, and other foreign aromatics, from which fumigations are made to the Gods, together with purple, and other dyed colours, which are not produced in this region, or any other article of foreign importation, let no one introduce any of theſe, nor yet again export any thing which the region neceſſarily requires. All theſe particulars muſt be attended

to, and taken care of, by the twelve guardians of the laws, five of the eldeſt being excepted. With reſpect to arms, and all warlike inſtruments, if there ſhould be a neceſſity of any foreign art, whether relative to plants, or metals, or bonds, or animals which are ſubſervient to war, the care of the importation and exportation of theſe muſt be committed to the maſters of the horſe, and the generals of the army; but the guardians of the law muſt eſtabliſh reſpecting theſe becoming and ſufficient laws. No victualling-houſes ſhall be ſuffered, either in the city or in any part of the region for the ſake of accumulating wealth. But it appears that the mode eſtabliſhed by the law of the Cretans of diſtributing the food which is the produce of the country, is a proper one: for a general diſtribution into twelve parts is made of the whole produce of the land, which alſo is conſumed. Every twelfth part of barley, wheat, all autumnal fruits, and vendible animals, ſhould be triply divided according to proportion; one part being given to free-born perſons, another to the ſervants of theſe, and a third part to artificers and ſtrangers, whether ſuch ſtrangers have taken up their reſidence in the city through the want of neceſſary ſuſtenance, or for the ſake of any advantage to the city, or any individual in it. This third part, therefore, of all neceſſaries, ſhould be alone vendible from neceſſity; but nothing belonging to the two other parts ſhould be neceſſarily ſold. How, therefore, are theſe to be diſtributed in the moſt proper manner? In the firſt place, it is evident that we ſhould diſtribute them partly equally, and partly unequally.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. It is neceſſary that every land ſhould produce and nouriſh things better or worſe than each of theſe.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As, therefore, there are three parts, let no more be diſtributed either to maſters or ſlaves, or ſtrangers, but let the diſtribution be made to all, according to the ſame equality of ſimilitude. But let each citizen ſince he receives two parts, have the power of diſtributing both to ſlaves and free-born perſons, as much, and ſuch things, as he pleaſes. It is however proper that a greater quantity than theſe ſhould be diſtributed in meaſure and number, and that a diſtribution ſhould be made after an account is taken of all the animals which derive their nouriſhment from the earth. After this, it is neceſſary that habitations ſhould be ſeparately aſſigned them in an orderly

orderly manner. But the following order will be adapted to things of this kind. There ought to be twelve ſtreets in the middle, and one in each of the twelve parts; and in each ſtreet a forum, and temples of the Gods, and of dæmons the attendants of the Gods, ſhould be raiſed; and whether there are ſtatues of certain inhabitants of Magneſia, or of other antients whoſe memory is preſerved, to theſe the honours of antient men ſhould be paid. The temples of Veſta, Jupiter, Minerva, and of him who is the leader of each of the other divinities that preſide over the twelve parts, ſhould be every where eſtabliſhed. But firſt of all buildings ſhould be raiſed about theſe temples in the higheſt place, as well defended receptacles for the guards: but the reſt of the region ſhould be diſtributed for the artificers into thirteen parts. And one part of theſe ſhall reſide in the city, this part being diſtributed into the twelve parts of the whole city; but another part ſhall be circularly diſtributed about the environs of the city. In every ſtreet artificers ſhall reſide that are adapted to the purpoſes of huſbandmen. The governors of the huſbandmen, too, ſhall take care of all theſe particulars, and of ſuch things as each place may require; and ſhall provide ſuch places as will be moſt advantageous to the huſbandmen. The ædiles in like manner ſhall take care of the artificers in the city. Things pertaining to the forum ought likewiſe to be taken care of by the præfects of the markets. After attention to ſacred things, they ſhould be careful, in the firſt place, that no one acts unjuſtly in buying or ſelling; and, in the next place, they ſhould puniſh every one that deſerves puniſhment, as being the inſpectors of modeſty and inſolence. With reſpect to things vendible, they ſhould, in the firſt place, conſider, whether the citizens ſell to foreigners in a manner conformable to law. But let the law be this: On the firſt day of the month, thoſe that take care of foreigners ſhall exhibit a part of what is to be ſold; viz. in the firſt place a twelfth part of the corn: and foreigners during the ſpace of the whole month ſhall buy corn, and ſuch things as pertain to corn, in the firſt market. But on the twelfth day of the month, the ſelling and buying of moiſt articles ſhall take place through the whole of the month. And on the twenty-third day of the month, let ſuch animals be ſold as may be wanted, together with ſuch articles as huſbandmen require, viz. ſkins and garments of every kind, whether knit or woven. But it is neceſſary that ſtrangers ſhould buy the poſſeſſions of others. However, let there be no buying

or ſelling of wheat or barley, diſtributed into barley-meal, or of any other aliment, either among the citizens or their ſlaves. In the markets of the ſtrangers, a ſtranger may ſell and exchange to artificers and their ſlaves, wine and food, and in like manner diſtributed fleſh, which is generally called cauponation. A ſtranger, too, may be permitted to buy every day the whole materials of fire, from the inſpectors of places, and ſell it again to other ſtrangers, for as much as he pleaſes, and when he pleaſes. Let every other uſeful article be ſold in the common forum, in ſuch places as the guardians of the laws, and præfects of the markets, together with the ædiles, ſhall appoint. Here let money be exchanged for things, and things for money; no one committing the exchange to another, but performing it by himſelf. However, if any one thinks proper to commit it to another, whether reſtitution is made to him or not, he muſt be contented, becauſe no notice is taken in the courts of juſtice of ſuch contracts. But if that which is bought or ſold, has been bought or ſold at a greater or leſs price than the law fixes upon vendible commodities, the quantity by which it exceeds the juſt price ſhall be taken an account of in writing by the guardians of the laws, and the contrary ſhall be expunged. Let the ſame things be enjoined reſpecting the regiſtering of the property poſſeſſed by the inhabitants of the city. Let it likewiſe be lawful for any one to migrate to our city on certain conditions, viz. ſo that he is ſkilled in, and exerciſes, ſome art, and does not continue more than twenty years from the day of his being regiſtered; during which time he ſhall not be forced to pay any tribute for buying and ſelling, nor be under any reſtraint, except that of conducting himſelf temperately. But when the twenty years are expired, he ſhall receive his own property and depart. However, if it ſhould ſo happen during this time, that the city ſhould be greatly benefitted by him, and he is deſirous of continuing longer, or of ſettling for life in the city, let his requeſt be complied with, if agreeable to the inhabitants of the city. With reſpect to the ſons of the emigrants that are artiſts and fifteen years of age, let the time of their continuance in the city commence from their fifteenth year, ſo that they may ſtay, if they pleaſe, twenty years after this period, or longer if agreeable to the inhabitants. But if they chooſe to leave the city, they may depart after their regiſters, which were committed to the care of the magiſtrates, are obliterated.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK.

THE LAWS,

BOOK IX.

AS judicial affairs are conſequent to all the preceding particulars, the diſcuſſion of them at preſent will be agreeable to the natural order of laws. But we have partly ſhown what the particulars are reſpecting which judgments ought to take place, viz. reſpecting agriculture and the like; though we have not as yet diſtinctly ſpoken of the greateſt judgments, and ſhown what puniſhments they ought to inflict, and who ſhould be the judges. It therefore follows that we ſhould now ſpeak of theſe.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But it is after a manner baſe that the city which we ſay will be properly inhabited, and furniſhed with every thing adapted to the ſtudy of virtue, ſhould obſerve all ſuch laws as we are now about to eſtabliſh. For to ſuppoſe that, in ſuch a city, a man capable of the greateſt iniquity will be born, ſo that it will be neceſſary to give laws by anticipation, and enjoin threatenings, if ſuch a character ſhould ariſe, and this for the ſake of preventing the greateſt enormities, and that when they are committed, they may be legally puniſhed,—to ſuppoſe this will, as I have ſaid, be in a certain reſpect baſe. But ſince we do not, like the antient legiſlators, give laws to heroes the ſons of the Gods, theſe legiſlators at the ſame time being themſelves deſcended from the Gods, but being ourſelves men, we at preſent give laws to thoſe that are born from the ſeed of men;—ſince this is the caſe, we may juſtly be afraid leſt any one of our citizens ſhould be ſo naturally intractable and untamed, as not to be liquefied; juſt as leguminous ſubſtances, when blaſted by thunder, cannot be ſubdued by fire. The firſt law, therefore, which we ſhall eſtabliſh, though it is not agreeable to us to do ſo, is reſpecting ſacrilege, if any

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one ſhall dare to commit it. Indeed, we neither wiſh, nor do we very much fear, that a citizen, when properly educated, will ever labour under this diſeaſe. But the ſervants of theſe, ſtrangers, and the ſlaves of ſtrangers, will attempt many things of this kind; for the ſake of which eſpecially, and at the ſame time fearing for all the imbecility of human nature, I ſhall ſpeak about the law of ſacrilege, and all other ſuch particulars as are either difficult to be cured or entirely incurable. The preface, however, to theſe particulars, according to what has been formerly aſſented to, ought to be as ſhort as poſſible. Some one, therefore, may thus addreſs him who is excited by a vicious deſire both day and night to plunder temples, mingling at the ſame time admonitions with his ſpeech: O wonderful man, neither a human nor a divine evil moves and excites you now to ſacrilege, but a certain execrable fury, ariſing in men from antient and unpurified offences, which you ought to dread with all your might. Learn, then, what this dread is. When any ſuch opinion attacks you, betake yourſelf to expiations, betake yourſelf, in a ſuppliant manner, to the temples of thoſe Gods that avert evils from mankind; and betake yourſelf to an aſſociation with good men. Among theſe partly hear, and endeavour yourſelf to ſay, that every man ought to honour things beautiful and juſt. But fly without turning back from an aſſociation with the vicious. And if, in conſequence of your acting in this manner, the diſeaſe ceaſes, you have done well; but if not, conſidering that in this caſe it is better to die, liberate yourſelf from life. Since, therefore, we have ſung theſe exordia to thoſe whoſe thoughts lead them to deeds impious and deſtructive to the city, it is proper to diſmiſs him in ſilence who is obedient to the law: but to him who will not be perſuaded, it is neceſſary, after the preface, to ſing in a higher ſtrain. He, then, who is detected in the act of ſacrilege, if he is either a ſlave or a ſtranger, ſhall have his calamity written in his face and hands, and after he has received as many laſhes with a whip as the judges ſhall think proper, he ſhall be driven naked beyond the borders of the region. For, perhaps, being brought to his right mind by this puniſhment, he will become a better man. For no puniſhment ſubſiſting according to law is inflicted with an evil intention. But one of two things is nearly always effected: for he who ſuffers puniſhment either becomes better or leſs depraved. If, however, a citizen ſhall at any time appear to have perpetrated any thing of this kind, or ſome mighty and

arcane

arcane crime towards the Gods, or his parents, or his country, the judge ſhall pronounce ſuch an one to be incurable, in conſequence of conſidering, that though he has been well nouriſhed and diſciplined from his childhood, yet he has not abſtained from the greateſt vices. But death to ſuch a man is the leaſt of evils. Such an one, therefore, that others may be benefited by his example, being ſtigmatized with infamy, and expelled beyond the boundaries of the region, ſhall there be put to death. But let his children and race be honoured and praiſed, if they avoid his manners, as thoſe that bravely fly from evil to good. It will not, however, be proper that the riches of any ſuch perſon ſhould become public property, in a polity in which the ſame and equal allotments ought to be perpetually preſerved. But when any one perpetrates ſuch things as are to be puniſhed with a fine, he ſhall be fined as much as he poſſeſſes above his allotted portion, but the lot itſelf ſhall remain entire. The guardians of the laws, however, conſidering this affair accurately from written accounts, ſhould always give a clear ſtatement of it to the judges, that no one may be deprived of his allotments through want of money. If any one ſhould appear to deſerve a greater fine, and no one of his friends is willing to be bound for him, and procure his liberty, ſuch an one ſhall be puniſhed with laſting and apparent bonds, and with certain reproaches. But let no one offence ever by any means paſs unpuniſhed, nor any fugitive; but let him either be puniſhed with death, or bonds, or ſtripes, or certain ſqualid ſeats, or with ſtanding, or being exhibited in temples at the extremity of the region, or by fines, in the manner we have before mentioned. Let the guardians of the laws too be eſtabliſhed the judges of death; and let the beſt among them be choſen for this purpoſe, who in the preceding year had acted in the capacity of magiſtrates. But the citations and accuſations of theſe, and ſuch like particulars, together with the manner in which they ought to take place, ſhould be attended to by junior legiſlators. The manner, however, in which ſuffrages ought to be conducted, it is our buſineſs to determine. Let them, therefore, be given openly. But, prior to this, let the judge ſit before the accuſer and defendant, and as near to them as poſſible, in a grave and dignified manner. Let all the citizens too that are at leiſure, diligently attend as the hearers of ſuch cauſes. And, in the firſt place, let the accuſer ſpeak, and afterwards the defendant. After this, let the ſenior judge diligently and ſufficiently examine what was ſaid: and, after the elder judge,

judge, all the other judges in order ought to conſider what is worthy of diſcuſſion in the ſpeeches of the accuſer and defendant. But he who does not think there is any thing worthy of diſcuſſion in either of the ſpeeches, ſhould refer the inveſtigation of it to another. And, laſtly, ſuch things as ſhall appear to be well ſaid, being committed to writing, and ſigned by all the judges, ſhall be placed in the temple of Veſta. And again, aſſembling the next day into the ſame place, they ſhall in a ſimilar manner examine and judge, and put their ſignatures to what ſhall appear to have been well ſaid. When this has been thrice accompliſhed, and the proofs and witneſſes have been ſufficiently examined, each judge bearing in his hand a ſacred pebble, and ſwearing before Veſta that he has judged to the utmoſt of his ability juſtly and truly, a judgment of this kind ſhall be thus brought to a concluſion.

After crimes reſpecting the Gods, it is requiſite to ſpeak of thoſe which pertain to the diſſolution of a polity. He, therefore, who ſubjects government to the power of a man, enſlaves the laws, makes the city ſubſervient to factious ſocieties, and, accompliſhing all this by force, excites illegal ſeditions. It is proper to conſider a character of this kind as the greateſt of all enemies to the whole city. But he who, though he is not the author of any thing of this kind, yet poſſeſſes the greateſt authority in the city, but takes no notice of theſe conſpiracies, or if he does notice them, through timidity, ſuffers his injured country to be unrevenged,—a citizen of this kind ought to be conſidered as the ſecond in wickedneſs. Every man who is of the ſmalleſt utility in a city ſhould inform the judges of theſe particulars, and bring him to judgment who endeavours by ſtratagem to produce a violent and illegal mutation of the polity. But let the ſame judges give ſentence in theſe caſes as decided in ſacrilege; and let the whole proceſs be conducted in a ſimilar manner. Let the ſuffrage too which vanquiſhes in multitude, be the ſentence of death. And, in ſhort, let not the diſgrace and puniſhment of the father attend the children, unleſs the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, of ſome one in ſucceſſion, have deſerved death. Theſe, with their poſſeſſions, except as much as pertains to the lot, ſhall be ſent to their antient paternal city. But as to thoſe citizens who ſhall happen to have more children than one, and theſe not leſs than ten years of age, ten out of their number muſt be choſen by lot, which the father, or

paternal or maternal grandfather, ſhall approve; and after they are choſen, their names muſt be ſent to Delphi. Then, with a better fortune, the poſſeſſions and habitation aſſigned by lot ſhall be reſtored to him whom the Delphic God approves.

CLIN. And very properly ſo.

GUEST. Let there be yet a third common law, reſpecting judges, and the mode of judgment, againſt thoſe that are accuſed of treaſon. In a ſimilar manner let there be one law reſpecting the abiding of children in, and their egreſſion from, their country; juſt as we inſtituted one reſpecting the betrayer of his country, the man who commits ſacrilege, and he who by violence deſtroys the laws of the city. With reſpect to theft too, whether in great or ſmall matters, let one law, and one puniſhment, be ordained for every kind of theft. For, when any one is condemned for thieving, if his own poſſeſſions, beſides his allotted portion, are ſufficient, he ſhall make a twofold reſtitution: and if he does not, he ſhall be fettered till he has either paid the appointed ſum, or perſuaded him to whom he is indebted to excuſe him from paying it. But if any one is convicted of public theft, he ſhall then be freed from his bonds, when he has either perſuaded the city, or made a twofold reſtitution.

CLIN. How is it that we ſay, O gueſt, there is no difference whether the theft is ſmall or great, and whether it is from ſacred or not ſacred places, and ſuch other diſſimilitudes as ſubſiſt about the whole of thieving? For, ſince thefts are various, the legiſlator ought to attend to their varieties, and not inflict ſimilar puniſhments on diſſimilar offences.

GUEST. You moſt excellently repulſe me, O Clinias, who am, as it were, hurrying along, and you likewiſe recall into my memory what I have formerly thought, that the particulars reſpecting the eſtabliſhment of laws have never been by any means properly determined.

CLIN. But how, again, do we ſay this?

GUEST. We did not adopt a bad image when we ſaid, that all thoſe of the preſent day that ſubmitted to laws were ſimilar to thoſe ſlaves who are cured by ſlaves. For it is well to know this, that if at any time one of thoſe phyſicians who meddle with the medical art from experience alone, without reaſon, ſhould meet with a free-born phyſician diſcourſing with a free-born patient, and very nearly philoſophiſing, by inveſtigating in a ra-

tional manner the beginning of his diſeaſe, and afterwards diſcourſing about all the nature of bodies, he would readily and vehemently laugh, and would addreſs the free-born phyſician in language not at all different from what is generally uſed towards moſt phyſicians. For he would ſay to him, O ſtupid fellow, you do not cure the ſick man, but you diſcipline him as if he wanted to become a phyſician, and not to be well.

CLIN. And would he not ſpeak properly by ſpeaking in this manner?

GUEST. And may it not alſo be very properly objected againſt us, that whoever diſcuſſes laws in the manner we do at preſent, diſciplines the citizens, but does not give them laws?

CLIN. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But at preſent a fortunate circumſtance happens to us.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. That there is no neceſſity for us to eſtabliſh laws, but that, entering voluntarily on the buſineſs of legiſlation, we have endeavoured to perceive in every polity what is beſt and moſt neceſſary, and after what manner it might take place. And now, as it ſeems, it is permitted us if we pleaſe to conſider what is beſt, or, if we had rather, what is moſt neceſſary, reſpecting laws. We may chooſe, therefore, whichever is moſt agreeable to us.

CLIN. We propoſe, O gueſt, a ridiculous choice, and we manifeſtly become ſimilar to thoſe legiſlators who are compelled by a certain mighty neceſſity to give laws immediately, and are not permitted to defer this till tomorrow. But it is lawful for us to ſpeak through divine aſſiſtance, juſt as it is permitted thoſe who gather ſtones, or any other materials of a building, to collect abundantly, and at leiſure, ſuch things as are adapted to the future building. Like builders, therefore, who do not raiſe ſtructures from neceſſity, but at leiſure, let us lay down ſome things, and join together others, ſo that it may be rightly ſaid that ſome things pertaining to the laws are placed as foundations, and that other particulars are raiſed on them as foundations.

GUEST. For thus indeed, O Clinias, our ſynopſis of laws will be more natural. But, by the Gods, let us conſider this reſpecting legiſlators.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That there are writings and written diſcourſes in cities reſpecting

a variety of particulars, and that there are writings and diſcourſes of the legiſlator.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, ſhall we direct our attention to the writings of poets and others; writings which, whether in verſe or in proſe, are compoſed reſpecting the mode of conduct in life; but by no means apply ourſelves to the writings of legiſlators? Or ſhall we direct our attention to theſe beyond all others?

CLIN. To theſe far beyond others.

GUEST. But will it not be neceſſary that the legiſlator ſhould only conſult writings reſpecting things beautiful, good, and juſt, and that he ſhould teach what is the nature of theſe, and how they ſhould be ſtudied by thoſe that intend to be happy?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But it is ſhameful that Homer, Tyrtæus, and other poets, ſhould have written more beautifully reſpecting life and the ſtudies of men than Lycurgus, Solon, and other legiſlators. Or, is it not proper that writings reſpecting laws ſhould be by far the moſt beautiful and beſt of all writings in a city: but that other writings ſhould be conſonant to theſe; or, if they are diſcordant, that they ſhould be treated with ridicule? We ought, therefore, to conceive, that laws ſhould be ſo written for cities that the legiſlator in compoſing them ſhall appear to have aſſumed the perſon of a father and mother, and the writings themſelves ought to be full of benevolence and prudence, and not like thoſe of a tyrant and deſpot, commanding, threatening, and written on walls. Let us conſider, therefore, whether we ſhould endeavour to ſpeak in this manner reſpecting laws, whether we are able or not. Let us, however, attempt it with alacrity, and, proceeding in this way, patiently endure whatever difficulties we may have to encounter. And may our journey be proſperous! which it will be if Divinity pleaſes.

CLIN. You ſpeak well. Let us, therefore, do as you ſay.

GUEST. In the firſt place, then, let us accurately conſider, as we began to do, reſpecting ſacrilege, every kind of theft, and all injuries. And let us not be indignant if, while delivering laws in an intermediate manner, we eſtabliſh ſome things, and deliberate about others. For we are becoming to be legiſlators, but are not yet, though, perhaps, we ſoon ſhall be. But

if it is agreeable to you, as I have ſaid, to conſider reſpecting the particulars I have mentioned, let us conſider them.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. However, reſpecting all beautiful and juſt things, we ſhould endeavour to conſider this, in what manner we now accord, or diſſent from ourſelves: for we acknowledge that we deſire, though we may not be able, to excel moſt others.

CLIN. What kind of diſagreements among ourſelves do you ſpeak of?

GUEST. I will endeavour to inform you. With reſpect to juſtice entirely, juſt men, things, and actions, we all of us, in a manner, agree that all theſe are beautiful. So that, if any one ſhould ſtrenuouſly affirm that juſt men, through the habit of juſtice, are all-beautiful, though they ſhould be deformed in body, there is ſcarcely any one who by thus ſpeaking would be conſidered as ſpeaking in a diſorderly manner. Is not this true?

CLIN. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But let us ſee whether all ſuch things as partake of juſtice are beautiful: for all our paſſions are nearly equal to our actions.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. Whatever action is juſt, ſo far as it participates of the juſt, ſo far alſo it nearly participates of the beautiful.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If a paſſion, therefore, which participates of the juſt, is acknowledged by us to be beautiful on this acccount, our diſcourſe by ſuch an aſſertion would not be rendered diſſonant.

CLIN. True.

GUEST. But if we ſhould agree that a paſſion is juſt, but at the ſame time baſe, the juſt and the beautiful would be diſſonant, in conſequence of aſſerting that juſt things are moſt baſe.

CLIN. How is this?

GUEST. It is not at all difficult to underſtand. For the laws which a little before have been eſtabliſhed by us, appear to announce things perfectly contrary to the preſent aſſertions.

CLIN. After what manner?

GUEST. We eſtabliſhed it as juſt, that he who committed ſacrilege ſhould die; and likewiſe the enemy of well-eſtabliſhed laws; and, as we were about

about to eſtabliſh many other laws of this kind, we deſiſted, on perceiving that theſe were paſſions infinite both in multitude and magnitude: and that they were the moſt juſt, but at the ſame time the moſt baſe, of all the paſſions. Do not things juſt and beautiful after this manner appear at one time to be the ſame, and at another to be moſt contrary?

CLIN. They do appear ſo.

GUEST. By the multitude, therefore, things beautiful and juſt, which are ſo diſſonant with each other, are denominated things ſeparate.

CLIN. It appears ſo, O gueſt.

GUEST. Let us therefore again, O Clinias, ſee how we accord with ourſelves reſpecting theſe things.

CLIN. What concord and what particulars are you ſpeaking of?

GUEST. I think it has clearly been ſhown by me in the foregoing diſcourſe.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. However, if it has not been already ſhown by me, yet conſider me as now ſpeaking about it.

CLIN. After what manner?

GUEST. That all vicious men are in all things involuntarily vicious; and that, if this is the caſe, this alſo muſt neceſſarily follow.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That the unjuſt is a vicious man; and that the vicious man is involuntarily ſuch. But the voluntary can by no means be done in an involuntary manner. He, therefore, who acts unjuſtly, will appear to act ſo in an involuntary manner to him who conſiders injuſtice as a thing involuntary. This alſo too is now acknowledged by me. For I have agreed, that all men act unjuſtly involuntarily, though ſome one, for the ſake of contention or ambition, may ſay that unjuſt men are involuntarily unjuſt, but yet many act unjuſtly voluntarily. This, however, is not my aſſertion. After what manner, then, ſhall I accord with my own aſſertions, if any one, O Clinias and Megillus, ſhould thus interrogate me? If theſe things are ſo, O gueſt, what would you adviſe us reſpecting the city of the Magneſians? Shall we give laws to them, or not? I ſay, undoubtedly. Do you diſtinguiſh injuries then by the voluntary and involuntary? And do you ordain greater puniſhments for voluntary offences and injuries, than for ſuch as are involuntary?

involuntary? Or do you puniſh all offences equally, as conſidering that no injuries are voluntarily committed?

CLIN. You ſpeak properly, O gueſt. But what uſe ſhall we make of what has now been ſaid?

GUEST. You interrogate well. In the firſt place, then, we ſhall uſe what has been ſaid for the following purpoſe.

CLIN. What purpoſe?

GUEST. Let us call to mind that it was well ſaid by us above, that there is great confuſion and diſſonance among us reſpecting things juſt. Reſuming this, therefore, we again aſk ourſelves whether, ſince we have neither ſolved the doubt about theſe things, nor defined what is their difference, though in all cities, by all legiſlators that have ever exiſted, voluntary and involuntary injuries are conſidered as forming two ſpecies of injuries, and laws are eſtabliſhed conformable to this opinion,—whether, therefore, ſince this is the caſe, ought we to diſmiſs what we have now advanced, after we have aſſerted that it is, as it were, divinely ſaid, without offering any arguments to ſhow the rectitude of ſuch aſſertions? Certainly not. But it is in a manner neceſſary, that before we eſtabliſh laws we ſhould evince that theſe two things have a ſubſiſtence, and what is the difference between them; that, when any one eſtabliſhes a puniſhment for either, every one may underſtand, and be able to judge, whether it is eſtabliſhed in a becoming manner, or not.

CLIN. You appear to us, O gueſt, to ſpeak well. For it is fit we ſhould do one of two things, viz. either not ſay that all unjuſt actions are involuntary, or firſt of all evince by defining that this is properly aſſerted.

GUEST. One of theſe two things, therefore, I can by no means endure, I mean the denying that I think it is ſo, (for this would neither be legal nor holy). But after what manner theſe are two, if they by no means differ with reſpect to voluntary and involuntary, but with reſpect to ſomething elſe, we ſhould endeavour to evince.

CLIN. By all means, O gueſt: for we cannot otherwiſe underſtand the nature of theſe.

GUEST. Let it be ſo. Do not, therefore, many damages take place among citizens in their communications and aſſociations with each other, in which the voluntary and involuntary abound?

CLIN.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, does any one, conſidering all damages as injuries, think, in conſequence of this, that they are attended with twofold injuries, one kind being voluntary, and the other involuntary? For the involuntary damages of all men are neither in number, nor magnitude, leſs than the voluntary. But conſider whether I ſay any thing to the purpoſe, or not. For, do I not ſay, O Clinias and Megillus, that when ſome one unwillingly hurts another, he acts unjuſtly, but involuntarily injures one who is unwilling to be injured? And do I legally eſtabliſh this as an involuntary injury? Indeed I do not at all conſider a damage of this kind as an injury, whether it is of a greater or leſs magnitude. But we often ſay that he who aſſiſts another in an improper manner acts unjuſtly, if his aſſiſtance is not victorious. For, my friends, it is not proper, neither if any one imparts any thing, nor if, on the contrary, he takes any thing away, to call ſuch an action ſimply juſt or unjuſt: but the legiſlator ſhould conſider whether he who benefits, or is the cauſe of detriment to another, is endued with worthy manners, and employed thoſe manners juſtly. And he ſhould look to theſe two things, viz. injuſtice, and detriment. He ſhould likewiſe, as much as poſſible, legally indemnify the perſon that has ſuſtained a damage, reſtore what has been loſt, raiſe what has fallen, and repair the ravages of death and wounds. Laſtly, he ſhould always endeavour that the diſcords ariſing from damages may, by means of the laws, terminate in friendſhip.

CLIN. Theſe things are well ſaid.

GUEST. Unjuſt damages, therefore, and emoluments, if any one happens to derive emolument from injuring another, ought to be cured, if they are ſuch as are capable of being cured, as diſeaſes inherent in the ſoul. But it is requiſite to ſay, that the cure of injuſtice verges to this.

CLIN. To what?

GUEST. That the law may diſcipline every one who does an injury, whether it be great or ſmall, and may entirely compel him, either that he ſhall never afterwards dare to do the like voluntarily, or by far leſs frequently, through the dread of the conſequent puniſhment. In whatever manner any one may accompliſh this, whether by works or words, pleaſure or pain, honour or infamy, fines or gifts, ſo as that men may either love, or at leaſt not hate, the nature of juſtice, but may hate injuſtice,—this is the buſineſs of

the

the moſt beautiful laws. But thoſe whom the legiſlator perceives to be incurable with reſpect to theſe particulars, he ſhould puniſh in the extreme, as knowing that death is better than life to all ſuch as theſe; and that when they are liberated from life they will doubly benefit others. For they will ſerve as a warning to others not to act unjuſtly, and the city, by their death, will be freed from bad men. On this account *it will be neceſſary for the legiſlator to puniſh* INCURABLE *offences with death, but* BY NO MEANS *on any other account.*

CLIN. Theſe things appear to have been ſpoken by you in a very ſufficient manner; but we ſhould gladly hear you relating ſtill more clearly the difference between injuſtice and detriment.

GUEST. I ſhall endeavour, therefore, to do and ſay as you requeſt me. For it is evident that you have both ſaid to, and heard from, each other thus much reſpecting the ſoul, that anger naturally reſiding in it, whether as a certain paſſion, or a certain part, and being contentious and invincible, ſubverts many things through irrational violence.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Beſides this, too, we do not call pleaſure the ſame as anger, but we ſay that it poſſeſſes dominion from a contrary power, and that it perſuades us, with a violent deception, to do whatever it pleaſes.

CLIN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. He, likewiſe, who ſays that ignorance is the third cauſe of crimes will not be deceived. But he will be a better legiſlator who gives this a twofold diviſion: conſidering one kind as ſimple, and the cauſe of light offences; but the other twofold, when any one is void of diſcipline, not only from being detained by ignorance, but by an opinion of wiſdom, ſo as to think that he has a perfect knowledge about things of which he is entirely ignorant. Things of this kind, therefore, when followed by power and ſtrength, are to be eſtabliſhed as the cauſes of mighty and ruſtic crimes; but when followed by imbecility, as in this caſe they become the crimes of children and old men, they are to be conſidered as crimes, and laws are to be eſtabliſhed for thoſe that commit them; but, at the ſame time, they ſhould be reckoned the mildeſt of all crimes, and as deſerving the moſt abundant indulgence.

CLIN. You ſpeak reaſonably.

GUEST. We nearly, therefore, all of us ſpeak of pleaſure and anger, as things to which ſome of us are ſuperior, and by which others of us are vanquiſhed: and this is truly the caſe.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But we never have at any time heard that one of us is ſuperior to ignorance, and another vanquiſhed by it.

CLIN. Moſt true.

GUEST. But we ſay that all theſe allure us to their will, and often, at the ſame time, draw us to things contrary.

CLIN. Often, indeed.

GUEST. But I will now explain to you clearly what I call the juſt and the unjuſt, without any variety of diſtinction. For I entirely denominate injuſtice to be the tyranny of anger, fear, pleaſure, and pain, envy and deſire in the ſoul, whether ſuch a tyrant injures any one, or not. But the opinion of that which is beſt, whether it is the conception of cities, or of certain private individuals, if, poſſeſſing dominion in the ſoul, it adorns the whole man, though it may in a certain reſpect lead him into error,—this I denominate juſtice, and call every thing which is performed from this opinion, juſt. And I further add, that the whole life of thoſe who are obedient to a principle of this kind will be moſt excellent. But a damage of this nature is conſidered by the multitude as involuntary injuſtice. However, our buſineſs at preſent is not a contention about names. But ſince we have evinced that there are three ſpecies of crimes, let us, in the firſt place, ſtill more diligently recall theſe into our memory. Of pain, therefore, which we denominate anger and fear, there is one ſpecies for us.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But of pleaſure and deſires there is a ſecond ſpecies; a third of hopes and a deſire of true opinion about that which is beſt. This third ſpecies being divided into two parts, five ſpecies will be produced, for which laws are to be eſtabliſhed, differing from each other in two genera.

CLIN. What are theſe?

GUEST. The one, every thing which is performed through violent and according actions; the other, which takes place with darkneſs and deception in a ſecret manner. And ſometimes actions are attended with both theſe; which, if they are treated in a proper manner, ought to be reſtrained by the ſevereſt laws.

CLIN. It is juſt they ſhould.

GUEST. But let us now return whence we have digreſſed, and finiſh the eſtabliſhment of laws. The particulars then which we propoſed to diſcuſs were reſpecting ſacrilege, betrayers of their country, and thoſe who corrupted the laws, by diſſolving the polity governed by thoſe laws. Some one may perhaps commit one or other of theſe through inſanity, diſeaſe, exceſſive old age, or youthfulneſs, which laſt does not in any reſpect differ from the other cauſes which we have enumerated. If it ſhall appear that any one thus affected has perpetrated one of theſe crimes, when the judges are choſen, and the crime is divulged, either by the guilty perſon or the inſpector of the deed, he ſhall be judged to have acted contrary to law; and he ſhall be entirely fined a ſimple fine for the injury which he has committed. But let him be exempt from other puniſhments, unleſs, having committed manſlaughter, his hands are not pure from murder: for, in this caſe, departing to another country, he ſhall be exiled for a year. If he returns before the time preſcribed by the law, or ſhall be detected within the borders of the country, he ſhall be impriſoned for two years in the public gaol by the guardians of the laws, but liberated from his bonds after this period. However, as we began with murder, let us endeavour to eſtabliſh laws conſummately for every ſpecies of it. And, in the firſt place, let us ſpeak concerning violent and involuntary homicide. If any one, therefore, in a conteſt, and public gymnaſtic exerciſes, ſhall involuntarily ſlay his friend, whether his death happens immediately, or ſome time after, from the wounds which he has received; or, if a man kills his friend in battle in a ſimilar manner, or in warlike exerciſes inſtituted by the magiſtrates, whether with naked bodies, or with certain arms in imitation of warlike exerciſes,—in all theſe caſes let him be purified according to the law about theſe particulars received from Delphi. But let all phyſicians who, in endeavouring to cure, have unwillingly been the death of any one, be conſidered as pure according to law. If any one with his own hand unwillingly ſlays another, whether with his own naked body, or with an inſtrument or dart, or from adminiſtering drink or food, or by the hurling of fire, or tempeſt, or the privation of breath, whether he does this with his own body, or through the means of other bodies, let him be entirely conſidered as one that ſlays with his own hand, and ſuffer the following puniſhments: If he kills a ſlave belonging

belonging to another perſon, thinking that it is his own, he ſhall indemnify the maſter of the dead ſlave, or be fined the double of the worth of ſuch ſlave: but his worth ſhall be determined by the judges. The homicide, too, in this caſe ſhall uſe greater and more numerous purifications than thoſe who commit murder in gymnaſtic exerciſes; and the proper interpreters of theſe things ſhall be thoſe whom the Delphic God approves. But if any one kills his own ſlave, when he is purified according to law, let him be liberated from murder. If any one involuntarily ſlays a free-born perſon, let him be purified with the ſame purifications as he who cuts off a ſlave. And let him not deſpiſe one of the antient ſayings. For it is ſaid, that a free-born perſon who is violently put to death, will ſoon after his death be angry with his murderer; and being filled with fear and terror through his violent diſſolution, and perceiving the perſon that ſlew him living after his uſual manner, he will terrify, and, being diſturbed himſelf, diſturb with all his might his murderer and his actions, memory at the ſame time contributing to oppoſe him. On this account, it is requiſite that a homicide ſhould be exiled from every part of his country for a whole year. But, if it is a ſtranger who is ſlain, the homicide ſhall be expelled from the country of the ſtranger for the ſame length of time. And if any one is willingly obedient to this law, he who is the neareſt relation of the deceaſed, and who was an inſpector of all the particulars relative to the murder, ſhall pardon the homicide; with whom if he is entirely reconciled, it will be perfectly ſufficient. But with reſpect to him who is not obedient to this law, and who, in the firſt place, being unpurified, dares to go to the temples of the Gods, and ſacrifice; and, in the next place, is unwilling to be exiled for the above-mentioned time, ſuch a one the neareſt relative of the deceaſed ſhall accuſe to the judges, and he ſhall ſuffer double the puniſhments which are due to the crime. If the neareſt relative of the deceaſed does not call him to an account, the defilement, as it were, revolving on ſuch a one, or, in other words, the ſlain perſon directing his anger towards him, he ſhall be accuſed by any one that pleaſes, and ſhall be compelled by law to leave his country for five years. But if a ſtranger involuntarily ſlays a ſtranger in the city, whoever is willing ſhall accuſe him by the ſame laws. If an inhabitant ſlays a ſtranger, he ſhall be exiled for one year. And, univerſally, if a ſtranger ſlays a ſtranger, who is an inhabitant and a citizen, beſides his purification he ſhall be

baniſhed for the whole of his life from the country in which laws of this kind have dominion. And if he returns illegally, the guardians of the laws ſhall puniſh him with death; and his property, if he has any, ſhall be given to the neareſt relation of the deceaſed. However, if any one involuntarily returns before the limited time, being driven on the coaſt by a ſtorm at ſea, in this caſe, let him fix a tent on the ſhore, ſo that his feet may touch the water, and watch for a fit opportunity of ſailing. But, if he ſhould be forcibly brought into the city by any one, let him be liberated by the firſt magiſtrate he may meet with, and ſent back with ſafety into exile. Again, if any one with his own hand ſhall ſlay a free-born perſon, being incited by anger to the deed, a thing of this kind ought, in the firſt place, to receive a twofold diſtinction. For he commits murder through anger, who ſuddenly and unintentionally kills a man by blows, or any other ſuch like means, ſo that immediately after the impulſe penitence follows the deed. And he likewiſe murders another in anger, who having been previouſly defamed by ignominious words or deeds, and, endeavouring to be avenged, afterwards voluntarily ſlays the perſon by whom he has been injured, and is not penitent for the deed. Murder, therefore, as it appears, muſt receive a twofold diſtribution; and both of them nearly are produced by anger. But they may moſt juſtly be ſaid to ſubſiſt between the voluntary and the involuntary. In reality, indeed, they are but images of the voluntary and involuntary. For, he who retains his anger, and does not immediately and ſuddenly, but with ſtratagem, at ſome diſtance of time, avenge himſelf, is ſimilar to one who murders voluntarily. But he who does not conceal his anger, but immediately follows its impulſe without premeditation, is ſimilar to one who murders involuntarily. However, he is not altogether involuntary, but an image of one that acts involuntarily. On this account, it is difficult to determine reſpecting murders committed through anger, whether they ſhould be eſtabliſhed by law as voluntary or involuntary actions. The beſt and the trueſt method, therefore, that can be adopted is, to conſider both theſe kinds of murder as images, and to divide them apart from each other, ſo as to claſs the one under premeditated, and the other under unpremeditated actions. Severer puniſhments, therefore, are to be ordained for thoſe that commit murder through anger, with premeditation; but milder puniſhments for thoſe that murder without deliberation, and ſuddenly. For, that which is

ſimilar

ſimilar to a greater evil ſhould receive a greater puniſhment, but that which is ſimilar to a leſſer evil, a leſſer puniſhment. Let it, therefore, be thus eſtabliſhed by our laws.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. But again returning to the ſubject we ſay, that if any one with his own hand ſlays a free-born perſon, but was incited to the deed by a certain anger, without premeditation, in other reſpects let him ſuffer the ſame puniſhment as it is proper he ſhould ſuffer who kills a man without anger; but let him, from neceſſity, be exiled for two years, as a puniſhment for his anger. But he who commits murder through anger, but with deliberation, ſhall be puniſhed in other reſpects in the ſame manner as the former character; but he ſhall be baniſhed for three years inſtead of two, that his anger, which is greater, may be puniſhed for a longer time. And let this be the univerſal eſtabliſhment reſpecting theſe particulars. For it is difficult to give laws about ſuch things with accuracy. For, ſometimes, murder of this kind, which is conſidered by the law as of a more atrocious, will prove to be of a milder, nature; and ſometimes that which is of a milder, will be conſidered as of a more atrocious, nature; according as the murder is committed in a more ſavage or a more gentle manner. But, for the moſt part, they will happen agreeably to the above-mentioned mode. Of all theſe particulars, therefore, the guardians of the laws ſhould be inſpectors. When the time of the baniſhment of theſe offenders is expired, the guardians of the laws muſt ſend twelve judges to the boundaries of the region, for the purpoſe of conſidering, in a ſtill clearer manner, the actions of the exiles during this time; and that they may determine in a proper manner reſpecting their modeſty and reception. But the exiles ſhall acquieſce in the judgment of theſe magiſtrates. And if again, on returning from baniſhment, any one of theſe, being impelled by anger, ſhall commit the ſame offence, he ſhall be perpetually baniſhed: and if he returns from his exile, he ſhall be puniſhed in the ſame manner as a ſtranger for returning from exile. Let him who kills his ſlave purify himſelf. But if he kills the ſlave of another perſon in anger, let him pay to the maſter of the ſlave double the worth of his loſs. If any homicide is not obedient to the laws reſpecting murder, but, while he is unpurified, defiles by his preſence the forum, gymnaſia, and other ſacred places,—whoever is willing may bring before a court of judgment

ment both the homicide, and the relation of the deceaſed who has neglected to avenge the dead, and compel him to pay a double fine, and ſuffer in other reſpects a double puniſhment. And let the offending party conſider the fine as legal. If a ſlave kills his maſter in anger, the kindred of the deceaſed ſhall be allowed to ſlay the homicide in whatever manner they pleaſe, and ſhall be pure from murder, ſo long as they do not by any means preſerve the life of the ſlave. But if a ſlave does not kill his own maſter, but ſome other free-born perſon, in anger, he ſhall be given up by his maſter to the kindred of the deceaſed, who ſhall, from neceſſity, put him to death in whatever manner they pleaſe. If a father or mother ſhall in anger ſlay a ſon or daughter, by blows, or any other violent manner (a thing which will happen, though but rarely), let them be purified after the ſame manner as other homicides, and be exiled for three years. And after they return from exile, the huſband ſhall be divorced from the wife, and the wife from the huſband: and they ſhall never afterwards beget children together, nor ſhall either of theſe dwell together with him whoſe ſon or brother either of them ſlew, nor communicate with him in ſacred rites. But he who is impious with reſpect to theſe things, and does not obey theſe laws, ſhall be obnoxious to the charge of impiety by any one that is willing. If a man ſlays his wife, or a wife her huſband, in anger, they ſhall be purified in a ſimilar manner with other homicides, and ſhall be exiled for three years. But, on returning from exile, let not either of them be permitted to join with their children in ſacred rites, nor ever eat at the ſame table with them. And, if either the father or the child is diſobedient to this law, let them be obnoxious to the charge of impiety by any one that is willing. If a brother ſlays either a brother or a ſiſter, or ſiſter a brother or a ſiſter, in anger, let them be purified and exiled in the ſame manner as parents that ſlay their children; and, on their return from exile, let them not eat at the ſame table, or join in ſacred rites, with thoſe whom they have deprived of brothers, or ſiſters, or ſons. And if any one is diſobedient to this law, he ſhall with juſtice be obnoxious to the charge of impiety. If any one, through incontinent anger, is ſo enraged with his parents as to dare to ſlay one of them in his inſane fury,—if the dying parent, before he expires, ſhall voluntarily abſolve his murderer from the deed, then, being purified in the ſame manner as thoſe who commit murder voluntarily, and performing ſuch other things as they perform,

form, let him be conſidered as pure. But if the dying parent does not abſolve him, let him be obnoxious to many laws. For he muſt be ſubject to the extreme puniſhments of whipping, and, in a ſimilar manner, of impiety and ſacrilege, becauſe he has expelled the ſoul of his begetter. So that, if it were poſſible that a man could die frequently, it would be moſt juſt that a parricide or matricide ſhould ſuffer many deaths. For, how is it poſſible that he who is not permitted by any law to deſtroy his parents, who led forth his nature into light, even though he ſhould find that he was going to be ſlain by them, but is enjoined by the legiſlator to endure all things rather than perpetrate a deed of this kind,—how is it poſſible, I ſay, that ſuch a one can in any other way be properly puniſhed? Let death, therefore, be ordained as the puniſhment of him who in anger ſlays either his father or mother. But if a brother ſlays a brother in his own defence, being attacked by him, through ſedition taking place between them, or any other ſuch means, let him be pure in the ſame manner as one who ſlays an enemy. And if a citizen ſlays a citizen, or a ſtranger a ſtranger, in his own defence, let him be ſimilarly pure; as, likewiſe, if, in defending himſelf, a citizen ſlays a ſtranger, or a ſtranger a citizen, or a ſlave a ſlave. But if a ſlave, in his own defence, ſlays a free-born perſon, let him be obnoxious to the ſame laws as him who ſlays his father. Let the ſame thing alſo be underſtood reſpecting the abſolution from murder in all theſe caſes as was ſaid concerning the abſolution from parricide. If any dying perſon, therefore, among theſe, previous to his death, willingly abſolves his murderer from voluntary murder, purifications ſhall be adminiſtered to the homicide, and he ſhall be exiled for a year. And thus we appear to have ſpoken ſufficiently reſpecting murders committed by violence, involuntarily, and in anger. Let us now ſpeak concerning ſuch as are voluntary, and perpetrated with every kind of injuſtice, and from ſtratagems, through the tyranny of pleaſures, deſires, and envy.

CLIN. You ſpeak properly.

GUEST. Again, therefore, in the firſt place, let us ſpeak to the utmoſt of our power concerning the cauſes of theſe. The greateſt cauſe, then, is deſire, which has dominion in a ſoul rendered ſavage by venereal incentives. It is this which abundantly, and in the moſt vehement manner, inflames the minds of the multitude, and which, through a depraved nature and want of diſcipline,

diſcipline, generates ten thouſand loves of infinite riches. But we ſay that the want of diſcipline is the cauſe why both among the Greeks and Barbarians riches are praiſed in a vicious manner. For they place theſe in the firſt, though they belong to the third, rank of things good; and, through this opinion, deſtroy both themſelves and poſterity. For, to ſpeak the truth to all cities reſpecting riches, is the moſt beautiful and the beſt of all things. But the truth is, that riches ſubſiſt for the ſake of the body, and the body ſubſiſts for the ſake of the ſoul. Since, therefore, thoſe things are good for the ſake of which riches naturally ſubſiſt, they will rank in the third place after the virtue of the body and ſoul. This reaſon, therefore, will inform us as a teacher, that he who deſires to be happy ought not to ſeek after wealth indiſcriminately, but in a juſt and temperate manner. For thus murders would not be committed in cities, which require to be purified by murders. But now, as I ſaid in the beginning of this diſcuſſion, this is one and the greateſt cauſe of the greateſt puniſhments of voluntary murder. The ſecond is the habit of an ambitious ſoul, which generates envy; and this is bitter to thoſe that dwell together, and eſpecially to him by whom it is poſſeſſed, and afterwards to the beſt perſons in the city. But cowardly and unjuſt fears rank in the third place, which produce many murders, when ſuch things have been tranſacted by any one, or are at preſent tranſacted, as no one wiſhes to be conſcious have taken place, or do take place. On this account they take away by death thoſe that might give information of ſuch tranſactions, when they cannot prevent them from making a diſcovery by any other means. And thus much for a preface to all theſe particulars. To which may be added, what many who are ſtudious reſpecting the myſteries have heard about things of this kind, of the truth of which they are vehemently perſuaded,—I mean, that ſuch actions are puniſhed in Hades, and that the perpetrators of them, again returning hither, neceſſarily ſuffer puniſhment according to nature, and end their days by ſuffering the very ſame kind of death which they cauſed another to ſuffer. For him, therefore, who from this preface is perſuaded, and is in every reſpect afraid of ſuch a puniſhment, there is no occaſion to eſtabliſh a law reſpecting voluntary murder: but for him who will not be perſuaded by it let the following law be ordained. He who deſignedly and unjuſtly ſlays with his own hand his fellow-citizen, ſhall, in the firſt place, be expelled from temples, from the forum,

forum, from ports, and from every general aſſembly, that he may not defile any of theſe by his preſence; and this, whether any one forbids him from theſe places or not. For the law forbids him, and forbids him as a perpetual injunction to the whole city. But the male or female relative, as far as to a couſin, of the deceaſed, who does not proſecute ſuch a one in a proper manner, nor expel him from theſe places, ſhall firſt of all receive in himſelf the defilement, together with the hatred of the Gods, agreeably to the imprecation of the law. And, in the ſecond place, he ſhall be obnoxious to any one who is willing to revenge the dead. He who is willing to do this, having performed every thing reſpecting waſhings, and ſuch other particulars as Divinity has cauſed to be legal in caſes of this kind, and uttered ſuch things as muſt be previouſly announced, let him proceed, and compel the homicide to ſuffer the puniſhment of his deed according to law. But that theſe things ought to take place through certain prayers and ſacrifices to certain Gods, who attend to ſuch particulars, and are careful that murder may not be perpetrated in cities, will eaſily be apparent to the legiſlator. However, who theſe Gods are, and in what manner theſe judgments may be introduced, ſo as to take place with the utmoſt rectitude with reſpect to a divine nature, the guardians of the laws, together with the interpreters and diviners, muſt promulgate. But let the judges of theſe particulars be thoſe to whom we have given the power of puniſhing ſacrilege. Let him too who is condemned, be puniſhed with death; and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered perſon, on account of his having acted in an impudent, as well as an impious manner. If he makes his eſcape, being unwilling to ſtand his trial, let him be perpetually exiled. And if he is ever detected in any part of the country in which he has committed the murder, he who firſt meets with him, whether he was the murderer of one of his kindred, or fellow-citizens, ſhall ſlay him with impunity; or ſhall deliver him bound to thoſe magiſtrates that preſide as judges over theſe affairs, that he may by them be put to death. But if any one ſhould ſtand forth in his defence, he ſhall be bound for his appearance, and ſhall procure three bondsmen, whom the judges ſhall think ſufficient, for the purpoſe. If he is either unwilling or incapable of doing this, he ſhall be bound by the magiſtrates, and properly ſecured, that he may be puniſhed for his interference. If any one ſlays another, not with his own hand, but by conſulta-

tion and ſtratagem, and yet, though he is the cauſe of the murder, and not purified in his ſoul, ſhall reſide in the city where the deed was committed, ſuch a one, being condemned, ſhall be ſimilarly puniſhed, except that he ſhall not be permitted to procure bondsmen, but ſhall be allowed his proper ſepulchre. Let other things reſpecting him take place in the ſame manner as above. Let the ſame particulars too be eſtabliſhed reſpecting ſtrangers towards ſtrangers, citizens and ſtrangers towards each other, and ſlaves towards ſlaves, in murder committted with the homicide's own hand; and in that which is committed by conſultation and ſtratagem, excepting that theſe latter homicides ſhall be obliged to give bondsmen, in the ſame manner as thoſe that murder with their own hands. If a ſlave voluntarily murders a free-born perſon, whether with his own hand, or through conſultation, and is condemned, the public executioner ſhall lead him to the tomb of the murdered perſon, or to a place where he may ſee the tomb. Here he ſhall be whipt as long as the perſon that apprehended him pleaſes, and if he ſurvives the whipping, he ſhall be put to death. But if any one kills a ſlave who has not in any reſpect acted unjuſtly, through fear leſt he ſhould diſcloſe his baſe and vicious actions, or through ſome ſimilar cauſe, he ſhall be puniſhed in the ſame manner as if he had ſlain a citizen. However, if caſes ſhould happen for which it is very difficult to eſtabliſh laws, at the ſame time that it is impoſſible not to deliver laws reſpecting them, ſuch as the voluntary, and, in every reſpect, unjuſt, murdering of kindred, whether the homicide accompliſhes this with his own hand, or by conſultation and ſtratagem, (murders which frequently take place in cities badly inhabited and governed, and ſometimes in a region where no one would expect to find them)—in ſuch caſes as theſe, it will be proper that what was lately mentioned by us ſhould be repeated. For, perhaps, ſome one, on hearing theſe things, may be induced more willingly to abſtain from the moſt impious of all murders. For a fable, or a diſcourſe, or by whatever other name it may be proper to call it, is clearly delivered by antient prieſts, that Juſtice, the avenger and inſpector of the murdering of kindred, uſes the law of which we have juſt now ſpoken. Hence, they ſay, ſhe has ordained that he who commits any ſuch action ſhall neceſſarily ſuffer the ſame things as he has committed. So that, if any one has ever murdered his father, he ſhall himſelf, in certain periods of time, be violently put to death by his children. And, if any one has mur-

dered his mother, he ſhall, in ſucceeding times, partake from neceſſity of a feminine nature, and be deprived of life by his offspring. For they add that, when common blood is defiled, there is not any other purification, nor can the ſtain be waſhed away by other means, than by the guilty ſoul ſuffering murder for murder, and in a ſimilar manner, and laying aſleep the anger of all the kindred of the murdered perſon. It is proper, therefore, that men ſhould be reſtrained from crimes of this kind, through the fear of thoſe puniſhments which are inflicted by the Gods. But if ſuch a miſerable calamity ſhould happen to any, as that they ſhould deſignedly and voluntarily dare to deprive father or mother, brothers or children, of life, let the following law reſpecting things of this kind be eſtabliſhed by the mortal legiſlator. By a public declaration they ſhall be expelled from all ſacred places, and ſhall be obliged to give bondsmen, in the ſame manner as was mentioned above. And when any one is condemned for murder of this kind, he ſhall be put to death both by the ſervants of the judges and the magiſtrates, and ſhall be driven naked out of the city to an appointed place, where three roads meet. Then all the magiſtrates, for the ſake of the whole city, carrying each of them a ſtone, ſhall hurl it at the head of the dead body, and thus expiate the whole city. After this, carrying the dead body to the boundaries of the region, and hurling it thence, they ſhall leave it unburied, according to law.—But what ought he to ſuffer who ſlays his neareſt, and, as it is ſaid, moſt friendly, relative? I mean the man who kills himſelf, and by violence deprives himſelf of the allotment of fate; being neither compelled to do this by the judgment of the city, nor by a grievous and inevitable chance of fortune, nor by any extreme ſhame or poverty; but, through indolence and effeminate timidity, unjuſtly puniſhes himſelf. What purifications, and what mode of interment, ought to be legally eſtabliſhed reſpecting ſuch a one, Divinity knows: but the neareſt relatives of the deceaſed muſt inquire what theſe are from the interpreters of the Gods, and the laws about theſe. As to their ſepulture, let them be buried in ſolitary places, where no one elſe is buried, and in thoſe parts of the region which are the boundaries of the twelve diviſions, and which are deſolate and without a name. Let them, likewiſe, be buried in an ignoble manner, neither making their tombs conſpicuous by the erection of pillars, or the inſcription of their names. If a beaſt of burthen, or any other animal, ſhall kill a man, unleſs this happens in

ſome public conteſt, the relations of the perſon ſo killed ſhall avenge his death: and the præfects of the land ſhall do whatever the relation or relations of the deceaſed command. But the puniſhment ſhall conſiſt in driving the animal beyond the boundaries of the region, and there ſlaying him. If any inanimate thing deprives a man of life, except thunder, or any other ſuch-like dart ſent from Divinity, by either falling on the man, or the man falling on it, he who is neareſt of kin to the deceaſed ſhall appoint his neighbour to be a judge in this caſe, and ſhall make an expiation both for himſelf and the whole of his kindred. But the thing condemned ſhall be exterminated the region, in the ſame manner as animals that are homicides. If any one is found dead, and it is not manifeſt by whom he was ſlain, but cannot be diſcovered after the moſt diligent ſearch, proclamations muſt be employed as in other murders, and the crier muſt proclaim in the forum, that whoever has ſlain this or that perſon, as being guilty of murder, muſt not approach any ſacred places, nor reſide in any part of the region where the deed was committed: for, if he is detected within the boundaries of the ſaid region, he ſhall be put to death, and, being hurled beyond them, left unburied. Let this one law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed as the principal one reſpecting murder. And thus much may ſuffice about things of this kind. Let the following, then, be the particular caſes in which he who commits murder will be pure. If any one detects a thief entering his houſe by night, for the purpoſe of robbing it, and ſlays him, let ſuch an one be pure. In like manner, let him be pure who ſlays a highwayman in his own defence. And if any one uſes force reſpecting venereal concerns towards a free-born woman or boy, let him be put to death with impunity, either by the injured party, or by the father, brothers, or ſons of the perſon ſo injured. Likewiſe, if a man meets with any one offering violence to his wife, and kills him, let him be pure, according to law. And if any one, in aſſiſting his father, or mother, or children, or brothers, or wife, in doing that which is by no means unholy, ſhould ſlay ſome one, let him be in every reſpect pure. And thus far we have given laws concerning that education and diſcipline of the living ſoul, which if it is fortunately endued with, it may be ſuffered to live, but of which if it is unfortunately deprived, it muſt be put to death: and we have likewiſe ordained ſuch puniſhments as murders deſerve. We have ſpoken too reſpecting the nutrition and diſcipline of bodies.

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It now remains that we ſhould define, to the utmoſt of our power, what violent, voluntary, and involuntary actions are, and how many they are in number, and what are the puniſhments accommodated to each. For theſe, as it appears, will be properly diſcuſſed after thoſe. But even the vileſt legiſlator will place the conſideration of wounds, and mutilations from wounds, after murder. Wounds, therefore, are to be divided in the ſame manner as murders. For ſome of them are inflicted involuntarily; others through anger; ſome through fear; and ſome voluntarily and from deſign. Reſpecting all theſe, the following obſervations muſt be premiſed. It is neceſſary that laws ſhould be eſtabliſhed for men, and that they ſhould live according to law, or they would in no reſpect differ from the moſt ſavage animals. But this is owing to the nature of men, which is never found to be ſufficient of itſelf to know what is advantageous to a human polity; and, when it does know this, is never always able to do and wiſh that which is beſt. For it is, in the firſt place, difficult to know that not private but public advantage muſt neceſſarily be attended to by the political and true art; (for that which is common binds, but that which is private dilacerates, cities,) and that it is more advantageous, both to the public and individuals, that common concerns ſhould be well eſtabliſhed, than ſuch as are private. In the ſecond place, though ſome one ſhould know ſufficiently from art, that theſe things naturally ſubſiſt in this manner, yet, after this, if he ſhould govern the city with an unreſtrained authority, he would be incapable of perſevering in this dogma, and of living in the opinion that common advantage ſhould be nouriſhed in a city, and private follow the general good. But the mortal nature will always impel him to prerogative and private advantage: for this nature avoids pain, and purſues pleaſure, in an irrational manner; prefers both theſe to that which is more juſt and excellent; and, producing darkneſs in itſelf, fills at length both itſelf and the whole city with evils of every kind. Indeed, if any man, through a divine deſtiny, ſhould be naturally ſufficient to comprehend what is the public good, he would require no laws for the government of himſelf; for neither any law, nor any order, is better than ſcience; nor is it lawful that intellect ſhould be ſubſervient and a ſlave to any thing, but that it ſhould be the ruler of all things, if it is thus true, and really free by nature. But now, with reſpect to ſuch an intellect as this, it cannot be ſaid, that it is not by any means any where to be found, but it

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ſhould be ſaid that it is but rarely ſeen. That which ranks, therefore, in the ſecond place, muſt be choſen, viz. order and law; of which many things are indeed perceived, but it is impoſſible to view all that pertains to them. And thus much we have ſaid for the ſake of theſe things.—Now, let us ordain what he who wounds or injures another ought to ſuffer or pay. For it is eaſy for every one to comprehend properly, whether any one is wounded or not, who it is that is wounded, in what part, and after what manner. For there are an innumerable multitude of particulars of this kind, and which very much differ from each other. It is, therefore, alike impoſſible, to refer all, or no one of theſe, to courts of juſtice. For this one thing, in all theſe, muſt neceſſarily be referred to the deciſion of juſtice. I mean, whether each of theſe was done, or not. That nothing, indeed, ſhould be determined by courts of juſtice reſpecting the fine for injuries of this kind, but that all things, both ſmall and great, ſhould be determined by law, is nearly impoſſible.

CLIN. What then ſhall we ſay after this?

GUEST. That ſome things ſhould be referred to courts of juſtice, but that others ſhould be determined by the legiſlator himſelf.

CLIN. What are the particulars then which the legiſlator muſt decide, and what thoſe which muſt be decided by courts of juſtice?

GUEST. With the greateſt propriety, after theſe things, the following aſſertions may be made: That, in a city in which the courts of juſtice are depraved and dumb, the opinions of the judges concealed, and ſentence privately paſſed; and in which ſomething ſtill more dire than this takes place, when each of the judges decides, not in ſilence, but in the midſt of tumult, as in a theatre, the rhetoricians praiſing and blaming with loud exclamations;—then a heavy calamity befalls the whole city. If, therefore, from a certain neceſſity, any one ſhould be compelled to give laws to ſuch courts of juſtice, it would not be a fortunate circumſtance; but, at the ſame time, he who is forced to give them, ſhould commit only the ſmalleſt fines to the judges, but ſhould clearly ordain the greateſt part of them himſelf. But, in a city, in which courts of juſtice are eſtabliſhed with as great propriety as poſſible, and the judges are well educated, and examined with the greateſt accuracy; in ſuch a city, it will be proper and becoming to refer many things to the deciſion of ſuch judges, reſpecting the puniſhment of ſuch as are condemned. No one, therefore, ſhould be indignant with us, that we do not

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now promulgate to theſe, ſuch things as are the greateſt and moſt numerous, which judges that are educated in the vileſt manner may be able to perceive; and who likewiſe may be capable of puniſhing every offence in a proper manner. But, as we are of opinion that thoſe for whom we promulgate laws, will not be in the ſmalleſt degree inelegant judges of theſe things, we ſhall commit moſt things to their deciſion. However, as we have often ſaid, in the former part of this diſcuſſion, that a deſcription and formulæ of puniſhments ought to be given as examples to judges, which are never to be tranſgreſſed, and this we ourſelves have accompliſhed,—this was then both rightly aſſerted and performed, and muſt be obſerved at preſent, as we are again returning to the laws. Let the written law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed reſpecting wounds. If any one, thinking in conjunction with his will to ſlay his friend, (if his friend is one of thoſe whom the law forbids him to injure) wounds, but is not able to kill him, ſuch an one, as neither deſerving pity nor regard, we ſhall compel to ſuffer the puniſhment of murder, no otherwiſe than if he had actually ſlain his friend: except we ſhould reverence his fortune, if it ſhould not be entirely bad, and alſo the dæmon who, commiſerating both him and the wounded perſon, may become an averter of evil to both, and may cauſe the wound of the one not to be incurable, and the fortune and calamity of the other to be devoted to the Furies. Giving thanks, therefore, to this dæmon, and not oppoſing him, we ſhall take away the puniſhment of death from him that inflicted the wound, but order him to be exiled for life in a neighbouring city, and there enjoy the fruits of all his poſſeſſions. If the wounded perſon, however, has ſuffered any loſs, he ſhall make him a proper reſtitution, and ſuch an one as the court of juſtice ſhall determine. But thoſe judges that decide in caſes of murder ſhall decide in this caſe. If a child deſignedly wounds his parent, or a ſlave his maſter, the puniſhment ſhall be death. And if a brother deſignedly wounds a brother or ſiſter, or a ſiſter a ſiſter or brother, the puniſhment ſhall in like manner be death. But if a woman wounds her huſband with an intention of ſlaying him, or a huſband his wife with the ſame deſign, let each be perpetually baniſhed. And, with reſpect to their property, if their ſons or daughters are at that time but children, let perſons be appointed to manage their affairs, and take care of the orphan children. But if their ſons or daughters are adults, let them not be compelled to pro-

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vide for their exiled parent, but let them be permitted to take poſſeſſion of his or her property. If any one who has no children happens to fall into calamities of this kind, let his kindred, as far as to couſins, both of the male and female ſide, aſſemble, and, conſulting together with the guardians of the laws and prieſts, in the houſe of the exiled perſon, let one family out of the five thouſand and forty houſes of the city be appointed as his heir: at the ſame time conſidering that no houſe out of this number is ſo much the property of its inhabitant, and his kindred, as of the city at large. It is requiſite, indeed, that the city ſhould poſſeſs its own houſes, to the utmoſt of its power, in the moſt holy and proſperous manner. When any houſe, therefore, is at the ſame time both unfortunate and impious, in conſequence of its poſſeſſor leaving no children behind him, and of having been condemned for voluntary murder, or any other crime towards the Gods, or his fellow citizens, the puniſhment of which according to law is evidently death, or perpetual exile;—when this is the caſe, in the firſt place, let the houſe be purified and expiated according to law; and, in the next place, let the kindred, as we juſt now ſaid, aſſembling together with the guardians of the laws, conſider what family in the city is moſt renowned for virtue, and at the ſame time fortunate, and conſiſting of a numerous progeny. Let one of the children belonging to this family be adopted by the father of the deceaſed, and by his grandfather and great grandfather, beſeeching, at the ſame time, Divinity that he may be a parent, maſter, and miniſter of holy and ſacred rites, with better fortune than his predeceſſor. Having prayed after this manner, let him be appointed heir according to law. But let the guilty perſon be ſuffered to lie without a name, without children, and without any lot, in conſequence of being oppreſſed by ſuch calamities as theſe. Boundary, however, as it appears, is not in all things mingled with boundary. But where there is a common confine, this, being previouſly hurled in the middle of both boundaries, ſubſiſts between both. And we have ſaid that crimes committed through anger are of this kind, ſubſiſting between voluntary and involuntary crimes. If then any one is condemned for wounding another through anger, if the wound ſhall prove to be curable, he ſhall pay the double of the loſs ſuſtained; but if incurable, he ſhall make a four-fold reſtitution. If the wound ſhall prove to be curable, but at the ſame time becomes the cauſe of great ſhame and diſgrace to the wounded perſon, he ſhall likewiſe

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pay a fourfold fine. But if any one, in wounding another, not only injures the wounded perſon, but the city, by rendering him incapable of aſſiſting his country againſt the enemy, he ſhall be ſimilarly fined, and, beſides this, make reſtitution to the city for its loſs. Beſides, too, his own military duties, he ſhall perform thoſe of the wounded perſon; or, in caſe of non-compliance, he ſhall be accuſed according to law, by any one that is willing, for neglect of military duty. He ſhall likewiſe make a double, triple, or quadruple reſtitution, according to the deciſion of the judges. If one near relation in a ſimilar manner wounds another, the parents and kindred, as far as to the male and female couſins aſſembling together, ſhall decide the caſe among themſelves, and ſhall deliver the offender to his parents to be puniſhed according to nature. But if the puniſhment ſhould be doubtful, it ſhall be determined by the kindred on the male ſide. And if they are incapable of deciding the caſe, they ſhall betake themſelves at laſt to the guardians of the laws. When children inflict any ſuch wounds on their parents, the judges ſhall be thoſe that have paſſed beyond their ſixtieth year, and whoſe children are truly their own, and not ſuch as are adopted. He that in this caſe is condemned ſhall be put to death, or ſuffer ſome greater puniſhment, or one that is not much leſs; but no one of his kindred ſhall be permitted to judge him, though he ſhould be of the age preſcribed by law. But if a ſlave wounds any free-born perſon in anger, his maſter ſhall deliver him to the wounded perſon, that he may puniſh him in whatever manner he pleaſes: but if his maſter does not deliver him, he himſelf ſhall make a compenſation for the injury. If any one has a ſuſpicion that the ſlave and wounded perſon acted from mutual compact, he ſhall acquaint the judges with his ſuſpicion; and if he does not prove that his ſuſpicion was true, he ſhall be fined triple of the damage ſuſtained; but if he does prove it, let him be obnoxious to ſlavery, who has acted thus artfully with a ſlave. But let him who involuntarily wounds another, pay a ſimple fine. For no legiſlator is ſufficient to govern fortune. Let the judges alſo be ſuch as were appointed for children when guilty of wounding their parents, and let theſe determine the proper puniſhment. All the above-mentioned paſſions, indeed, are violent; and every kind of ſtriking likewiſe is violent. It is neceſſary, therefore, that every man and every woman ſhould always think about things of this kind, that an elderly perſon is to be honoured in no

ſmall degree beyond a younger perſon; that they are ſo by the Gods; and muſt be ſo by men who deſign to be ſaved and be happy. To ſee, therefore, an elderly ſtruck by a young man in a city, is ſhameful, and odious to Divinity. But it ſeems fit that every young man, when ſtruck by an old man, ſhould patiently endure it, through a reverence of his age. Let it, therefore, be thus: Every one ſhall reverence both in word and deed a perſon older than himſelf; and in ſuch a manner, that whoever is more than twenty years of age, whether male or female, may be reverenced as a father or mother; and ſo that every young perſon may abſtain from offering violence to any who are capable of begetting or bringing forth children, through regard to the Gods that preſide over births. In a ſimilar manner, let no violence be offered to a ſtranger, whether he has reſided for ſome time in the city, or has but recently taken up his abode in it. For, whether he excites contention, or reſiſts an injury, let no one dare to chaſtize him with blows. But if a ſtranger ſhould dare wantonly to ſtrike a citizen, let him who thinks he ought to be puniſhed bring him before the præfects of the city, but not ſtrike him himſelf, that, by thus refraining from a ſtranger, he may be far from daring to ſtrike a fellow-citizen. The præfects of the city, reverencing the hoſpitable God, ſhall examine the affair; and if it ſhall appear that the ſtranger has acted unjuſtly, the citizen ſhall give him as many laſhes with a whip, as the blows which he received from him, that he may prevent him from daring to do the like in future. But if it ſhall appear that the ſtranger has not acted unjuſtly, after threatening and diſgracing the perſon that brought him before the præfects of the city, let both be diſmiſſed. If one perſon ſtrikes another of the ſame age with himſelf, or who is a little older, but without children, or if an old man ſtrikes an old man, or one youth another, the injured parties may defend themſelves according to nature, without weapons, with their naked hands. But if any one who is more than forty years of age ſhall dare to ſtrike another, either while the perſon he ſtrikes is attacking another, or defending himſelf, let him be called ruſtic, illiberal, and ſervile; and he may be conſidered as ſufficiently puniſhed by this reproach. And if any one is obedient to theſe admonitions, he will be of a tractable diſpoſition: but let him who cannot be perſuaded by them, and who deſpiſes this exordium, receive with alacrity the following law: If any one ſtrikes another who is older than himſelf by twenty years or more,—

more,—in the firſt place, let him who happens to be preſent at the time, if he is neither of an equal age, nor younger, prevent any further violence; or, if he does not prevent it, let him be conſidered as unworthy according to law. But if he is of the ſame age with, or younger than, the perſon ſtruck, let him defend him as if he was his brother or father, or as if he was his ſuperior. And, beſides this, let him be obnoxious to judicial puniſhment, who, as we have ſaid, dares to ſtrike a perſon older than himſelf: and if he is condemned, let him be puniſhed with bonds, for not leſs than a year; or for a longer time, if it ſhall ſeem proper to the judges by whom he is condemned. If a ſtranger or an inhabitant ſhall ſtrike one who is twenty years older than himſelf, let the ſame law have the ſame power, with reſpect to thoſe that are preſent giving him aſſiſtance. And let him who in this caſe ſhall be condemned, if he is a ſtranger, and not an inhabitant of the city, be puniſhed with bonds for the ſpace of two years. But if he is an inhabitant of the city, and is not obedient to the laws, let him be puniſhed with bonds for three years, if the court of juſtice does not determine that he ſhall be puniſhed for a longer time. Let whoever happens to be preſent on this occaſion, and does not give aſſiſtance according to law, be fined. And if he poſſeſſes one of the firſt and largeſt eſtates, let him be fined a mina; but if his eſtate is of the ſecond rank, fifty drachms; if of the third, thirty; and if of the fourth, twenty. Let the court of juſtice too reſpecting all ſuch particulars conſiſt of the generals of the army, the præfects of the military orders, the governors of tribes, and the maſters of the horſe. But with reſpect to laws, as it appears, ſome are inſtituted for the ſake of worthy men, that they may be inſtructed by them, how they may aſſociate with each other in a benevolent manner; but others for the ſake of thoſe who, avoiding diſcipline, and being of an intractable nature, are diſpoſed to ruſh into every kind of vice. It is for theſe that what follows is aſſerted, and that the legiſlator neceſſarily eſtabliſhes laws; at the ſame time wiſhing, that there may never be any occaſion to uſe them. Whoever, therefore, dares to ſtrike his father or mother, or the progenitors of theſe, neither dreading the anger of the Gods above, nor the puniſhments which are ſaid to be inflicted under the earth, but, as one who thinks he knows that of which he is perfectly ignorant, deſpiſes aſſertions which are both antient and aſſented to by all men, and in conſequence of this acts unlawfully,—ſuch a one

requires the moſt extreme remedy. Death, therefore, is not the laſt remedy, but the puniſhments which are inflicted in Hades are rather ultimate remedies; and which, though they are moſt truly ſaid to exiſt, yet are incapable of averting ſouls of this kind from evil. For, if they were capable, there never would be found any who would impiouſly dare to ſtrike their parents. It is requiſite, therefore, that the puniſhments for crimes of this kind in the preſent life, ſhould be as much as poſſible in no reſpect inferior to thoſe which are inflicted in Hades. Let the following law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed: If any one who is not inſane ſhall dare to ſtrike his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers,—in the firſt place, let any one who is preſent (as was mentioned before) give aſſiſtance. And if it is an inhabitant that gives aſſiſtance, let him be called to take the principal ſeat in the games; but if he does not give aſſiſtance, let him be perpetually baniſhed from the region. If he is not an inhabitant, but gives aſſiſtance, let him be praiſed; but if he does not give aſſiſtance, let him be blamed. If a ſlave gives aſſiſtance, let him be made free; but if he does not aſſiſt, let him receive a hundred laſhes with a whip. And if this happens in the forum, let the puniſhment be inflicted by the præfects of the market; but if in any other part of the city, by the ædiles. In like manner, if it ſhould happen beyond the city, let him be puniſhed by the governors of the huſbandmen. If any citizen is preſent when a parent is ſtruck by his child, whether ſuch citizen is a boy, a man, or a woman, let him give aſſiſtance, at the ſame time exclaiming that ſuch conduct is impious. But if he does not give aſſiſtance, let him be obnoxious to Jupiter Omognius [1] and Patroïus [2]. Laſtly, if any one is condemned for ſtriking his parents, let him, in the firſt place, be perpetually baniſhed from the city to ſome other region; and, in the next place, let him be expelled from all ſacred places and ceremonies; from which if he will not abſtain, let him be puniſhed with blows by the magiſtrates that take care of rural affairs, and entirely in ſuch a manner as they pleaſe. And if he returns from exile, let him be puniſhed with death. If any free-born perſon ſhall eat or drink with ſuch a one, or have any tranſactions with him, or voluntarily touch him, if he ſhould happen to meet with him,—ſuch a one ſhall neither be ſuffered to enter into any temple, or forum, nor in ſhort into the

[1] Viz. who preſides over nations and families. [2] Paternal.

city,

city, till he is purified; for he ſhould think that he has had communication with an execrable fortune. But if, being unperſuaded by the law, he illegally defiles ſacred places, and the city,—whatever magiſtrate, perceiving this, does not puniſh ſuch an one, let him be accuſed as guilty of one of the greateſt crimes. If a ſlave ſtrikes a free-born perſon, whether he is a ſtranger or a citizen, let any one who is preſent give aſſiſtance, or be puniſhed with the above-mentioned fine, according to the value of his eſtate. Thoſe who are preſent, therefore, ſhall ſuccour the injured perſon, and deliver to him the offender bound. Then the injured perſon, receiving him in this condition, ſhall give him as many laſhes with a whip as he pleaſes; obſerving, at the ſame time, not to injure his maſter, to whom he ſhall afterwards deliver him, to be poſſeſſed according to law. But let the law be this: If a ſlave ſtrikes a free-born perſon, without being ordered to do ſo by the magiſtrates, his maſter, on receiving him bound from the perſon he has injured, ſhall not free him from his bonds till the ſlave has perſuaded the injured perſon that he deſerves to be releaſed from them. Let the ſame laws be adopted for women, in their conduct towards each other, with reſpect to all theſe particulars; and for women towards men, and men towards women.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE TENTH BOOK OF THE LAWS.

THE following book may be juſtly conſidered as forming one of the moſt important parts of the works of Plato, as it demonſtrates the exiſtence of divine natures, the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of things; and ſhows that they provide for all things, and govern the univerſe with juſtice. It is alſo important in another point of view, as it inconteſtably proves that Plato firmly believed in the religion of his country; though this has often been denied by thoſe who, being ignorant of its real nature, have had no conceptions of its unequalled ſublimity. As Proclus, therefore, with his uſual depth and fecundity of conception, has admirably elucidated Plato's doctrine on theſe three important ſubjects, in his firſt book On the Theology of Plato, the following tranſlation from that book is ſubjoined for the benefit of the reader:

I. In the Laws theſe three things are aſſerted by Plato: That there are Gods, that they providentially attend to all things, and that they conduct all things according to juſtice, and receive no perverſion from ſubordinate natures. That theſe, then, are the principal of all theological dogmas, is obvious to every one. For, what is more principal than the hyparxis of the Gods, or than beneficent providence, or immutable and undeviating power? through which the Gods produce ſecondary natures uniformly, and preſerve and convert them to themſelves with perfect purity: they indeed governing others, but being in no reſpect paſſive to things ſubordinate, nor changed together with the variety of the objects of their providential energy. We ſhall learn, however, in what manner theſe things are naturally diſtinguiſhed, if we endeavour firſt to comprehend by a reaſoning proceſs the

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ſcientific method of Plato in each of theſe ſubjects, and, prior to the reſt, by what irreprehenſible arguments he proves that there are Gods; and, in the next place, conſider the problems which are ſuſpended from this.

Of all beings, then, it is neceſſary that ſome ſhould move only, that others ſhould be moved only, and that the natures which ſubſiſt between theſe ſhould both be moved and move; and this in ſuch a manner, that either they muſt neceſſarily be moved by others, and move others, or be ſelf-motive. Theſe four hypoſtaſes [1] ſucceed each other in an orderly progreſſion. For, prior to that which is moved only, and is paſſive to other primary cauſes, is that which moves others, and is moved by others; and beyond this is the ſelf-motive nature, originating from itſelf, and, in conſequence of moving itſelf, imparting to others alſo the repreſentation of being moved. And after all thoſe which participate of efficient or paſſive motion the immovable nature ſucceeds. For every thing ſelf-motive, as poſſeſſing its perfection in a life attended with mutation and interval, is ſuſpended from another more antient cauſe, which always ſubſiſts according to the ſame things, and after the ſame manner, and whoſe life is not according to time, but in eternity: for time is the image of eternity. If, therefore, all things which are moved by themſelves are moved according to time, but the eternal form of motion is beyond that which is borne along according to time, the ſelf-motive nature will be the ſecond in order, and not the firſt among beings. And again, that which moves others, and is moved by others, muſt neceſſarily be ſuſpended from a ſelf-motive nature: and not this only, but likewiſe every alter-motive compoſition or conſtitution of things, as the Athenian gueſt demonſtrates. For, ſays he, if every thing which is moved ſhoul ſtop [2], there will not be that which is firſt moved, unleſs the ſelf-motive natures have a ſubſiſtence in beings. For the immovable is by no means naturally adapted to be moved, nor would it then be that which is firſt moved. And the alter-motive nature will require another moving power. The ſelf-motive nature, therefore, alone, as beginning its energy from itſelf, will

[1] *Hypoſtaſis* (ὑποστασις) is *an individual ſubſiſtence.*

[2] The force of this argument for the exiſtence of a ſelf-motive nature is very great. If all motion were to ſtop, whence could it again originate? Not from the immovable; for it is a mover only, and therefore cannot be that which is firſt moved. Nor could motion originate from the alter-motive nature; for this, as its name implies, derives its motion from another.

move itſelf, and others alſo, in a ſecondary degree. For a nature of this kind imparts to things alter-motive the power of being moved, in the ſame manner as the immovable inſerts in all things the power of moving. And again, in the third place, that which is moved only, we muſt primarily ſuſpend from the natures which are moved by another, but which move others. For it is requiſite that both other things, and the ſeries of natures which are moved, and which extends ſupernally as far as to the order of things laſt, ſhould be filled with their proper media. All bodies, therefore, belong to things which are naturally adapted to be moved only, and to be paſſive. For they are effective of nothing, on account of poſſeſſing an hypoſtaſis endued with interval, and participating of magnitude and bulk; ſince whatever is effective and motive of other things naturally makes and moves in conſequence of employing an incorporeal power.

Of incorporeal natures, however, ſome are diviſible about bodies, and others are exempt from ſuch a diſtribution about the laſt of things. The natures, therefore, which are divided about the bulks of bodies, whether they conſiſt in qualities, or in material forms, belong to the natures which are moved by another, but which move others. For theſe, becauſe they have an incorporeal allotment, participate of the power of moving; but again, becauſe they are divided about bodies, and, in conſequence of this, are deprived of the power of verging to themſelves, are diſtributed together with their ſubjects, and are replete with ſluggiſhneſs from theſe, they require a moving power which is not borne along to foreign ſeats, but poſſeſſes an hypoſtaſis in itſelf. Where, then, ſhall we have that which moves itſelf? For things which are extended into bulks and intervals, or which are divided in theſe, and conſiſt about them inſeparably, muſt of neceſſity either be alone moved, or move in conſequence of being moved by others. But it is requiſite, as we have before ſaid, that the ſelf-motive nature ſhould be prior to theſe, which is eſtabliſhed in itſelf, and not in others, and which fixes its energies in itſelf, and not in things ſubordinate to itſelf. There is, therefore, ſome other nature exempt from bodies, both in the heavens and the much-mutable elements, from which the power of being moved is primarily imparted to bodies. If, then, it be requiſite to diſcover what ſuch an eſſence is, we ſhall act rightly in following Socrates, and conſidering what that nature is, which, by being preſent to things alter-motive,

imparts

imparts to them a repreſentation of ſelf-motion, and to which of the above-mentioned natures we ſhould aſcribe the power of being moved from themſelves. For all inanimate things are alone alter-motive, and their paſſive properties are naturally derived from a power externally moving and impelling.

If, therefore, the ſelf-motive is more antient than the alter-motive eſſence, but ſoul is primarily ſelf-motive, from which the image of ſelf-motion pervades to bodies, ſoul will be beyond bodies, and the motion of every body will be the progeny of ſoul, and of its internal motion. Hence, it is neceſſary that the whole of heaven, and all the bodies it contains, poſſeſſing ſuch a variety of motion, and theſe moved according to nature (for to every body of this kind a circular motion is natural [1]), ſhould have ruling ſouls, eſſentially more antient than bodies, moving in themſelves, and ſupernally illuminating bodies with the power of being moved. With reſpect to theſe ſouls, therefore, which orderly diſtribute the whole world, and its parts, and move and vitalize every thing corporeal, and which, of itſelf, is deſtitute of life, inſpiring the cauſe of motion,—with reſpect to theſe, it is neceſſary that they ſhould either move all things rationally, or according to a contrary mode, which it is not lawful to aſſert. But if this world, and every thing which has an orderly ſubſiſtence in it, and which is equably moved and perpetually borne along according to nature, are referred to an irrational ſoul, which both moves itſelf and other things, neither the order of the periods, nor motion eſſentially bounded according to one reaſon, nor the poſition of bodies, nor any thing elſe which is generated according to nature, will have a ſtable cauſe, and which is able to arrange every thing according to the ſame things, and after the ſame manner. For every thing irrational is naturally adapted to be adorned by another, ſince, of itſelf, it is indefinite and inordinate. But to commit all heaven to a thing of this kind, and a circulation which revolves according to the ſame reaſon, and after the ſame manner, by no means accords with the nature of things, nor with our undiſciplined conceptions. If, on the contrary, an intellectual and rational ſoul governs all things, and if every thing which eternally revolves is under the dominion of ſuch a ſoul, and there is nothing of wholes deſtitute of ſoul

[1] See the Introduction to my Tranſlation of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics.

(for, as Theophraſtus ſomewhere obſerves, no body that is honourable is deprived of this power),—if this be the caſe, whether has it this intellectual [1], perfect, and beneficent nature, according to participation, or according to eſſence? For, if according to eſſence, every ſoul muſt neceſſarily be of this kind, if each, according to its own nature, is ſelf-motive. But if it is intellectual according to participation, there will be another intellect in energy more antient than ſoul, which will poſſeſs intellection eſſentially, and which comprehends in itſelf, by its very eſſence, an uniform knowledge of wholes; ſince it is alſo neceſſary that the ſoul which is eſſentialized according to reaſon, ſhould poſſeſs a ſubſiſtence according to intellect through participation, and that an intellectual nature ſhould be twofold,—one primarily in a divine intellect itſelf, and another ſecondarily in ſoul, and proceeding from this divine intellect.

You may alſo add, if you are willing, the preſence of intellectual illumination in body. For whence is the whole of this heaven either ſpheric, or carried in a circle, and is rolled round the ſame according to one definite order? How is it always immutably allotted the ſame idea and power according to nature, unleſs it participate of the effective nature of form according to intellect? For ſoul is the ſupplier of motion; but the cauſe of a ſtable condition, and which leads back the fluctuating mutation of things which are moved, to ſameneſs, and to a life bounded according to one reaſon, and a circulation ſubſiſting after the ſame manner, muſt evidently be ſuperior to ſoul.

Body, therefore, and the whole of this ſenſible eſſence, belong to altermotive natures; but ſoul is ſelf-motive, binding in itſelf all corporeal motions; and prior to this is immovable intellect. Nor muſt you conceive that this immovable nature of intellect is ſuch as that which we ſay is ſluggiſh, void of life, and without ſpirit; for it is the leading cauſe of all motion, and the fountain of all life, as well of that which is converted to itſelf, as of that which has its hypoſtaſis in other natures. Through theſe cauſes the world is called by Timæus an animated intellectual animal. It is denominated an animal from its own nature, and the life which pervades to it from ſoul, and which is divided about it; but animated, from the preſence of a divine

[1] Intuitive perception is the characteriſtic of intellect, as diſcurſive energy of the rational ſoul.

ſoul

ſoul in it; and intellectual, from the government of intellect. For a ſufficient ſupply of life, the government of ſoul, and the communication of intellect, connectedly contain the whole of heaven.

But if this intellect is intellect according to eſſence, ſince the very being of intellect conſiſts in intellection, and Timæus, demonſtrating this, calls it divine, for he ſays that ſoul [1], receiving a divine intellect, is rightly and prudently diſciplined,—if this be the caſe, it is neceſſary that the whole of heaven ſhould be ſuſpended from the deity [2] of this intellect, and that motion ſhould be preſent to this univerſe from ſoul, but perpetual permanency and a ſubſiſtence after the ſame manner from intellect, and one union, concord in itſelf, ſympathy and an all-perfect meaſure, from a unity through which intellect is uniform, ſoul is one, and every being is a whole and perfect, according to its nature. It is alſo neceſſary that every thing ſecondary, together with the perfection in its own proper nature, ſhould alſo participate from an order eſtabliſhed above it of another more excellent idiom. For that which is corporeal, being alter-motive, derives the appearance of ſelf-motive power from ſoul, and is through it an animal. But ſoul, being ſelf-motive, participates of life according to intellect, and, energizing temporally, poſſeſſes unceaſing energy and ever-vigilant life from its vicinity to intellect. And intellect, poſſeſſing its life in eternity, and in an eſſence ever in energy, and fixing* all its intelligence collectively in itſelf, is perfectly divine, through a cauſe prior to itſelf, or, in other words, from the unity which it participates. For, as Plotinus ſays, it has twofold energies, ſome as intellect, and others as being inebriated with nectar [3]: and, in another place, that this intellect is a God, through that prior to itſelf which is not intellect. Juſt as ſoul, by that ſummit of itſelf which is above ſoul, is intellect; and body, through a power prior to body, is ſoul.

All things, therefore, as we have ſaid, are ſuſpended from unity through intellect and ſoul as media. And intellect is, indeed, uniform, or has the form of unity; but ſoul is mentiform, or has the form of intellect; and the body of the world is vital. Every thing, in ſhort, is ſuſpended from that which is prior to itſelf. And, with reſpect to the things poſterior to

[1] i. e. the ſoul of the world.

[2] See the Introduction to the Parmenides.

[3] That is, as energizing ſuper-intellectually through its unity, which is the bloſſom of its eſſence, and which abides in unproceeding union in the ineffable cauſe of all.

thoſe above mentioned, one enjoys a divine nature more nearly, and another more remotely. And deity, indeed, is prior to an intellectual eſſence, in which, as in a vehicle, it firſt rides; but intellect is moſt divine, as being deified prior to other things. Soul is divine, ſo far as it requires an intellectual medium; and the body which participates of ſuch a ſoul, ſo far as it participates, is, indeed, divine (for the illumination of divine light ſupernally pervades as far as to the laſt dependance), but, ſimply conſidered, is not divine. But ſoul, by looking to intellect, and living from itſelf, is primarily divine.

The ſame reaſoning, alſo, muſt be adopted with reſpect to each of the whole ſpheres, and the bodies which they contain. For all theſe imitate the whole of heaven, ſince they have a perpetual allotment. And the ſublunary elements are not entirely mutable according to eſſence, but abide, according to their *wholeneſſes*[1], in the univerſe, and comprehend in themſelves partial animals: for every *wholeneſs* has, in conjunction with itſelf, more partial hypoſtaſes. As, therefore, in the heavens the number of the ſtars proceeds in conjunction with the whole ſpheres, and as, in earth, a multitude of terreſtrial partial animals ſubſiſts, together with its wholeneſs,—in like manner, I think it is neceſſary, that in the wholes which are ſituated between heaven and earth, every element ſhould be filled with its proper numbers. For how, in the extremes, can wholes, which ſubſiſt prior to parts, be arranged with their parts, unleſs there is alſo the ſame analogy in the media?

But if each of the ſpheres is an animal, is perpetually eſtabliſhed after the ſame manner, and gives completion to the univerſe, ſo far as it has life always primarily participating of ſoul, but, ſo far as it preſerves its own order immutably in the world, is comprehended by intellect, and ſo far as it is one and a whole, being the leader of its proper parts, is illuminated by divine union,—if this be the caſe, not only the univerſe, but each of its perpetual parts, is animated, endued with intellect, and as much as poſſible ſimilar to the whole. For each of theſe is a univerſe, with reſpect to its kindred multitude. In ſhort, there is one wholeneſs with a corporeal form of the univerſe, but many others under this, depending on this one; one

[1] Each of the elements is a *wholeneſs* from the poſſeſſion of one perfect form which remains perpetually the ſame.—See the Introduction to the Timæus.

ſoul

ſoul of the world, and after this others orderly diſtributing, in conjunction with it, its whole parts with inviolable purity; one intellect, and an intellectual number under this participated by theſe ſouls; and one God who connectedly contains all mundane and ſupermundane natures, and a multitude of other Gods who diſtribute intellectual eſſences, the ſouls ſuſpended from theſe, and all the parts of the world. For, it is impoſſible that every progeny of nature ſhould be generative of things ſimilar to itſelf, but that wholes, and the firſt things in the univerſe, ſhould not in a much greater degree extend in themſelves the exemplar of ſuch like propagation. For the ſimilar is more allied to, and more naturally accords with, the ſimilar, from the reaſon of cauſe, than with the diſſimilar; and, in like manner, the ſame than the different, and bound than the infinite. And thus much concerning the firſt particular, or the exiſtence of the Gods.

II. Let us now direct our attention to the ſecond thing demonſtrated in the following book, viz. that the Gods providentially attend both to wholes and parts. That which is ſelf-motive, then, is the principle of motion and being to all mundane natures; and life proceeds from ſoul, together with local and other motions. A progreſſion, likewiſe, into being is derived from this; and, by a much greater priority, from an intellectual eſſence, which binds in itſelf the life of things ſelf-motive, and precedes, according to cauſe, all temporal energy. But in a ſtill greater degree is this progreſſion into being derived from an hyparxis, characterized by unity, which contains both intellect and ſoul, fills with total goods, and proceeds to the laſt of things. For all the parts of the world are not able to participate of life, nor of intellect and gnoſtic power; but all things participate of *the one*, as far as to matter itſelf, wholes and parts, things according to nature and the contraries to theſe, and nothing is deſtitute of a cauſe of this kind; nor can any thing which participates of being be deprived of *the one*. If, therefore, the Gods, who are characterized by unity, produce all things, and contain all things in their unknown comprehending powers, how is it poſſible that they ſhould not alſo contain a providence, ſupernally pervading as far as to the moſt partial natures? For it is every where fit that offſpring ſhould enjoy the care of their cauſes. But all alter-motive are the progeny of ſelf-motive natures; and things which ſubſiſt in time, either according to the whole or a part of the whole of time, are the effects of things eternal; becauſe perpetual

petual being is the cauſe of being which ſometimes has a ſubſiſtence. Divine and ſingle genera, likewiſe, preſubſiſt as cauſes of the ſubſiſtence of all multiplied natures; and, in ſhort, there is no multitude of eſſences or powers which is not allotted its generation from *the one*. It is neceſſary therefore, that all theſe ſhould partake of the providence of preceding cauſes, being vivified, indeed, by the Gods that are connected with ſouls, and circularly moved according to temporal periods; but participating the permanent eſtabliſhment of forms from the intellectual Gods [1]; and receiving in themſelves the preſence of union, meaſure, and the diſtribution of good, from the firſt [2] Gods. Hence it is neceſſary, either that the Gods ſhould know their productions, becauſe a providential care of their own offspring is natural to them, and that they ſhould not only give ſubſiſtence to ſecondary natures, and impart life, eſſence, and union, but alſo comprehend the primary cauſe of the good in theſe; or, that, being Gods, they ſhould be ignorant, which it is not lawful to aſſert, of what is proper to every thing. For what ignorance can there be of things beautiful, with the cauſes of beauty, or of things good, with thoſe who are allotted an hyparxis bounded in the nature of the good?

Indeed, if the Gods are ignorant of their progeny, neither do ſouls govern the univerſe according to intellect, nor are intellects carried in ſouls, nor prior to theſe do the unities of the Gods contract all knowledge in themſelves, which we have granted from preceding demonſtrations. But, if the Gods know their progeny, being the fathers, leaders, and rulers, of all things in the world, and to theſe, being ſuch, the care of the things governed, conſequent to, and generated by, them, pertains,—whether ſhall we ſay that theſe, knowing the law according to nature, are able to give completion to it, or, that through imbecility of providence they are deprived of their poſſeſſions or progeny, or whatever elſe you may think proper to call them? For, if through imbecility they abandon the care of all things, what is the cauſe of this imbecility? For they do not move things externally, nor are other things the cauſes of eſſence, while the Gods merely aſſume the government of what others have produced, but as from the ſtern of a ſhip they direct all

[1] It is neceſſary here in the original, after the word καταστασεως, to add εκ των νοερων θεων.

[2] Viz. from the intelligible Gods, who are wholly characterized by the ſupereſſential. See the Introduction to the Parmenides.

things,

things, imparting being, containing the meaſures of life, and diſtributing the powers of energy to energizing natures. Whether alſo are they incapable of providentially attending to all things at once, or do not leave any part deſtitute of their preſiding care? And if they are not curators of all things in the world, whether do they provide for greater things, but neglect leſſer? Or do they take care indeed of leſſer things, but pay no attention to ſuch as are greater? For, if we ſimilarly deprive them of a providential attention to all things through imbecility, how, attributing to them that which is greater, viz. the production of all things, can we avoid granting what is naturally conſequent to this, that they providentially attend to their offspring? For it is the province of a power which makes a greater thing, to direct alſo a leſſer. But if the Gods take care of leſſer things, but neglect greater, how can this mode of providence be right? For the more allied and the more ſimilar are naturally more adapted to the communication of good, which the Gods impart. And, if the firſt of mundane natures are thought worthy of providential attention and of the perfection emanating from the Gods, but the Divinities are incapable of proceeding as far as to the laſt of things, what is that which will reſtrain their being preſent to all things? What will interrupt their unenvying energy? How can thoſe who are capable of effecting greater things, be imbecil with reſpect to dominion over leſſer? Or how will thoſe who produce the eſſence even of the minuteſt things, through impotency not be the lords of their perfection? For all theſe things oppoſe our natural conceptions. It remains, therefore, that the Gods muſt know what is adapted to every thing, and poſſeſs a power perfective of, and a dominion which rules over, all things. But if they know what is according to nature, and this, to thoſe that generate all things, is to take care of all things, an abundance of power is not deprived of this providential attention.

It may alſo be inquired, whether the will of providence is in the Gods? or whether this alone is wanting to their knowledge and power, and that, on this account, things are deprived of their care? For if, knowing what is adapted to themſelves, and being able to fill the objects of their knowledge, they are not willing to provide for their own progeny, they will be indigent of goodneſs, will be no longer unenvious, and, by ſuch an hypotheſis, we ſhall ſubvert the hyparxis according to which they are eſſentialized. For the very being of the Gods is conſtituted in goodneſs, and in this they poſſeſs their

hypoſtaſis.

hypoſtaſis. But to provide for ſubject natures, is to impart to them a certain good. By depriving the Gods therefore of providence, do we not at the ſame time deprive them of goodneſs? And, depriving them of goodneſs, do we not alſo ignorantly ſubvert their hyparxis? By every neceſſity [1], therefore, goodneſs is conſequent to the very being of the Gods. And this being admitted, it follows that they do not depart from a providential attention to ſecondary natures, through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance; and again, as conſequent to this, it muſt be admitted, that they poſſeſs the moſt excellent knowledge, undefiled power, and unenvying will.

Thus providing, therefore, for all things, they appear to be in no reſpect deficient in the ſupply of goods. Let no one, however, ſuppoſe a providence of ſuch a kind, as to extend the Gods about ſecondary natures, and deprive them of their exempt tranſcendency, or aſcribe to them, who are eſtabliſhed far remote from all mortal moleſtation, a buſy energy, and laborious life. For their bleſſedneſs is not willing to be defiled with the difficulty of adminiſtration; ſince the life alſo of worthy men is attended with facility of energy, and is free from moleſtation and pain. But all labours which are the conſequence of perturbation, ariſe from the impediments of matter. If, however, it be requiſite to define the mode in which the providence of the Gods energizes, we muſt eſtabliſh it to be ſpontaneous, undefiled, immaterial and ineffable. For they do not govern all things in the ſame manner as men when they providentially attend to their own affairs, viz. by inquiring what is fit, inveſtigating the good of any particular by dubious reaſonings, directing their view to externals, and following effects; but, previouſly aſſuming in themſelves the meaſures of wholes, producing from themſelves the eſſences of things, and looking to themſelves, in a ſilent path, they lead, perfect, and fill all things with good, neither producing ſimilar to nature, which alone energizes by its very eſſence without free deliberation, nor like partial ſouls, who energize in conjunction with will, and are deprived of eſſential operation, but they comprehend both theſe in profound union. And they will, indeed, what they are able to effect by their very eſſence; but, being able to accompliſh, and producing all things by their very eſſence, they contain, in unenvying will, the cauſe of production. What buſy energy, there-

[1] In the original inſtead of πασαν αναγκην, we find πασαν αρετην.

fore,

ſore, what moleſtation, what puniſhment of Ixion, can be ſaid to give completion to the providence of the Gods, unleſs to impart good in any way is laborious to a divine nature? But that which is according to nature is not laborious to any thing: for it is not laborious to fire to impart heat, nor to ſnow to refrigerate, nor, in ſhort, to bodies to energize according to their proper powers. Nor, prior to bodies, is it laborious to natures to nouriſh, or generate, or increaſe; for theſe are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to theſe, to ſouls: for many of the energies of theſe are from free deliberation; and they move many things and excite many motions by their very eſſence, through their preſence alone. So that, if the communication of good is natural to the Gods, providence alſo is natural to them; and this we ſhould ſay is effected by the Gods with facility, and by their very eſſence alone. But if theſe things are not natural to the Divinities, neither will they be naturally good: for good imparts good; juſt as life gives ſubſiſtence to another life, and intellect to intellectual illumination. And whatever is primary in every nature generates that which has a ſecondary ſubſiſtence.

What, however, is moſt illuſtrious in the Platonic theology is this, that neither does it convert the exempt eſſence of the Gods to ſecondary natures, through the care of things ſubordinate, nor diminiſh their providential preſence to all things, through their undefiled tranſcendency; but, at the ſame time that it aſſigns to them that which is ſeparate in hypoſtaſis, and unmingled with every deterior nature, it celebrates them as extending to all things, and as taking care of and adorning their proper progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through all things is not corporeal, like that of light through the air, nor diviſible about bodies, as that of nature, nor converted to things ſubordinate, as that of a partial ſoul; but it is ſeparate from, and unconverted to, body, is immaterial, unmingled, unreſtrained, uniform, primary, and tranſcendently exempt. In ſhort, ſuch [1] a mode of divine providence muſt be underſtood in the preſent caſe; ſince it is evident that there is a peculiar mode of providence according to every order of the

[1] Viz. This general mode of providence is applicable to all the Gods; but a peculiar mode is alſo united with it. For the providence of ſuperior Gods is more univerſal, but that of the inferior Deities more particular. In ſhort, the providence of the Gods is varied according to the ſubjects, times, and places of its energy; not that the diverſity of the latter produces, but, on the contrary, proceeds from, the variety of the former.

Gods. For ſoul is ſaid to provide for things ſecondary in one way, and intellect in another; but Deity, which is prior to intellect, tranſcendently provides for all that intellect and ſoul provide. And of the Gods themſelves there is one providence of the ſublunary, and another of the celeſtial. And of thoſe beyond the world there are many orders; but the mode of providence is varied in each.

III. In the third place, let us conſider how we are to underſtand the immutability of a divine nature, which conducts all things according to juſtice, without departing from undeviating rectitude, both in the providence of all other things and of human affairs. This, then, I think, muſt be apparent to every one, that every where that which governs according to nature, and pays every attention to the felicity of the governed, muſt lead and direct them to that which is beſt. For neither will the pilot, in governing ſailors and a ſhip, have any other principal end than the ſafety of thoſe that ſail in the veſſel, and of the veſſel itſelf; nor will the phyſician, being the curator of the ſick, either cut the body, or adminiſter medicines for the ſake of any thing elſe than the health of the ſubjects of his care; nor can it be ſaid that the general or guardian looks to any other end, than the latter the liberty of thoſe whom he preſerves, and the former that of his ſoldiers. Nor does any other, to whom the government and care of any thing are committed, endeavour to ſubvert the good of his charge, over which he preſides, and, aiming at which, he diſpoſes every thing pertaining to the objects of his government in a becoming manner. If, therefore, we grant that the Gods are the governors of all things, and acknowledge that their providence is extended to all things, goodneſs being the characteriſtic of their nature, and that they poſſeſs every virtue, how is it poſſible for them to neglect the felicity of the ſubjects of their providential energy? Or how can they be inferior to other leaders in the providence of things ſubordinate? ſince the Gods always look to that which is better, and eſtabliſh this as the end of all their government; but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than virtue, being perverted by the gifts of the depraved. In ſhort, whether you are willing to call them leaders, or governors, or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will not appear to be indigent of any one of ſuch-like appellations. For all things venerable and honourable ſubſiſt in them primarily: and, on this account, here alſo ſome things are naturally more venerable

and

and honourable than others, becauſe they bear an ultimate reſemblance of the Gods. But what occaſion is there to inſiſt any further on this? For we hear, I think, paternal, guardian, ruling, and Pæonian powers celebrated by thoſe who are ſkilled in divine concerns. How is it poſſible, therefore, that the images of the Gods, when ſubſiſting according to nature, and aiming at their proper end, ſhould provide for the well-being of the ſubjects of their government, but that the Gods themſelves, with whom the whole of good, real and true virtue, and an innoxious life, reſide, ſhould not direct their government to the virtue and vice of men? And how do they evince [1] that virtue is victorious, but that vice is vanquiſhed in the univerſe? Indeed, by admitting that they attend to the worſhip of the depraved, we muſt alſo admit that they corrupt the meaſures of juſtice, ſubvert the boundary of undeviating ſcience, and evince that the gifts of vice are more honourable than the purſuits of virtue. Such a mode of providence, however, is neither profitable to thoſe that lead, nor to thoſe that are led. For to thoſe that have become vicious there will be no liberation from guilt, becauſe offenders always endeavour to anticipate juſtice, and decline the meaſures of deſert. But it will be neceſſary that the Gods (which it is not lawful to aſſert) ſhould regard the vice of the ſubjects of their providence, neglect their true ſafety, and be alone the cauſes of ſhadowy goods. This univerſe, too, muſt be filled with diſorder and incurable perturbation, depravity abiding in it, and muſt be in a condition ſimilar to that of badly-governed cities; though, is it not perfectly impoſſible that parts ſhould be governed according to nature rather than wholes, human affairs than things divine, and images than primary cauſes?

So that if rulers among men rule with rectitude, honouring ſome and diſgracing others, and every where directing the works of vice by the meaſures of virtue,—by a much greater neceſſity muſt the Gods, who are the leaders of wholes, be immutable; for men, through a ſimilitude to the Gods, are allotted this virtue. But, if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the ſafety and well-being of thoſe who are governed by them, imitate in a greater degree the providence of the Gods, we ſhall forget that, at the ſame time, we entirely aboliſh the truth concerning the Gods, and the tranſcendency of

[1] Proclus here alludes to the Chaldæan Oracles, of one of which the ſentence, "Virtue is victorious, but vice is vanquiſhed in the univerſe," is a part, as appears from his Commentary on the Republic, p. 376.

virtue. For this I think is obvious to every one, that what is more ſimilar to the Gods is more bleſſed than that which is deprived of them through diſſimilitude and diverſity. So that, if here, indeed, the uncorrupted and undeviating form of providence is honourable, in a much greater degree muſt it be honourable with the Gods. But if with them mortal gifts are more venerable than the divine meaſures of juſtice,—with men, alſo, earth-born will be more ſufficient than Olympian goods to perfect felicity, and the blandiſhments of vice than the works of virtue. Through theſe demonſtrations, therefore, Plato, in this book, delivers to us the hyparxis of the Gods, their providential care extending to all things, and their immutable energy, which things are, indeed, common to all the Gods, but have a leading dignity and a primary ſubſiſtence according to nature in the doctrine concerning the divinities. For this triad appears ſupernally pervading from the occult genera as far as to the moſt partial progreſſions, in the divine orders; ſince a uniform hyparxis, a power providential of all ſecondary natures, and an intellect undeviating and immutable, ſubſiſt in all the Gods, as well in thoſe prior to the world, as in thoſe of a mundane characteriſtic.

THE LAWS,

BOOK X.

AFTER the laws reſpecting wounds, let the following general law be eſtabliſhed reſpecting violence of every kind; that no one ſhall carry or take away any thing belonging to another, or uſe his neighbour's property, if he has not obtained the conſent of its poſſeſſor. For all the above-mentioned evils have depended, depend at preſent, and will depend on a thing of this kind. But the greateſt of the remaining evils are the intemperance and inſolence of young men. The firſt of theſe conſiſts in inſolent and injurious behaviour towards ſacred concerns. And the intemperance and inſolence of young men are particularly mighty evils when they take place in public and holy affairs, or in any common part of the tribes, or any other communions of this kind. But the ſecond of theſe crimes, and which rank in the ſecond place, are thoſe committed towards private ſacred concerns and ſepulchres. Thoſe of the third rank, ſeparate from the above-mentioned particulars, conſiſt in inſolent behaviour towards parents. The fourth kind of inſolence takes place when any one, deſpiſing the magiſtrates, takes away or uſes any thing belonging to them, contrary to their intention. The fifth conſiſts in unjuſtly calling to account the political conduct of any citizen. And for each of theſe a common law muſt be eſtabliſhed. For, with reſpect to ſacrilege, we have ſummarily ſaid in what manner it ought to be puniſhed, if it is committed with violence and ſecrecy. Let us now ſpeak concerning the puniſhment which thoſe ought to ſuffer who ſpeak or act in an inſolent manner towards the Gods, premiſing firſt of all the following particulars, as an atonement. He who believes that there are Gods, conformably to the laws, will never at any time voluntarily act in an impious manner, or ſpeak

illegally. But he who does ſo will ſuffer one of theſe three things: either he will not believe that there are Gods; or he will believe that there are, but that they take no care of human affairs; or, in the third place, he will believe that they are eaſily appeaſed by ſacrifices and prayers.

CLIN. What then ſhall we do, and what ſhall we ſay to them?

GUEST. O good man! let us, in the firſt place, hear what I propheſy they will jocoſely ſay in contempt of us.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. They will, perhaps, in a reviling manner thus addreſs us:—O Athenian gueſt, you Lacedæmonian, and you Cnoſſian, you ſpeak the truth. For ſome of us are by no means of opinion that there are Gods; others among us believe that they take no care of human affairs; and others, that they may eaſily be appeaſed by ſacrifices and prayers, agreeably to what you ſaid. But we think it proper, in the ſame manner as it appeared proper to you reſpecting laws, that before you threaten us ſeverely you ſhould endeavour to perſuade and teach us that there are Gods, adducing for this purpoſe ſufficient arguments; and likewiſe, that they are beings too excellent to be allured in an unjuſt manner by any gifts. For, now often hearing theſe, and other ſuch particulars, aſſerted by the beſt of poets, rhetoricians, prophets, prieſts, and ten thouſand others, the greater part of us do not turn from acting unjuſtly, but we endeavour by ſuch conduct to obtain a remedy for our evils. But from legiſlators who confeſs themſelves not to be ruſtic, but mild, we think it reaſonable to expect that they ſhould endeavour to perſuade us that there are Gods; ſo that, though they may not ſpeak better than others reſpecting the exiſtence of the Divinities, yet they may ſpeak better with reſpect to truth. And perhaps, indeed, we may be perſuaded by you. If, therefore, we ſpeak in a proper manner, comply with our requeſt.

CLIN. It appears therefore eaſy, O gueſt, to ſhow the truth of this aſſertion, that there are Gods.

GUEST. How?

CLIN. In the firſt place, the earth and ſun, all the ſtars, and the ſeaſons ſo beautifully adorned and diſtinguiſhed by months and years, evince the truth of this aſſertion. To which we may add, that all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, believe that there are Gods.

GUEST.

GUEST. O bleſſed man, I am afraid for the depraved, (for I will not ever ſay that I am aſhamed of them,) leſt you ſhould deſpiſe them. For you are ignorant with reſpect to the cauſe of the difference between them and others, and think that their ſouls are impelled to an impious life through the incontinence alone of pleaſures and deſires.

CLIN. But what other cauſe is there, O gueſt, beſides this?

GUEST. One, of which you are nearly entirely ignorant, through living remote from ſuch characters.

CLIN. What is it?

GUEST. A certain ignorance of a very grievous nature, and which appears to be the greateſt prudence.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. There are certain writings among us, partly in verſe and partly in proſe, which, as I underſtand, you have not, through the virtue of your polity. The moſt antient of theſe writings aſſert, reſpecting the Gods, that the nature of Heaven, and of the other Divinities, was firſt generated; and at no great diſtance from the beginning of theſe compoſitions, the generation of the Gods, and their diſcourſes with each other, are related. It is not eaſy to cenſure theſe writings, on account of their antiquity, whether they may be properly adapted to the hearers of them, or not. But I ſhall never praiſe them as uſeful, nor as in every reſpect ſpeaking properly reſpecting the reverence and honour which is due to parents. Let us, therefore, diſmiſs and bid farewel to the writings of the antients, and ſpeak of them in ſuch a manner as is pleaſing to the Gods. But let us accuſe ſuch aſſertions of junior wiſe men as are the cauſes of evil. Their aſſertions, then, produce the following effect:—When you and I, as arguments that there are Gods, adduce the ſun and moon, the ſtars, and the earth, as Gods and Divine natures,—others, perſuaded by theſe wiſe men, will ſay that they are earth and ſtones, incapable of paying any attention to human affairs, though they are celebrated as Divinities in diſcourſes well calculated to procure perſuaſion.

CLIN. Such an aſſertion, O gueſt, would be of a dangerous nature, even if I was the only one that heard it; but now, ſince it is heard by many, it is ſtill more dangerous.

GUEST. What then ought we to ſay, and what ought we to do?, Shall we

we apologize as if we were accuſed by ſome impious perſon for acting in a dire manner by eſtabliſhing laws as if there were Gods? Or ſhall we bid farewel to theſe, and again return to the diſcuſſion of laws, that this our preface to the laws may not become more extended than is proper? For our diſcourſe will be far from being ſhort, if we ſufficiently exhibit what is neceſſary to men prone to impiety; wiſh to deter them from wickedneſs; to render them indignant with what is baſe; and afterwards to eſtabliſh laws in a proper manner.

CLIN. But, O gueſt, we have often ſaid in the courſe of this ſhort time, that in the preſent diſcuſſion brevity is not to be preferred to prolixity. For nothing (according to the ſaying) purſues us urging. But it would be ridiculous, and at the ſame time baſe, to prefer that which is ſhorter to that which is beſt. For it will be a thing of no ſmall conſequence if our diſcourſe ſhall poſſeſs any perſuaſive arguments that there are Gods, that they are good, and that they honour juſtice far more than men. For this will be nearly the moſt beautiful and excellent preface to all our laws. Without any moleſtation, therefore, and delay, let us, to the utmoſt of our power, omit nothing which may tend to perſuade that theſe things are ſo.

GUEST. What you have juſt now ſaid appears to me to call us to prayer, ſince you excite yourſelf with alacrity to the enſuing diſcourſe, and do not admit of any further delay. *But how can any one, without anger, ſpeak concerning the exiſtence of the Gods, as if it was a thing of a doubtful nature?* For it neceſſarily follows that we muſt be indignant with, and hate, thoſe who are the cauſes to us of the preſent diſcuſſion. Theſe, indeed, might be perſuaded there are Gods, from what they heard while children, and while they were yet nouriſhed with milk from their nurſes and mothers, as it were in ſongs, both in ſport and in earneſt, in ſacrifices and prayers. For in theſe they muſt have ſeen and heard in the ſweeteſt manner their parents ſupplicating the Gods with the greateſt earneſtneſs for themſelves and children, and proclaiming, by their prayers and ſupplications, that there are indubitably Gods. Beſides this, too, they muſt have heard and ſeen both Greeks and Barbarians, during the riſing and ſetting of the ſun and moon, ſupplicating and adoring, as well when their affairs were proſperous as when they were adverſe; by all which they might be led to conclude that there are Gods, without any ſuſpicion to the contrary. But with reſpect to thoſe who

who deſpiſe every thing of this kind, though not from one ſufficient argument, as every one who poſſeſſes the leaſt degree of intellect will acknowledge, and on this account compel us to ſpeak as we do at preſent, how ſhall we be able to correct them in mild language, and at the ſame time, in the firſt place, teach them that there are Gods? Let us, however, dare the attempt. For it is not proper that, at the ſame time they are inſane through the voracity of pleaſure, we ſhould be tranſported through anger with ſuch characters as theſe. Laying aſide all anger, therefore, let us previouſly addreſs thoſe who are thus vitiated in their dianoëtic part, and mildly ſpeak to one of them as follows: O boy, you are as yet a youth; but time, as it advances, will cauſe you to change your opinions, and think in many reſpects contrary to what you do at preſent. Wait, therefore, till that period, that you may be able to judge concerning things of the greateſt conſequence. But to poſſeſs right conceptions reſpecting the Gods, though to you at preſent it appears to be a thing of no conſequence, is of the greateſt importance as to living well, or the contrary. If, therefore, I announce to you what follows as one of the things of the utmoſt conſequence, I ſhall by no means ſpeak falſely. Not you alone, nor your friends, are the firſt that have entertained this opinion reſpecting the Gods, but there always have been a greater or leſs number who have laboured under this diſeaſe. I will, therefore, tell you what happens to moſt of them, viz. that they do not remain in this opinion, that there are no Gods, from youth to old age. Two opinions, indeed, reſpecting the Gods remain, though not in many, yet in a few,—I mean, that there are Gods, but that they take no care of human affairs; or, if they do, that they may be eaſily appeaſed by ſacrifices and prayers. If, therefore, you will be perſuaded by me, wait, conſidering whether this is the caſe or not, till you poſſeſs as clear information in this particular as can poſſibly be obtained. And in order to this, interrogate others, and particularly the legiſlator. But at the preſent time do not dare to act in any reſpect impious towards the Gods. For he who eſtabliſhes laws for you will endeavour, both now and hereafter, to teach you how theſe things ſubſiſt.

CLIN. What has been ſaid thus far, O gueſt, is moſt beautiful.

GUEST. Entirely ſo, O Megillus and Clinias; but we are ignorant that we have fallen upon a wonderful aſſertion.

CLIN. What kind of aſſertion do you mean?

GUEST. That which in the opinion of many is the wiſeſt of all aſſertions.

CLIN. Speak yet clearer.

GUEST. Some then ſay, with reſpect to all things that have been, are, and will be, that ſome ſubſiſt from nature, others from art, and others through fortune.

CLIN. And they ſpeak well.

GUEST. It is fit, indeed, that wiſe men ſhould ſpeak properly. Following them, therefore, let us conſider what they meant by this aſſertion.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. It appears (ſay they) that the greateſt and moſt beautiful things are produced by nature and fortune, but leſſer things by art; which receiving from nature the generation of great and primary works, faſhions and fabricates all ſmaller works, which we all of us denominate artificial.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. I will ſpeak ſtill clearer. They ſay [1] that fire and water, earth and air, ſubſiſt from nature and fortune, and not from art. That the bodies alſo, which are poſterior to theſe, viz. of the earth, the ſun, the moon, and the ſtars, are generated through theſe, which are entirely deſtitute of ſoul. They add, that, all things being caſually borne along by the impulſe of fortune, they became in a certain reſpect properly harmonized together, viz. the hot with the cold, the dry with the moiſt, the ſoft with the hard; and, in ſhort, that all things of a contrary temperament were, from neceſſity, through fortune mingled together. That, beſides this, the whole of heaven, with all that it contains, all animals and plants, and the ſeaſons of the year, were produced after this manner: not (ſay they) through intellect, or any divinity, nor yet through art, but, as we have ſaid, from nature and fortune. That afterwards mortal art was generated from theſe by mortals, and that through its aſſiſtance certain poſterior diſciplines were produced, which do not very much partake of truth, but are certain images allied to each other; ſuch as painting, muſic, and the ſiſter arts, beget. They add, that if there are any arts which produce any thing of a ſerious nature, they are ſuch as commu-

[1] Plato here alludes to thoſe natural philoſophers Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Archelaus; the firſt of whom aſſerted, that the univerſe was conſtituted by a certain raſh chance rather than by a divine intellect; and the other two, that the celeſtial orbs have nothing in them more divine than the ſublunary elements.

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nicate their own power with that of nature; ſuch as are the arts of medicine, agriculture, and gymnaſtic: and that the political art communicates in a certain ſmall part with nature, but very much with art. So that, according to them, the whole of legiſlation does not conſiſt from nature, but art, and its poſitions are not true.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. O bleſſed man, they ſay in the firſt place, that the Gods do not ſubſiſt from nature, but from art and certain laws, and that theſe are different in different nations, according as the legiſlators by mutual agreement have determined. They likewiſe aſſert, that things beautiful or becoming are not the ſame by nature as by law; and that things juſt have not any natural ſubſiſtence whatever, but that men always diſſent among themſelves reſpecting theſe, and are perpetually changing them. That, when they are changed by them, they then poſſeſs authority, deriving their ſubſiſtence from art and laws, and not from any certain nature. Theſe, my friends, are the particulars which are taught young men from the writings of the wiſe, both in proſe and verſe, and by which they learn that the moſt juſt is that which is obtained by violence. Hence, young men fall into impiety ſo as to believe that there are not Gods, ſuch as the law ordains us to conceive have an exiſtence. Hence, too, ſeditions ariſe, through which men are drawn to a life conſiſting in vanquiſhing others, and refuſing ſubjection to others according to law, as if it was a life naturally proper.

CLIN. O gueſt, what a circumſtance have you related, and what a peſt to young men, both publicly to cities, and to private families!

GUEST. You ſpeak truly, O Clinias. What then ought a legiſlator to do in this caſe? Ought he only to threaten every one in the city, that they ſhall be puniſhed unleſs they aſſert and believe that there are Gods, ſuch as the law ſays there are; and unleſs they conceive they ought to act in ſuch a manner with reſpect to things beautiful and juſt, and every thing elſe of the greateſt conſequence, and whatever pertains to virtue and vice, as the writings of the legiſlator enjoin? If, therefore, any refuſe to obey his laws, ought he to puniſh ſome with death, others with ſtripes and bonds, others with infamy, and others with poverty and exile? but ought he to pay no attention to perſuaſion and gentle methods, at the ſame time that he is eſtabliſhing laws?

CLIN. By no means, O gueſt. But if any perſuaſion, though ſmall, reſpecting things of this kind can be obtained, a legiſlator who is of the leaſt worth ought by no means to be weary, but, as it is ſaid, with the moſt ſtrenuous exertions of his voice, ſhould give aſſiſtance to the antient law, by aſſerting that there are Gods, and ſuch other things as you have diſcuſſed; and ſhould give his ſuffrage both to nature and art, that they have a natural ſubſiſtence, or a ſubſiſtence not inferior to that of nature, ſince they are the progeny of intellect, according to the dictates of right reaſon, as you appear to me to aſſert, and as I believe.

GUEST. O moſt prompt Clinias, is it not difficult to follow by a reaſoning proceſs things aſſerted by the multitude, and which are of a very extended nature?

CLIN. But what, O gueſt? Shall we patiently endure to diſcourſe in ſo prolix a manner about intoxication and muſic, and ſhall we not be equally ready to ſpeak about the Gods, and ſuch-like particulars? Beſides, ſuch an undertaking will be of the greateſt aſſiſtance to legiſlation, when prudently conducted, ſince thoſe written mandates pertaining to the laws, which have always been ſubject to reprehenſion, will thus entirely remain undiſturbed. So that we ought not to be terrified if thoſe things ſhould at firſt be difficult to hear, which, when often repeated, may be apprehended even by one whom, from his inaptitude to learning, it is difficult to inſtruct. Theſe things, therefore, though they may be prolix, yet, if they are uſeful, they are not to be conſidered as of no conſequence; nor does it appear to me to be holy not to aſſiſt theſe aſſertions to the utmoſt of our power.

MEGIL. O gueſt Clinias, you appear to me to ſpeak moſt excellently.

GUEST. He does very much ſo indeed.

MEGIL. Let us, therefore, do as he ſays. For, if aſſertions of this kind were not, as I may ſay, ſcattered among all men, there would be no occaſion of arguments to prove that there are Gods: but now this is neceſſary. Since, therefore, the greateſt laws are corrupted by vicious men, to whom does it pertain to give aſſiſtance to them more than to the legiſlator?

CLIN. To no one.

GUEST. But inform me again, O Clinias, (for it is proper that you ſhould partake of this diſcourſe,) does it not appear that he who aſſerts the above-mentioned particulars conſiders fire and water, earth and air, as the firſt of

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all things, and that he denominates theſe very things nature, but is of opinion that ſoul was produced afterwards from theſe? Indeed, it not only appears to be ſo, but is truly ſignified to us by the very aſſertions themſelves.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Whether or no, therefore, by Jupiter, have we found, as it were, a certain fountain of the ſtupid opinion of thoſe men who have ever touched upon phyſical inquiries? Conſider, inveſtigating the whole affair. For it will be of no ſmall conſequence if it ſhall appear that thoſe who meddle with impious aſſertions, and thus rule over others, do not employ good, but vicious arguments. To me, therefore, this appears to be the caſe.

CLIN. You ſpeak well: but endeavour to ſhow that it is ſo.

GUEST. But I ſhall appear to employ unuſual arguments.

CLIN. Let not this make you ſluggiſh, O gueſt. For I underſtand that you are of opinion we ſhall wander from the buſineſs of legiſlation, if we engage in a diſputation of this kind. But if it is not poſſible to ſhow by any other method than this that the laws ſpeak properly concerning the Gods, let us, O wonderful man, adopt it.

GUEST. I will enter, therefore, on this diſcourſe, which, as it appears, is ſo unuſual. Thoſe diſcourſes, then, which render the ſoul impious, aſſert that the firſt cauſe of the generation and corruption of all things is not the firſt, but was produced afterwards; and that what was poſterior is prior. On this account they err reſpecting the true eſſence of the Gods.

CLIN. I do not yet underſtand.

GUEST. Almoſt all men, O my aſſociate, appear to be ignorant what the ſoul is, and what power it poſſeſſes, both with reſpect to other things and its generation; I mean, that it ranks among things firſt, that it had a ſubſiſtence prior to all bodies, and that more than any other nature it rules over the mutation and all the ornament of bodies. If this is the caſe, does it not neceſſarily follow, that things allied to ſoul will have an origin prior to thoſe pertaining to body, ſoul itſelf being more antient than body?

CLIN. It is neceſſary.

GUEST. Opinion, therefore, diligent attention, intellect, art, and law, will be prior to things hard and ſoft, heavy and light. Beſides this, too, great and primary works and actions, which are produced by art, will rank among things firſt; but natural productions, and nature herſelf, (which they do not properly

properly denominate,) will be things poſterior, and in ſubjection to art and intellect.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. They are not willing to ſay that the generation about things firſt is nature, though it would be right to call it ſo; and they place bodies in the firſt rank of beings. But if ſoul ſhall appear to belong to the firſt order of things, and not fire or air, it may nearly be ſaid with the greateſt rectitude, that ſoul was generated [1] prior to body; that, if theſe things ſubſiſt in this manner, they will ſubſiſt naturally, viz. if any one evinces that ſoul is more antient than body; but that this will by no means be the caſe if they ſubſiſt otherwiſe.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, after this manner proceed to what follows?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But let us by all means guard againſt and avoid fraudulent arguments, leſt theſe, which are of a juvenile nature, ſhould deceive by falſe perſuaſion us who are advanced in years, and thus render us ridiculous; and leſt we ſhould appear to attempt greater things, and wander from ſuch as are ſmaller. Conſider, therefore, if it were neceſſary that we three ſhould paſs over a very rapid river, and I, who am the youngeſt of the three, and have tried many rivers, ſhould ſay it is proper that I ſhould firſt of all endeavour to paſs over it by myſelf, leaving you in ſafety, and ſhould conſider whether or not it may be paſſed over by you, who are more aged than myſelf; that afterwards, this being agreeable to you, I ſhould either call you to ford the river in conjunction with me, or, if it ſhould be too deep for you, encounter the danger by myſelf;—conſider, I ſay, if in this caſe I ſhould not appear to ſpeak to the purpoſe. In like manner, ſince the diſcourſe we are now entering on is of a more vehement nature, and perhaps nearly inacceſſible by your ſtrength, leſt it ſhould cauſe in you a dark giddineſs, by leading you to queſtions to which you are unaccuſtomed, and afterwards overwhelm you with diſgrace and ſorrow, it appears to me that I ought, in the preſent caſe, firſt to interrogate myſelf, while you hear in ſafety, and, after this, again anſwer myſelf; proceeding in this manner till the whole of this diſ-

[1] Plato, when he uſes the word *generation*, in ſpeaking of the ſoul, does not mean to imply a *temporal origin*, but *an eternal proceſſion from an eternally energizing cauſe*.

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courſe reſpecting the ſoul is finiſhed, and it is ſhown that ſoul is prior to body.

CLIN. You appear to us, O gueſt, to ſpeak moſt excellently: do, therefore, as you ſay.

GUEST. Come then, let us invoke Divinity; for, if it is ever proper to do ſo, it will be requiſite in the preſent caſe; and let us beſeech the Gods with the greateſt earneſtneſs to aſſiſt us in demonſtrating their exiſtence. Holding, therefore, as by a certain ſecure rope, let us aſcend into the preſent reaſoning. And it appears to me that, by the following interrogations reſpecting theſe things, I ſhall moſt ſecurely anſwer my opponent. If any one then ſhould aſk me, O gueſt, do all things ſtand ſtill, and is nothing moved? Or, does the very contrary to this take place? Or, are ſome things moved, but others ſtand ſtill? To this I ſhould reply, Some things are moved, and others ſtand ſtill. Do not, therefore, the things which ſtand ſtill, abide in a certain place, and are not the things which are moved, moved in a certain place? Undoubtedly. And ſome things do this in a certain reſpect in one ſeat, but others in more than one. Do you mean we ſhall ſay that ſome things which abide, receiving the power in the middle, are moved in one, in the ſame manner as the periphery of circles, which are ſaid to ſtand ſtill, revolves? I do. But we underſtand that in this revolution a motion of this kind, leading round the greateſt and the leaſt circle, diſtributes itſelf analogouſly in ſmall and large circles, and is itſelf, according to proportion, leſs and more. On this account it becomes the fountain of all wonderful things, proceeding homologous according to ſlowneſs and ſwiftneſs, in large and ſmall circles, and thus accompliſhing what to ſome one it might appear impoſſible to accompliſh. You ſpeak moſt true. But by things moving in many things, you appear to me to mean ſuch as are moved locally, always paſſing from one place to another. And ſometimes, indeed, they obtain the baſis of one certain centre, and ſometimes of more than one [1], by being rolled round. Each too meeting with each, they are cut by thoſe that ſtand ſtill. But when they meet with each other, and are borne along

[1] Viz. That which changes its place changes the centre of place, to which the circumference of the moving body is compared; and ſometimes, beſides changing the centre, it preſerves after a manner the ſame centre, when, not being fixed, but transferred from one place to another, it is carried round by a certain equal circumference.

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in an oppoſite direction, then the parts ſituated in the middle, and thoſe between theſe, becoming one, they are mingled together. I acknowledge that theſe things are as you ſay. Beſides this, too, the things which are mingled together are increaſed; but when they are ſeparated, they are then corrupted, when the permanent habit of each remains; but when it does not remain, it is diſſolved through both. But the generation of all things takes place when a certain paſſion is produced, viz. when the principle [1] receiving increaſe arrives at a ſecond tranſition, and from this to that which is near it; and when it has arrived as far as to three, it poſſeſſes ſenſe in things ſentient. Every thing, therefore, is generated by this mutation and tranſition. However, a thing truly is, when it abides: and when it is changed into another habit, it becomes entirely corrupted. Have we not therefore, O friends, enumerated all the forms of motion, except two?

CLIN. Of what kind are thoſe?

GUEST. They are nearly thoſe, O excellent man, for the ſake of which the whole of our preſent diſcuſſion is undertaken.

CLIN. Speak more clearly.

GUEST. Was not the preſent diſcuſſion undertaken for the ſake of ſoul?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Let one motion then be that which is able to move other things, but is always incapable of moving itſelf [2]: but let the other be that which is always able to move both itſelf [3] and other things, by mingling and ſeparating, by increaſe, and the contrary, and by generation and corruption; and this motion is different from all the other motions.

CLIN. Be it ſo, therefore.

GUEST. Shall we not, then, place that motion as the ninth, which always moves another, and is moved by another; but call that the tenth [4] motion,

[1] By the principle here, Plato means a motive and ſeminal nature. This nature by alteration proceeds through three degrees, i. e. into length, breadth, and depth, and finally arrives at vitality and ſenſation.

[2] This motion belongs to nature.

[3] This is the motion of ſoul.

[4] Plato in this book diſtinguiſhes the genus of motions into ten ſpecies, viz. circulation about an immovable centre, local tranſition, condenſation, rarefaction, increaſe, decreaſe, generation, corruption, mutation or alteration produced in another by another, and mutation produced from a thing itſelf, both in itſelf and in another. This laſt is the tenth motion, of which he now ſpeaks, and is the motion of ſoul.

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which moves both itſelf and others, which is adapted to all actions and paſſions, and which is truly denominated the mutation and motion of all things?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But which of the ten motions ſhall we with the greateſt rectitude judge to be the moſt robuſt, and by far the moſt efficacious of all motions?

CLIN. It is neceſſary to ſay, that the motion which is able to move itſelf is infinitely to be preferred to the reſt, and that all the others are poſterior to this.

GUEST. You ſpeak well. Muſt not, therefore, one or two of the things which have not at preſent been rightly aſſerted by us be tranſpoſed?

CLIN. What things do you mean?

GUEST. We did not altogether ſpeak properly reſpecting the tenth motion.

CLIN. Why ſo?

GUEST. Becauſe, according to reaſon, it is the firſt in generation and ſtrength; but that which follows this is the ſecond, though it has been juſt now abſurdly called by us the ninth.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Thus. When one thing moves another, and ſomething elſe always moves this, will there ever among ſuch things as theſe be any thing which is firſt moved? But how is it poſſible that a thing which is moved by another can ever be the firſt of things changed? It is certainly impoſſible. But when a thing moving itſelf cauſes mutation in ſomething elſe, and this latter in ſome other, and ten thouſand things are thus moved in ſucceſſion,—whether or no in this caſe will there be any other principle of all the motion than the mutation of that which moves itſelf?

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt excellently. Theſe things, therefore, muſt be granted.

GUEST. Further ſtill, let us thus interrogate and anſwer ourſelves. If all generated natures ſhould, after a manner, ſtand ſtill, as many of thoſe we are now addreſſing dare to ſay they do, which among the above-mentioned motions would neceſſarily firſt take place?

CLIN. Doubtleſs that which moves itſelf. For the motion depending on another could not by any means take place till it had previouſly undergone ſome mutation.

GUEST. We muſt ſay, therefore, that the principle of all motions, and which firſt ſubſiſts in things abiding and in motion, is that which moves itſelf; and that this is neceſſarily the moſt antient and the moſt powerful mutation of all things: but that the ſecond is that which is changed by another, and at the ſame time moves others.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. Since we have, therefore, arrived thus far in our diſcourſe, let us alſo anſwer the following queſtion.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. If we ſhould ſee this firſt motion taking place in a terrene, aquatic, or fiery-formed body, whether ſimple or mixed, what paſſion ſhould we ſay was inherent in a thing of this kind?

CLIN. Do you aſk me, whether that which moves itſelf ſhould be ſaid to live?

GUEST. I do.

CLIN. Undoubtedly it ſhould.

GUEST. But what? When we ſee ſoul inherent in any thing, do we admit that it lives through any thing elſe than this?

CLIN. Through nothing elſe.

GUEST. Conſider then, by Jupiter, are you willing to underſtand three things reſpecting every thing?

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. One of theſe is eſſence, another the reaſon or definition of eſſence, and a third the name. And likewiſe the interrogations reſpecting every being are two.

CLIN. How two?

GUEST. Sometimes each of us, when a name is propoſed, inquires the reaſon of the denomination; and ſometimes, when the reaſon is propoſed, we inquire after the name. Are you, therefore, willing that we ſhould now ſpeak of a thing of this kind?

CLIN. Of what kind?

GUEST. A twofold diſtinction is found in other things, and in number. Thus, for inſtance, in number, the name indeed is the even, but the definition is one number divided into two equal parts.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. My meaning is this. Do we ſignify the ſame thing in each, when, being aſked concerning the name, we aſſign the reaſon, or, when, being aſked the reaſon, we aſſign the name; ſince we denominate one and the ſame thing by name, even, but, by reaſon or definition, a number divided into two equal parts?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But what is the definition of that which is called ſoul? Have we any other than that which was juſt now mentioned by us, I mean a motion capable of moving itſelf?

CLIN. Do you ſay, that the being moved by itſelf is the definition of that eſſence which we all denominate ſoul?

GUEST. I do ſay ſo. But if this be the caſe, do we yet deſire it ſhould be more ſufficiently ſhown, that ſoul is the ſame with the firſt generation and motion of things which now are, have been, and ſhall be; and, again, of all the contraries to theſe; ſince it appears that ſoul is the cauſe of all mutation and motion to all things?

CLIN. Certainly not. For it has been ſufficiently ſhown, that ſoul is the moſt antient of all things, and is the principle of motion.

GUEST. Will not, therefore, the motion which ſubſiſts through another in another, but which is never the cauſe of a thing moving itſelf, be the ſecond in order? and ought it not to be placed after the former motion, by whatever interval of numbers any one may chooſe to aſſign, ſince it is truly the mutation of an inanimate body?

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. We have ſaid, therefore, with rectitude, propriety, and in the moſt perfect manner, that ſoul was generated prior to body, but that body is poſterior and ſecondary, ſoul naturally poſſeſſing dominion, and body ſubjection.

CLIN. With the greateſt truth, therefore.

GUEST. But do we recollect, that it was acknowledged by us above, that if ſoul ſhould appear to be more antient than body, the things pertaining to ſoul would alſo be more antient than thoſe pertaining to body?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Diſpoſition, therefore, manners, volitions, reaſonings, true opinions, attention, and memory, muſt have been generated prior to the length,

breadth, depth, and ſtrength of bodies, on account of the priority of ſoul to body.

CLIN. Neceſſarily ſo.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, after this neceſſary to acknowledge, that ſoul is the cauſe of things good and beautiful, evil and baſe, juſt and unjuſt, and of all contraries, ſince we eſtabliſh it to be the cauſe of all things?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Is it not alſo neceſſary to aſſert, that ſoul, which governs all things, and which reſides in all things that are in any reſpect moved, governs likewiſe the heavens?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But does one ſoul, or many, govern them?

MEGIL. Many: for I will anſwer for you.

GUEST. We ſhould not, therefore, eſtabliſh leſs than two, one beneficent, and the other of a contrary [1] nature.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. Soul, therefore, by its motions, leads every thing in heaven, earth, and the ſea; and the names of theſe motions are—to will, to conſider, take care of, conſult, form true and falſe opinions, rejoicing, grieving, daring, fearing, hating, loving; together with all ſuch primary motions as are allied to theſe, and which, receiving the ſecondary motions of bodies, lead all things to increaſe and decay, ſeparation and concretion, and to things conſequent to theſe, ſuch as heat and cold, gravity and levity, the hard and the ſoft, the white and the black, the ſour, ſweet, and bitter; and, laſtly, to all things which, ſoul employing, when it perpetually receives a divine intellect, as being in this caſe a goddeſs, diſciplines all things with rectitude and felicity; but when it is conjoined with folly, it produces every thing contrary to theſe. Shall we admit that theſe things ſubſiſt in this manner, or ſhall we yet doubt whether they do not in a certain reſpect ſubſiſt differently?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, ſhall we ſay, that the genus of ſoul which is

[1] Plato, by an evil ſoul, here means the nature or natural life ſuſpended from the rational ſoul of the world, and which is the proximate *vis motrix* of bodies. As this life, without the governing influence of the rational ſoul of the world, would produce nothing but confuſion and diſorderly motions, it may be ſaid, when conſidered as left to itſelf, to be evil.

prudent, and full of virtue, governs heaven and earth, and the whole period of generated nature, or that which poſſeſſes neither of theſe? Are you willing, therefore, that we ſhould anſwer this queſtion as follows?

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Thus, O wonderful man. If the whole path of the heavens, and the local motion of all the natures it contains, poſſeſs a nature ſimilar to the motion, circulation, and reaſonings of intellect, and proceed in a manner allied to theſe, it muſt evidently be granted, that the moſt excellent ſoul takes care of the whole world, and leads it according to a path of this kind.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But if it proceeded in a mad and diſordered manner, it muſt be led by an evil ſoul.

CLIN. And this alſo is rightly aſſerted.

GUEST. What nature, then, does the motion of intellect poſſeſs? To this queſtion indeed, O friends, it is difficult to anſwer prudently. It is, therefore, juſt, that I ſhould now anſwer for you.

CLIN. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. Let us not, therefore, looking as it were to the ſun in an oppoſite direction, and thus introducing night in midday, anſwer the preſent queſtion, as if we could ever ſufficiently behold and know intellect with mortal eyes: for, by looking to the image of the object of our interrogation, we ſhall ſee with greater ſecurity.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Let us receive from among thoſe ten motions, as an image, that to which intellect is ſimilar. This motion I will recall into your memory, and anſwer for you in common.

CLIN. You ſpeak in the moſt beautiful manner.

GUEST. We muſt remember, therefore, it was aſſerted by us above, that of all things that exiſt, ſome are moved, and others abide.

CLIN. It was ſo.

GUEST. But, of things which are moved, ſome are moved in one place, but others are borne along in more than one.

CLIN. They are ſo.

GUEST. But it is neceſſary that theſe motions, which are always borne along in one, ſhould be moved about a certain middle, in imitation of circles

faſhioned.

faſhioned by a wheel, and that they ſhould be, in every reſpect, as much as poſſible allied and ſimilar to the circulation of intellect.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. That both of them are moved according to the ſame, in a ſimilar manner, in the ſame, about the ſame, and towards the ſame, according to one reaſon and order. If, therefore, we ſhould ſay that intellect, and the motion which is borne along in one, are ſimilar to the local motions of a ſphere faſhioned by a wheel, we ſhould not by any means be bad artificers in diſcourſe of beautiful images.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. The motion, therefore, which is never borne along in a ſimilar manner, nor according to the ſame, nor in the ſame, nor about the ſame, nor towards the ſame, neither in ornament, nor in order, nor in one certain reaſon, will be allied to all folly.

CLIN. It will, with the greateſt truth.

GUEST. Now, therefore, it will be no longer difficult to aſſert openly, that ſince it is ſoul which leads all things in a circular [1] manner, it muſt neceſſarily follow that the circulation of the heavens muſt be led round, taken care of, and adorned, either by the moſt excellent ſoul, or the contrary.

CLIN. O gueſt, from what has been ſaid, it is not holy to ſay otherwiſe than that either one ſoul, or many ſouls, poſſeſſing every virtue, cauſe the circulation of the heavens.

GUEST. You underſtand my arguments, O Clinias, moſt excellently: but liſten ſtill further to this.

CLIN. To what?

GUEST. If ſoul convolves the ſun, moon, and the other ſtars, is not each of theſe convolved by a ſoul [2] of its own?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We ſhall, therefore, diſcourſe about one ſoul, in ſuch a manner, that what we ſay may be accommodated to all the ſtars.

[1] The reader muſt carefully remember that ſoul leads all things circularly, from its poſſeſſion of a divine intellect; for Plato has juſt before ſhown, that a circular is an image of intellectual motion.

[2] Ariſtotle alſo, in the twelfth book of his Metaphyſics, ſhows, that each of the heavenly bodies poſſeſſes a divine intellect, which is the ſource of its motions; to my Tranſlation of which I refer the reader.

CLIN.

CLIN. What ſoul is that?

GUEST. Every man perceives the body of the ſun, but no one its ſoul; nor, indeed, does any one perceive the ſoul of any other body, either of a living or of a dead animal; but there is every reaſon to believe that this genus of things is naturally incapable of being ſeen by any of the corporeal ſenſes, but is of an intelligible nature. Let us, therefore, by intellect alone, and the dianoëtic energy, apprehend this reſpecting it.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. If ſoul is the leader of the ſun, we ſhall perhaps not err in aſſerting, that it accompliſhes this by one of theſe three modes.

CLIN. What modes?

GUEST. That either, reſiding within this apparent circular body, it entirely rolls it along, in the ſame manner as our ſoul moves us, or that, in a certain reſpect being ſituated externally, and connecting itſelf with a body of fire or air, according to the aſſertions of ſome, it violently impels body with body; or, in the third place, being itſelf deſtitute of body, it governs this viſible orb through poſſeſſing certain other powers tranſcendently admirable.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. This then is neceſſary,—that all things ſhould be governed by this ſoul, according to one of theſe modes. But whether this ſoul reſiding in the ſun, as in a chariot, imparts light to all things, or whether it is ſituated externally, or in whatever other manner it may be connected with this viſible orb, it is better that all men ſhould conſider it as a God. Or, how ſhall we ſay?

CLIN. *This muſt certainly be acknowledged by every one who has not arrived at the extremity of folly.*

GUEST. *But with reſpect to all the ſtars, and the moon, years, months, and the ſeaſons, ſhall we ſpeak in any other manner than this—That ſince a ſoul and ſouls, good from the poſſeſſion of every virtue, appear to be the cauſes of all theſe, they ſhould be called* GODS, *whether being reſident in bodies, and thus becoming animals, they adorn all heaven, or in whatever other manner they may accompliſh this? And, in the next place, can he who aſſents to theſe things deny that all things are full of* GODS?

CLIN. No one, O gueſt, is ſo *inſane* as to deny this.

GUEST. Aſſigning, therefore, certain boundaries at preſent to him, O Clinias

nias and Megillus, who does not believe that there are Gods, let us diſmiſs him.

CLIN. What boundaries do you mean?

GUEST. Either that he muſt teach us we do not ſpeak rightly, in aſſerting that ſoul is the firſt generation of all things, together with ſuch other particulars as are conſequent to this; or, if he is incapable of aſſerting any thing better than we have aſſerted, that he ſhall be perſuaded by us, and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods. Let us, therefore, now ſee whether we have ſpoken ſufficiently or not, in our arguments that there are Gods, to thoſe who deny their exiſtence.

CLIN. Your arguments, O gueſt, are very far from being inſufficient.

GUEST. Let this, then, be the concluſion of our diſcourſe to theſe. But let us cure, in the following manner, him who believes that there are Gods, but that they take no care of human affairs.—O moſt excellent man! we ſhall ſay, becauſe you think that there are Gods, a certain nature allied to Divinity leads you to honour, and believe in that which is connate with yourſelf; but the proſperous condition of evil and unjuſt men, both in private and public, who, though they are not truly happy, yet are conſidered to be ſo in the higheſt degree in the inelegant opinion of the multitude, and are improperly celebrated as ſuch in poetical, and a variety of other compoſitions;—this it is which leads you to impiety. Or, perhaps, on ſeeing impious men leaving behind them, after having arrived at old age, grandchildren in the greateſt honours, you are diſturbed: Or from hearing, or perhaps being yourſelf an eye-witneſs, of ſome who, though they have acted in a moſt impious and dire manner, yet, by means of ſuch actions, have arrived from ſlender poſſeſſions and ſmall power to tyrannies and the greateſt wealth. It is evident that, in all ſuch caſes as theſe, you are unwilling to blame the Gods as the cauſes of them, through your alliance with their nature, but, at the ſame time, being led by a certain privation of reaſon, and not being able to be indignant with the Gods, you have arrived at the preſent condition, ſo as to believe in their exiſtence, but that they deſpiſe and neglect human affairs. That the preſent dogma, therefore, may not lead you to greater impiety, but that you may be removed further from it, we ſhall endeavour, to the utmoſt of our power, to convince you of its fallacy, conjoining the following diſcourſe with the former, which we employed againſt thoſe

thoſe who entirely denied the exiſtence of the Gods. But do you, O Megillus and Clinias, take upon you to anſwer for the young man, as you did before; and if any thing difficult ſhould happen to take place in our diſcourſe, I, taking hold of you as I juſt now did, will paſs over the river.

CLIN. Rightly ſaid. Do you, therefore, act in this manner; and we to the utmoſt of our power will do as you ſay.

GUEST. But, perhaps, it will not be difficult to evince that the Gods pay no leſs attention to ſmall things than to ſuch as tranſcend in magnitude. For it was juſt now aſſerted by us, that they are good from the poſſeſſion of every virtue, and that, in conſequence of this, a providential concern for all things is in the higheſt degree accommodated to their nature.

CLIN. This was vehemently aſſerted.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in common inveſtigate that which follows this,—I mean, what the virtue of the Gods is, ſince we acknowledge that they are good. Do we not then ſay, that to be temperate, and to poſſeſs intellect, are things pertaining to virtue, but the contraries of theſe to vice?

CLIN. We do ſay ſo.

GUEST. But what? Does not fortitude belong to virtue, and timidity to vice?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And do not we ſay that ſome of theſe are baſe, and others beautiful?

CLIN. It is neceſſary we ſhould.

GUEST. And muſt we not ſay that ſuch among theſe as are baſe belong to us, but that the Gods participate neither any thing great, nor any thing ſmall, of ſuch-like particulars?

CLIN. And this alſo every one will acknowledge.

GUEST. But what? Do we place negligence, indolence, and luxury, as belonging to the virtue of the ſoul? Or how do you ſay?

CLIN. How can we?

GUEST. As belonging, therefore, to the contrary?

CLIN. Yes.

GUEST. The contraries, therefore, to theſe belong to that which is contrary.

CLIN. To that which is contrary.

GUEST. What then? Will not he who poſſeſſes theſe contraries be con-

ſidered by all of us as luxurious, negligent, and indolent, and, according to the poet [1], ſimilar to a drone bee, without a ſting?

CLIN. The poet ſpeaks with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. It muſt not, therefore, be ſaid, that Divinity poſſeſſes manners that are odious to him, nor muſt we permit any one to make ſuch an aſſertion.

CLIN. By no means. For how can it be ſaid?

GUEST. But will he to whom it belongs in the moſt eminent degree to do and take care of any thing, will the intellect of ſuch a one take care of great, but neglect ſmall things? And ſhall we not in every reſpect err by praiſing ſuch an aſſertion? But let us conſider as follows: Will not he who acts in this manner, whether he is a God or a man, be influenced by two ſpecies of action?

CLIN. What are thoſe two?

GUEST. I will tell you: Either becauſe he thinks the neglect of ſmall things is of no conſequence to the whole; or, if he thinks it is of conſequence, yet he pays no attention to them, through indolence and luxury. Or is it poſſible that negligence can take place in any other way? For, when any one is incapable of taking care of all things, and, in conſequence of this, neglects either ſuch as are ſmall, or ſuch as are great, he is not in this caſe ſaid to be negligent, whether it is a man or a God who is thus deſtitute of power.

CLIN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But now let thoſe two anſwer us three, who, though they both of them acknowledge there are Gods, yet one of them conſiders the divinities as eaſy to be appeaſed, but the other as neglecting ſmall affairs. Let us, therefore, thus addreſs theſe in the firſt place: You both acknowledge that the Gods know, ſee, and hear all things, and that nothing which is either an object of ſenſe or ſcience can be concealed from them. Do you not ſay that this is the caſe? Or how do you ſay?

CLIN. That this is the caſe.

GUEST. But what? Are they not able to accompliſh all things which both mortals and immortals are able to accompliſh?

[1] Heſiod.

CLIN.

CLIN. How is it poſſible they ſhould not acknowledge this?

GUEST. We, that are five in number, alſo agree that the Gods are good and moſt excellent.

CLIN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. Muſt we not, therefore, acknowledge that it is impoſſible for them ever to act in an indolent and luxurious manner, ſince they are ſuch as we have granted them to be? For, in us, indolence is the offspring of timidity, but ſluggiſhneſs, of indolence and luxury.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. But the Gods cannot be negligent through indolence and ſluggiſhneſs; for timidity is not preſent with them.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude.

GUEST. It remains, therefore, that if they neglect a few things, and ſuch as are ſmall in the univerſe, they muſt either do ſo becauſe they know that things of this nature ought by no means to be taken care of, or becauſe they are ignorant that they ought to be taken care of; for, can there be any other alternative?

CLIN. None.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, O moſt excellent and beſt of men, ſhall we conſider you as ſaying that the Gods neglect theſe in conſequence of being ignorant that they ought to be taken care of; or that, like the moſt depraved of men, they know that this is proper, but are prevented from acting agreeably to their knowledge, through being vanquiſhed by certain pleaſures or pains?

CLIN. But how could this be poſſible?

GUEST. Beſides, human affairs participate of an animated nature, and at the ſame time man is the moſt religious of all animals.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. We likewiſe ſay that all mortal animals are the poſſeſſions of the Gods, in the ſame manner as all heaven.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, any one ſays, that theſe things are conſidered either as ſmall or great by the Gods, it is not proper, ſince they are the moſt provident and beſt of beings, that they ſhould neglect their poſſeſſions. But further ſtill, in addition to theſe things, let us conſider this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. Reſpecting ſenſe and power, whether they are not naturally contrary to each other, with reference to facility and difficulty.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Small things are ſeen and heard with greater difficulty than ſuch as are large. But to carry, govern, and take care of a few things, and ſuch as are ſmall, is in every reſpect more eaſy than to carry, govern, and take care of the contraries to theſe.

CLIN. It is by far more eaſy.

GUEST. But ſince it is the province of a phyſician to take care of a certain whole, and he is both willing and able to do this, will this whole ever be in a good condition if he neglects parts, and ſuch things as are ſmall?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But neither will things numerous and mighty ever be well conducted either by pilots, or commanders of an army, or certain political characters, or any others ſimilar to theſe, without an attention to things few and ſmall. For builders ſay, that great ſtones cannot be well placed without ſmall ones.

CLIN. For how can they?

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to think that divinity is more vile than mortal artificers: for theſe, by how much the more ſkilful they are, by ſo much the more accurately and perfectly, from one art, do they accompliſh things ſmall and great pertaining to their peculiar works. Since this is the caſe, can it be ſuppoſed that divinity, who is moſt wiſe, and who is both willing and able to energize providentially, will alone take care of great things, but by no means of ſuch as are ſmall, which it is eaſy to take care of, like one indolent, or timid, or ſluggiſh through labour?

CLIN. We can by no means admit this opinion, O gueſt, concerning the Gods; for this would be forming a conception neither holy nor true.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, to me, that we have now ſufficiently ſpoken to him who accuſes the Gods of negligence.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But we have hitherto forced him by our arguments to change his opinion.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST.

GUEST. It appears, however, to me that he yet requires to be enchanted by certain words.

CLIN. What words, O good man?

GUEST. We ſhould perſuade the young man, that he who takes care of the whole has conſtituted all things with a view to the ſafety and virtue of the whole, every part of which, as much as poſſible, ſuffers and acts in a manner accommodated to its nature; that over each of theſe parts rulers are placed, who always cauſe that which is ſmalleſt in every action and paſſion to receive its ultimate diſtribution; among which parts, O miſerable creature, thou art one, and which, though *diminutive in the extreme*, continually directs its views to *The All*. But you are ignorant that every generated nature ſubſiſts for the ſake of the whole, that the univerſe may enjoy a bleſſed life, and not for your ſake, but that you ſubſiſt for the ſake of the univerſe. For every phyſician, and every artificial fabricator, effects all things for the ſake of the whole, and regards that which is beſt in common; faſhioning a part for the ſake of the whole, and not the whole for the ſake of a part. You, however, are indignant, in conſequence of not knowing how that which is beſt with reſpect to yourſelf happens both to the univerſe and yourſelf, according to the power of common generation. But ſince a ſoul which is connected at different times with different bodies undergoes all various mutations, either through itſelf, or through ſome other ſoul, nothing elſe remains to be done by the *dice-player* than to transfer manners when they become better, into a better place, but, when they become worſe, into a worſe place, according to the proper condition of each, that they may obtain convenient allotments.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. I appear to myſelf to ſpeak with reference to the facility with which the Gods take care of all things. For if any one, always looking to the whole, faſhions any thing, and transforms all things, with a view to this, ſuch as animated water from fire, and not many things from one, or one thing from many, participating of a firſt, ſecond, or third generation, there will be an infinite multitude of tranſpoſed ornaments. But now there is an admirable facility in the power that provides for the univerſe.

CLIN. How, again, do you ſay?

GUEST. Thus. Since our king beholds all our actions, and theſe are animated,

mated, containing much virtue and much vice, and ſince both ſoul and body are generated indeſtructible [1], though not eternal, like the Gods according to *law* [2], (for there never would be any generation of animals if either ſoul or body was deſtroyed,) and beſides, ſince that which is good in the ſoul is always naturally diſpoſed to aſſiſt, but that which is evil in it to injure,—our king, perceiving all theſe things, deviſed in what manner each of the parts ſhould be ſituated, ſo that virtue might vanquiſh in the univerſe, but vice be ſubdued, in the moſt eminent degree, and in the beſt and moſt facile manner. He deviſed, therefore, how each particular ſhould be generated with reference to the univerſe, what ſeat it ſhould reſide in, and what places it ſhould be allotted: but he left to our will the cauſes of this or that generation. For where the deſire of any ſoul is, and ſuch as is its condition, there each of us nearly reſides, and ſuch for the moſt part each of us ſubſiſts.

CLIN. It is likely.

GUEST. Every thing, therefore, that participates of ſoul is changed, and poſſeſſes in itſelf the cauſe of this mutation; but, when changed, it is borne along according to the order and law of fate. And thoſe ſouls whoſe manners are leſs changed, have a leſs extended progreſſion; for they proceed no further than the ſuperficies of the region. But thoſe whoſe manners are more changed, and are more unjuſt, fall into depth, and into the places beneath, which are denominated Hades, and the like, where they are vehemently terrified, and converſant with dreams, both living and when freed from body. A greater ſoul, however, when it participates either of virtue or vice, becoming in this caſe ſtrong, through its own will, and converſe with other natures, if, mingling with divine virtue, it becomes eminently divine, then it is tranſlated into another better place, which is entirely holy: but if it mingles itſelf with the contrary to divine virtue, then its life is transferred into a contrary place. This then, O boy and young man, who think that you are neglected by the Gods, is the judgment of the Olympian divinities;—that he who is more depraved ſhall depart to more depraved ſouls, but he

[1] Body, when corrupted, is reſolved into the elementary wholes from which it originated, but is never deſtroyed.

[2] *Law* here ſignifies intellectual diſtribution. So that the Gods according to *law* are thoſe divine natures which proceed from the intellect of the fabricator of the univerſe. Theſe Gods are thus denominated in the Golden Verſes of Pythagoras.

who

who is better, to ſuch as are better, both in life, and in all deaths, and that he ſhall both ſuffer and do ſuch things as ought to be done by ſimilars to ſimilars. But neither you nor any other ſhould pray that you may be exempt from this judgment of the Gods. For thoſe who ordained this eſtabliſhed it more firmly than all judgments, and as that which ought to be venerated in every reſpect. Indeed, you will never be neglected by this judgment; not though you were ſo ſmall, that you could deſcend into the profundities of the earth, or ſo elevated, that you could fly into heaven. But you will ſuffer from theſe divinities the puniſhment which is your due, whether you abide here, or depart to Hades, or whether you are removed to a place ſtill more ruſtic than theſe. My diſcourſe to you, likewiſe, will be the ſame reſpecting thoſe impious men whom you have ſeen riſing into conſequence from ſmall beginnings, and whom you have conſidered as having paſſed from felicity to miſery. For it has appeared to you that, in the actions of theſe, as in a mirror, the negligence of all the Gods was viſible; and this, from your being ignorant in what manner the end of ſuch characters contributes to the good of the whole. But can you think, O moſt courageous of all men, that it is not neceſſary to know this, which he who is ignorant of, will neither be able to perceive, nor diſcourſe about, the felicity of life, and an unhappy fortune. If, therefore, Clinias, and the whole of this aged company, are able to perſuade you that you do not know what you ſay reſpecting the Gods, divinity will aſſiſt you in a beautiful manner; but if you ſtill require ſome further reaſon, hear, if in any reſpect you poſſeſs intellect, what we ſhall ſay to our third antagoniſt. For, that there are Gods, and that they take care of men, I ſhould ſay, has been not altogether badly demonſtrated. But that the Gods can be moved by the gifts of certain unjuſt men, muſt not be granted to any one, but confuted in every poſſible way to the utmoſt of our power.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully; and we ſhall do as you ſay.

GUEST. Come, then, by the Gods themſelves, if they are moved by gifts, in what manner are they moved; and what kind of beings muſt they in this caſe be? For it is neceſſary that they muſt poſſeſs ſovereign authority who continually govern all heaven.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But to what rulers are they ſimilar, or what rulers are ſimilar to them,

them, that we may be able to compare ſmall things with great? Whether will the charioteers of two-yoked cars that contend in the courſe be ſuch as theſe, or the pilots of ſhips? Perhaps, however, they may be aſſimilated to certain commanders of armies, or to phyſicians, who are cautious reſpecting the war of diſeaſes about bodies, or to huſbandmen, who fear for their plants during the ſtormy ſeaſons, or to ſhepherds and herdsmen. For, ſince we have granted that the univerſe is full of much good, and much evil, though not of more evil than good, we ſay that a thing of this kind is an immortal war, and requires an admirable defence. But the Gods, and, at the ſame time, dæmons, fight for us; and we are the poſſeſſion both of Gods and dæmons. Injuſtice and inſolence, however, together with imprudence, corrupt us. And, on the contrary, juſtice and temperance, in conjunction with prudence, which reſide in the animated powers of the Gods, preſerve us. But that ſomething of theſe reſides in us, though for a ſhort time, may be clearly ſeen from this; for certain ſouls reſiding on the earth, and poſſeſſing an unjuſt gift, are evidently ſavage towards the ſouls of guardians, whether they are dogs, or ſhepherds, or in every reſpect the higheſt of all rulers. Theſe they attack, perſuading them by flattering words and ſpecious enchantments, (according to the rumours of the wicked,) that it is lawful for them to uſurp an unjuſt authority among men, without any diſagreeable conſequences to themſelves. This fault, which we denominate prerogative, is called, in fleſhly bodies, diſeaſe; in the ſeaſons of the year, peſtilence; and in cities and polities, by changing the word, injuſtice.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. According to this reaſoning, therefore, it is neceſſary to ſay, that he who aſſerts that the Gods always pardon unjuſt men, when a part of their unjuſt acquiſitions is offered to them, aſſerts at the ſame time that they are like dogs, to whom wolves give a ſmall portion of their rapine, and who, becoming mild by gifts, permit them to plunder the herds. Is not this the aſſertion of thoſe who conſider the Gods as eaſily appeaſed?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But will not he be the moſt ridiculous of all men, who aſſimilates the Gods to any of the above-mentioned guardians? Shall we ſay, therefore, that they reſemble pilots, who giving themſelves up to the libation of wine, and the odour of fleſh, deſtroy both the ſhips and the ſailors?

CLIN.

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But neither do they reſemble charioteers, who, when orderly arranged in the courſe, through being corrupted by gifts, yield the victory to the two-yoked cars of their opponents.

CLIN. For ſuch an aſſertion produces a dire image.

GUEST. But neither do they reſemble the commanders of an army, nor phyſicians, nor huſbandmen, nor ſhepherds, nor certain dogs ſeduced by wolves.

CLIN. Propheſy better things. For how is it poſſible they can reſemble any of theſe?

GUEST. But are not all the Gods the greateſt of all guardians, and guardians of the greateſt affairs?

CLIN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. Shall we ſay, then, that thoſe who are the guardians of the moſt beautiful things, and who, as guardians, are tranſcendent in virtue, are worſe than dogs, and men of a moderate character, who never betray juſtice by receiving in an unholy manner gifts from unjuſt men?

CLIN. By no means; for ſuch an aſſertion is not to be borne. And he who entertains ſuch an opinion may moſt juſtly be conſidered as the worſt and moſt impious of men.

GUEST. We may ſay, then, that we have ſufficiently demonſtrated the three things which we propoſed to evince, viz. that there are Gods; that they take care of all things; and that they are not in any reſpect to be moved by gifts, contrary to what is juſt.

CLIN. Undoubtedly; and we aſſent to theſe reaſons.

GUEST. And beſides this, in a certain reſpect we have ſpoken more vehemently, through the contention of vicious men. But, O friend Clinias, we have employed a diſcourſe of a contentious nature, leſt our adverſaries, thinking that they had vanquiſhed, ſhould imagine they had a licenſe to do whatever they pleaſed, conformably to their conceptions reſpecting the Gods. Through an earneſt deſire of preventing this, we have ſpoken in a more novel manner. But if, during this ſhort time, we have offered any thing calculated to perſuade theſe men that they ſhould hate themſelves, and embrace contrary manners, the exordium of our laws reſpecting impiety will have been beautifully delivered.

CLIN. Let us hope that this will be the caſe; but if it ſhould not, the legiſlator is not to be accuſed for this kind of diſcourſe.

GUEST. After the preface, therefore, the diſcourſe which is the interpreter of the laws will properly follow, proclaiming to all impious perſons, that they muſt depart from their depraved manners, and betake themſelves to ſuch as are pious. But for thoſe who will not be perſuaded by theſe arguments, let the following law of impiety be eſtabliſhed:—If any one ſpeaks or acts impiouſly, let any one who is preſent defend the cauſe of piety, and give information to the magiſtrates of the affair: and thoſe magiſtrates that are firſt made acquainted with it, ſhall bring the offender before the court of juſtice appointed by law for the determination of ſuch caſes. But if any magiſtrate, on hearing the affair, does not act in this manner, let him be accuſed of impiety by any one who is willing to puniſh him, for the ſake of the laws. And if any one is condemned, let the court of juſtice puniſh him for the ſeveral impieties he has committed. Let bonds, then, be the puniſhment of all impious conduct. And let there be three priſons in the city: one common for moſt crimes about the forum, for the ſake of ſecuring a multitude of perſons; another ſituated about the place where a nocturnal aſſembly is held, and which is to be denominated the priſon for the correction of manners; and a third in the middle of the region, and in that part which is moſt ſolitary and ruſtic, calling it by the name of the priſon of puniſhment. With reſpect to impiety, there are three cauſes of it, as we have already mentioned; and ſince two things take place from each of ſuch-like cauſes, there will be ſix genera of crimes againſt the Gods, which require neither an equal nor a ſimilar puniſhment. For ſome, who though they do not in any reſpect believe there are Gods, yet, from naturally poſſeſſing a juſt diſpoſition, hate the vicious, and, through being indignant with injuſtice, neither commit unjuſt actions themſelves, nor aſſociate with, but avoid, unjuſt men, and love the juſt. But others, beſides the opinion that all things are deſtitute of the Gods, fall into incontinence of pleaſures and pains, at the ſame time poſſeſſing ſtrong memories and acuteneſs with reſpect to diſciplines. The opinion that there are no Gods, is a paſſion common to both theſe; but they differ in this, that the one is the cauſe of leſs, and the other of more, evil than other men. The one of theſe ſpeaks with the greateſt freedom concerning the Gods, ſacrifices and oaths; and, as he ridi-

cules

cules others, will perhaps render others like himſelf, unleſs he is puniſhed. But the other who is of the ſame opinion, is conſidered by the vulgar as ingenious, and is full of fraud and ſtratagem. From theſe characters many diviners are produced, and ſuch as are excited to every kind of incantation. Sometimes, too, from theſe tyrants, public ſpeakers, and commanders of armies, are formed; and thoſe who in their private myſteries act inſidiouſly, and deceive men by ſophiſtical devices. Of theſe, indeed, there are many ſpecies; but two of them deſerve the eſtabliſhment of laws: of which the ironic produces crimes that deſerve more than one or two deaths; but the other requires admonition and bonds. In a ſimilar manner, too, the opinion that the Gods are negligent, produces two characters; and the opinion that they are eaſily appeaſed, another two. Since, therefore, the impious are thus diſtinguiſhed, thoſe who become ſuch through folly, without a vicious diſpoſition and corrupt manners, the judge ſhall confine in the priſon for correction, for not leſs than five years. But, during this time, let no one of the citizens converſe with them, except thoſe that participate of the nocturnal aſſembly, who aſſociate for the purpoſe of admoniſhing and procuring ſafety to the ſoul. When the period arrives that they are to be liberated from their bonds, if any one among them ſhall appear to be more modeſt in his manners, let him dwell together with the modeſt; but if it appears that he is not, and he is again condemned for the ſame crime, let him be puniſhed with death. With reſpect to ſuch as, in addition to their believing that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, or eaſily appeaſed, are of a ſavage diſpoſition, deſpiſing mankind, alluring the ſouls of many while living, and aſſerting that they can allure the ſouls of the dead; likewiſe, pretending that they can perſuade the Gods by ſacrifices, prayers, and incantions, and endeavouring by theſe means to deſtroy private perſons, whole families, and cities, for the ſake of their riches,—among ſuch as theſe, whoever ſhall be condemned, let him be fettered in the priſon which is in the middle of the region, and let no free-born perſon be ever allowed to viſit him, but let the food appointed for him by the guardians of the laws be brought to him by ſervants. But, when he dies, let him be hurled beyond the boundaries of the region, and left without a tomb. And, if any free-born perſon ſhall bury him, let him ſuſtain the puniſhment of impiety by any one who is willing to inflict it. If he leaves behind him children ſufficient for

the purpoſes of the city, let the guardians of orphans take no leſs care of theſe than of others, and from the very day on which their father was condemned. But it is proper that a common law ſhould be eſtabliſhed for all theſe, which may cauſe the multitude to behave leſs impiouſly towards the Gods, both in word and deed, and may render them leſs void of intellect, through not permitting them to make innovations in ſacred concerns. Let the following law, then, be ſimply eſtabliſhed for all of them:—No one ſhall have a temple in any private houſe. But when any one intends to ſacrifice, let him go to public buildings raiſed for this purpoſe, and preſent his offerings to thoſe prieſts and prieſteſſes who take care of theſe particulars in a pure and holy manner. Here let him pray, together with theſe, and any other who is willing to join him in prayer. Let theſe things be adopted, becauſe it is not eaſy to eſtabliſh temples and ſtatues of the Gods; but to effect a thing of this kind properly, is the work of a mighty dianoëtic power. But it is uſual, with women particularly, and all ſuch as are imbecile, or in danger, or want, or, on the contrary, when they receive an abundance of any thing, always to conſecrate that which is preſent, vow ſacrifices, and promiſe ſtatues to the Gods, dæmons, and the ſons of the Gods; being terrified by ſpectres when awake, and, in a ſimilar manner, recollecting many viſions in dreams; for all which they endeavour to obtain remedies, and for this purpoſe fill all the pure places in houſes and ſtreets with altars and temples. For the ſake of all theſe particulars, it is requiſite that the law we have juſt mentioned ſhould be eſtabliſhed; and beſides this, for the ſake of the impious, leſt they, fraudulently uſurping theſe in their actions, and raiſing temples and altars in private houſes, ſhould think to make the Gods propitious by ſacrifices and prayers; thus infinitely increaſing their injuſtice, and provoking the indignation of the Gods, both againſt themſelves, and thoſe that permitted them to act in this manner, though men of a better character. For by this means the whole city becomes ſubject to the puniſhment of impiety, and, in a certain reſpect, juſtly. Divinity, indeed, does not blame the legiſlator; for the law eſtabliſhed by him ſays, that no one ſhall poſſeſs temples of the Gods in private houſes. But if it ſhall appear that any one poſſeſſes temples, and performs orgies in any other places than ſuch as are public, he who detects him ſhall announce the affair to the guardians of the laws. And if ſuch a one, whether a man or a woman, ſhall be found not to have committed

mitted any great or impious crimes, he ſhall be obliged to carry his private ſacred concerns to public temples: and if he does not immediately comply with the law, let him be fined till he does. But, if any one acting impiouſly ſhall appear to have committed, not the impious deed of boys, but of impious men, whether by ſacrificing to the Gods in private or in public temples, let him be condemned to death, as one who has ſacrificed impurely. However, the guardians of the laws muſt judge whether his impiety is puerile or not, and thus, when he is brought before a court of juſtice, muſt inflict on him the puniſhment of impiety.

THE END OF THE TENTH BOOK.

THE LAWS,

BOOK XI.

IT now remains that we ſhould ſpeak of mutual compacts, and the order which they ought to receive. But a thing of this kind is, in a certain reſpect, ſimple. I mean, that no one ſhall touch my property, nor move the leaſt thing belonging to me, without my conſent. And I, if I am endued with a ſound mind, ſhall act in the ſame manner with reſpect to the property of others. In the firſt place, then, we ſhall ſpeak about ſuch treaſures, as ſome one may depoſit both for himſelf and thoſe belonging to him, who is not deſcended from my parents, and which I ſhould never pray that I might find, nor, if I did find, ſhould move, nor be induced to partake of, by thoſe who are called diviners. For I ſhould never be ſo much benefited by the poſſeſſion of riches, when obtained after this manner, as I ſhould excel in the virtue of the ſoul, and in juſtice, by not receiving them. For thus I ſhould acquire one poſſeſſion inſtead of another, a better in that which is better; preferring the prior poſſeſſion of juſtice in the ſoul, to wealth. For it is well ſaid of many particulars, that things immovable ſhould not be moved; and it may be ſaid of this, as being one of them. It is likewiſe proper to be perſuaded by what is commonly aſſerted about theſe things, that ſuch particulars do not contribute to the procreation of children. But he who takes no care of children, and neglects the legiſlator, and, therefore, takes away that which neither he nor his grandfather depoſited, ſuch a one corrupts the moſt beautiful and ſimple law, which was eſtabliſhed by a man by no means ignoble, and which ſays, You ſhall not take away that which you have not depoſited. What then ought he to ſuffer, who deſpiſes theſe two legiſlators, and who takes away that which he did not himſelf depoſit, and which is not a ſmall

affair, but a mighty treaſure? Divinity, indeed, knows what puniſhment he ought to ſuffer from the Gods. But let us declare what he ought to ſuffer from men. Let him who firſt perceives him, give information of the affair:—if it happens in the city, to the ædiles; if in the forum, to the præfects of the markets; and, if in any other part of the region, to thoſe that take care of the land, and the governors of theſe. When the affair becomes apparent, let the city ſend to Delphi, and let what the God determines, both reſpecting the money and him that has moved it, be performed by the city conformable to the oracle. And if he who gives the information is free-born, let him be conſidered as a virtuous character; but, if he does not give information, as a vicious character. If he who reveals the affair is a ſlave, it will be proper that he ſhould be made free by the city, and that the city ſhould pay his maſter the price of his manumiſſion; but, if he does not reveal it, let him be puniſhed with death. Let a ſimilar law follow this, reſpecting things ſmall and great. If a man leaves any property, whether willingly or unwillingly, let him who may happen to meet with it ſuffer it to remain; conſidering that the dæmon who preſides over roads defends things of this kind, which are dedicated to Divinity by law. When any one, being unperſuaded by this law, takes away ſuch property to his own houſe, if he is but of little worth, being a ſlave, let him receive many laſhes with a whip, from any one not leſs than thirty years of age who may happen to meet him. But, if he is free-born, beſides being conſidered as illiberal, and void of law, let him pay as a fine ten times the worth of what he took away to its proper owner. When any one accuſes another of holding his property, whether it be much or little, and the perſon who detains it acknowledges that it is in his poſſeſſion, but denies that it is his who demands it,—if a written account of the affair is given to the magiſtrates according to law, he who detains it ſhall be called before a magiſtrate, and if it ſhall appear to be the property of the accuſer, it ſhall be reſtored to him. But if it ſhall be found to belong to neither, but to ſome abſent perſon, if its poſſeſſor will not engage to reſtore it to the abſent perſon, let him be compelled to depoſit it. If a written account of the affair is not given to the magiſtrates, let the property be depoſited with the three oldeſt magiſtrates till ſentence is paſſed. And, if the ſubject of diſpute is an animal, let him who upon trial is caſt, pay the magiſtrates the expenſe of its keeping; but let the affair be decided by the magiſtrates within

within the ſpace of three days. If any one leads away another as a ſlave, who is going to be manumitted, let him who leads him be diſmiſſed; but he who is thus led away, if he can procure three reſpectable bondsmen, ſhall be conſidered as free; but otherwiſe not. But if any one is led away in any other manner, let him by whom he is thus led be obnoxious to the charge of uſing violence, and be condemned to reſtore double the loſs to the perſon led away. Every one, too, may be permitted to lead away his freeman, if he is not ſerved by him, or not ſufficiently. The attention, however, which ſuch a one ought to pay his maſter conſiſts, in the firſt place, in going thrice every month to his maſter's houſe, and announcing that he is prepared to do whatever is juſt, and in his power; and, in the ſecond place, that he may perform, with reſpect to matrimony, whatever ſhall appear requiſite to his maſter. But it ſhall not be lawful for him to poſſeſs greater wealth than the perſon by whom he was liberated: but, if he does poſſeſs more, let the exceſs be given to his maſter. Let a freed perſon not remain in the city more than twenty years, but, in the ſame manner as ſtrangers, let him after this period depart, taking with him the whole of his property, unleſs he can perſuade the magiſtrates and his liberator to the contrary. But if the poſſeſſions of a freed perſon, or of any other ſtranger, exceed thoſe of the third eſtate, let him, on the thirtieth day after this has been diſcovered to be the caſe, take his property and depart; and let him not, though he ſhould requeſt it, be permitted by the magiſtrates to ſtay any longer. Let him who diſobeys this law be brought before a court of juſtice; when condemned, be puniſhed with death; and let his riches become public property. Let the judges of the tribes take cognizance of theſe caſes, unleſs the litigants have previouſly ſettled the affair among themſelves by means of their neighbours or arbitrators. If any one aſſerts that a certain animal, or any thing elſe, is his own property, let him who poſſeſſes it take it either to the ſeller, or to him who properly and juſtly gave it, or who after ſome other manner delivered it of his own authority. And let it remain with a citizen, or an inhabitant of the city, for thirty days, but with a ſtranger for five months, ſo that the middle of theſe may be that month in which the ſun is turned from the ſummer to the winter tropic. Let whatever one perſon changes with another through buying or ſelling, be exchanged in a place appointed for each in the forum, and let every thing pertaining to buying and ſelling be

tranſacted

be tranſacted in this place, and no where elſe. Likewiſe, let there be no delay either in buying or ſelling. But, if the commutation is made in other places, let no judgment according to law be paſſed upon it. With reſpect to feaſts, in which every man pays his own ſhare, if any difference ſhould ariſe in ſettling the payment of the ſhares, let the parties ſo tranſact with each other as about a thing which is not noticed by the courts of juſtice. Let a ſeller, who receives no leſs than fifty drachms as the price of his commodity, be obliged to wait ten days in the city, and let the buyer know the place of his abode; and this for the ſake of thoſe complaints and legitimate abatements which uſually happen about things of this kind. But let lawful and unlawful abatements take place as follows: When any one ſells a ſlave who labours under a conſumption, or the ſtone, or the ſtrangury, or that which is called the ſacred diſeaſe, or any other diſeaſe which is immanifeſt to many, is of long continuance and difficult to cure, whether of the body or mind, if a phyſician or a maſter of gymnaſtic buys him, no abatement ſhall be made; nor yet when the ſeller informs the buyer of the true condition of the article of ſale. But if an artiſt ſells to an ignorant perſon any thing of this kind, the buyer ſhall be permitted to return the perſon bought by him, who labours under any diſeaſe but the ſacred, within ſix months: but if he labours under this diſeaſe, he ſhall be permitted to return him within a year. Affairs of this kind ſhall be decided by phyſicians choſen by the common conſent of the litigants. He who in theſe caſes is condemned, ſhall pay to the buyer double the price for which he ſold him. But if one ignorant perſon ſells any thing to another, let the return and judgment be made in the ſame manner as was mentioned above; and let him who is condemned pay a ſimple fine. If any one ſells a homicide to another, if the tranſaction takes place between two ſkilful perſons, let no return be made; but if between a ſkilful and ignorant perſon, let a return then be made when the buyer perceives the caſe. But let the affair be decided by the five youngeſt guardians of the laws. If it ſhall appear that the ſeller was not ignorant that the perſon he ſold was a homicide, let the houſe of the buyer be purified according to the law of the interpreters, and let the ſeller pay him triple the price of the homicide. Let him who changes money for money, or for animals, or any thing elſe, give and receive every thing unadulterated, agreeably to the injunctions of law. About the whole of this vice, how-

ever, it is requiſite to lay down a preface, in the ſame manner as in other laws. Every man, indeed, ought to conſider adulteration, lying, and deception, as forming one genus, about which it is uſual for the multitude to ſay, though very erroneouſly, that when each of theſe is opportunely adopted, the reſult is frequently proper. But as they leave the occaſion, the where, and the when, diſorderly and indefinitely, they often by this aſſertion both injure themſelves and others. The legiſlator, however, ſhould not ſuffer this indefinite to be unnoticed, but greater or leſſer boundaries ought always to be clearly determined. Let them, therefore, now be determined. Let no one tell a lie, or deceive, or adulterate any thing, calling at the ſame time on the Gods, unleſs he is deſirous of becoming odious to Divinity. This, however, will be the caſe with him, in the firſt place, who, ſwearing falſely, deſpiſes the Gods; and, in the ſecond place, with him who ſpeaks falſely before thoſe that are better than himſelf. But the good are more excellent than the bad, and, in ſhort, the elder than the younger. On this account, parents are better than their offspring, men than women and children, and governors than the governed. All theſe ought to be reverenced in every government, and eſpecially in political governments, for the ſake of which we have engaged in the preſent diſcuſſion. For he who adulterates any thing in the forum, lies and deceives, and, calling on the Gods, ſwears falſely before the guardians of the forum, and violates their laws, neither fearing men, nor reverencing the Gods. To be careful, indeed, not to contaminate the names of the Gods, is in every reſpect beautiful; for they ought not to be uſed in common like other names, but every thing pertaining to the Gods ſhould be preſerved in a pure and holy manner. Let the following law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed for thoſe who will not be perſuaded to act in this manner:—He who ſells any thing in the forum ſhall not be ſuffered to fix two prices to any article; but when he has fixed a ſimple price, if he does not ſell it, he ſhall take it away, and be allowed to bring it back again on the ſame day, without valuing it at a higher price than before. Let praiſe, and taking an oath, never be employed in ſelling. And if any one is diſobedient to this law, any citizen, not leſs than thirty years of age, who detects him in ſwearing, ſhall ſtrike him with impunity; and if he neglects to do this, let him be conſidered as a betrayer of the laws. But let him who detects any one ſelling an adulterated article, and incapable of being perſuaded by what

we have now ſaid, expoſe the fraud of ſuch a one, if he is able, before a magiſtrate; and let a ſlave, or an inhabitant, bring with him the adulterated article. Let a citizen, who neglects to accuſe ſuch a one, be pronounced a bad man, as one who defrauds the Gods: but, if he accuſes him, let him dedicate the adulterated article to the Gods who preſide over the forum. Let him who openly ſells things of this kind, beſides being deprived of the adulterated article, receive publicly as many laſhes with a whip as there are drachms in the ſum for which he ſold the article; a cryer at the ſame time proclaiming in the forum the cauſe of his being whipped. Let the præfects of the markets, and the guardians of the laws, endeavour to detect all the adulterations and evil practices of the ſellers, by making inquiry of men ſkilled in vendible articles, and cauſe to be written on a pillar before the forum what a ſeller ought to do, and what not, ſo that men of this kind may clearly know how to act according to law in diſpoſing of their reſpective articles. As to the particulars relating to the ædiles, we have ſpoken of theſe ſufficiently above. But if it ſhould appear that any thing is wanting to theſe, let them ſupply the deficiency by communicating with the guardians of the laws, and afterwards let them write their firſt and ſecond legal inſtitutions on a pillar.

After adulteration it follows that we ſhould ſpeak of cauponation [1]. But about the whole of this we ſhall firſt of all give our advice, and the reaſons for ſuch advice, and afterwards eſtabliſh a law reſpecting it. For all cauponation in a city does not ſubſiſt for the ſake of injuring the city, but naturally for the ſake of the contrary. For how is it poſſible that he ſhould not benefit the city who cauſes money, from being poſſeſſed in an incommenſurate and anomalous manner, to be poſſeſſed equably, and with commenſuration? It is requiſite to ſay, that the power of money, the merchant, the mercenary character, and the inn-keeper, will accompliſh this for us. For theſe, and others of this kind, whether they act in a more becoming or a more baſe manner, endeavour to ſupply the indigence of others, and render poſſeſſions equal. But let us conſider the reaſon why this appears neither beautiful nor becoming, and why it is calumniated; that though we may not procure a remedy for the whole by law, yet we may for a part.

[1] The keeping an inn or victualling-houſe.

CLIN. This affair, as it appears, is of no trifling nature, and requires no ſmall degree of virtue.

GUEST. How do you ſay, O friend Clinias? A ſmall part of mankind naturally, and who are educated in the beſt manner, are able, when they are in want, or influenced by the deſire of certain things, to conduct themſelves with moderation, and, when they have it in their power to acquire great wealth, behave ſoberly, and prefer moderation to exceſs. But the vulgar conduct themſelves in a manner perfectly contrary to theſe. For they deſire without meaſure; and when it is permitted them to become moderately, they chooſe to become immenſely rich. On this account, all ſuch as are converſant with cauponation and merchandize are calumniated, and ſubject to ſhameful diſgrace. For, if any one (which never did take place, nor ever will) ſhould compel (though indeed it is ridiculous to mention it) the beſt of men to keep an inn for a certain time, or victualling-houſe, or do any thing of this kind; or if certain moſt excellent women, through the neceſſity of fate, ſhould engage in ſuch employments, we ſhould know that they were honeſt and laudable, and that, when they are conducted according to uncorrupt reaſon, all ſuch characters as theſe ſhould be honoured as ſuſtaining the part of mothers and nurſes. But now, ſince inns and victualling-houſes are raiſed in ſolitary places, and at a great diſtance from cities, they ſerve as places of ſhelter for thoſe that are caught in a ſtorm, and afford a cool retreat to thoſe that are oppreſſed with heat. They do not, however, diſmiſs thoſe that take refuge in them like friends, with hoſpitable gifts, but cruelly compel them to ranſom themſelves, as if they were enemies and captives, and plunder them of all their poſſeſſions. Theſe, and other baſe actions of this kind, ſubject thoſe employments to calumny which are calculated to aſſiſt the indigent. A legiſlator, therefore, ought always to deviſe a remedy for theſe. For it is a true and antient ſaying, that it is difficult to fight againſt two things, as is evident in diſeaſes, and many other particulars. And in the preſent caſe, indeed, there is an oppoſition againſt two things, poverty and riches; the latter of which corrupt the ſoul of men through luxury, and the former leads them through pain to impudence. What remedy, therefore, can be deviſed for this diſeaſe in a polity endued with intellect? In the firſt place, we muſt endeavour to the utmoſt, that it may uſe cauponation in the ſmalleſt degree; and, in the next place, we muſt

muſt aſſign cauponation to thoſe men whoſe manners, when corrupt, will be no great peſt to the city; and, in the third place, ſome method muſt be deviſed by which the ſouls of theſe men may not eaſily be filled with impudence and illiberality. But, after what has now been ſaid, a certain law reſpecting theſe things preſents itſelf to us, with good fortune. The city of the Magneſians, which Divinity firſt raiſed, is by Divinity again inhabited. Among theſe there is a law, that no huſbandmen who belong to the forty-five thouſand houſes ſhall either voluntarily or involuntarily be an inn-keeper or a merchant, or act in the capacity of a ſervant to any private perſon, unleſs that perſon becomes in his turn a ſervant to him; a father and mother, with their progenitors, all his elders, and ſuch as being free live in an independent manner, being excepted. It is not, however, eaſy to determine by law who is free, or the contrary; yet ſuch as theſe are diſtinguiſhed from the nobles by the hatred and love which they bear towards them. But let him who through a certain art is engaged in illiberal cauponation be accuſed before thoſe who hold the firſt rank in virtue, by any one that is willing, as a diſgrace to his family. And if it ſhall appear that he has defiled his paternal houſe by any unworthy employment, let him, after having been fettered for a year, abſtain from ſuch employment. If, after this, he engages in it again, let him be fettered for two years. And let him always be confined in bonds as often as he is detected, twice as long as the preceding time. But a ſecond law orders that all ſuch as are not citizens, together with foreigners, ſhall exerciſe cauponation. And a third law ordains, that the foreigner or inhabitant who engages in this art, ſhall either be a moſt excellent character, or vicious in the ſmalleſt degree. It is proper, likewiſe, that the guardians of the law ſhould conſider that they are not only guardians of thoſe who are eaſily prevented from acting in an illegal and vicious manner, viz. thoſe who are well-born and educated; but that they are much more guardians of thoſe who are different from theſe, and who engage in employments by which they are ſtrongly impelled to improbity. Since, however, caupona-tion is abundantly various, the guardians of the laws ſhould aſſemble together with thoſe that are ſkilled in the ſeveral ſpecies of it; and, as we obſerved a little before concerning adulteration, which is allied to this art, they ſhould, in the firſt place, eſtabliſh ſuch things as apppear neceſſary to the city. Afterwards, having inquired into the coſt and emolument attending

ing this art, they ſhould attend to the moderate gain reſulting from it, and eſtabliſh its expenſes and emoluments. And ſome particulars ſhould be attended to by the præfects of the markets, others by the ædiles, and others by the præfects of the land. After this manner nearly will cauponation be advantageous to every one, and injure thoſe by whom it is exerciſed in the city in the ſmalleſt degree. The genus of artificers is ſacred to Vulcan and Minerva, who furniſh our lives by their arts. But thoſe individuals are ſacred to Mars and Minerva who preſerve the works of artificers by other arts of an aſſiſtant and defenſive nature. The genus of theſe is, indeed, juſtly ſacred to theſe Gods: and all theſe providentially take care of the region and people. Some of them, too, preſide over warlike conteſts; but others effect the generation of inſtruments, and works for hire. Reverencing, therefore, the Gods that are the authors of theſe arts, it will not be proper to deceive them, by lying about things of this kind. If any artificer does not complete his work in a prefixed time, through a vicious diſpoſition, but, paying no reverence to the divinity who is the giver of life, through a blindneſs of intellect, thinks that his kindred God will pardon him, ſuch a one, in the firſt place, will be puniſhed by the God himſelf; and, in the ſecond place, let it be eſtabliſhed by law, that he ſhall be fined the worth of the work which he has not finiſhed in the proper time, and that, beginning again, he ſhall complete it in the time firſt agreed upon. Let the ſame law too conſult for the artificer as for the ſeller of vendible articles. Let care be taken, therefore, that he does not aſk more than the worth of his work, but let his demand be moſt ſimple, and accommodated to its worth. For an artiſt knows the worth of his work. In cities, therefore, conſiſting of free men, it is not proper that an artiſt ſhould endeavour to deceive the ſimple by art, which is naturally clear and void of falſehood. Hence, when this is the caſe, the injurer ſhall make a proper recompenſe to the injured perſon. If any one, in paying an artiſt for his work, does not pay him according to the agreement, deſpiſing Jupiter the guardian of the city, and Minerva who communicates with the polity, and, being influenced by a little gain, diſſolves mighty communions; in this caſe, let the law aſſiſt the union of the city, in conjunction with the Gods. Let him, therefore, who, having ordered a work to be executed for him, does not pay for it in the appointed time, be fined double the price agreed upon. And let judgment be paſſed on things of this kind

kind in the courts of juſtice belonging to the tribes. As we have, however, made mention of artificers, and as commanders of armies and military arts are artificers of ſafety to a city, it is but juſt that we ſhould alſo ſpeak of theſe. If, therefore, any one of theſe undertakes any public work, whether voluntarily or from command, and executes it in a becoming manner, let the law confer upon him the honour of unceaſing praiſe, which is the reward of warlike men. But the law may be juſtly blamed which does not reward him who conducts himſelf well in military affairs. Let the following law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed for theſe, mingled with praiſe, and which does not compel, but conſults the multitude of the citizens: that ſuch good men ſhall be honoured in the ſecond place, as have been ſaviours of the whole city, whether by their valour, or by warlike devices; for the firſt honour muſt be given to thoſe who have been remarkably obedient to the written laws of good legiſlators. We have, therefore, now nearly ſpoken ſufficiently of the greateſt compacts among men, except thoſe pertaining to orphans, and the guardians of orphans. It is, therefore, neceſſary in the next place to ſpeak of theſe. The beginning of all theſe is the deſire of the teſtator, and the fortune of thoſe that make no will. I have ſaid it is neceſſary to ſpeak of theſe, O Clinias, in conſequence of looking to the difficulty reſpecting them: for it is not poſſible to leave them in a diſordered manner. For teſtators would deſire many things differing from each other, and contrary to the laws, to the manners of the living, and to their anceſtors, if any one ſhould ſimply give them permiſſion to make their wills in whatever manner they pleaſed, and ſhould ordain, that every will made near the end of life ſhall be properly executed. For moſt men, when they conſider themſelves as about to die, are affected with ſtupidity and remiſſneſs.

CLIN. What induces you to ſay this, O gueſt?

GUEST. A man when about to die, O Clinias, is moroſe, and is full of ſuch language as is terrible to legiſlators, and difficult for them to endure.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. Deſiring to be the lord of all things, it is uſual for him to ſpeak with anger.

CLIN. What does he ſay at this time?

GUEST. It is a dire thing, ſays he, O Gods, if it is not permitted me to leave my property in whatever manner I pleaſe, and to bequeath ſome more,

and

and others leſs, according as they were evidently well or ill affected towards me in my diſeaſes, in my old age, and in other all-various fortunes.

CLIN. Does he not therefore, O gueſt, appear to you to ſpeak well?

GUEST. Antient legiſlators, O Clinias, appear to me to have been effeminate, and to have looked to a trifling part of human affairs in the eſtabliſhment of laws.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. That, being terrified at this language of the dying man, they made a law, that every one ſhould be permitted to make his will as he pleaſed. But both you and I could anſwer the dying in your city in a more elegant manner.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. O friends, (we ſhould ſay) who have but a ſhort time to live, it is difficult for you to know your affairs, and likewiſe to know yourſelves, according to the inſcription of the Delphic temple. I, therefore, being a legiſlator, conſider that neither yourſelves, nor theſe poſſeſſions, are your own, but that they belong to the whole of your race, both paſt and to come, and that both the whole of your race and poſſeſſions, by a much greater priority, belong to the city. This being the caſe, if any one, through flattery, either when you are diſeaſed, or in your old age, ſhould perſuade you to make your will in an improper manner, I ſhould not admit ſuch a will to be voluntarily made. But, looking to that which is beſt both for the whole city, and the whole of your race, I ſhall eſtabliſh laws in ſuch a manner as that the advantage of individuals may give way, as it is fit it ſhould, to that of the public. Do you, therefore, be mild and benevolent towards us, as human nature requires you ſhould. It will be our part to take care to the utmoſt of our power of every thing belonging to you, and not in a partial manner, by neglecting ſome things and attending to others. Let this then, O Clinias, be the conſolation which we addreſs in a prefatory manner to the living and the dead. But let the law be as follows:—Let him who makes a will, and has children, in the firſt place appoint that child his heir whom he thinks moſt deſerving. And, in the next place, let him ſignify which of his children he chooſes to conſign over to the care of another perſon. If any one of his children ſhall remain without an hereditary portion, and there is reaſon to expect that this child will be ſent into a colony

a colony according to law, let the father be permitted to leave him from his other poſſeſſions as much as he pleaſes, except the paternal allotment, and every thing pertaining to it. But if there are many children thus circumſtanced, let the father bequeath them, as he pleaſes, whatever remains beyond the allotment. However, if any one of theſe poſſeſſes a houſe, let him not leave ſuch a one any money. In like manner, let him not bequeath a daughter any thing if ſhe is betrothed to a man; but let him bequeath her ſomething if ſhe is not betrothed. If any allotment in the region belonging to ſons or daughters ſhall be found after the will has been made, let it be left to the heir of the perſon that made the will. If the teſtator has no ſons, but daughters, let him ſignify in writing what men he would wiſh as huſbands for his daughters, and as ſons for himſelf. And if the ſon of any one, whether natural or adopted, happens to die before he has arrived at manhood, let the teſtator mention this circumſtance in the will, and ſignify who he wiſhes ſhould be his ſon in his ſtead, with more auſpicious fortune. If any one who has no children makes a will, let him be permitted to leave the tenth part of his poſſeſſions, beyond the allotment, to any one that he pleaſes. Let him bequeath all the reſt benignantly, without blame, and according to law, to the ſon whom he adopts. If the children of any dying perſon require tutors, and the father in his will has mentioned thoſe whom he wiſhes to undertake this office, let ſuch perſons enter on this employment according to his wiſh, if it is agreeable to them. But, if ſuch a one has either died inteſtate, or has not mentioned the tutors in his will, let the next of kin undertake this office,—two on the father's ſide, two on that of the mother, and one from among the friends of the deceaſed. In this caſe, too, let the guardians of the law appoint the tutors. And let the whole care pertaining to orphans devolve on fifteen of the guardians of the laws that are older than the reſt. And this number being divided into three parts, let three of them every year undertake this office, till the five periods are accompliſhed in a circle. Let the greateſt care likewiſe be taken that this mode may never fail. If any one dies inteſtate, and leaves behind him children that require a guardian, let them be provided for by the ſame laws. But if any one dies unexpectedly, and leaves behind him daughters, let him pardon the legiſlator if he diſpoſes of his daughters in conſequence of looking to two things, viz. proximity of race, and the

preſervation of the allotment. The third thing which a father ought to attend to is, the chooſing a proper ſon for himſelf, and a huſband for his daughter: but this he omits, becauſe the conſideration of it belongs to impoſſibilities. Let the following law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed about things of this kind:—If any one, dying inteſtate, leaves behind him daughters, let the brother on the father's or mother's ſide, if he is without an allotment, take care both of the daughter and the allotment of the deceaſed. But, if his brother is not living, let his brother's ſon undertake this office, if his age is ſufficient for the purpoſe. If no one of theſe ſurvives, let the charge devolve on the ſon of his ſiſter; and let the fourth after theſe be his father's brother; the fifth, the ſon of this brother; and the ſixth, the ſon of his father's ſiſter. Let a ſimilar proceſs be always adopted when a man leaves behind him daughters, viz. through brothers and couſins; firſt, the males, and afterwards the females, in the ſame family. But let the judge determine the fitneſs or unfitneſs of the time of marriages, by looking at the males naked, and at the females naked, as far as to the navel. If there is a want of kindred, as far as to the ſons of brothers and grandfathers, whatever citizen the girl ſhall chooſe, with the conſent of her tutors, ſhall become the heir of the deceaſed, and the huſband of his daughter. Further ſtill, if there ſhould happen to be but few inhabitants in the city, and the virgin ſhould wiſh to make ſome one who is ſent into a colony her father's heir, let this perſon, if he belongs to her family, proceed to the allotment according to the order of law. But if he is a citizen, but not related to her, let him marry her if he pleaſes, according to her own choice, and that of her guardians; and, returning home, let him take poſſeſſion of the hereditary eſtate. If any one dies inteſtate, and without children, either of the male or female ſex, let other particulars take place according to the above-mentioned law, but let the males and females of the family enter as kindred the deſolate houſe, as thoſe to whom the allotment properly belongs. In the firſt place, let the ſiſter enter; afterwards the daughter of the brother; in the third place, the daughter of the ſiſter; in the fourth place, the ſiſter of the father; in the fifth place, the daughter of the father's brother; and, in the ſixth place, the daughter of the father's ſiſter. Let theſe live together with thoſe according to proximity and what is right, in the manner we have eſtabliſhed above. But let not the weighty nature of laws of this kind eſcape

us, and let us not be inſenſible to the difficulty of ordering a relation of a deceaſed perſon to marry a relation. For he who introduces ſuch a law as this, does not appear to conſider that ten thouſand impediments may ariſe reſpecting mandates of this kind, ſo as to render perſuaſion to a compliance with them ineffectual. For many had rather ſuffer any thing than marry a perſon whoſe body is either diſeaſed or maimed, and whoſe dianoëtic part is not in a ſound ſtate. The legiſlator, therefore, will, perhaps, appear to ſome, though improperly, to pay no attention to theſe. Let this, then, be as it were a common preface, both for the legiſlator, and thoſe that are governed by his laws. Thoſe, indeed, for whom laws are made, ought to pardon the legiſlator, becauſe, while he is taking care of public concerns, he cannot at the ſame time attend to private calamities. We ſhould alſo pardon thoſe for whom laws are made, if they are ſometimes incapable of perfectly complying with the mandates of the legiſlator, through his ignorance of private calamities.

CLIN. In what manner then, O gueſt, will it be moſt proper to act in this caſe?

GUEST. Arbiters, O Clinias, muſt neceſſarily be choſen for laws of this kind, and for thoſe that are governed by them.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. It will ſometimes happen, that a rich young man given to luxury will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his father's brother, though rich, in conſequence of aſpiring after a greater marriage; and ſometimes he will neceſſarily be unwilling to comply with the law which forces him to marry a girl who is diſordered either in body or mind, conſidering this as the greateſt of all calamities. Let, therefore, the following law reſpecting theſe particulars be eſtabliſhed by us:—If any accuſe the eſtabliſhed laws on account of wills or marriages, or any thing elſe, aſſerting that the legiſlator, if he were living, would not compel them to act in ſuch a manner, or to marry ſuch a perſon; and if any relation or tutor ſhould affirm that the legiſlator left fifteen guardians of the laws as arbiters and fathers of the orphans,—in this caſe, let the litigants apply to theſe, and abide by their deciſion. But, if it ſhall appear that the guardians of the law exerciſe greater authority than they ought, let the affair be brought before ſelect judges; and, when determined, let him who is condemned be branded

with infamy,—this being a punishment, to him who possesses intellect, of a more weighty nature than a very considerable fine. After this, a second generation, as it were, follows with respect to orphans. For education and discipline follow the first generation, of which we have spoken. But, after the second, it is necessary to devise some means by which orphans may be oppressed with calamity as little as possible. In the first place, then, we say, that guardians of the laws should be appointed for them in the place of parents, and not worse than these; and that they should take care of them every year as if they were their own offspring. Let this, then, be our preface respecting the education of orphans, and the appointment of tutors for them. For we appear to me to have spoken opportunely above, when we asserted, that the souls of the dead possessed a certain power, through which they bestowed a providential attention to human affairs. This, indeed, is true, but the confirmation of it requires a long discourse. It is likewise proper to believe in other traditions respecting things of this kind, which are both numerous and very antient. Legislators, too, unless they are perfectly insane, ought to believe in the truth of these traditions. Since, therefore, these things naturally subsist after this manner, those that attend to the desolate condition of orphans should, in the first place, fear the Gods above; and, in the next place, the souls of the deceased, who naturally take a particular care of their offspring, and who are, therefore, propitious to those that honour them, but hostile towards those that despise them. Add, too, that the souls of those that are living, but are in old age, and who in a city happy through good laws possess the greatest honours, and whose children and grandchildren live a pleasant life, through paying them a proper attention,—these acutely hear and perceive things of this kind, and are benevolent to those that behave justly to orphans, but in the highest degree indignant with those that injure them. For they consider the deposit of orphans as the greatest and most holy of all deposits. It is requisite, therefore, that the tutor and magistrate who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, should direct his attention to these particulars, and bestow as much care on the discipline and education of orphans as of his own offspring. He, therefore, who is persuaded by this preface to the law, and who acts in no respect unjustly towards orphans, will evidently be exempt from all anger of the legislator about things of this kind. But let him who is unpersuaded by it, and injures any

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one who is deprived of either father or mother, ſuffer twice the puniſhment he would have ſuſtained from injuring one, both of whoſe parents were living.

The laws which follow relate to the tutors of orphans, and the attention which magiſtrates ſhould pay to the tutors. If, therefore, they poſſeſſed a paradigm of the education of free children, the tutors both taking care of theſe and their own concerns, and if they had laws reſpecting theſe ſufficiently diſtinct, we ſhould not without reaſon eſtabliſh certain laws for tutors, as very much differing from others, and diſtinguiſh, by various purſuits, the life of orphans from that of thoſe who are not orphans. But now, with reſpect to every thing of this kind, the privation of parents does not with us differ much from paternal government, but is unwilling to equalize honour, diſhonour, and providential care. Hence the law, through its attention to orphans, conſoles and threatens. And further ſtill, it will be very opportune for it to threaten as follows:—He who takes care either of a female or a male, and who from among the guardians of the law is appointed to obſerve the tutor of theſe, ſhall poſſeſs the ſame affection for the orphans intruſted to his care as if they were his own offspring; nor ſhall he beſtow leſs attention to their affairs, but even more, than to his own. Let every one, therefore, take care of orphans conformably to this law. But, if any one acts contrary to this law in affairs of this kind, let ſuch a tutor be condemned by a magiſtrate. And if it ſhall appear to the kindred of the orphans, or to any other of the citizens, that the tutor has acted negligently or viciouſly, let him be brought before a court of judgment, and make a fourfold reſtitution of the loſs ſuſtained, and let one half be given to the boy, and the other to the accuſer. When an orphan arrives at puberty, if he thinks that he has been neglected by his tutor, let him be permitted to call his tutor to an account for five years from the time that his tutorſhip is finiſhed. And if any tutor is condemned, let a court of juſtice determine what he ought to ſuffer, or what fine he ought to pay. If any magiſtrate ſhall appear to have injured an orphan through negligence, let a court of juſtice determine the reſtitution which he ought to make. But, if he ſhall appear to have injured the orphan through injuſtice, beſides making a reſtitution, let him be deprived of the office of a guardian of the law; and let another common guardian of the city be appointed in his place by the region and the city.

city. Greater diſcord takes place between fathers and ſons, and ſons and fathers, than is proper, in which fathers think that the legiſlator ought to permit them to renounce their ſons by a public crier, ſo as that they may no longer be their ſons according to law: and ſons are of opinion that they ought to be allowed to accuſe their fathers of madneſs, when they are diſgracefully circumſtanced through diſeaſe or old age. Theſe things uſually take place when the manners of men are perfectly corrupt. For, if the half only of theſe evils took place, as that the parents alone, or the children alone, were vicious, calamities which are the progeny of ſuch a mighty hatred would have no exiſtence. Indeed, in any other polity, a ſon, when abandoned by his father, would not neceſſarily be deprived of the city. But, in a city governed by theſe laws, he who is given up by his father muſt neceſſarily take up his abode in ſome other place. For no one is allowed to unite himſelf with any family of the five thouſand and forty houſes. On this account it is neceſſary, that the ſon who is abandoned by his father ſhould not only be driven from his father, but from his whole race. It is proper, therefore, in things of this kind, to act according to the following law:—When any one, through anger by no means fortunate, whether he is juſtly enraged or not, deſires to be liberated from an alliance with him whom he has begotten and educated, let him not be permitted to accompliſh his deſire either in an improper manner or directly. But, in the firſt place, let him aſſemble his own relations, as far as to his couſins, and, in a ſimilar manner, thoſe of his ſon on the mother's ſide. When they are aſſembled, let him accuſe his ſon to them, and ſhow them that he deſerves to be expelled from all his kindred. Let the ſon alſo be permitted to defend himſelf, and endeavour to prove that he does not deſerve to ſuffer any thing of this kind. And if the father perſuades them that his accuſation is juſt, and all the relations, both male and female, except the father, mother, and the ſon himſelf, vote for his being abandoned; when this is the caſe, let a father be permitted to renounce his ſon, but by no means when this is not the caſe. If any citizen wiſhes to adopt a ſon whom his father abandons, let him not be reſtrained from adopting him by any law. For the manners of youth naturally ſuſtain many mutations in life. But, if no one in the ſpace of ten years wiſhes to adopt ſuch a ſon, let thoſe whoſe province it is to ſend offspring into a colony, take care that this rejected ſon is made an inhabitant of ſuch a colony

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in a proper manner. If a certain diſeaſe, old age, or ſeverity of manners, or all theſe together, more than any thing elſe, render a man inſane, and this is concealed from every one except his domeſtics; and if ſuch a one diſſipates his ſubſtance, as being the maſter of it, but his ſon is unwilling to accuſe his father of madneſs, in this caſe let the following law be eſtabliſhed:—In the firſt place, let the ſon go to the oldeſt guardians of the law, and inform them of his father's calamity. Afterwards, let theſe, when they have ſufficiently conſidered the affair, conſult whether the father ſhould be proſcribed, or not: and, if they agree that he ſhould be proſcribed, let them be both witneſſes and patronizers of the cauſe. But, if the father is condemned, let him not afterwards poſſeſs any authority over his own affairs, but dwell at home for the reſt of his life like a child. If a huſband and wife, through the wretchedneſs of their manners, live in diſcord with each other, let ten men who ſubſiſt in the middle of the guardians of the laws, and, in a ſimilar manner, ten women who are curators of marriages, take care of things of this kind. And if they are able to procure a reconciliation, let their deciſion be valid. But, if their minds are too vehemently inflamed to admit of a reconciliation, let them ſeek, to the utmoſt of their power, after ſuch perſons as are adapted to reſide with each. It appears, indeed, that the manners of ſuch as theſe are far from being mild; and, on this account, we ſhould endeavour to adapt to them more profound and gentle manners. And ſuch, indeed, as are without children, or have but a few, and diſagree, let theſe be compelled to marry again, for the ſake of procreating children. But let ſuch as, having a ſufficient number of children, diſagree, be divorced, and united with others, for the ſake of that attention which old age requires. If a woman dies, and leaves behind her male and female children, let the law not compel, but perſuade, the huſband to educate his children without marrying again. But if there are no children, let him be compelled to marry again, till he has procreated children ſufficient both for his family and the city. But, if a man dies, and leaves behind him a ſufficient number of children, let the mother of the children educate them, remaining a widow. If ſhe appears, however, to be too young to live in a ſtate of health without a huſband, let her kindred, in conjunction with the women that take care of marriages, conſult what is fit to be done both for her and the children. And if both theſe are in want of children, let them marry for the

the ſake of having children. But let an accurate ſufficiency of children be a male and female according to law. When it is allowed that any offspring is the progeny of the begetter, but it is neceſſary to have recourſe to a court of juſtice in order to know which of the parents the child ought to follow, let the following mode be adopted:—If a female ſlave has connection with a ſlave, or with a free-born perſon, or with a freed-man, let the offspring be the property of the maſter of the female ſlave. But if a free-born woman is with child from a ſlave, let the maſter of the ſlave, in a ſimilar manner, be the maſter of the offspring. If any maſter has a child by his own ſlave, or any miſtreſs is pregnant from her ſlave, and this becomes apparent, let the women ſend the offspring of the woman, together with the father, into another region: but let the guardians of the law baniſh the offspring of the man, together with the mother of ſuch offspring. However, neither will Divinity, nor any man who is endued with intellect, ever adviſe any one to neglect his parents. Indeed, the aſſertion, that it is proper to know how to worſhip the Gods, will be a proper preface with reſpect to the honouring and diſhonouring of parents. Antient laws concerning the Gods are among all men eſtabliſhed in a twofold manner. For, clearly perceiving ſome of the Gods [1], we honour them; but we fabricate images of others; and while we rejoice in theſe images though inanimate, we think that the animated Gods themſelves will be benevolent and propitious to us for the attention which we pay to theſe. He, therefore, whoſe father or mother, or the fathers or mothers of theſe, reſide in his houſe, worn out with old age, like precious furniture, ſuch a one will never think that any other ſuch image, or one more efficacious, can ever reſide in his houſe, if he pays that reverential regard to it which he ought.

CLIN. Of what proper reverential regard are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. I will tell you. For things of this kind, O friends, deſerve to be heard.

CLIN. Only ſpeak.

GUEST. We ſay that Oedipus, being diſhonoured by his children, imprecated on them thoſe things which every one is perfectly acquainted with, and has heard were inflicted by the Gods. Amyntor, too, is ſaid to have

[1] Meaning the celeſtial orbs, which, in conſequence of being divine animals, from the participation of divinity, are called Gods.

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curſed his ſon Phœnix in anger, and Theſeus, Hippolytus, and innumerable other fathers, innumerable other ſons. From which it becomes apparent, that the Gods hear the prayers of parents againſt their children. For it is moſt juſt that nothing ſhould be ſo noxious to a child as the imprecation of his parent. Nor let any one think that the prayers of his father and mother are alone heard by the Gods according to nature, when they are deſpiſed by him, for they are alſo heard when they are honoured by, and are vehemently dear to, him. On this account, when in their prayers they earneſtly invoke the Gods to bleſs their children, ought we not to think that they are ſimilarly heard by them, and that the Gods equally impart to them ſuch things as are good? For otherwiſe they would not be juſt diſtributors of what is good, which we ſay becomes the Gods the leaſt of all things.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. We ſhould think, therefore, as we obſerved a little before, that we cannot poſſeſs any image which is more honoured by the Gods, than our fathers and grandfathers, mothers and grandmothers, when worn out with age. When any one honours theſe, divinity rejoices: for, otherwiſe, he would not hear their prayers. The image, indeed, of our progenitors ought to be conſidered by us, as far more wonderful than inanimate images. For animated images when they are reverenced by us, pray for us, but do the very contrary when they are deſpiſed by us. But inanimate images do neither of theſe. So that he who behaves properly to his father, grandfather, and all of this kind, ſuch a one poſſeſſes the moſt powerful of all images with reſpect to procuring divine benevolence.

CLIN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully.

GUEST. Every one, therefore, endued with intellect will fear and honour the prayers of his parents, as knowing that they have often been profitable and noxious to many. Theſe things, then, are thus eſtabliſhed by nature. By good men, therefore, their aged progenitors when living to the extremity of life, will be conſidered as a treaſure; and, if they die before they arrive at that period, they will be vehemently deſired by them. On the contrary, they will be terrible in the extreme to the vicious. Let every one, therefore, perſuaded by theſe aſſertions, honour his parents according to law. But if any one is deaf to theſe exordia, for ſuch the following law will be properly eſtabliſhed. If any one then, in this city, reverences his parents leſs

than he ought, and does not pay them more attention than he does his ſons, grandſons, and himſelf, neglecting to comply with their will in all things beyond that of others, let parents who are ſo neglected, give information of the affair themſelves, or by ſome other, to three of the oldeſt guardians of the law, and likewiſe to three of the women that have the care of marriages. And let theſe, after they have inveſtigated the affair, puniſh the offender; if he is a young man, indeed, with ſtripes and bonds, if he is not more than thirty years of age; and let the ſame puniſhment be inflicted on a woman, if ſhe is forty years of age. But if they are older than this, and yet do not ceaſe to neglect their parents, but afflict them, let them be brought before a court of juſtice, and be tried by thoſe citizens who ſurpaſs all the reſt in age: and, if they are condemned, let the court of juſtice determine what they ought to ſuffer, without omitting any puniſhment which ought to be inflicted on ſuch an occaſion. If any one, however, who is afflicted by his children, is unable to tell his condition, let any free perſon who hears of his caſe, announce it to the governors; or let him, if he omits to do this, be conſidered as a vicious perſon, and be accuſed by any one that is willing of the injury ſuſtained. But if a ſlave gives information of this affair, let him be made free. And if he is the ſlave either of the afflicting or afflicted perſon, let him be made free by the magiſtrate who is acquainted with the affair. But if he is the ſlave of any other citizen, let his ranſom be paid for to his maſter, by the public. Let the magiſtrates, likewiſe, be careful that no one injures a perſon of this kind, on account of his giving information. With reſpect to injuries by poiſons, we have already made a diviſion of ſuch of theſe as are deadly: but we have not yet diſtinguiſhed other injuries, whether they are committed by means of drink or meat, or unctions, voluntarily, and with premeditation. For there are two kinds of poiſons pertaining to the human ſpecies. For, as we juſt now clearly ſaid, bodies are naturally injured by bodies: and, in the next place, by enchantments, incantations and bindings, ſome who dare to injure others, are perſuaded that they are able to accompliſh their purpoſe through theſe, and others, that nothing is ſo eaſy as to be injured by thoſe that poſſeſs the power of witchcraft. Theſe particulars, therefore, and all that pertains to things of this kind, it is neither eaſy to know how they naturally ſubſiſt, nor, if any one does know, to perſuade others. But the minds of men being dubious as to things of this kind,

kind, it is not worth while to endeavour to perſuade them that, if at any time they ſee waxen images, whether in gates, in places where three roads meet, or on the tombs of their parents, they ſhould deſpiſe every thing of this kind, as they have no clear notions concerning them. Giving a twofold diviſion, therefore, to the law reſpecting enchantments, in the firſt place, we ſhall exhort, admoniſh, and adviſe men, not to attempt any thing of this kind; nor terrify the multitude, who are frightened like children; nor compel the legiſlator and judge to procure a remedy for ſuch fears of mankind. For, in the firſt place, he who endeavours to hurt another by poiſon, if he does not poſſeſs medical ſcience, cannot know what he does with reſpect to bodies. The ſame may be ſaid of him who endeavours to injure another by enchantment, unleſs he happens to be a diviner, or an interpreter of portents. Let the following law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed reſpecting poiſons. He who employs poiſon, not for the purpoſe of killing a man, but cattle, or ſwarms of bees, or in order to injure them ſome other way than by procuring their death, if he happens to be a phyſician, and is condemned for poiſoning, let him be puniſhed with death; but if he is unſkilled in medicine, let a court of juſtice determine what he ought to ſuffer, or what fine he ought to pay. But if any one by bonds, or allurements, or certain incantations, or ſuch like enchantments, is found endeavouring to injure another, if he is a diviner, or an interpreter of prodigies, let him be put to death. But if any one is accuſed of witchcraft, without being a diviner, let his puniſhment in a ſimilar manner be determined by a court of juſtice. Let him who injures another by fraud or force, pay a great fine, if the injury is great, but a ſmaller fine, if the injury is ſmall; and let reſtitution in all caſes be equivalent to the loſs ſuſtained. And, in all injuries, let the injurer be fined till he is amended. If it ſhall appear that any one was impelled to injure another, by a folly foreign to his nature, through the imprudence of youth, let him be ſentenced to pay a lighter fine; but if by his own proper folly, or through the incontinence of pleaſures and pains, or through fear, envy, certain deſires, or anger difficult to cure, a heavier fine. At the ſame time obſerving, that offenders are not to be puniſhed becauſe they have acted ill, (for what is done, can never become undone,) but that afterwards both offenders, and thoſe that ſee them puniſhed, may hate injuſtice, or may be in a conſiderable degree liberated from a calamity of this kind. For the

ſake of all theſe particulars, and looking to all theſe, the laws, like good archers, ſhould conſider this as a mark, viz. the magnitude of puniſhment, and the proper deſert in each offence. A judge, therefore, ought to act in this manner, as the miniſter of the legiſlature, ſince it is permitted him by law to eſtabliſh what puniſhment offenders ought to ſuffer: and, like a painter, he ſhould diligently copy his original. This, indeed, O Megillus and Clinias, ſhould be done by us at preſent, in the moſt beautiful and beſt manner; and we ſhould eſtabliſh what puniſhments ought to be inflicted, both on baſe actions committed by fraud, and thoſe committed by violence; and this in ſuch a manner as the Gods, and the ſons of the Gods, will permit us to eſtabliſh. Let no one then who is inſane be openly ſeen in the city, but let the relations of the inſane perſon keep him ſecure at home, in the beſt manner they are able. If they do not, let them be fined. And let him who poſſeſſes the largeſt eſtate be fined a hundred drachms, if he is negligent in ſecuring an inſane perſon, whether he be a ſlave, or free. But let him who poſſeſſes the next eſtate to this, be fined four out of five parts of a mina; he who poſſeſſes a third eſtate, three parts of a mina: and, he who poſſeſſes a fourth eſtate, four parts. Many, indeed, are rendered inſane by various means. Some, as thoſe of whom we have juſt ſpoken, through diſeaſe. Others through anger, and the vicious education of a depraved nature; who, being incited by a trifling enmity, talk loudly, and blaſpheme each other. But nothing of this kind ought to take place in a city governed by good laws. With reſpect to every kind of ſlander, therefore, let the following law be eſtabliſhed. Let no one ſlander another. But when one perſon in diſcourſe with another is doubtful of any particular, let him with whom he diſcourſes inſtruct both him and thoſe that are preſent in the truth of the caſe, and entirely abſtain from ſlander. For men, when they ſlander each other with baſe words, are to be conſidered as effeminate. And, in the firſt place, from words, which are a light thing, hatred and grievous enmities are often produced in reality. For he who is gratified with anger, which is a thing of an unpleaſant nature, and is filled with it as with noxious aliment,—ſuch a one, being rendered as ruſtic and ſavage in this part of his ſoul as he was once gentle and mild through diſcipline, leads a moroſe life, and receives from anger this bitter grace. Hence, nearly all men from

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things of this kind, utter ſomething ridiculous to their adverſaries; and he who accuſtoms himſelf to a thing of this kind, either errs in every reſpect, or deſtroys many parts of magnanimity. On this account, therefore, let no one ever ſpeak in this manner in a temple, or where public ſacrifices are performed; or in places of conteſt, or the forum, or in a court of juſtice, or in any common aſſembly. But let the magiſtrate, who is preſent at the time, freely puniſh any one who acts in this manner: and, if he neglects to do ſo, let him be conſidered as one who pays no attention to the laws nor the mandates of the legiſlator, and let him never be permitted to contend for the rewards which are conferred on virtue. But, if any one uſes ſlander in other places, either by provoking, or anſwering, let any more elderly perſon who is preſent, in defence of the law, reſtrain with blows thoſe who are incited by a foreign and vicious anger; or, if they do not, let them be puniſhed in the manner mentioned above. We ſay, too, at preſent, that he who is entangled with ſlander will not be able to refrain from ſometimes ſpeaking ridiculouſly; and this is what we condemn when it takes place through anger. But what then? Shall we admit the jeſts and ridiculous ſlanders which comedians employ againſt the citizens, if they are not accompanied with anger? Or ſhall we give this affair a twofold diviſion, viz. into the jocoſe and the ſerious? And, indeed, any one may be permitted jocoſely to employ ridicule without anger. But let no one be allowed to employ it, as we ſaid before, when inflamed with anger. Let us now, therefore, eſtabliſh by law to whom this may be allowed, and to whom not. Let not then a compoſer of comedies, or of iambic or muſical melody, be permitted either in words or images to ſlander any citizen, either in anger or without anger. And, if any one diſobeys this law, let thoſe that determine the rewards of conteſts drive him from the region the very ſame day, or they ſhall be fined three minæ, ſacred to the God to whom the conteſt belongs. But let the others, whom we mentioned above, be permitted to employ ridicule without anger, and in ſport; but let them not be permitted to do this ſeriouſly, and in anger. Let the determination, too, of this affair be committed to him who takes care of the whole diſcipline of youth. And let him who compoſes any thing be permitted to make it public, if it is approved of by this curator of youth: but if he does not approve of it, let not the author be permitted to ſhow it to any one, or inſtruct in it either a ſlave or a free-

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born perſon. Or, if he does, let him be conſidered as a vicious character, and as one who diſobeys the laws. But he deſerves commiſeration who, when temperate, or poſſeſſing ſome other virtue, or a part of virtue, is oppreſſed with a certain calamity, either from hunger, or ſomething of a ſimilar kind; but this cannot be ſaid univerſally of any one who falls into ſuch-like misfortunes. Hence it will, indeed, be a wonderful circumſtance if a man of this kind is ſo entirely neglected as to arrive at extreme poverty, whether he is a ſlave, or free, in a polity and city which is moderately inhabited. On this account, the following law may be ſafely eſtabliſhed by the legiſlator. Let there be no beggars in the city. But if any one attempts to procure food by prayers which cannot be ſatisfied, let the præfects of the forum expel him from the forum, and the governor of the ways and buildings from the city: and let the magiſtrate who preſides over the lands expel him from every other part of the region, that the whole country may be pure from an animal of this kind. If a male or a female ſlave injures the property of another perſon undeſervedly, whether through inexperience, or intemperate conduct, let the maſter of ſuch ſlave either make ſatisfaction to the injured perſon, or deliver up to him the injurer. But if the maſter of the ſlave contends that the affair happened through the mutual craft of the injurer and injured, that the ſlave might be taken from him, let him charge with the crime of malice the perſon who ſays he has been injured; and, if he convicts him, let him receive from him double the price at which a court of juſtice had valued the ſlave. If the maſter of the ſlave is convicted, let him both make the injured perſon a recompenſe for his loſs, and deliver up the ſlave. And, if a heifer, horſe, or dog, or any other animal, injures any neighbouring property, let the maſter of the animal in a ſimilar manner make reſtitution for the loſs. If any one refuſes to bear witneſs willingly, let him be cited by him who is in want of his evidence; and when cited, let him attend at a proper time, and bear witneſs to the beſt of his knowledge. But if he ſays that he is ignorant of the affair, let him ſwear that he is ignorant of it by the three Gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis, and be diſmiſſed. Let him who, when called to bear witneſs, does not attend, be obnoxious to the injury, according to law. If any judge is cited to give evidence, let him not, in giving evidence, paſs ſentence on the caſe. Let a free woman be permitted to bear witneſs, de-

fend a cauſe, and obtain juſtice, if ſhe is more than forty years of age, and is unmarried. But, if ſhe is married, let her be permitted to bear witneſs only. Let a male and female ſlave, and a boy, be alone permitted to bear witneſs and defend a cauſe in caſes of murder, if they can give ſufficient ſecurity for their appearance at the trial, if they ſhould happen to be accuſed of bearing falſe witneſs. If any one accuſes another of bearing falſe witneſs, let each of the litigants conſider the teſtimony, both in whole and part, before ſentence is paſſed. But let the magiſtrates preſerve in writing the accuſations of bearing falſe witneſs made by both, and bring them forward for the purpoſe of determining the falſe witneſſes. If any one ſhall be found to have given falſe witneſs twice, let the law no longer compel him to bear witneſs again. But if he ſhall be found to have given falſe witneſs thrice, let him not be permitted ever to bear witneſs again. And if he dares after this to bear witneſs, let any one who is willing give information of him to a magiſtrate. Afterwards, let the magiſtrate deliver him to a court of juſtice, and, if he is convicted, let him be put to death. When in any law-ſuit falſe witneſſes are detected, and are found to be the means of an opponent gaining his cauſe, if more than half of the witneſſes are condemned, let no judgment be paſſed from their evidence. But it is proper in this caſe diligently to inquire, whether or not any ſentence ſhould be paſſed; that, in whatever manner the cauſe may be determined, by this means juſtice may be done. Since, however, there are many beautiful things in the life of man, in moſt of them dire calamities are, as it were, naturally inherent, through which they are ſtained and defiled. But why ſhould not juſtice among men be beautiful, which renders all human affairs mild? And this being beautiful, why ſhould it not be beautiful to patronize the cauſe of another? This, then, being the caſe, a certain evil calumny gives a beautiful name to an art, which, it ſays, was firſt deviſed in judicial affairs; by means of which, in litigations, and the patronizing of cauſes, any one may vanquiſh another, whether the cauſe is juſt or not. They add, that the gift of this art, and of the arguments proceeding from it, conſiſts in beſtowing rewards from money. This, therefore, whether it is an art, or a certain exerciſe void of art, muſt by no means be planted in our city; but, reverencing the legiſlator, it ſhould be perſuaded not to ſpeak contrary to juſtice, and ſhould be ſent to ſome other region. Thoſe, then, that are perſuaded by

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theſe arguments we paſs over in ſilence: but let the following law be announced for thoſe that are unperſuaded by them:—If it ſhall appear that any one endeavours to give a contrary direction to the power of juſtice in the ſouls of the judges, and either excites or patronizes many unſeaſonable law ſuits, let any one who is willing charge him with acting baſely in judicial matters, or with patronizing a bad cauſe. And let the cauſe be tried in a ſelect court of juſtice. If, too, he is condemned, let the court of juſtice determine whether he acted in this manner through avarice or love of contention. And if through a love of contention, let the judges appoint him a certain time, beyond which he ſhall neither plead any cauſe himſelf, nor patronize that of another. But if through avarice, if he is a ſtranger, let him depart from the city without ever returning to it again, or if he neglects to do this, let him be put to death. If he is a citizen, in conſequence of thus improperly honouring money, let him be immediately put to death. Likewiſe, let him be put to death who has been found by a court of juſtice to have acted twice in this manner.

THE END OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK.

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THE LAWS,

BOOK XII.

IF an ambaſſador or a crier deceives the city in any thing committed to his charge, or does not announce what he is ſent to proclaim; or again, when returning from friends or enemies, does not truly relate the meſſage he received from them, let a written information be drawn up againſt ſuch a one, as irreligiouſly deſpiſing, contrary to law, the denunciations and mandates of Hermes and Jupiter. And if he is condemned, let the judges determine what he ought to ſuffer, or what fine he ought to pay. The theft of money is, indeed, illiberal, but rapine is baſe. But no one of the ſons of Jupiter will ever do any thing of this kind, in conſequence of being delighted either with fraud or force. Let no one, therefore, acting in a diſorderly manner through poets, or certain mythologiſts, be falſely perſuaded that if he thieves either by fraud or force, he does not act baſely, but does that which the Gods themſelves have done. For this is neither true nor becoming: but he who illegally acts in this manner, is neither a God, nor a ſon of the Gods. But it is proper that theſe things ſhould be known by the legiſlator rather than by all poets. He, therefore, who is perſuaded by this our diſcourſe, is happy, and will be happy through the whole of time; but he who is unperſuaded by it, muſt be reſtrained by the following law:—If any one commits any public theft, whether it is great or ſmall, he ought to ſuffer the ſame puniſhment. For he who takes away a thing of ſmall conſequence, thieves with the ſame deſire, though with leſs force. But he who moves any thing of greater conſequence, and does not reſtore it to its proper place, is wholly unjuſt. The law, however, thinks it proper that the one ſhould be leſs puniſhed than the other, not on account of the ſmallneſs of the theft,

but becauſe, perhaps, one of theſe characters may be cured, but the other is incurable. If a ſlave, or a ſtranger, is accuſed and condemned of any public theft, let ſentence be paſſed on him what he ought to ſuffer, or what fine he ought to pay, as if it were probable that he might be cured. But if any citizen, who has been properly educated, is convicted of having committed any public theft, or violence, whether he is detected in the fact or not, let him be puniſhed with death, as one who is nearly incurable. For hte ſake of war, indeed, many conſultations and many laws are very properly inſtituted. The greateſt of all things, however, conſiſts in this, that neither any male or female be at any time without a governor, nor the ſoul of any citizen be ever accuſtomed, either ſeriouſly or in ſport, to do any thing from itſelf alone; but that in all war, and in all peace, it perpetually looks to a governor, and lives following his mandates, ſo as to comply with them in the ſmalleſt particular; to ſtand when he commands, walk, engage in gymnaſtic exerciſes, waſh, eat, riſe by night for the purpoſe of keeping guard and giving ſignals; and in dangers themſelves, neither to purſue nor give way to any one, without the mandate of the governors. And, in one word, that it ſhould never be taught to do or know any thing ſeparate from others; but that the life of all men ſhould, in the higheſt degree, in all things be collected into one, ſubſiſt together, and be common. For nothing will ever be more excellent, better, or more artificial than this, for the purpoſe of procuring ſafety and victory in war. In peace, too, men ſhould be accuſtomed from their childhood to govern others, and to be governed by others. But anarchy ſhould be expelled from all life, both from that of men, and of beaſts that are in ſubjection to men. All choirs, too, ſhould be celebrated, with a view to the beſt mode of conducting war; and all facility, dexterity, and promptitude, ſhould be ſtudied for the ſake of this. On this account, too, we ought to accuſtom ourſelves to endurance of hunger and and thirſt, cold and heat, and a hard bed. And, what is greateſt of all, for the ſake of this we ſhould be careful not to corrupt the power of the head and feet by the tegument of foreign clothing, which deſtroys the generation and nature of our proper hairs and ſhoes. For theſe extremities, when preſerved, poſſeſs the greateſt power of the whole body, but the contrary when they are not preſerved. And one of theſe is in the higheſt degree ſubſervient to the whole body; but the other is endued with a principal authority, naturally

rally poſſeſſing all its principal ſenſes. And this praiſe of a warlike life ought to be heard by young men. But the law is as follows:—Let every one engage in war who is choſen for this purpoſe, or is deputed a certain part. But, if any one, through a certain vice, deſerts his poſt without leave from his commander, let him be accuſed of deſertion, when he returns, to the principal officers of the army. Let him be judged, too, by all the military orders, by the horſe and the foot ſeparately, and in a ſimilar manner by the reſt. And let the foot be introduced to the foot, the horſe to the horſe, and each of the other orders to thoſe of the ſame rank with themſelves. If any one is condemned, let him afterwards be prohibited from engaging in any military conteſt, or accuſing another of neglect of military duty. And beſides this, let a court of juſtice determine what he ought to ſuffer, or what fine he ought to pay. After this, when the trial for deſertion is finiſhed, let the commanders again aſſemble each of theſe orders, that military rewards may be conferred on thoſe who have conducted themſelves ſtrenuouſly in battle. But any one who is willing may judge of the victory among thoſe of the ſame rank with himſelf, ſo as that he neither produces arguments nor witneſſes of any former battle, but alone conſiders the battle which has then been fought. Let a crown of olive, too, be the reward of the military champion. And afterwards, let thoſe that have obtained theſe crowns ſuſpend them in the temples of the warlike Gods, with any inſcription they pleaſe, that they may be a teſtimony through the whole of life of the military virtue of the moſt valiant, and thoſe that were valiant in the ſecond and third degree. But, if any one engages in battle, and leaves the army before he is diſmiſſed by his commanding officers, let him be tried by the ſame judges as the deſerter was tried by, whom we mentioned above, and, if condemned, let him be ſimilarly puniſhed. It is proper, however, that one man, when he is about to judge another, ſhould be fearful leſt he ſhould either voluntarily or involuntarily inflict puniſhment falſely. For juſtice is ſaid, and is truly ſaid, to be a baſhful virgin. But falſehood is naturally odious to baſhfulneſs and juſtice. In other things, therefore, it is requiſite to be cautious with reſpect to judging erroneouſly, but particularly as to throwing away armour in battle. For, it may happen that ſome one may be erroneouſly conſidered as baſe for an action of this kind, and may be puniſhed for it undeſervedly. For it is by no means eaſy to determine properly in this caſe. At the ſame

time it is neceſſary that the law ſhould endeavour to define according to parts. Employing a fable, therefore, we ſay, if Patroclus ſhould have been carried to his tent without arms, and ſcarcely alive, as is frequently the caſe, and if his arms, which, as the poet ſays, were given to Peleus by the Gods on his marriage with Thetis, ſhould be in the poſſeſſion of Hector, would evil men in this caſe reproach the ſon of Menœtius, as if he had thrown away his arms? Further ſtill, if any perſons, being hurled from lofty places, either into the ſea, or into places conſiſting of an abundant conflux of water produced through tempeſts, or into many other places of this kind, which might eaſily be adduced to free them from a ſuſpicion of cowardice,—if, being hurled into theſe, they ſhould loſe their arms, ought they in this caſe to be blamed? But we ought to endeavour, to the utmoſt of our power, to ſeparate the greater and the moſt grievous evil from the contrary. In ſlandering, therefore, the very words employed for the purpoſe, poſſeſs a certain diviſion. For, as the throwing away arms cannot be juſtly aſſerted in all caſes, but the loſing them may; in like manner, he is not to be ſimilarly called a thrower away of his ſhield who loſes it by force, as he who voluntarily throws it away. For they totally and univerſally differ from each other. Let the following law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed:—If any one, being aſſaulted by enemies, and having arms, does not defend himſelf againſt them, but voluntarily drops them, or throws them away, preferring a baſe life, in conjunction with infamy, to a beautiful and happy death, accompanied with fortitude, let ſentence be paſſed on ſuch a one, as a thrower away of arms, but let the judge neglect to conſider the loſing of arms mentioned above. For it is requiſite always to puniſh the vicious, that they may become better, but not the unfortunate. For no advantage would be derived from an action of this kind. But what puniſhment will be adapted to him who is condemned for throwing away his arms in a cowardly manner? For, it is impoſſible to change a man of this kind into a contrary character, as they report Divinity once changed the Theſſalian Cæneus from the nature of a woman into that of a man. For a contrary generation would, after a manner, be the moſt adapted of all others to him who throws away his ſhield,—I mean, that he ſhould be puniſhed by being changed from a man into a woman. But now, ſince this is impoſſible, let us deviſe a puniſhment which approaches the neareſt to this, I mean that, in conſequence of his great love

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of life, he ſhall never afterwards engage in any dangerous enterprize, but, as being a vicious character, live as long as poſſible, covered with diſgrace. Let, then, the following law be eſtabliſhed for theſe:—When a man is condemned for ſhamefully throwing away his warlike arms, let neither any general of an army, nor any other military officer, ever employ him as a ſoldier, nor admit him into the army. But if any ſuch officer does admit him, let the judge who inquires into the reaſons of conduct puniſh him as follows: If he poſſeſſes the largeſt eſtate, let him be fined ten minæ; if the ſecond in rank, five minæ; if the third, three; and, if the fourth, one mina. But he who was condemned for throwing away his armour, beſides being excluded from engaging in manly dangers, through his cowardice, ſhall, if he poſſeſſes the largeſt eſtate, be in like manner fined ten minæ; if the ſecond, five; if the third, three; and, if the fourth, one mina. But, with reſpect to thoſe magiſtrates who inquire into the reaſons of conduct, what ought we to determine; ſome magiſtrates being choſen by a yearly lot, but others for many years, and by ſelection? For who will be a ſufficient judge of the reaſons of conduct, if it ſhould happen that any magiſtrate, being bent by the weight of his government, ſhould ſay or do any thing unworthy of his office? It is, indeed, by no means eaſy to find one adequate to the purpoſe. For, ſince one magiſtrate ſurpaſſes another in virtue, how ſhall we diſcover him who tranſcends all the reſt. At the ſame time, we ſhould endeavour to find certain divine men who may act for us as judges of the reaſons of conduct. For the caſe is as follows:—There are many occaſions for diſſolving a polity, as there are of a ſhip, or a certain animal, of which, though there is one diſperſed nature, yet we denominate them tones, tranſverſe encloſures, extenſions of nerves, and call them by many other names. But this is an occaſion, by no means the ſmalleſt, of the preſervation and diſſolution of a polity. For, if the judges who require of the magiſtrates the reaſon of their conduct, are better than the magiſtrates, and this is managed in ſuch a manner as to take away all occaſion of complaint, the whole region and city will thus flouriſh and be happy. But, if an inquiry is made into the conduct of the magiſtrates in a different manner, then, that judgment being diſſolved by which all political affairs are connected in one, a diviſion of all government takes place, and magiſtrates no longer verging to the ſame thing, they cauſe the city from being one, to be many; and

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filling it with ſeditions, bring it rapidly to deſtruction. On this account, it is neceſſary that thoſe who inquire into the reaſons of conduct ſhould, in a wonderful manner, be endued with every virtue. We ſhall, therefore, thus deviſe the fabrication of theſe. Let the whole city aſſemble every year after the ſummer ſolſtice, to a ſacred grove common to the Sun and Apollo, in order to elect three men, which every one ſhall judge to excel all others except himſelf; and let theſe be not leſs than fifty years of age. Afterwards, let the half of thoſe who are choſen by the greateſt number of votes be ſelected, if they form an even number; but if they form an odd number, then, leaving out one who had the feweſt votes, let the half of the remainder be taken, and a judgment formed by the number of votes. If ſome happen to have an equal number of votes, and the half of theſe is more than three, let the exceſs be taken away, and the juniors rejected. Afterwards, out of theſe, let an election be made by votes, till three, whoſe votes are unequal, are obtained. But if all theſe, or two of them, have equal votes, then, committing the affair to good fate and fortune, let the three be diſtinguiſhed by lot; and let him who is victor, together with the ſecond and third, be crowned with leaves of olive. Afterwards, the rewards being conferred, let it be proclaimed to all men, that the city of the Magneſians having again obtained ſafety from Divinity, conſecrates three of its beſt citizens as common firſt fruits to Apollo and the Sun, conformably to an antient law. Let theſe, too, in the firſt year, chooſe twelve examiners of the reaſons of conduct, and continue to do this till each has accompliſhed his ſeventy-fifth year; and afterwards, let three always be added every year. Let theſe accurately obſerve all the magiſtrates, who are to be divided into twelve parts, with all poſſible free examination. Let them reſide, too, at the time in which they act as examiners of the reaſons of conduct, in the grove ſacred to the Sun and Apollo, in which they were elected. Here, each inquiring into every thing by himſelf, and all examining in common, let them ſignify by public writings in the forum what each of the magiſtrates ought to ſuffer, or be fined, according to their deciſion. But if any one of the magiſtrates does not acknowledge that he has been condemned juſtly, let him go to the choſen judges appointed to examine the reaſons of conduct, and if he is acquitted by theſe, let him accuſe, if he is willing, the examiners of the reaſons of conduct; but, if he is condemned by the choſen judges alſo, and was before by the other

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judges condemned to death, let him die, as neceſſity requires. But if he was ſentenced by them to pay a fine, the double of which he is capable of paying, let him be fined the double of it.

It is, however, now requiſite to hear what the accuſations of theſe judges will be, and after what manner they will take place. The firſt places, then, in all public ſpectacles ſhould always be given to thoſe who are appointed by the common conſent of the whole city to preſide over all others as long as they live. And further ſtill, when it is found neceſſary to ſend magiſtrates to inſpect the common ſacrifices, ſpectacles, and other ſacred rites of the Greeks, let them be ſent from theſe. Likewiſe, let theſe alone in the city be adorned with a crown of laurel; and let them all be prieſts of Apollo and the Sun. Let him, too, be the high-prieſt every year from among theſe, who in the former year was judged to excel the other prieſts; and let his name every year, as long as the city is inhabited, become the meaſure of the number of time. But when theſe prieſts die, let care be taken that their funerals and ſepulchres ſurpaſs thoſe of the other citizens. Let every one, too, on this occaſion have a white robe, and let there be no weeping and lamentation. Let there be alſo two choirs, one conſiſting of fifteen girls, and the other of as many boys; and let each of theſe ſurround the bier, praiſing the prieſts, as it were, in a hymn, and each by turns celebrating their felicity in ſongs through the whole day. On the morning following, let a hundred young men, who are engaged in gymnaſtic exerciſes, carry the bier to the ſepulchre which the relations of the deceaſed have choſen. And, in the firſt place, let the unmarried young men march before the bier armed in a warlike manner, together with horſes and horſemen; the foot with their light arms, and others in a ſimilar manner. But let boys, going before the bier, ſing a paternal ſong; and let them be followed by girls, and women who are no longer capable of bearing children. After theſe, let prieſts and prieſteſſes follow, as to a pure ſepulchre, though they are forbidden to go to other ſepulchres; if the Pythian deity likewiſe aſſents. Let the ſepulchre, too, for theſe be built under the earth; and let it be a long arch compoſed of valuable and undecaying ſtones, and containing on each ſide beds of ſtone. In this let them place the bleſſed deceaſed, and plant a grove of trees in a circular order round the monument, except in one part, that the ſepulchre may be always enlarged when it is requiſite. Every year, too,

too, let muſical, gymnaſtic and equeſtrian conteſts be inſtituted in honour of theſe deceaſed prieſts. And ſuch are the honours which ought to be paid to thoſe whoſe judgments concerning the reaſons of conduct are not condemned. But, if any one of theſe, confiding too much in his deciſion, ſhould make the imbecility of human nature apparent, and become depraved after his deciſion, let him be accuſed by any one who is willing; and let the following law reſpecting the mode of his accuſation be eſtabliſhed:—In the firſt place, let him be brought before a court of juſtice, and let the guardians of the laws at the ſame time be preſent. Afterwards, let the colleagues of the accuſed be preſent; and, laſtly, let the court of juſtice be compoſed of ſelect judges. Then, let his accuſer ſignify in writing that he who is accuſed is an unworthy character, and that he does not deſerve either the rewards, or to act in the capacity, of a magiſtrate. If, therefore, he is condemned, let him be deprived of magiſtracy, of a ſepulchre, and of thoſe other rewards which pertain to his office. But if his accuſer has not a fifth part of votes, let him who poſſeſſes the largeſt eſtate be fined twelve minæ; he who poſſeſſes the ſecond, eight; the third, ſix; and the fourth, two minæ. Rhadamanthus, indeed, deſerves to be admired with reſpect to his deciſion of judicial affairs. For he perceived that the men of that time evidently believed that there were Gods, and this very properly, becauſe at that time many of them were the progeny of the Gods; and he is ſaid to have been one of theſe. He appears, therefore, to have conceived that cauſes ought not to be referred to any human judge, but to the Gods; and, on this account, cauſes were decided by him in a ſimple and rapid manner. For, cauſing the litigants in every caſe to take an oath, he determined cauſes rapidly and with ſafety. But now, as we have ſaid, a certain part of mankind denies that there are Gods; others conceive that they take no care of us; and the opinion of the greateſt and worſt part is, that they may be appeaſed by trifling ſacrifices and abundance of flattery, and that thoſe who thus appeaſe them, may with impunity defraud others of great ſums of money. Hence, the art of Rhadamanthus in judicial affairs will not be adapted to men of the preſent time. The opinions of men, therefore, reſpecting the Gods being changed, it is neceſſary that laws alſo ſhould be changed. A prudent legiſlator, therefore, in judicial conteſts, will not ſuffer the litigants to take an oath, that as well the intention of the accuſer, as the entreaty of the defendant,

dant, may be committed to writing without an oath. For if every one in the city ſhould be freely permitted to take an oath, in conſequence of many caſes being every day brought before the judges, almoſt every one would be perjured, through connections ariſing from feaſting together, and other aſſociations, and from private meetings. Let it, therefore, be eſtabliſhed by law, that he who is about to be judged ſhall ſwear to the judge, and that he who appoints the public magiſtrates ſhall either appoint them through oaths, or by ſuffrages. Likewiſe, that the judge of choirs, and all muſic, together with the preſidents and thoſe that confer rewards on gymnaſtic and equeſtrian exerciſes, ſhall take an oath; and, in ſhort, in all caſes in which, according to the opinion of men, perjury is not attended with gain. But let thoſe caſes in which any one may derive great advantage from perjury be judged without an oath. Likewiſe, in judicial caſes, let not the litigants by any means be permitted either to ſwear for the ſake of perſuading, or imprecate themſelves and their family, or employ baſe ſupplications or feminine excitations to pity; but let them always in an honourable manner teach and learn that which is juſt. But if they do not act in this manner, let the magiſtrates again bring them back to the affair in hand, as thoſe who ſpeak foreign to the purpoſe. When ſtrangers, like us, quarrel among themſelves, let them be permitted, if they are willing, to take an oath. For, as they are not allowed to grow old in the city, there is no reaſon to fear leſt they ſhould corrupt others. In the ſame manner, let juſtice be executed among free men, if any one of theſe is not perſuaded by the city in things which are neither puniſhed with blows, nor bonds, nor death. If any one does not attend at the celebration of a choir, or ſolemn proceſſion, or any other common adornings of this kind, or public office, ſuch as take place for the ſake of pacific ſacrifice or warlike tributes,—in all theſe caſes let the damage be repaired as ſoon as poſſible; or let the pledge be taken to him to whom the city and law have committed it, and when the limited time is expired let the pledge be ſold, and the money applied to public uſe. But, if there is occaſion for a greater fine, let the magiſtrates bring thoſe that refuſe to pay it before a court of juſtice, and compel them to pay the fine enacted by the laws. It is neceſſary, however, to conſult what ought to be done with a city which does not apply itſelf to the acquiſition of wealth, except that which ariſes from agriculture, ſince it neither exports nor im

ports commodities, nor admits foreigners. The legiſlator, therefore, ought to conſult about theſe particulars, employing, in the firſt place, perſuaſion to the utmoſt of his power. The mixture, indeed, of different nations naturally cauſes a mixture of all-various manners; and the aſſociation of ſtrangers with ſtrangers produces innovations which injure in the higheſt degree cities that are well governed through good laws. But, to the greater part of cities, as being by no means well governed, it is of no conſequence if as well the old as the young travel into other countries whenever they pleaſe, and receive foreigners in their own country. But, on the contrary, in theſe never to receive ſtrangers, and never to viſit foreign countries, would appear ruſtic and ſavage to other men, who would call the city by opprobrious names, ſuch as, that it is the enemy of ſtrangers, and that its manners are arrogant and moroſe. The appearing, however, to be good, or not good, to others, ought never to be conſidered as a thing of ſmall importance. For the multitude, though deprived of virtue themſelves, are capable of diſtinguiſhing the worthy from the unworthy: and in certain vicious characters there is ſomething divine, and a power of conjecturing well. So that many, and even ſome that are vicious in the extreme, are able to diſtinguiſh, both in words and opinions, the better from the worſe ſort of men. On this account, the multitude of cities are very properly exhorted not to deſpiſe the good opinion of the multitude. For it is a thing of the greateſt rectitude and magnitude, when a man is truly good himſelf, that he ſhould aſpire after a renowned life; ſince, without this, a man will by no means become perfect. On this account, it will be proper that the city which is to be inhabited about Crete ſhould endeavour to obtain the moſt beautiful and excellent reputation for virtue among other men. But there is every reaſon to hope, that this city in a ſhort time will be beheld both by the Sun and other Gods, in well-governed cities and regions, living according to reaſon. Let the following law, therefore, be eſtabliſhed reſpecting travelling into other regions and places, and the reception of gueſts:—In the firſt place, let it not be lawful for him who is leſs than forty years of age by any means to travel; and further ſtill, let no perſon be permitted to travel privately; but let cryers, ambaſſadors, or certain ſpeculators, be allowed to travel publicly. Leaving a country, however, in order to wage war, is not to be conſidered as political travelling. It is likewiſe requiſite that certain perſons ſhould be

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ſent to Pythian Apollo, to Olympian Jupiter, and alſo to Nemea and Iſthmus, for the purpoſe of communicating in the ſacrifices and conteſts ſacred to theſe Gods. But let as much as poſſible many, and theſe ſuch as are the moſt beautiful and the beſt, be ſent on this occaſion, who may procure for the city renown, and glory correſponding to warlike glory in ſacred concerns, and things pertaining to pacific communions. And when they return home, let them teach the young men, that the legal inſtitutions of other nations, reſpecting political affairs, are inferior to their own. If any ſpeculators, likewiſe, who abound in leiſure, are deſirous of ſurveying the affairs of other men, let no law belonging to the guardians of the laws reſtrain them from executing their deſire. For a city, when ignorant of good and evil men, cannot, in conſequence of being unſociable, be ſufficiently mild and perfect. Nor, again, can it preſerve its laws by manners alone, without a knowledge of them. For among the multitude of mankind, there are always ſome divine men, not indeed many, but who in the higheſt degree deſerve to be aſſociated with: and theſe do not ſpring up in well-governed cities, more than in their contraries. Every one, therefore, who is an inhabitant of a well-governed city, and whoſe manners are uncorrupt, ought, leaving his country, to tread in the ſteps of theſe men, exploring both by land and ſea, that when he returns to his country he may give ſtability to ſuch legal inſtitutions as are beautifully ordained, and correct ſuch as are in any reſpect deficient. For without ſuch a ſpeculation and inquiry a city can never continue perfect, nor yet if the explorers ſpeculate badly.

CLIN. How, therefore, can both theſe take place?

GUEST. Thus. In the firſt place, let a ſpeculator of this kind not be more than fifty years of age. In the next place, let him be approved both in other reſpects, and for the purpoſes of war, if he intends to leave to other cities an example of the guardians of laws. But, when he is more than ſixty years of age, let him no longer travel as a ſpeculator. Let him, therefore, return when he pleaſes, within the ſpace of ten years, and on his return go to the aſſembly of thoſe that examine the laws. But let this aſſembly be compoſed of the old and the young; and let it be held every day from neceſſity, before the dawn of day, till the ſun riſes. And, in the firſt place, let it be compoſed of thoſe prieſts who receive rewards, as being more excellent than the reſt; in the next place, of twelve of the ſenior guardians of the

laws; and, in the laſt place, of the preſident of all erudition, together with the young, and thoſe who no longer act in this capacity. Let not any one of theſe be alone, but let him go with ſome young man whom he may chooſe, between thirty and forty years of age. Let theſe, when they aſſemble, always diſcourſe concerning the laws and their own city; and, if they have heard any thing excellent reſpecting theſe, let them communicate it to each other. Let them alſo diſcourſe concerning ſuch diſciplines as appear to conduce to this ſpeculation, and which thoſe who are ſkilled in will be enabled to underſtand more clearly; but thoſe who are not ſkilled in them will more darkly comprehend the things pertaining to laws. Afterwards, let ſuch particulars among theſe as are approved of by the more aged, be learnt with the greateſt aſſiduity by the younger. If any young man of the aſſembly ſhall appear to be an unworthy character, let the whole aſſembly blame him by whom he was brought thither. But let the whole city defend and honour thoſe young men whoſe conduct in the aſſembly is approved. If ſuch young men as go to the aſſembly are worſe than others, let them be more diſgraced than others. Let him who ſpeculates the legal inſtitutions of other men immediately go to this aſſembly on his arrival from foreign parts; and if he has diſcovered any thing among others, reſpecting the eſtabliſhment of laws, or diſcipline, or education, or has himſelf found out any thing pertaining to theſe, let him communicate it to the whole aſſembly. If, too, it ſhall appear that he has returned neither worſe nor better than he was before, let him be praiſed for having done his beſt: but if he returns much better, let him while living be greatly honoured, and, when dead, let all the aſſembly pay him thoſe honours which are his due. But if it ſhall appear that he has returned corrupted, though he pretends to be wiſe, let him not dare to aſſociate with any young or old perſon. And if he is obedient to the magiſtrates, let him live as a private man; but if not, let him be put to death. Likewiſe, if, when he ought to be brought before a court of juſtice, any magiſtrate neglects to bring him, let ſuch magiſtrate be diſgraced when a contention takes place about rewards. Let him, therefore, who travels, travel in this manner, and let him be ſuch a perſon as we have deſcribed. But, in the next place, foreigners ought to be kindly received. There are four kinds of foreigners, then, of whom we ought to make mention. The firſt is, of thoſe who are always ſummerly, and moſt of whom, like birds, fly over

over the ſea in ſummer to other cities, for the ſake of acquiring riches. It is proper that theſe ſhould be received in the forum, in the ports and public buildings, beyond the city, by the magiſtrates who preſide over theſe places; ſuch magiſtrates at the ſame time taking care that no innovation is made by any of theſe foreigners. Let juſtice, too, be properly diſtributed to them, and no aſſociation be held with them, beyond what is abſolutely neceſſary. The ſecond kind is, of thoſe who travel for the ſake of beholding what Muſes are received by different cities. It is proper that all ſuch as theſe ſhould have habitations near the temples, properly conſtructed for hoſpitable purpoſes. Prieſts, too, and the purifiers of temples, ought to take care of theſe, that after they have ſtaid a ſufficient time, and have ſeen and heard all that they came to ſee and hear, they may depart without any detriment either to themſelves or others. Let the prieſts, too, be the judges of theſe. And, if any one of them commits an injury, or is injured, let the prieſts fine the offending party as far as to fifty drachms. But it is proper that greater offences ſhould be puniſhed by thoſe that preſide over the markets. The third kind of foreigner that ought to be publicly received, is he who is ſent from another region on ſome public affair. Him let the generals of the army, the maſters of the horſe, and the military tribunes, alone receive. And let him be alone taken care of by him with whom he reſides together with the chief magiſtrates. The fourth genus of foreigners is indeed rare. Some one, however, may come from another region with the ſame deſign that our ſpeculators travel into foreign parts. Let ſuch a one then be received on the following conditions. In the firſt place, he muſt not be leſs than fifty years of age. In the next place, he muſt come with an intention either of beholding what is remarkably beautiful in other cities, or of inſtructing other cities in things of this kind. Let ſuch a one, therefore, approach, unbidden, to the gates of the rich and the wiſe, ſince he comes under this deſcription himſelf. And let him go to the houſe of him who takes care of the whole of diſcipline, believing that one who is victorious in virtue will be conſidered by ſuch a character as a ſufficient gueſt. Likewiſe, when he has learnt from others, and has taught others, what he conſiders as fit to be learnt and taught, let him depart like a friend from friends with gifts and becoming honours. All foreigners, both male and female, ought to be received according to theſe laws, and, in a ſimilar manner

reverencing

reverencing hoſpitable Jupiter, we ſhould ſend men from our city. For foreigners ought not to be expelled with food and victims, (as the inhabitants of the Nile do at preſent,) nor yet are they to be driven away by ſavage edicts. Let every ſurety be reſponſible for another in a conſpicuous manner; and let the whole tranſaction be acknowledged in writing, before not leſs than three witneſſes, if the ſecurity is within a hundred drachms. But, if it is beyond a thouſand, let there be five ſureties at leaſt. Let the ſurety, if he is a ſhopkeeper, be one that acts juſtly in his buſineſs, or elſe let him by no means be conſidered as worthy of belief. If any one deſires to ſearch in the houſe of another perſon for ſomething belonging to himſelf, let him firſt of all ſwear by the legal Gods that he hopes to find there what he is in ſearch of. In the next place, let him enter the houſe naked, or with no other clothing than a tunic, and ungirded. Then let him be permitted to ſearch the houſe, and examine every thing, whether ſealed or unſealed. But, if any one refuſes admittance to him who deſires to ſearch his houſe, let him who is forbidden acceſs bring an action againſt him who refuſes him admittance, for the value of what he has loſt; and, if ſuch perſon is condemned, let him be obliged to pay twice the value of the loſs ſuſtained. If the maſter of the houſe on ſuch an occaſion happens to be abſent, let thoſe that are preſent permit only ſuch things as are unſealed to be examined; and let the perſon that ſearches the houſe ſeal with his own ſignet the things already ſealed, and leave for five days any perſon he pleaſes as a guard in the houſe. But if the maſter of the houſe is abſent for a longer time than this, let him who deſires to ſearch the houſe take the ædiles along with him, break open ſuch things as are ſealed, and, after he has examined them in conjunction with the domeſtics and ædiles, ſeal them again. With reſpect to things of an ambiguous nature, let not a limited time for the determination of them be left dubious: for by this means there will be no altercation about houſes and land. But if any one is in poſſeſſion of other things, and it appears that he has uſed them openly for the ſpace of a year, in the city, in the forum, and in temples, and no one has laid claim to them during that time, in this caſe let no one be permitted afterwards to demand thoſe things as his own. But if ſuch perſon uſed ſuch things, neither in the city, nor in the forum, but openly in the fields, and the proper owner of them is not found in five years, let no one be ſuffered to demand

them after the expiration of this time. But if ſuch perſon uſes theſe things at home in the city, let the period of laying claim to them be limited to three years. But if he uſes them ſecretly in the fields, let it be limited to ten years. And, if he uſed them in another diſtrict, let the perſon who has loſt them be permitted to lay claim to them at any time. If any one forcibly hinders another, whether a plaintiff or defendant, from having recourſe to juſtice, if it is a ſlave that he hinders, whether his own or belonging to another perſon, let no notice be taken of the affair, and let the legal proceſs be ſtopt: but if it is a free-born perſon, beſides the legal proceſs being ſtopt, let him by whom he was forcibly detained be impriſoned for a year, and let any one who is willing accuſe him of mancipation. If any one forcibly prohibits a gymnaſtic or muſical antagoniſt, or an opponent in any other conteſt, from contending in his art, let any one who is willing inform thoſe that confer rewards on the victors in theſe exerciſes, of the affair; and theſe ſhall be the means of procuring admittance to the conteſts to ſuch as are willing to engage in them. But if it ſhould happen that they are incapable of procuring them admittance, if he who impedes is himſelf victorious, let the reward of his victory be given to the perſon he impeded, and let the name of the perſon ſo impeded be inſcribed as victor in whatever temples he pleaſes. But let not the perſon that impedes be ſuffered to ſuſpend an offering, or make any inſcription of a victory of this kind. Likewiſe, let him be accuſed of having done an injury, whether he vanquiſhes in contending, or is vanquiſhed. If any one receives ſtolen goods knowingly, let him ſuffer the ſame puniſhment as the perſon that ſtole them. Let death, too, be the puniſhment of him that harbours an exile. For every one ſhould reckon him as a friend or an enemy, who is conſidered as ſuch by the city. If any one of his own accord makes peace with, or denounces war againſt, certain perſons, without general conſent, let death be the puniſhment of ſuch a one. But if any part of a city makes peace, or denounces war, by itſelf, let the generals of the army bring the authors of this action before a court of juſtice; and, when condemned, let their puniſhment be death. Let thoſe that ſerve their country in any reſpect do this without gifts. And let no occaſion or arguments ever induce us to believe that we ought to receive gifts for good offices, but not for ſuch as are bad. For it is neither eaſy to know when actions are good or bad, nor to endure patiently

patiently when this knowledge is obtained. It is, therefore, more ſafe to liſten to, and be perſuaded by, the law, which ſays that no one ſhall ſerve his country for the ſake of gifts. Let him, therefore, who is unperſuaded by this law, when condemned, be puniſhed with death. Let public tributes, too, be diſpoſed as follows: In the firſt place, every one's poſſeſſions muſt be conſidered as ſubſiſting for the ſake of many utilities. In the next place, let thoſe of the ſame tribe carry a written account of the annual fruits to the præfects of the land; ſo that, in conſequence of there being two tributes, the republic may chooſe every year whichever of the two they pleaſe, viz. either a part of all the eſtates, or the annual crop, excluſive of ſuch things as contribute to aliment. It is likewiſe proper that moderate offerings to the Gods ſhould be dedicated by moderate men. Earth, therefore, which is the hearth of habitation, is the ſacred poſſeſſion of all the Gods. Let no one then conſecrate the ſame thing a ſecond time to the Gods. But gold and ſilver in other cities, both privately and in temples, are an invidious poſſeſſion. Ivory, too, as belonging to a body deprived of ſoul, is not a pure offering to the Gods. And iron and braſs are the inſtruments of war. Let, therefore, any one dedicate whatever he pleaſes, from wood, ſo as it is faſhioned from one piece of wood, and, in a ſimilar manner, any thing formed from ſtone, in the common temples. With reſpect to things woven, let nothing of this kind be dedicated which exceeds the monthly work of a woman. White colours will to adapted to the Gods, both in other things, and in ſuch as are woven. But nothing dyed ſhould be offered, except it belongs to warlike ornaments. The moſt divine gifts, however, are ſuch birds and pictures as a painter has finiſhed in one day. And let all other offerings be ſimilar to theſe. Since, therefore, we have divided the parts of all the city, in ſuch a manner as is proper, and have ſpoken in the beſt manner we are able reſpecting the laws which ought to be eſtabliſhed in all the greateſt compacts, it now remains that we ſhould ſpeak concerning judgments. In the firſt place, therefore, let there be ſelect judges for the courts of juſtice, and ſuch as are choſen in common by plaintiffs and defendants. Theſe, indeed, may more properly be called arbiters than judges. In the next place, let thoſe of the ſame ſtreet and tribe, when divided according to a twelfth part, be appointed as judges. Let the contending parties, if they cannot be reconciled by the former judges, go to theſe, and litigate with

greater

greater loſs. Here, if the defendant is a ſecond time condemned, let him pay the fifth part of the preſcribed fine. But if any one accuſes theſe judges, and wiſhes to diſpute the affair in a third court of juſtice, let him refer the cauſe to ſelect judges. And if he is again condemned by theſe, let him pay the ſum that is owing, and the half of it beſides. But if the plaintiff, being repulſed by the firſt judgment, is not ſatisfied, but appeals to a ſecond,—if he vanquiſhes let him receive a fifth part, but if he is vanquiſhed let him loſe the ſame part. And if he goes to a third court of juſtice, not being ſatisfied with the former judgments, let the defendant, if vanquiſhed, pay (as we have ſaid) the ſum that is owing, and the half of it beſides; but let the plaintiff pay the half only. With reſpect to the allotments of courts of juſtice, the perfection and eſtabliſhment of things miniſtrant to the magiſtrates, the times in which each of theſe ought to take place, the particulars reſpecting votes, the delays, terms, citations and repulſes which take place in judicial affairs, and whatever elſe neceſſarily pertains to theſe,—all this we have already diſcuſſed. However, according to the proverb, what is beautiful and right may be ſpoken twice and thrice. All ſuch legal particulars, therefore, as are ſmall and eaſy to be diſcovered, when omitted by an aged legiſlator, ought to be filled up by a junior legiſlator. And thus much may ſuffice concerning private courts of juſtice. But ſuch as are public and common, and which are employed by magiſtrates to proper purpoſes, are found in many cities eſtabliſhed in no unbecoming manner by equitable men. Whence it is requiſite that the guardians of the laws ſhould procure ſuch things as are adapted to this new polity, by reaſoning, correcting, and exploring them, till they appear to them to be ſufficiently eſtabliſhed; and then bringing them to a concluſion, that they ſhould ſeal them as things immovable, and uſe them through the whole of life. With reſpect to the ſilence of judges, the praiſes which are given them, or the contrary, and likewiſe concerning things juſt, good, and becoming, which differ in other cities, we have already ſpoken, and ſhall again ſpeak in the end. But it is requiſite that he who in future will be an equitable judge ſhould look to all theſe particulars, and being in poſſeſſion of them, when committed to writing, ſhould make them the object of his ſtudy. For written laws are more calculated to make him who learns them better, than all other diſ-

ciplines, if they are properly eſtabliſhed. For, indeed, divine and admirable law does not raſhly poſſeſs a name adapted to intellect [1]. And beſides this, the writings of the legiſlator afford us a perſpicuous examination of the aſſertions of others reſpecting praiſe and blame, which are partly tranſmitted to us in verſe, and partly in proſe, and which likewiſe daily take place in all other aſſociations, when men contend with each other through emulation, and conceſſions which are vain in the extreme. Theſe a good judge ſhould always keep in his poſſeſſion, as remedies againſt the poiſon of other diſcourſes, correcting by them both himſelf and the city; confirming and praiſing the good, and recalling, to the utmoſt of his power, ſuch of the evil as are curable from ignorance, intemperance, timidity, and, in ſhort, from all injuſtice. For, if they are incapable of being cured, thoſe judges, and governors of the judges, that put them to death, as the only remedy to ſouls in ſuch a condition, may be often ſaid, with juſtice, to deſerve praiſe from the whole city. After annual judgments are finiſhed, let them uſe the following laws:—In the firſt place, let the magiſtrate who exerciſes the office of a judge conſign over all the money of the debtor to the victor, leaving him only ſufficient for neceſſary uſes. And let this take place immediately after the giving of votes, the affair being announced by a cryer, and in the hearing of the judges. In the next place, if, after ſentence is paſſed, one month has elapſed and a ſecond commenced, and the vanquiſhed perſon has not voluntarily paid what is due to the victor, let the judicial magiſtrate deliver up the money of the debtor to the victor. But if the debtor has not ſufficient money to diſcharge the debt, and he is deficient not leſs than a drachm, let not the debtor be ſuffered to go to law with any other perſon till he has paid all that is due to the victor; but let any other perſon be permitted to go to law with him. If any one, when condemned by a magiſtrate, unjuſtly takes any thing from him, let the injured magiſtrate take the offender before the court of juſtice of the guardians of the laws. And if he is condemned by theſe, let him be puniſhed with death, as one who ſubverts the whole city and the lasw. But a man who is born and educated, and who begets and educates children, under theſe laws, who engages moderately in

[1] For νομος, law, is properly νου διανομη, a diſtribution of intellect.

contracts,

contracts, is punished if he acts unjustly, and sees those punished that injure him, and, lastly, who grows old together with the laws,—such a one will end his days according to nature.

With respect to the funeral rites of the dead, whether male or female, and the particulars which pertain to the infernal and supernal Gods, let them be instituted according to the answers of the interpreters. Let there be no sepulchres in cultivated places, neither large nor small. But let that place alone receive the bodies of the dead which is useless for other purposes, and will in the smallest degree injure the living. For no one, either living or dying, should impede the fecundity of mother earth, and thus deprive some living person of aliment. Likewise, let no tomb be raised higher than five men are able to raise in five days. Let the stone columns, too, be no larger than are sufficient to admit an encomium of the dead in four heroic verses; and let the dead be laid out no longer a time than is sufficient to evince that they are truly dead. But, with respect to human affairs of this kind, an interval of three days before the burial will be nearly sufficient. It is likewise proper to believe the legislator in other things; and when he asserts that the soul is in *every respect* different from the body; and that, in the present life, it causes each of us to be that which each of us is; but, that body follows each of us like an image; and, that bodies may be beautifully said to be the images of the perfectly dead. That, besides this, each of us may be truly denominated an immortal soul, which will depart to other Gods to give an account of its conduct, as the law of our country asserts. This, however, is a circumstance which produces confidence in the good, but is terrible in the extreme to the evil; for no great assistance can be rendered them after death. Hence, it is necessary to give them all proper assistance while living, that they may live in the most just and holy manner, and that after the present life they may escape the punishments which await the commission of crimes. Since this, then, is the case, we ought by no means to ruin our families, in consequence of thinking that this mass of flesh which is buried is truly our relative; but we should be persuaded that the son or brother, or any person for whom we have an affection, and whom we consider as buried, has departed hence in consequence of having finished and filled up his fate. We shall, therefore, act well on these occasions by employing a moderate

expenſe, as upon an inanimate altar of terreſtrial natures. But the legiſlator will not, in the moſt diſgraceful manner, divine what this moderate expenſe ſhould be. Let this, then, be the law :—That he who poſſeſſes the greateſt eſtate ſhall not ſpend more than five minæ on any funeral; that he who poſſeſſes the ſecond eſtate ſhall ſpend three minæ; the third, two; and the fourth, one mina. For thus the funeral expenſes of every individual will be moderate. But, as the guardians of the laws ought neceſſarily to take care of many things, ſo eſpecially of this, that their life may be employed in attending to boys and men, and to males and females of every age. And beſides this, on the death of every citizen, one of the guardians of the laws, whom the relations of the deceaſed ſhall think fit to chooſe, ſhould take care that every thing pertaining to the funeral is conducted in a becoming and moderate, and not in an unbecoming and diſgraceful manner. And let them be honoured when the former, but conſidered as infamous when the latter, is the caſe. Let, therefore, every thing pertaining to funerals take place according to this law. But things of the following kind ought to be committed to the care of the legiſlator who eſtabliſhes political law :—It would be unbecoming either to order, or not, the dead to be lamented with tears; but loud lamentations on this occaſion, out of the houſe, are to be forbidden. The dead body, likewiſe, ſhould not be ſuffered to be carried openly in the more frequented roads, accompanied with lamentations, nor yet out of the city before day. Let ſuch, therefore, be the eſtabliſhed laws reſpecting theſe particulars. And let him who is obedient to them be exempt from puniſhment; but let him who diſobeys one of the guardians of the laws be puniſhed by all of them in ſuch a manner as ſhall appear fit to all. With reſpect to other particulars, which either pertain to ſepulchres, or to thoſe who through patricide and ſacrilege are deprived of ſepulchres, theſe we have ſpoken of before, and legally eſtabliſhed. So that legiſlation has now nearly obtained its completion. But the end of all things muſt be conſidered as taking place, not from their being performed, or poſſeſſed, or inhabited, but from their being properly accompliſhed, and firmly eſtabliſhed. For, in a preſervation of this kind, it is proper to think, that what ought to be done is done, but that prior to this the whole is imperfect.

Clin. You ſpeak well, O gueſt. But inform me in a yet clearer manner what was your deſign in what you juſt now ſaid?

GUEST. Many things, O Clinias, are beautifully ſaid by the antients, and this is true, in no ſmall degree, with reſpect to the names of the Fates.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. That the firſt of theſe is Lacheſis, the ſecond Clotho, and the third Atropos [1], who is the preſerver of what has been aſſerted by us. Theſe are aſſimilated to things conglomerated by fire, and which poſſeſs an inconvertible power. And in a city and polity theſe ought not only to procure health and ſafety to bodies, but a good eſtabliſhment of laws in ſouls, or rather the preſervation of laws. But it appears to me that this is yet wanting to laws,—I mean, an inquiry how they may obtain an inconvertible power according to nature.

CLIN. You ſpeak of no ſmall affair, if it is poſſible to find how a thing of this kind may take place in every poſſeſſion.

GUEST. But this is poſſible, as it appears in every reſpect to me at preſent.

CLIN. Let us not, therefore, depart hence, by any means, till we have added this to the laws we have now delivered. For it is ridiculous to labour in any thing in vain, and not to lay down ſomething ſtable.

MEGIL. You exhort in a proper manner: and you will alſo find me to be ſuch a one.

CLIN. You ſpeak well. What then is this preſervation, and after what manner may it be obtained in our polity and laws?

GUEST. Have we not ſaid that an aſſembly ought to be held in our city of the following kind:—That always ten of the oldeſt guardians of the law, together with all ſuch as are honoured with gifts, ſhould make a part of this aſſembly? That, further ſtill, thoſe who have travelled over many regions in order that they might find ſomething adapted to the preſervation of the laws, ſhould go to this aſſembly, if on their return their manners were found to be uncorrupted, and themſelves worthy to be members of this aſſembly? That, beſides this, each of theſe ought to bring with him young men, who are not leſs than thirty years of age, and who are judged to deſerve this honour both by nature and education, and by the approbation of the whole aſſembly? And that if any unworthy young man ſhould be brought to the aſſembly, the ſentence which is paſſed ſhould be of no moment? Laſtly, that this

[1] For an account of the Fates, ſee the Notes to the Tenth Book of the Republic.

aſſembly

aſſembly ſhould be convened before day, when there is a perfect leiſure from all other buſineſs, both public and private? Was not ſomething of this kind aſſerted by us in the preceding diſcourſe?

CLIN. It was.

GUEST. Again, therefore, reſuming the diſcourſe about this aſſembly, we ſay, that if any one hurls forth this, as an anchor of the whole city, and which contains in itſelf every thing that can be deſired, every thing will be preſerved which we wiſh to be ſo.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. We ſhall after this take occaſion to ſpeak with rectitude, and, to the utmoſt of our power, leave nothing unfiniſhed.

CLIN. You ſpeak exceedingly well: act, therefore, agreeably to your conceptions.

GUEST. It is proper therefore, O Clinias, to underſtand, with reſpect to every thing, a fit ſaviour in every work; as in an animal, the ſoul and the head are naturally the greateſt ſaviours of the whole.

CLIN. How again do you ſay?

GUEST. The virtue of theſe, doubtleſs, affords ſafety to the whole animal.

CLIN. But how?

GUEST. In ſoul, indeed, beſides other things, intellect is inſerted; and in the head, beſides other things, ſight and hearing. And, in ſhort, intellect being mingled with the moſt beautiful ſenſes, ſo as to produce one thing, the preſervation of the ſeveral parts may moſt juſtly be ſaid to be thus effected.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Undoubtedly. But does not intellect, mingled with the ſenſes, become the ſafety of ſhips, both in tempeſts and fair weather? Or, in a ſhip, do not the pilot and the ſailors, in conſequence of mingling their ſenſes with the piloting intellect, preſerve both themſelves and every thing pertaining to the ſhip?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But there is no need of many examples about things of this kind: let us conſider, therefore, in an army, and in medicine, to what mark both commanders and phyſicians directing their attention, become the means of preſervation.

CLIN.

CLIN. It will be proper to do ſo.

GUEST. Do not the former of theſe, then, direct their attention to victory, and the ſtrength of the enemies, but the latter to the health of the body?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, if the phyſician is ignorant of that reſpecting the body which we now denominate health, or the commander of victory, or of other things which we might mention, would they appear to be endued with intellect about any of theſe particulars?

CLIN. How could they?

GUEST. But what with reſpect to a city? If any one is ignorant of the mark at which a politician ought to look, could he, in the firſt place, be juſtly denominated a governor? And, in the next place, would he be able to preſerve that, the ſcope of which he is perfectly unacquainted with?

CLIN. How could he?

GUEST. It is neceſſary therefore now, as it appears, if the eſtabliſhment of this our city is to obtain its completion, that there ſhould be ſome one in it who knows, in the firſt place, this which we call the political ſcope; in the next place, after what manner it is requiſite to partake of this; and, in the third place, which of the laws, and who among men, will properly or improperly conſult with a view to this. For, if any city is deſtitute of a thing of this kind, it will not be wonderful, ſince it muſt be void of intellect and ſenſe, if all its actions are the reſult of chance.

CLIN. You ſpeak the truth.

GUEST. Now, therefore, are we able to ſay in what part of our city, or by what ſtudies, any guard of this kind will be ſufficiently obtained?

CLIN. I cannot clearly inform you, O gueſt. But, if I may be allowed to jeſt, it appears to me that this diſcourſe tends to that nocturnal aſſembly which you ſaid ought to be inſtituted.

GUEST. You have rightly conjectured, O Clinias; and, as the preſent reaſoning announces, this aſſembly ought to poſſeſs every virtue; the chief of which is not to wander, by regarding a multitude of particulars, but, looking to one thing, always to emit all things like darts to this.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Now, therefore, we learn that it is not wonderful that the legal

inſtitutions of cities wander. For different eſtabliſhments of the laws in each city look to different things. And to ſome, the end of what is juſt conſiſts in certain perſons governing in the city, whether they are better or worſe than others. But, with others, the end conſiſts in becoming rich, whether they are ſlaves or not. The attention of others again is directed to a life of liberty. Others eſtabliſh laws for two purpoſes, that they may be free themſelves, and that they may become the deſpots of other cities. And thoſe that are moſt wiſe direct their attention to theſe, and to all ſuch particulars, at once; but they are unable to aſſign any one principal thing to which the reſt ought to look.

CLIN. Hence, O gueſt, that which was formerly eſtabliſhed by us is right; for we ſaid that the whole of our laws ſhould always look to one thing. And we granted that this might, with the greateſt rectitude, be called virtue.

GUEST. We did ſo.

CLIN. And it was likewiſe eſtabliſhed by us that virtue was, in a certain reſpect, fourfold.

GUEST. Entirely ſo.

CLIN. And that intellect, likewiſe, was the leader of all theſe, to which all other things, and three of the virtues, ought to look.

GUEST. You have followed me in a beautiful manner, O Clinias; continue, therefore, to follow me in what remains. For we have ſaid, that the intellect of the pilot, the phyſician, and the commander, looks to one thing; but, accuſing the politic intellect, we have arrived thus far, and we ſhall now thus interrogate it as if it were a man:—O wonderful man! to what do you tend? What is that one thing which the medicinal intellect can ſpeak of in a perſpicuous manner; but you, who, as you ſay, excel all prudent perſons, are not able to do this in your art? Or can you, O Megillus and Clinias, anſwer for him what this is, as I have often done to you for others?

CLIN. By no means, O gueſt.

GUEST. But ſhould we not deſire to perceive what this is, and in what things it ſubſiſts?

CLIN. In what particular things do you mean?

GUEST. As we have ſaid that there are four ſpecies of virtue, it is evident that each of them muſt neceſſarily be one, ſince they are altogether four.

CLIN.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We likewiſe denominate all theſe one. For we ſay that fortitude is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue; and, in a ſimilar manner, the two others, as if this thing virtue was not in reality many things, but one thing only.

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. So far, therefore, as theſe two differ from each other, and receive two names, and, in a ſimilar manner, the other two, there is no difficulty in ſpeaking of them; but ſo far as we call both of them, together with the other two, one thing, viz. virtue, it is not eaſy to ſpeak of them.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. There is no difficulty in explaining what I ſay. For let us only divide among ourſelves the buſineſs of interrogating and anſwering.

CLIN. How again do you mean?

GUEST. Do you aſk me why, denominating virtue one thing, we again give this appellation to two things, one of which is fortitude, and the other prudence? For I will tell you the cauſe, which is this:—One of theſe is converſant with fear, whence ſavage beaſts alſo participate of fortitude, and the manners of very young children. For the ſoul may be brave from nature without reaſon, but without reaſon it never was prudent and endued with intellect, nor is, nor ever will be. So that this latter differs from the former.

CLIN. You ſpeak truly.

GUEST. You, therefore, underſtand from my diſcourſe in what manner theſe are two, and how they differ from each other; but how they are one and the ſame do you again inform me. But think as if you were telling me how being four they are one, and as if I afterwards ſhould ſhow you how being one they are again four. And after this, let us conſider, whether he who wiſhes ſufficiently to underſtand any thing which has both a name and a definition, ought only to know the name, but ſhould be ignorant of the definition; or whether it is baſe for him who has any knowledge reſpecting things which tranſcend in magnitude and beauty, to be ignorant of all ſuch particulars as theſe.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But is there any thing greater which a legiſlator, a guardian of

the laws, and he who is thought to ſurpaſs all others in virtue, and for this receives rewards, can poſſeſs, than fortitude, temperance, juſtice, and prudence?

CLIN. How is it poſſible there can?

GUEST. Ought not, therefore, interpreters, teachers, legiſlators, and guardians of others, to teach thoſe who deſire to know and to perceive things of this kind, or who require puniſhment and reproof, what power virtue and vice poſſeſs; and muſt they not, through information of this kind, in every reſpect excel others? Or will any poet coming into the city, or any inſtructor of youth, be conſidered as better than him who excels in all virtue? And, in the next place, will it appear wonderful if a city, in which the guardians have not a ſufficient knowledge of virtue, in conſequence of being without a guard, ſhould ſuffer the ſame things which many cities at preſent ſuffer?

CLIN. It will not appear wonderful.

GUEST. What then? Shall we do what we juſt now ſpoke of? Or ſhall we conſider how we may enable the guardians to excel others in virtue, both in words and in reality? Or after what manner our city may become ſimilar to the head and ſenſes of the prudent, through poſſeſſing in itſelf a guard of this kind?

CLIN. How, therefore, O gueſt, and after what manner, ſhall we ſpeak, aſſimilating it to a thing of this kind?

GUEST. It is evident that the city itſelf will reſemble the cavity of the head; and that the junior guardians, who are ingenuous and ſagacious, will be placed, as it were, on the higheſt ſummit, whence they can ſurvey, in a circle, the whole city, and, while they defend it, deliver the ſenſes to the memory, and announce to the elders every thing that takes place in the city. But theſe being aſſimilated to intellect, through underſtanding in the higheſt perfection a multitude of things which are worthy of regard, they will conſult for the city, and employ the junior guardians as agents in their conſultations. For thus both will truly preſerve the city in common. Whether, therefore, ſhall we ſay they are to be eſtabliſhed in this manner, or not? Or ſhall we ſay that they are all to be conſidered as equal, and not accurately determine the difference between them, in education and diſcipline?

CLIN. But this, O wonderful man, is impoſſible.

GUEST.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, proceed to a more accurate diſcipline than the former.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. But is not that which we juſt now touched upon the very thing which we are in want of?

CLIN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We ſaid, then, that in every thing a conſummate artificer and guardian ought not only to be capable of looking to many things, but ſhould eagerly tend to one thing, and, when he has obtained a knowledge of it, orderly diſpoſe according to this whatever he beholds.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Can, therefore, any ſpeculation be aſſigned more accurate than that which is able to look to one idea from things many and diſſimilar?

CLIN. Perhaps not.

GUEST. Not perhaps, but in reality, O dæmoniacal man! there is not any human method more clear than this.

CLIN. Believing what you ſay, O gueſt, I will admit it. Let us, therefore, proceed, ſpeaking agreeably to this aſſertion.

GUEST. As it appears, therefore, the guardians of a divine polity muſt be compelled by us to ſee accurately, in the firſt place, what that is which is the ſame in all the four virtues; and which, being one thing in fortitude and temperance, juſtice and prudence, we very properly call by one name, virtue. Strenuouſly laying hold of this at preſent, O friends, if you are willing, we will not leave it till we have ſufficiently ſaid what that is which is to be looked to, whether as one thing, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way it may ſubſiſt. Or can we think that, if this eſcapes, us we can ever ſufficiently poſſeſs the things pertaining to virtue, reſpecting which we are neither able to ſay whether it is many things, nor whether it is four things, nor whether it is one thing? If, therefore, you are perſuaded by our advice, we ſhall deviſe ſome method by which this may take place in our city. Or, if it appears in every reſpect agreeable to you, we will diſmiſs it.

CLIN. A thing of this kind, O gueſt, is by the hoſpitable God by no means to be diſmiſſed, ſince you appear to us to ſpeak with the utmoſt rectitude. But how can any one deviſe this method?

GUEST. We ſhall not yet ſay how this is to be deviſed: but, in the firſt

place, is it requiſite or not that we ſhould firmly conſent among ourſelves?

CLIN. It is doubtleſs requiſite, if poſſible.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to the beautiful and the good? Are our guardians to know that each of theſe is alone many? Or ſhould they, likewiſe, know that it is one, and how it is ſo?

CLIN. It nearly ſeems neceſſary, that they ſhould know ſcientifically how each of theſe is one.

GUEST. But what? ought they to underſtand this, and at the ſame time be incapable of evincing by arguments that they do underſtand it?

CLIN. But how can this be? For you ſpeak of a certain habit belonging to a ſlave.

GUEST. But what with reſpect to all ſerious purſuits? Shall we in a ſimilar manner ſay, that thoſe who are to be truly guardians ought truly to know the particulars reſpecting the truth of laws, be able ſufficiently to unfold them in diſcourſe, and act agreeably to them, judging what things ſubſiſt beautifully according to nature, and what have a contrary ſubſiſtence?

CLIN. How is it poſſible we ſhould not?

GUEST. Is not that one of the moſt beautiful things which we ſeriouſly diſcuſſed concerning the Gods? As that they are, that they appear to poſſeſs a mighty power, and that this ought to be known by man, as far as he is capable of knowing it? Likewiſe, that we ſhould pardon the greater part of thoſe in the city, if they only follow the mandates of the laws, but that we ſhould not commit the guardianſhip of them to any one who has not laboured to acquire all poſſible faith in things pertaining to the Gods? And that we ſhould never chooſe any one for a guardian of the laws, who is not a divine man, who has not laboured in the ſtudy of the laws, and who does not excel in virtue?

CLIN. It is juſt, therefore, as you ſay, that he who is ſluggiſh, or incapable of judging reſpecting things of this kind, ſhould be far removed from beautiful concerns.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, know that there are two things which lead to a belief of the particulars concerning the Gods, which we diſcuſſed above?

CLIN. What are they?

GUEST. One is that which we aſſerted reſpecting the ſoul, that it is the moſt antient and divine of all things, of which the motion receiving generation

tion imparts an ever-flowing eſſence: but the other is concerning the orderly motion of the ſtars, and ſuch other things as through the dominion of intellect adorn the univerſe. For he who contemplates theſe things neither in a negligent nor in a ſtupid manner, can never become ſo impious as not to be affected in a manner perfectly contrary to the conjectures of the multitude. For theſe conceive that thoſe who apply themſelves to things of this kind, I mean to aſtronomy and other neceſſary arts in conjunction with it, become atheiſts, in conſequence of beholding things ſubſiſting from neceſſity, and not from the dianoëtic energies of a will by which all things are rendered good.

CLIN. How then do theſe ſubſiſt?

GUEST. They now ſubſiſt, as I have ſaid, perfectly contrary to what they would if they were conceived to be deprived of ſoul. For though ſuch as more accurately inveſtigate theſe things than others, in a wonderful manner touch upon the truth, and by employing accurate reaſoning evince that they are not deſtitute of ſoul and intellect; and though ſome of theſe [1] dared to aſſert that it was intellect which adorned every thing in the heavens; yet again erring with reſpect to the nature of the ſoul, as not knowing that it is more antient than body, but conceiving it to be junior, they again, as I may ſay, ſubverted all things, and, much more, themſelves. For, believing that all ſuch things as are obvious to the ſight ſubſiſt in the heavens [2], they conſidered the celeſtial regions as full of ſtones and earth, and many other inanimate bodies, and attributed to theſe the cauſes of the whole world. It was owing to this, that many who touched upon ſuch like particulars were accuſed of impiety, and of engaging in difficult undertakings. And, beſides this, thoſe who philoſophiſed were reviled by poets, and compared by them to dogs barking in vain; and other things were ſaid of them which it would be fooliſh to repeat. But now, as I have ſaid, the very contrary to this takes place.

CLIN. How ſo?

GUEST. No mortal man can ever become firmly pious who does not admit theſe two things: viz. that ſoul is the moſt antient of all things which

[1] Viz. Anaxagoras and his followers. See the Phædo.

[2] This is the doctrine of modern aſtronomers.

participate

participate of generation, and is immortal; and that it rules [1] over all bodies. But, beſides this, our guardian of the laws ſhould not be ignorant of that which has been often aſſerted by us, that there is a true intellect in the ſtars; and he ſhould likewiſe poſſeſs the neceſſary diſciplines which are previous to theſe things; and employ a proper Muſe, in order to harmonize the purſuits of manners and legal inſtitutions. And, laſtly, he ſhould be able to render a reaſon for ſuch things as admit one, and to ſhow why this is not poſſible with other things. He who has not theſe requiſites for public virtues will nearly never be a ſufficient governor of the whole city, but will be ſubſervient to other governors. But it is now proper to conſider, O Clinias and Megillus, whether we ought to eſtabliſh the character we have been deſcribing, as the future legal guardian of all the preceding laws, for the ſake of the preſervation of the whole city; at the ſame time, that nocturnal aſſembly of governors, endued with all ſuch diſcipline as we have mentioned above, being adopted: or how ſhall we act?

CLIN. But, O beſt of men, why ſhould we not to the utmoſt of our power eſtabliſh him?

GUEST. We certainly ought all of us to ſtrive to accompliſh this. I, indeed, will cheerfully be your helper. For perhaps through ſkill in, and the conſideration of, things of this kind, I may find many other aſſiſtants beſides myſelf.

CLIN. Let us, O gueſt, proceed in this path rather than any other, in which Divinity himſelf nearly leads us. But let us now ſpeak of and deviſe the method by which this may be properly accompliſhed.

GUEST. Laws about things of this kind, O Megillus and Clinias, cannot be eſtabliſhed till the city is orderly diſpoſed; for then their authority may be legally determined. But they cannot in any other way be adopted with rectitude than by erudition and frequent examination in conjunction with others.

CLIN. How ſo? Why do we again ſay this?

[1] As Plato, therefore, has demonſtrated in the preceding Tenth Book, that the apparent orb of every ſtar is the vehicle of a ruling ſoul, it follows, according to him, that no one is firmly pious who does not believe this. And hence, the groſs ignorance or impudence of thoſe ſophiſtical prieſts who have dared to aſſert that Plato ridiculed the religion of his country is ſufficiently obvious.

GUEST.

GUEST. In the firſt place, without doubt, a catalogue ſhould be made of thoſe men who are adapted to be guardians, by their age, by the power of diſciplines, and by their manners and habits. In the next place, it is neither eaſy to find what ought to be learnt, nor to become the diſciple of him who diſcovers this. Beſides this, the times will be in vain preſcribed in writing, in which the ſeveral particulars ought to take place. For neither will the learners be able to know when any thing may be opportunely learnt, before ſcience of the diſcipline is generated in their ſouls. Hence, all theſe particulars being ſpoken of occultly, will not be ſpoken of properly: but they are occult, becauſe they cannot be rendered clearer by narration.

CLIN. Since this then is the caſe, O gueſt, what ſhall we do?

GUEST. We muſt act, O friends, according to the proverb. For we muſt diſcuſs the affair in common and publicly. And if we wiſh to make the dangerous trial, reſpecting the whole polity, we muſt do all things, either, as they ſay, throwing thrice ſix, or three dice. I will, however, undergo the danger with you, in ſpeaking and explaining what appears to me reſpecting the diſcipline and education which we have now diſcuſſed. The hazardous enterpriſe is, indeed, neither ſmall, nor ſimilar to any other. But I exhort you, O Clinias, to make this the object of your care. For you, in the city of the Magneſians, or in that to which Divinity ſhall give a name, will obtain the greateſt glory if you eſtabliſh it properly. Or certainly, in this caſe, you cannot avoid appearing to be the braveſt of all that ſhall ſucceed you. If then this divine aſſembly ſhall be eſtabliſhed for us, O friends and companions, the city muſt be delivered to its care. Nor will there be any altercation, as I may ſay, with any of the legiſlators at preſent reſpecting theſe inſtitutions. But, in reality, we ſhall nearly effect that in a vigilant ſtate, which we touched upon in our diſcourſe a little before, as in a dream, when we mingled together a certain image of the agreement of the head with intellect, if theſe men are accurately mingled together for us, are properly diſciplined, and when diſciplined reſide in the acropolis of the region, ſo as to become ſuch guardians, and poſſeſs the virtue of preſervation in ſuch a degree as we have not known any to poſſeſs it in the former part of our lives.

MEGIL. O friend Clinias, from all that has been now ſaid by us, it follows,

that we muſt either omit the eſtabliſhment of this city, or not diſmiſs this our gueſt, but by entreaties and all manner of devices make him a partaker with us in eſtabliſhing the city.

CLIN. You ſpeak with the greateſt truth, Megillus. And I indeed ſhall act in this manner; but do you alſo cooperate with me.

MEGIL. I will.

THE END OF THE TWELFTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE LAWS.

THE

THE

EPINOMIS;

OR,

THE PHILOSOPHER.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EPINOMIS.

THE Epinomis, or Nocturnal Convention, was not written by Plato, but, as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius, by Philip Opuntius, one of Plato's diſciples. This dialogue, which, as its name implies, is a ſupplement to the Laws, is highly valuable, both for its great antiquity, its author being contemporary with Plato, and the recondite wiſdom which it contains. However, notwithſtanding its great intrinſic excellence, it appears to me that any one much converſant with the writings of Plato might eaſily diſcover that it was not written by that philoſopher, though antiquity had been totally ſilent in this particular; for, where ſhall we find in it either his heroical ſtrength and magnificence of diction, or his profundity, accuracy, and ſublimity of conception?

This dialogue is alſo very properly inſcribed *The Philoſopher*, ſince the deſign of it, as the author informs us in the very beginning, is to ſhow what wiſdom is, and how it may be obtained. Before, however, he teaches us what wiſdom is, he inquires what it is not; and having premiſed certain things neceſſary to its definition, he ſhows that the auguſt name of wiſdom can by no means accord with thoſe arts which are ſubſervient to the neceſſaries and conveniences of life, ſuch as politics, agriculture, architecture, rhetoric, and the like. After this, he enumerates the ſpeculative diſciplines, and, in the firſt place, not only praiſes but admires arithmetic, which, according to Plato, moſt of all things ſharpens the wit, ſtrengthens the memory, and renders the mind prompt and adapted to every ſpeculation and action. The arithmetic, however, which is here ſo deſervedly praiſed, is not that which is commonly taught, and which is ſubſervient to merchandize and traffic;

but it is entirely ſpeculative, and conſiders the properties of pure numbers unconnected with any thing ſenſible. Of this arithmetic Euclid and Nicomachus have tranſmitted to us the elements; but the ſtudy of it is at preſent neglected, becauſe it is not calculated to promote gain, facilitate calculation, or expedite buſineſs. The author alſo adds, that number was delivered by divinity to men, as a neceſſary inſtrument of reaſon and diſcurſive energy; and that, this being taken away, the ſoul would appear to be deſtitute of intellect, and arts and ſciences entirely vaniſh. He alſo praiſes geometry, aſtronomy, muſic, and phyſics; and places dialectic, i. e. metaphyſics, or *wiſdom*, before all the other ſciences, becauſe it employs theſe as ſteps in the diſcovery and adoration of Divinity. He likewiſe ſhows that there are three employments of this queen of the ſciences about other diſciplines. The firſt conſiſts in beholding the multitude of all theſe; the ſecond, in ſurveying the communion and connection in all of them; and the third conſiders in what manner this multitude and its union contribute to *the one itſelf* and divine good. Laſtly, the reader may learn from this dialogue, that as religion conſiſts in the worſhip, ſo wiſdom in the contemplation of Divinity; and that human felicity and the end of laws are only to be obtained in the union of both.

THE

THE EPINOMIS;

OR,

THE PHILOSOPHER.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An ATHENIAN GUEST,
CLINIAS the Cretan, and
MEGILLUS the Lacedæmonian.

ACCORDING to our agreement, O gueſt, we are all of us rightly aſſembled, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, for the purpoſe of conſidering after what manner we ſhould inveſtigate prudence; which when underſtood, we ſay that it cauſes the human habit to ſubſiſt in the moſt beautiful manner poſſible to man, with reſpect to itſelf. For we have diſcuſſed every thing elſe reſpecting the eſtabliſhment of laws. But we have not yet related and diſcovered, that which it is the greateſt thing to diſcover and relate, I mean, what that is by the learning of which mortal man will become wiſe. We ſhould now endeavour not to leave this uninveſtigated: for, if we do, we ſhall nearly leave that imperfect, for the ſake of rendering which apparent from the beginning to the end we have all of us proceeded thus far.

ATHENIAN GUEST. You ſpeak well, friend Clinias. But I think you will now hear a wonderful diſcourſe, though again in a certain reſpect it is not wonderful. For many that we meet with in life aſſert, that the human race can neither be bleſſed nor happy. Attend, therefore, and ſee, whether it appears

appears to you as well as to me, that by ſpeaking as follows about this affair we ſhall ſpeak well. For I ſay it is not poſſible for men in this life, except a few, to become bleſſed and happy. But the hope is beautiful that after death we ſhall obtain every thing, for the ſake of which we cheerfully live and die in the beſt manner we are able. Nor is my aſſertion novel, but that which we all after a certain manner know, as well Barbarians as Greeks. For the production of every animal is in the beginning difficult. In the firſt place, the participation of the fœtal habit is difficult; and, in the next place, to be nouriſhed and educated. And, as we all ſay, theſe things are accompliſhed through ten thouſand labours. The time, too, is ſhort, not only with reſpect to the endurance of calamities, but every thing elſe which cauſes human life to take breath, as it were, about a medium. For old age ſwiftly arriving makes every one who is not full of puerile opinion unwilling to return to life again, when he conſiders the life he has lived. And is not the ſubject of our preſent inveſtigation an argument of the truth of theſe aſſertions? For we inveſtigate how we may become wiſe, taking it for granted that there is in each of us a power by which this may be accompliſhed. But wiſdom then flies from us, when we apply ourſelves to any of thoſe things which are called by the name of art or prudence, or to any other ſuch particulars as we rank among the ſciences; becauſe no one of theſe, as being converſant with human affairs, deſerves to be called by the appellation of wiſdom. The ſoul, however, vehemently confides and propheſies, that ſhe naturally poſſeſſes this power: but what it is, and when, and how it ſubſiſts, ſhe is not altogether able to diſcover. But do not our doubting and inveſtigation reſpecting wiſdom refer to this exceedingly, viz. that there is abundance of hope for ſuch as are able to examine both themſelves and others prudently, and in an according manner, through every kind of reaſoning and diſputation? Shall we ſay that theſe things are ſo, or not?

CLIN. We admit that they are, O gueſt, hoping that we ſhall in time, together with you, entertain the moſt true opinions reſpecting them.

GUEST. In the firſt place, then, let us diſcuſs thoſe other purſuits which are, indeed, called ſciences, but do not render him wiſe who receives and poſſeſſes them; that, removing theſe out of the way, we may endeavour to aſſign the particulars of which we are in want, and, when aſſigned, to learn

them. Let us, therefore, firſt conſider the things which the mortal genus firſt requires: for theſe are nearly moſt neceſſary, and truly ſuch as are firſt[1]. But he who is knowing in theſe, though at firſt he may appear to be wiſe, yet now he is not conſidered as ſuch, but is rather diſgraced by ſcience of this kind. We ſhall mention, therefore, what they are, and ſhall ſhow that every one who propoſes to appear to others to be a moſt excellent man, will avoid theſe through the poſſeſſion of prudence and accurate ſtudy. Let the firſt art then be that which orders us to abſtain from the eating of human fleſh; this, according to the fable, being the practice of mankind formerly, after the manner of ſavage animals, and which recalls us to legal nutriment. The antients, indeed, were and are benevolent to us. Let us, however, bid farewell to thoſe whom we call the firſt men. The preparation, indeed, and nutriment of Cerealian food is beautiful and good, but will never render a man completely wiſe: for it is attended with moleſtation. Nor yet will the whole of agriculture be able to accompliſh this. For we all of us appear to undertake the cultivation of the earth, not from art but nature, through the favour of Divinity. But neither can the conſtruction of houſes, the whole of architecture, the making of every kind of furniture, the art of the copperſmith, and the apparatus of tectonic, plaſtic, plectic, and, in ſhort, of all inſtruments which are accommodated to the vulgar, but are not ſubſervient to virtue, accompliſh this. Nor, again, can the whole of hunting, though it is various and artificial, confer magnificence on the wiſe man. Nor yet divination, or the interpreting art; for theſe alone know that which is aſſerted, but they do not underſtand whether it is true or not. Since then we ſee that none of thoſe arts by which neceſſaries are procured can make any one wiſe, after this that diſcipline remains which is for the moſt part imitative, but by no means ſerious. For imitation is here effected by means of many inſtruments, and through many geſtures of bodies not altogether graceful. In diſcourſe, too, there is imitation in every Muſe; and in things of which the graphic art is the mother, where things, many and all-various, are expreſſed in moiſt and dry bodies; none of which, though fabricated with the greateſt diligence, can in any reſpect render a man wiſe. After imitation, thoſe arts remain which afford

[1] That is, they are firſt to man, who is naturally adapted to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect; but the perfect is firſt to nature.

innumerable

innumerable helps to men on innumerable occaſions. The greateſt of theſe and the moſt uſeful is the warlike art; but it is in want of abundance of felicity, and naturally rather requires fortitude than wiſdom. But that which they call the medicinal art affords us aſſiſtance in unſeaſonable cold and heat, and in all thoſe circumſtances by which the nature of animals is injured; at the ſame time that no one of theſe contributes to the moſt true wiſdom, for they proceed by uncertain conjectures and opinions. We likewiſe acknowledge that pilots and ſailors afford us aſſiſtance; but at the ſame time we do not permit any one of theſe to be called a wiſe man. For none of them knows the rage, or the friendſhip, of the winds, which is the moſt acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet do we call thoſe wiſe who by the power of eloquence afford aſſiſtance in courts of juſtice; for theſe pay attention to the manners of opinion, through memory and experience, but wander from the truth of things juſt in reality. There ſtill remains a certain abſurd power with reſpect to the opinion of wiſdom, which many denominate nature rather than wiſdom. This takes place when any one eaſily underſtands a thing which he is learning, and firmly remembers a multitude of things; and can rapidly attribute to any thing that which is accommodated to it, when it is proper ſo to do. For all theſe ſome denominate nature, others wiſdom, and others ſagacity of nature. But no prudent perſon will ever be willing to call any one of theſe a truly wiſe man. It is however neceſſary, that a certain ſcience ſhould be rendered apparent, which he who poſſeſſes will be truly wiſe, and not only ſo in opinion. But let us conſider; for we are attempting a thing in every reſpect difficult, as we are endeavouring to find ſomething different from the above-mentioned particulars, which may be truly and with propriety called wiſdom, and which he who receives will neither be vile, nor ſtupid, but be rendered through it wiſe and good, and become an elegant man in a city, whether he governs or is governed.

Let us, therefore, conſider this in the firſt place, inveſtigating that one ſcience belonging to human nature, which not exiſting, man would become moſt ſtupid and unwiſe. But this is not very difficult to perceive. For, as I may ſay, referring one to one, that which number imparts to the mortal race will accompliſh this. I think, however, that a God himſelf, rather than a certain fortune, gave us this for our preſervation. It is proper, however,

however, to inform you what God I think it was, though my opinion will appear wonderful, and yet in a certain reſpect not wonderful. For, how is it poſſible that he who is the cauſe to us of every thing good ſhould not alſo be the cauſe of by far the greateſt good, prudence? But what God am I celebrating, O Megillus and Clinias? Nearly *Heaven*, whom it is moſt juſt we ſhould, in the higheſt degree, honour, and fervently pray to, ſince this is done by all other Dæmons and Gods. That *Heaven*, indeed, is the cauſe to us of all other good, we all acknowledge. But we muſt alſo aſſert, that, at the ſame time, he has given us number, and ſtill imparts it to us, if any one is willing to follow us in what we ſay. For *he* will aſcend to the right contemplation of this divinity (whether we may be allowed to call him the World, or Olympus, or Heaven,) who attends to the variety it contains, and how, by the courſes of the ſtars which revolve in it, it imparts the ſeaſons and nutriment to all things; and beſides theſe, prudence, as we have ſaid, together with all number, and every other good. But this is the greateſt thing, when any one, receiving from him the gift of number, proceeds through every circulation. Again, recurring back a little, let us call to mind that we very rightly conceived that, by taking away number from human nature, we ſhould be deprived of prudence. For the ſoul of this animal would ſcarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue, if deprived of reaſon. But the animal which does not know two and three, the even and the odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, will never be able to give a reaſon reſpecting thoſe things of which it alone poſſeſſes ſenſation and memory; but nothing hinders it from poſſeſſing the other virtues, I mean fortitude and temperance, without this knowledge. However, he who is void of true reaſon can never become wiſe. And he to whom wiſdom is not preſent, which is the greateſt part of the whole of virtue, as in this caſe he will not be perfectly good, ſo he will never be happy. So that there is the greateſt neceſſity that number ſhould be eſtabliſhed as a principle: but to ſhow that this is neceſſary, a diſcourſe longer than the preceding is requiſite. It was, however, juſt now rightly aſſerted by us, that all the other arts which we a little before enumerated, muſt be entirely ſubverted if the arithmetical ſcience is taken away. But ſome one who looks to the arts may be of opinion, that there are but few things in which mankind are indigent of number; yet, even here its utility is great. But if any one looks to that

which is divine and mortal in generation, in which the cultivation of divinity and true piety are known, he will find that no prophet can comprehend the mighty power which the whole of number poſſeſſes. For it is evident that every thing pertaining to muſic requires numbered motion and ſound. And, which is the greateſt thing, it may be eaſily known that number is the cauſe of every thing good, but of nothing evil, becauſe every irrational, diſordered, inelegant, and unharmonious lation, and all ſuch things as participate of a certain evil, are deprived of all number. And this ought to be thus underſtood by him who is to be finally happy. To which we may add, that he who is ignorant of the juſt, the good, the beautiful, and all ſuch things, and who has not received a true opinion reſpecting them, cannot employ the power of number in order to perſuade himſelf and others.

But let us now proceed to conſider how we learnt to number:—Whence, then, came we to perceive one and two; ſo that we might underſtand that in order to the knowledge of which we received this power from the univerſe? Nature, indeed, has not imparted to many animals the power of numbering, derived from their parents; but Divinity firſt implanted in us the ability of underſtanding number in that which is pointed out to us. Afterwards he rendered it more apparent to us; in which unfolding of things nothing can be ſeen more beautiful, if one thing is compared with another, than the genus of day. In the next place behold the night, which poſſeſſes the greateſt diverſity. For, by continually revolving theſe things, you will ſee many days, and many nights, in which the heavens, without ceaſing, teach men one and two, ſo that even the moſt indocile may hence learn to number. For thus each of us, on perceiving theſe things, may underſtand three and four, and the many. And from theſe, Divinity fabricating, made one thing the moon, which at one time appearing greater, and at another leſs, continually varies as far as to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if any one is willing to eſtabliſh the whole circle as one. So that, as I may ſay, the moſt indocile animal may learn to number, if he is one to whom Divinity has imparted the ability of learning. And, as far as to theſe, and in theſe particulars, every animal has the ability of becoming ſkilled in arithmetic, by conſidering one thing itſelf, by itſelf. But always to reaſon about all numbers, when compared with each other, appears to be a more arduous undertaking. And for the ſake of this, Divinity having made, as

we

we have ſaid, the moon, increaſing and decreaſing, fabricated months for the purpoſe of conſtituting the year, and cauſed us to compare every number with number, with proſperous fortune. Hence, earth bears fruit for us, and becomes prolific, ſo that ſhe is the nurſe of all animals; and winds and ſhowers are produced, neither immoderate nor immenſe. But if any thing evil happens in theſe, it is proper to accuſe not a divine, but human, nature, as unjuſtly diſtributing its own life. To us, therefore, inveſtigating laws, it has appeared, that other things which are beſt for men, are eaſy to be known, and that every one can ſufficiently underſtand and perform what we aſſerted reſpecting them, if he underſtands what is advantageous and what is not ſo. It has been ſhown by us, indeed, and at preſent it appears, that all other purſuits are not difficult in the extreme; but to aſſign the manner in which men may be rendered good, is perfectly difficult. And again, to poſſeſs other goods in a proper manner is, as has been ſaid, poſſible, and not difficult,—I mean riches, and the body. Likewiſe, every one acknowledges it is requiſite that the ſoul ſhould be good; and every one will ſay that it becomes good through temperance, fortitude, and the like. Every one, too, will ſay that the ſoul ought to be wiſe; but what the wiſdom is which it ought to acquire, is not, as we juſt now obſerved, determined by any of the multitude. Now, therefore, beſides the above-mentioned kinds of wiſdom, we have diſcovered a wiſdom by no means vile; ſo that he who learns what we have diſcuſſed will appear to be wiſe. But whether he who learns theſe things will be in reality wiſe and good, muſt become the ſubject of our diſcourſe.

CLIN. How juſtly, O gueſt, you ſaid that you ſhould endeavour to ſpeak greatly about great things!

GUEST. They are not trifling things, Clinias; and what is of ſtill greater conſequence, they are in every reſpect true.

CLIN. Exceedingly ſo, O gueſt; but, at the ſame time, do not yield to labour, but continue your diſcourſe.

GUEST. I will. Neither do you, therefore, be weary of hearing.

CLIN. We ſhall not: for I will be anſwerable to you for both of us.

GUEST. It is well. But it is neceſſary, as it appears, to ſpeak firſt of all from the beginning; and eſpecially, if we are able, we ſhould comprehend in one name that which we conſider as wiſdom. But if we are very incapable of accompliſhing this, we ſhould conſider that which ranks in the

ſecond place, the quality and number of thoſe arts, which he who receives will, according to our doctrine, be a wiſe man.

CLIN. Proceed, then, in this manner.

GUEST. In the next place, then, the legiſlator will be without envy who ſpeaks better reſpecting the Gods than the antients, and who employing, as it were, beautiful diſcipline, honours the Gods with hymns, extols their felicity, and thus paſſes through life.

CLIN. You ſpeak well, O gueſt; ſince the propoſed end of your laws conſiſts in acquiring the beſt and moſt beautiful end of life, through reverencing the Gods, and purity of conduct.

GUEST. How, therefore, ſhall we ſpeak, Clinias? Does it appear to you that we ſhould vehemently honour by hymning the Gods, and that we ſhould beſeech them that we may proceed to ſpeak things the moſt beautiful and the beſt reſpecting their divinities? Or how do you ſay?

CLIN. Thus, in a wonderful manner. But, O dæmoniacal man, confiding in the Gods, pray, and begin your diſcourſe on the beautiful things reſpecting the Gods and Goddeſſes.

GUEST. Be it ſo, if Divinity himſelf is pleaſed to be our leader. Do you only pray with me.

CLIN. Now, therefore, proceed with your diſcourſe.

GUEST. As the antients, then, as it ſeems, have badly delivered in images the generation of Gods and animals, it is proper, in the firſt place, according to our former aſſertion, to accompliſh this in a better manner, by reſuming our diſcourſe to the impious. For, if you remember, Clinias, we have ſhown that there are Gods, that their providence extends to all things both ſmall and great, and that they are not to be appeaſed by any unjuſt ſupplications or gifts. Theſe things, indeed, you ſhould call to mind, becauſe they are highly true. But the greateſt among thoſe aſſertions is this, that every ſoul is more antient than every body. Do you remember? or, rather, do you not perfectly remember this? For that which is better, more antient, and more divine, is prior to that which is worſe, junior, and leſs honourable. And, univerſally, that which governs is more antient than that which is governed, and that which leads than that which is led. We muſt admit this, therefore, that ſoul is more antient than body. But, if this be the caſe, it is probable that what is firſt in the generation of the firſt muſt take the lead.

lead. We lay down this poſition, then, that the principle of a principle ſubſiſts in a more becoming manner, and that thus we ſhall moſt rightly aſcend to the wiſdom reſpecting the generation of the Gods.

CLIN. Let theſe things be ſo, which are aſſerted in the beſt manner we are able.

GUEST. Come, then, do we not ſay that an animal then ſubſiſts moſt truly according to nature, when one compoſition of ſoul and body produces by its junction one form?

CLIN. We do.

GUEST. A thing of this kind, then, is moſt juſtly called an animal.

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But it is requiſite, according to aſſimilative reaſoning, to ſay, that there are five ſolid bodies, from which the moſt beautiful and beſt things may be faſhioned. But the whole of the other genus poſſeſſes one form. For there is not any thing elſe which can be generated immortal, and in no reſpect at any time poſſeſs colour, except the truly moſt divine genus of ſoul. But this is nearly that alone to which it pertains to faſhion and fabricate; but it belongs to body to be faſhioned, generated, and become the object of ſight. And we again aſſert (for it muſt not be ſaid once only) that it is the property of ſoul to be inviſible, endued with knowledge, intelligible, and to partake of memory and the reaſoning power in even and odd mutations. As there are, therefore, five bodies, it is requiſite to ſay that two of them are fire and water, that the third is air, the fourth earth, and the fifth æther. But in the ſeveral principalities of theſe many and all-various animals are produced. The truth of this we may thus learn in one of theſe bodies. For let us, in the firſt place, conſider the terrene genus of animals, viz. all the human kind, all ſuch animals as have many feet, and are without feet, ſuch as have a progreſſive motion, and ſuch as are ſtable and connected by roots. But this one thing ought to be attended to, that though all animals are conſtituted from all theſe genera, yet the terrene genus abounds with earth and ſolidity. It is, however, requiſite to place another genus of animals, which is generated, and, at the ſame time, capable of being ſeen. For it conſiſts for the moſt part of fire; but likewiſe contains ſmall parts of earth and air, and of all other things. Hence, it is requiſite to aſſert that all-various and viſible animals are generated from this genus. It is likewiſe

neceſſary

neceſſary to think that theſe genera of animals conſtitute all that the heavens contain; or, in other words, that they are the divine genus of the ſtars, conſiſting of a moſt beautiful body, and of a ſoul the moſt happy and the beſt. It is alſo requiſite to conſider this reſpecting theſe two genera of animals. For each of them is, from the greateſt neceſſity, either indeſtructible, immortal and divine, or the life of each is ſo extended as not to require any longer period of duration. In the firſt place, therefore, as we have ſaid, we muſt conſider that there are theſe two genera of animals. And we again ſay that both of them are viſible; the one, as it appears, conſiſting wholly of fire, and the other of earth. We muſt likewiſe aſſert, that the earthly genus is moved in a diſorderly manner, but that which conſiſts from fire, in perfect order. It is proper, therefore, to conſider that which is moved without order, as ſtupid. But it is requiſite to eſtabliſh this as a great argument, that the natures which revolve in the heavens are endued with intellect,—I mean, that they always proceed according to the ſame and in a ſimilar manner, and both do and ſuffer the ſame. But the neceſſity of a ſoul poſſeſſing intellect is by far the greateſt of all neceſſities [1]. For it promulgates laws governing and not governed. But when ſoul, which is a thing of the moſt excellent nature, deliberates according to the moſt excellent intellect, then that which is perfect according to intellect takes place in reality, nor can an adamant be more firm and inconvertible than ſuch a ſoul. Indeed, the three fates preſerve perfect that which is deliberated by each of the Gods with the beſt counſel. It is requiſite, therefore, men ſhould be convinced that the ſtars, and the whole of this progreſſion, are endued with intellect, from this circumſtance, that they always perform the ſame things. For in the paſt time they have deliberated for a wonderfully extended period reſpecting their actions. But they are not, in deliberating, agitated upwards and downwards, nor do they wander and revolve in a diſorderly manner, acting differently at different times. The contrary of this, however, appears to many of us,—I mean, that becauſe they perform the ſame things, and in a ſimilar manner, they are without a ſoul. The vulgar, too, embracing this INSANE OPINION, conceive that the human genus is intellectual and vital, becauſe it is moved, but that the divine genus is deſtitute of intellect, becauſe

[1] For *perſuaſion* belongs to ſoul, but *neceſſity* to intellect.

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it abides in the ſame lations. But it becomes the man who attributes to the Gods things more beautiful, more excellent, and more friendly to their natures, to conceive that it is neceſſary to conſider them as poſſeſſing intellect, becauſe they always accompliſh the ſame things, according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner. And that this is the nature of the ſtars, moſt beautiful to the ſight, and which by a progreſſion and muſical dance, the moſt beautiful and magnificent of all choirs, produces in all animals every thing that is proper and becoming. But that we juſtly conſider them as animated, may, in the firſt place, be evinced by their magnitude. For they are not in reality ſo ſmall as they appear to be; but it deſerves to be believed, that each of them is of an immenſe magnitude, as this may be ſhown by ſufficient demonſtrations. For we may rightly think that the whole ſun is larger than the whole earth; and that all the ſtars poſſeſs a wonderful magnitude. We ſhould conſider, therefore, after what manner ſo great a bulk can be made to revolve by a certain nature perpetually in the ſame time. I ſay, therefore, that Divinity is the cauſe of this, and that it cannot in any other manner be accompliſhed. For it can no otherwiſe become animated than through a God, as we have evinced. As Divinity, therefore, is the cauſe of its animation, and all things are eaſy to a God, in the firſt place, he generated every body and every bulk in the heavens an animal; and, in the next place, he cauſed it to move in that manner which he conceived, by a dianoëtic energy, to be the beſt. And now, reſpecting all theſe particulars, we ſhall make one true aſſertion, viz. It is impoſſible that earth, heaven, all the ſtars, and all the bulks compoſed from theſe, could ſubſiſt, unleſs a ſoul is either preſent with each, or reſident in each, enabling them to revolve with ſuch accuracy according to years, and months, and days, and thus procuring for all of us every good. But it is requiſite that, by how much more vile man is than celeſtial animals, by ſo much the leſs ſhould he trifle, but aſſert ſomething conſpicuous concerning them. He, therefore, who aſſigns certain fluxions of bodies, or natures, or any thing of this kind, as the cauſes of the celeſtial convolutions, will not aſſert any thing conſpicuous.

It is, however, requiſite to reconſider what we have ſaid with the utmoſt attention, that it may appear whether our aſſertions were reaſonable, or altogether futile. In the firſt place, then, we ſaid, that there were two things, the

the one ſoul, and the other body; and that there were many things pertaining to each. We likewiſe aſſerted, that all theſe mutually differed from each other; and that there was no other third thing common to any one of them: but that ſoul differed from body in this, that the former poſſeſſed, and the latter was deſtitute of, intellect; that the one governed, and the other was in a ſtate of ſubjection; and that the one was the cauſe of all the paſſions of bodies; but that the other was not the cauſe of any one of theſe. So that he who aſſerts that celeſtial natures were generated by any thing elſe, and that they do not conſiſt, in the manner we have ſaid, from ſoul and body, muſt be very ſtupid and irrational. If, therefore, it is requiſite that the arguments reſpecting all ſuch particulars as theſe ſhould be victorious, and that every nature of this kind ſhould be believed to be divine, one of theſe two things muſt follow, viz. we muſt either celebrate the celeſtial orbs as Gods, and in ſo doing we ſhall act moſt rightly; or we muſt conſider them as images of the Gods, fabricated as ſtatues by the Gods themſelves. For theſe two conſequences are neither abſurd nor of ſmall importance, but, as we have ſaid, one of theſe muſt enſue; and theſe ſtatues are to be honoured beyond all other ſtatues. For no ſtatues will ever be found more beautiful and more common to all men than theſe, nor any that are eſtabliſhed in more excellent places, or which ſo tranſcend in purity, venerableneſs, and all life, as theſe, which are throughout generated the ſame. Now, therefore, we ſhould alſo endeavour to aſſert this reſpecting the Gods, viz. Since we perceive two ſpecies of viſible animals, one of which we ſay is immortal, and the whole of the other which is terrene, mortal, we ſhould endeavour to unfold, according to probable opinion, three ſpecies of animals which ſubſiſt between theſe five. After fire, then, we place æther; and we aſſert, that from it ſoul faſhions animals which poſſeſs, like other genera, an abundant power from their own nature, but the ſmalleſt degree of power for the ſake of a mutual bond, from other genera. But, after æther, ſoul faſhions from air another genus of animals; and a third genus from water. Soul, therefore, having fabricated all theſe, filled the whole of heaven with animals, employing, to the utmoſt of its power, all the genera, as all theſe participate of life. But the ſecond, third, fourth, and fifth, beginning from the generation of the viſible Gods, at length end in us men. Reſpecting the

Gods, Jupiter, Juno, and all the reſt, let any one aſſign them ſuch places as he pleaſes, if he only diſtributes them according to the ſame law, and conſiders this reaſoning as ſtable.

We muſt call, therefore, the nature of the ſtars, and ſuch things as we perceive together with the ſtars, the viſible Gods, the greateſt and the moſt honourable, perceiving every way moſt acutely, and ranking among ſuch things as are firſt. But after, and under theſe, in a following order, dæmons ſubſiſt, an aërial genus, poſſeſſing a third and middle ſeat, who unfold the will of the Gods to men, and whom it is highly fit we ſhould honour by prayers, for the ſake of obtaining their propitious interceſſion. We cannot, however, wholly perceive either of theſe two kinds of animals, one of which ſubſiſts in ether, and the other in a following order in air. For, though theſe dæmons are by their ſituations near us, yet they never become manifeſt to us; but they participate of an admirable prudence, as being docile and of a good memory; and they know all our thoughts. They likewiſe love in a wonderful manner worthy and good men, and vehemently hate ſuch as are vicious, as being themſelves participants of pain. For the Gods, indeed, who poſſeſs the end of a divine allotment, are ſituated beyond the reach of all pleaſure and pain, and participate, in the utmoſt perfection, of prudence and knowledge. And, as the heavens are full of animals, theſe dæmons, and the higheſt Gods, mutually [1] interpret all things to each other. For the middle animals are borne to earth and the whole heaven with a light and rapid impetus. But he who aſſimilates the fifth genus of animals, which is from water to a demigod, will aſſimilate rightly. And this genus is ſometimes viſible, and ſometimes concealed from our ſight; and, when it is viſible, is ſeen in a wonderful and obſcure manner. As, therefore, there are theſe five kinds of animals, whatever occurs to us in dreams, oracles, and divinations, and ſuch things as we hear through the voice of the healthy or diſeaſed, or which happen to us at the cloſe of life, whence many ſacred rites are inſtituted, both privately and publicly, and will be inſtituted hereafter,—*with reſpect to all theſe, the legiſlator who poſſeſſes the ſmalleſt degree of intellect, will never make innovations in any of them, leſt he ſhould turn his city to a religion which poſſeſſes nothing conſpicuous.* Nor will he forbid any thing

[1] By dæmons interpreting all things to the Gods, nothing more is implied than an energy in dæmons, by which they become fitted to receive the influence of divinity more abundantly.

reſpecting ſacrifices which the law of his country has eſtabliſhed, as being convinced that it is not poſſible for a mortal nature to know any thing about ſuch like particulars. And for the ſame reaſon MUST NOT THOSE BE THE WORST OF MEN WHO DO NOT CELEBRATE THE TRULY APPARENT GODS, AND WHO SUFFER THE OTHER GODS TO REMAIN DEPRIVED OF THEIR SACRED RITES, AND THE HONOURS WHICH ARE THEIR DUE? For this is juſt as if ſome one ſhould perceive the ſun and moon inſpecting without receiving any honours from the whole of the human race, and at the ſame time ſhould not be anxious for the celebration of their divinities by mankind, that feſtivals and ſacrifices may be inſtituted, and that certain parts of greater and leſſer years may be often diſtributed in honour of them. Would not ſuch a one, if he ſhould be ſaid to be evil both to himſelf and to any other by whom he is known, be juſtly ſaid to be ſo?

CLIN. Undoubtedly, O gueſt: for ſuch a one muſt be the worſt of men.

GUEST. Know aſſuredly then, friend Clinias, that this very thing has now happened reſpecting myſelf.

CLIN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Know that there are eight powers revolving round the whole heaven, which are ſiſters to each other, and which I have beheld without paying them any great attention: for this is eaſy for another to accompliſh. Of theſe, the following are three; one of the ſun, another of the moon, and another of all the ſtars, which I mentioned a little before: and beſides theſe there are five [1] others. With reſpect to all theſe, and ſuch natures as are contained in theſe, whether they have a progreſſive motion themſelves, or are borne along in vehicles, no one of us ſhould at any time think that ſome of them are Gods, and others not; nor yet, that ſome of them are legitimate, but others ſuch as it is not lawful for any of us to mention; but we ſhould ſay that they are all of them brothers, and that they live in fraternal allotments. We ſhould likewiſe honour them, not ordaining for ſome a year, for others a month, and for others no allotted portion of time, in which they accompliſh their revolutions, and at the ſame time give perfection to a world, which reaſon determines to be the moſt divine of all viſible things. This world a happy man will in the firſt place admire; and, in the next

[1] Viz. the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury.

place,

place, he will ardently deſire to learn as much reſpecting it as is poſſible to a mortal nature; thinking that he ſhall thus paſs through life in the beſt and moſt fortunate manner, and after death arrive at places adapted to virtue; and thus being truly initiated, and participating in reality of prudence, and becoming one, will paſs the reſt of his time in the contemplation of things the moſt beautiful of all ſuch as pertain to the ſight.

It now remains that we ſhould relate, in the next place, what and how many theſe are. For we may without falſehood ſtrenuouſly aſſert as follows. I again ſay, then, that there are eight of theſe, three of which we have already diſcuſſed, and conſequently five remain. But the fourth and fifth lation and tranſition are nearly equal in ſwiftneſs with the ſun, and are neither ſlower nor ſwifter. And of theſe three, intellect is always a ſufficient leader, I mean of the ſun, Lucifer, and that third which cannot be denominated becauſe it is not known. But the reaſon of this is, becauſe a Barbarian was the firſt ſpectator of theſe. For an antient region is the nurſe of thoſe who firſt underſtood theſe particulars through the beauty of the ſummer ſeaſon. And ſuch was Egypt, and Syria, where, as I may ſay, all the ſtars are perpetually apparent, becauſe clouds and rain are always far remote from that part of the world. Hence, both here, and in every other place, theſe things are found by the experience of an infinite length of time to be true; and on this account they ought boldly to be eſtabliſhed by the laws. For to think that divine natures are not honourable, or that theſe things are not divine, is clearly the province of one not endued with intellect. But it is requiſite to aſſign this as the reaſon why they have no names, though indeed they are denominated by certain perſons. For Lucifer is called Veſper, or the ſtar of Venus, by which it is probable that the author of this appellation was a Syrian. But the ſtar which revolves with an equal velocity with the ſun and Lucifer, is called Stilbon, or Mercury. And, beſides theſe, there are three lations of thoſe ſtars, whoſe courſe is to the right hand, in conjunction with the ſun and moon. But it is requiſite to call the eighth orb [1] one, which may with the greateſt propriety be denominated the upper world. This orb moves contrary to the reſt, and draws

[1] That is, the ſphere of the fixed ſtars.

the others along with it, according to the opinion of thoſe who have ſome ſkill in theſe affairs. But it is neceſſary to ſpeak of ſuch things as we ſufficiently know. For true wiſdom will thus in a certain reſpect appear to him who participates, though in a ſmall degree, of right and divine intelligence. Three ſtars then remain, one of which differs from the reſt by the ſlowneſs of its motion. This ſtar is called by ſome Phænon, or Saturn. That which is next to this in ſlowneſs is called Phaethon, or Jupiter: and, after this follows Puroeis, or Mars, who has the moſt red colour of them all. Theſe things, when explained by any one, are not difficult to be underſtood; but, when underſtood, we ſhould frame ſuch conceptions reſpecting them as we have mentioned above. This, alſo, ought to be known by every Grecian, that we inhabit a region which is nearly the beſt of all others for the acquiſition of virtue. But it is proper to aſſert that its praiſe conſiſts in being ſituated between the nature of ſummer and winter. However, as we have ſaid, becauſe we are more diſtant from the nature of ſummer than the Barbarians we underſtood poſterior to them the orderly arrangement of theſe Gods; yet we muſt aſſert, that whatever the Greeks receive from the Barbarians, is by them carried to greater perfection. This, too, we ſhould conceive to be the caſe with reſpect to the ſubject of the preſent diſcourſe. For, though it is difficult to diſcover without ambiguity all ſuch particulars as the preſent, yet the hope is both beautiful and great, that the Greeks will reverence all theſe divinities with a more excellent mode of worſhip than that which they received from the Barbarians, and that they will employ both diſcipline and the Delphic oracles, and every legitimate obſervance, for this purpoſe. Nor ſhould any Greek be at any time fearful, that mortals ought not buſily to employ themſelves about divine concerns; but, on the contrary, he ſhould think that neither is a divine nature deſtitute of intellect, nor ignorant of human nature. For he knows that, in conſequence of Divinity acting as a teacher, thoſe that are taught follow and learn: and he likewiſe certainly knows that he teaches us number and to numerate. For he would be the moſt ſtupid of all beings if he were ignorant of this. For, as it is ſaid, he would truly be ignorant of himſelf, if he were indignant, and not delighted with thoſe that are able to learn, and who are rendered good through Divinity. But it is highly reaſonable to ſuppoſe that the firſt conceptions

ceptions of men, reſpecting the nature and actions of the Gods, were neither ſuch as wiſe men would frame, nor thoſe that ſucceeded them. For they aſſerted, that fire and water, and the other bodies, were the moſt antient of all things; but that the particulars belonging to that wonderful thing ſoul were of poſterior origin. Hence, they conſidered the lation of body as better and more honourable, and as moving itſelf through heat and cold, and every thing elſe of this kind: but they aſſerted that ſoul neither moved body nor itſelf. But, now ſince we ſay, if ſoul ſubſiſts in body, that it is not at all wonderful it ſhould move and carry about both the body and itſelf, there can be no reaſon to diſbelieve its ability to carry about a certain weight. Hence, as we now think proper to aſſert, that ſoul is the cauſe of the univerſe; and as of things, ſome are good and others evil, it is not at all wonderful, that ſoul ſhould be the cauſe of every lation and motion, but that a lation and motion which tends to good ſhould proceed from the beſt ſoul, and a lation and motion to the contrary, from a contrary ſoul. But it is neceſſary that things good ſhould have vanquiſhed, and ſhould continue to vanquiſh, things which are not ſo. All theſe particulars have been aſſerted by us according to Juſtice, the avenger of the impious. With reſpect, however, to that which we have juſt now examined, we ought not to heſitate in aſſerting, that a good man is a wiſe man.

Let us however ſee, whether this wiſdom, of which we were ſome time ſince in ſearch, can be acquired by diſcipline or art. For, if we are deſtitute of the knowledge of this, we ſhall be ignorant of things juſt. Thus it appears to me, and therefore I aſſert this to be the caſe. For, having explored upwards and downwards, I will endeavour to evince to you that which has become apparent to me. For, when the greateſt part of virtue is negligently attended to, it becomes the cauſe of ignorance, as what we have juſt now ſaid appears to me moſt perſpicuouſly to ſignify. But no one ſhall perſuade us, that there is any part of virtue belonging to the mortal race, greater than piety. We muſt likewiſe aſſert that this is not produced in the moſt excellent natures through the greateſt ignorance. But thoſe are the moſt excellent natures which are moſt rarely found, and which when found benefit others in the higheſt degree. For the ſoul which moderately and mildly receives a flow, or the contrary nature, is ſimple and ingenuous:

ingenuous: it likewiſe admires fortitude, and is obedient to temperance: and, what is the greateſt of all in theſe natures, it is able to learn, is of a good memory, is a lover of literature, and is very much delighted with things of this kind. For theſe things are not eaſily implanted by nature; and when they are innate, and obtain proper education and diſcipline, their poſſeſſors obtain ſuch authority over moſt part of their inferiors as to cauſe them to think, ſpeak, and act, in ſuch a manner as is requiſite, and when it is requiſite, towards the Gods; prevent them from employing artifice in the ſacrifices and purifications which are performed both to Gods and men; and diſpoſe them to honour virtue in reality, which is the moſt important of all things to every city. This part, therefore, we ſay is naturally the moſt principal, and, when inſtructed, is capable of learning in the greateſt degree, and in the beſt manner. But no one can teach, unleſs Divinity leads the way. It is better, therefore, not to learn from one who teaches, but at the ſame time does not act after this manner. However, from what we have now ſaid, it is neceſſary to learn theſe things; and I have aſſerted that a nature of this kind is the moſt excellent. Let us then endeavour to explain what theſe particulars are, and how it is requiſite to learn them; and this both according to my ability, who am the ſpeaker, and the ability of thoſe who are able to hear, that we may know after what manner certain things pertaining to the culture of divinity may be learnt. Perhaps, therefore, what you will hear is unuſual: we ſhall, however, mention the name of the thing which, to him who is ignorant of it, would never appear to be the name. Are you then ignorant of aſtronomy, and that a true aſtronomer is neceſſarily the wiſeſt of men? Not, indeed, that he is ſo who aſtronomizes according to Heſiod [1], and all ſuch as conſider the riſing and ſetting of the ſtars; but this muſt be affirmed of him who contemplates the eight periods, and how ſeven of theſe are contained under the firſt, and in what order each revolves. But no one will eaſily contemplate theſe things, unleſs he participates of a wonderful nature, as we have juſt now ſaid, and as we ſhall again ſay, unfolding what is to be learnt, and the manner of learning it. In the firſt place, therefore, let this be ſaid

[1] Alluding to The Works and Days of Heſiod. He is not a true aſtronomer who ſtudies the heavenly bodies with a view to the neceſſaries, conveniences, or elegancies of a mortal life, but he who ſpeculates them as images of true beings.

by us, that the moon accompliſhes its period moſt ſwiftly, and thus, firſt of all, leads forth month and full moon. In the ſecond place, it is requiſite to conſider the ſun who produces the ſolſtices through the whole of his period, and, together with the ſun, thoſe that revolve in conjunction with him. But that we may not often aſſert the ſame things about the ſame, the revolutions of all thoſe natures which we mentioned before, and which it is not eaſy to underſtand, muſt be made the ſubject of contemplation; preparing human nature for this purpoſe by diſciplines pertaining to theſe ſpeculations, and this by long exerciſe and labour, while it is in a juvenile ſtate. On this account, the mathematical diſciplines will be neceſſary; of which the firſt and the greateſt is that which reſpects numbers, but not thoſe that poſſeſs a body, but which contain the whole of the generation and power of the even and the odd, as theſe two contribute to the knowledge and nature of things. That which is very ridiculouſly called geometry [1] follows theſe in an orderly ſucceſſion. But the ſimilitude of numbers naturally diſſimilar to planes, becomes conſpicuous by compariſon. This circumſtance, however, to him who is capable of underſtanding it, will evidently appear to be not a human, but a divine miracle. After this, thoſe numbers which receive a triple increaſe, and are ſimilar to the nature of a ſolid, are to be conſidered, and likewiſe thoſe that are diſſimilar to this nature, which is called by thoſe that are converſant with it, geometry. But this, to thoſe that are capable of underſtanding it, is a divine and wonderful thing, that as the power of things always revolves about that which is double, and in its own oppoſite, according to each proportion, every nature is faſhioned according to genera and ſpecies. The firſt power, therefore, of the double proceeds according to number, in the ratio of one to two, being double [2] according to power.

[1] Alluding to its name, which ſignifies the meaſuring of the earth, which is a mechanical operation; but geometry is a ſpeculative ſcience.

[2] Of numbers, ſome are linear, others ſuperficial, and others cubic and ſolid. The firſt are ſuch as the number 2; the ſecond ſuch as the number 4, which is the ſquare or ſecond power of 2; and the third ſuch as eight, which is the cube or third power of 2. Duple proportion alſo was conſidered by the antients as perfect. In the firſt place, becauſe it is the firſt proportion, being produced between one and two; and, in the ſecond place, becauſe it contains all proportions within

power. But in that which is ſolid and tangible, the double again proceeds from one to eight. Another power of the double proceeds to the middle, but perhaps into that which is more than the leſs, and leſs than the greater; while again, another power by the ſame part ſurpaſſes, and is ſurpaſſed by the extremities. But in the middle, of the proportion of ſix to twelve, the ſeſquialter and ſeſquitertian proportion ſubſiſts. And in the middle of theſe, a power revolving to both diſtributes to men an according and apt utility, which is imparted by the bleſſed choir of the Muſes for the ſake of ſports, rhythm, and harmony. All theſe things, therefore, are produced and ſubſiſt after this manner. But their end is this, that we may betake ourſelves to divine generation, and the moſt beautiful and divine nature of things viſible, as far as divinity has conferred on men the ability of beholding them. Theſe, however, we ſhall never behold without the above-mentioned diſcipline. Beſides this, in our ſeveral converſations we muſt refer every individual thing to its ſpecies, by interrogating and confuting when any thing is improperly aſſerted. For this may be rightly ſaid to be the moſt beautiful and the firſt touch-ſtone which men can employ. But where only a pretended examination takes place, it is of all labours the moſt vain.

Further ſtill, the accuracy of time muſt be conſidered by us, and the exactneſs with which it cauſes all the revolutions of the heavenly bodies to be accompliſhed; that he who believes the aſſertion to be true, that ſoul is more antient and more divine than body, may alſo think it was beautifully and ſufficiently ſaid, *that all things are full of Gods*, and that no one of the natures more excellent than mankind, at any time forget, or pay but little

within itſelf; for the ſeſquialter, ſeſquitertian, and the like proportions are, as it were, parts below duple proportion. The numbers which the author of the Epinomis here adduces are 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12. The ratio of 4 to 2 is duple, and that of 8 to 4 is alſo duple. Theſe two exceſſes are equal in ratio, for that of each is duple, but they are not equal in number; for 8 exceeds 4 by 4, but 4 exceeds 2 by 2. Again, if we compare 6 to 4, and afterwards to 8, in the firſt caſe we ſhall have a ſeſquialter, and in the ſecond a ſeſquitertian ratio; but theſe exceſſes are unequal in ratio, but equal in number. For the ratio of 6 to 4 $= 1\frac{1}{2}$, and the ratio of 8 to 6 $= 1\frac{1}{3}$; but 6 exceeds 4 by 2, and is exceeded by 8 by 2. Again, compare 12 to 6, which is a duple ratio, and between theſe compare 8 to each. Then, 12 to 8 will be a ſeſquialter ratio, and 8 to 6 will be a ſeſquitertian ratio; but a duple ratio ariſes from 12 to 6; and the exceſſes between 12 and 8, and 8 and 6, are unequal both in ratio and number.

attention

attention to our concerns. But in all ſuch things as theſe we ſhould thus conſider, that he who rightly apprehends each of theſe particulars will be benefited by them; but that it will be better for him who does not, to invoke Divinity. The manner, however, in which theſe particulars may be rightly apprehended is as follows: (for it is neceſſary to relate this alſo)—Every diagram, ſyſtem of number, and compoſition of harmony, together with the one concord of all the ſtars in their revolutions, ought to be beheld by him who learns in a proper manner. But that of which we are ſpeaking will become apparent to him who rightly learns looking to one thing. *For, to thoſe who reaſon ſcientifically, there will appear to be naturally one bond*[1] *of all theſe.* But he who attempts to apprehend theſe in any other way ought, as we have ſaid, to invoke Fortune. For, without theſe, it is not poſſible that any nature in cities can be happy. But this is the mode, this is the education, theſe are the diſciplines; and through theſe we muſt proceed, whether they are difficult or eaſy. But it is not lawful to neglect the Gods; ſince the proſperous conception of all the above-mentioned particulars becomes apparent by an orderly progreſſion. And I call him who rightly apprehends all theſe, moſt truly the wiſeſt of men. I likewiſe ſtrenuouſly affirm, both in jeſt and ſeriouſly, that ſuch a one, when he has by death filled up his allotted time, will no longer participate of many ſenſes, as at preſent, but will be a partaker of one deſtiny alone; and becoming one, inſtead of a multitude of things, will be happy, and, at the ſame time, moſt wiſe and bleſſed. And again, whether any one lives bleſſed on the continent, or in iſlands, I affirm that he will always participate a fortune of this kind; and that, whether any one living a public or a private life ſtudies theſe things, he will, in like manner, obtain the ſame deſtiny from the Gods. But, as we have ſaid in the beginning, and now the aſſertion appears to be moſt true, *it is only poſſible for a few of mankind to be perfectly bleſſed and happy.* And this is rightly aſſerted by us. For thoſe that are divine and at the ſame time prudent men, who naturally participate of the other virtues, and who beſides this have acquired all ſuch portions of *bleſſed diſcipline* as we have mentioned, theſe alone can ſufficiently receive and poſſeſs

[1] Meaning *Dialectic*; for an account of which ſee my Introduction to the Parmenides.

all that pertains to a divine deſtiny. We legally, therefore, ordain, that thoſe who thus labour in theſe things, both privately and publicly, when they have arrived at old age, ought to poſſeſs the greateſt authority in cities; and that others ſhould follow theſe, and ſhould celebrate all the Gods and Goddeſſes; and laſtly, that all of us, in conſequence of having examined theſe things, may, with the greateſt propriety, exhort the nocturnal aſſembly to the purſuit of this wiſdom.

THE END OF THE EPINOMIS.

THE

THE TIMÆUS,

A DIALOGUE

ON NATURE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE TIMÆUS.

THE deſign, ſays Proclus, of Plato's Timæus evidently vindicates to itſelf the whole of phyſiology, and is converſant from beginning to end with the ſpeculation of the univerſe. For the book of Timæus the Locrian concerning nature is compoſed after the Pythagoric manner; and Plato, thence deriving his materials, undertook to compoſe the preſent dialogue, according to the relation of the ſcurrilous Timon. This dialogue, therefore, reſpects phyſiology in all its parts; ſpeculating the ſame things in images and in exemplars, in wholes and in parts. For it is filled with all the moſt beautiful modes of phyſiology, delivering things ſimple for the ſake of ſuch as are compoſite, parts on account of wholes, and images for the ſake of exemplars; and it leaves none of the primary cauſes of nature unexplored.

But Plato alone, of all the phyſiologiſts, has preſerved the Pythagoric mode in ſpeculations about nature. For phyſiology receives a threefold diviſion, one part of which is converſant with matter and material cauſes; but a ſecond adds an inquiry into form, and evinces that this is the more principal cauſe; and laſtly, a third part manifeſts that theſe do not rank in the order of cauſes, but concauſes; and, in conſequence of this, eſtabliſhes other proper cauſes of things ſubſiſting in nature, which it denominates *producing*, *paradigmatical*, and *final* cauſes. But this being the caſe, all the phyſiologiſts prior to Plato, confining themſelves to ſpeculations about matter, called this general receptacle of things by different names. For, with reſpect to Anaxagoras himſelf, as it appears, though while others were dreaming he perceived that intellect was the firſt cauſe of generated natures, yet he made no uſe of intellect in his demonſtrations, but rather conſidered certain airs and

ethers

ethers as the cauſes of the phænomena, as we are informed by Socrates in the Phædo. But the moſt accurate of thoſe poſterior to Plato, (ſuch as the more early peripatetics,) contemplating matter in conjunction with form, conſidered theſe as the principles of bodies; and if at any time they mention a producing cauſe, as when they call nature a principle of motion, they rather take away than eſtabliſh his efficacious and producing prerogative, while they do not allow that he contains the reaſons [1] of his productions, but admit that many things are the progeny of chance. But Plato, following the Pythagoreans, delivers as the concauſes of natural things, an all-receiving matter, and a material form, as ſubſervient to proper cauſes in generation; but, prior to theſe, he inveſtigates primary cauſes, i. e. the producing, the paradigmatical, and the final.

Hence, he places over the univerſe a demiurgic intellect and an intelligible cauſe; in which laſt the univerſe and goodneſs have a primary ſubſiſtence, and which is eſtabliſhed above the artificer of things in the order of the deſirable, or, in other words, is a ſuperior object of deſire. For, ſince that which is moved by another, or a corporeal nature, is ſuſpended from a motive power, and is naturally incapable either of producing, perfecting, or preſerving itſelf, it evidently requires a fabricative cauſe for the commencement and continuance of its being. The concauſes, therefore, of natural productions muſt neceſſarily be ſuſpended from true cauſes, as the ſources of their exiſtence, and for the ſake of which they were fabricated by the father of all things. With great propriety, therefore, are all theſe accurately explored by Plato, and likewiſe the two depending from theſe, viz. form, and the ſubject matter. For this world is not the ſame with the intelligible and intellectual worlds, which are ſelf-ſubſiſtent, and conſequently by no means indigent of a ſubject, but it is a compoſite of matter and form. However, as it perpetually depends on theſe, like the ſhadow from the forming ſubſtance, Plato aſſimilates it to intelligible animal itſelf; evinces that it is a God through its participation of good, and perfectly defines the whole world to be a bleſſed God, participating of intellect and ſoul.

Such, then, being Plato's deſign in the Timæus, he very properly in the beginning exhibits, through images, the order of the univerſe; for it is

[1] That Ariſtotle himſelf, however, was not of this opinion, I have ſhown in the Introduction to my Tranſlation of his Metaphyſics.

uſual with the Pythagoreans [1], previous to the tradition of a ſcientific doctrine, to preſent the reader with a manifeſtation of the propoſed inquiry, through ſimilitudes and images: but in the middle part the whole of Coſmogony is delivered; and towards the end, partial natures, and ſuch as are the extremities of fabrication, are wove together with wholes themſelves. For the repetition of the Republic, which had been ſo largely treated of before, and the Atlantic hiſtory, unfold through images the theory of the world. For, if we conſider the union and multitude of mundane natures, we muſt ſay, that the ſummary account of the Republic by Socrates, which eſtabliſhes as its end a communion pervading through the whole, is an image of its union; but that the battle of the Atlantics againſt the Athenians, which Critias relates, is an image of the diſtribution of the world, and eſpecially ſo according to the two coordinate oppoſitions of things. For, if we make a diviſion of the univerſe into *celeſtial* and *ſublunary*, we muſt ſay that the Republic is aſſimilated to the celeſtial diſtribution; ſince Socrates himſelf aſſerts that its paradigm is eſtabliſhed in the heavens; but that the Atlantic war correſponds to generation, which ſubſiſts through contrariety and mutation. And ſuch are the particulars which precede the whole doctrine of phyſiology.

But after this the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final cauſes of the univerſe are delivered; from the prior ſubſiſtence of which the univerſe is fabricated, both according to a whole and according to parts. For the corporeal nature of it is fabricated with forms and demiurgic ſections, and is diſtributed with divine numbers; and ſoul is produced from the demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic reaſons and divine and fabricative ſymbols. The whole mundane animal too is connected together, according to the united comprehenſion which ſubſiſts in the intelligible world; and the parts which it contains are diſtributed ſo as to harmonize with the whole, both ſuch as are corporeal and ſuch as are vital. For partial ſouls are introduced into its ſpacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane Gods, and become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected, imitating their preſiding and leading Gods. Mortal animals too are fabricated and vivified by the celeſtial Gods; and prior to theſe, the formation of man is delivered as a

[1] Ειναι γαρ τοις Πυθαγορειοις εθος, προ της επιστημονικης διδασκαλιας προτιθεναι την δια των ομοιων, και των εικοτων των ζητουμενων σκεμματων δηλωσιν. Procl. in Tim. p. 10.

microcoſm,

microcoſm, comprehending in himſelf partially every thing which the world contains divinely and totally. For we are endued with an intellect ſubſiſting in energy, and a rational ſoul proceeding from the ſame father and vivific goddeſs as were the cauſes of the intellect and ſoul of the univerſe. We have likewiſe an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terreſtrial body compoſed from the four elements, and with which it is alſo coordinate. If, therefore, it be proper to contemplate the univerſe multifariouſly both in an intelligible and ſenſible nature, paradigmatically, and as a reſemblance, totally and partially, a diſcourſe concerning the nature of man is very properly introduced in the ſpeculation of the univerſe.

With reſpect to the form and character of the dialogue, it is acknowledged by all that it is compoſed according to the Pythagoric mode of writing. And this alſo muſt be granted by thoſe who are the leaſt acquainted with the works of Plato, that the manner of his compoſition is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonſtrative. If, therefore, Plato any where mingles the Socratic and Pythagoric property together, this muſt be apparent in the preſent dialogue. For it contains, agreeably to the Pythagoric cuſtom, elevation of intellect, together with intellectual and divine conceptions: it likewiſe ſuſpends every thing from intelligibles, bounds wholes in numbers, exhibits things myſtically and ſymbolically, is full of an elevating property, of that which tranſcends partial conceptions, and of the enunciative mode of compoſition. But from the Socratic philanthropy it contains an eaſy accommodation to familiar diſcourſe, gentleneſs of manners, proceeding by demonſtration, contemplating things through images, the ethical peculiarity, and every thing of this kind. Hence, it is a venerable dialogue, and deduces its conceptions from on high, from the firſt principles of things; but it mingles the demonſtrative with the enunciative, and prepares us to underſtand phyſics, not only phyſically but theologically. For, indeed, Nature herſelf rules over the univerſe ſuſpended from the Gods, and directs the forms of bodies through the influence of their inſpiring power; for ſhe is neither herſelf a divinity, nor yet without a divine characteriſtic, but is full of illuminations from all the various orders of the Gods.

But if it be proper, as Timæus ſays, that diſcourſes ſhould be aſſimilated to the things of which they are the interpreters, it will be neceſſary that the dialogue ſhould contain both that which is phyſical and that which is theological;

theological; imitating by this mean Nature which it contemplates. Further ſtill, ſince according to the Pythagoric doctrine things receive a triple diviſion, into ſuch as are intelligible, ſuch as are phyſical, and ſuch as rank in the middle of theſe, which the Pythagoreans uſually call mathematical, all theſe may very conveniently be viewed in all. For in intelligibles things middle and laſt ſubſiſt in a cauſal manner; and in mathematical natures both are contained, ſuch as are firſt according to ſimilitude, and ſuch as are third after the manner of an exemplar. And laſtly, in natural things the reſemblances of ſuch as are prior ſubſiſt. With great propriety, therefore, does Timæus, when deſcribing the compoſition of the ſoul, exhibit her powers, and reaſons, and the elements of her nature, through mathematical names: but Plato defines the characteriſtics of theſe from geometrical figures, and at the ſame time leaves the cauſes of all theſe pre-ſubſiſting in a primary manner in the intelligible intellect, and the intellect of the artificer of the univerſe.

And thus much for the manner of the dialogue; but its argument or hypotheſis is as follows. Socrates coming into the Piræus for the ſake of the Bendidian feſtival, which was ſacred to Diana, and was celebrated prior to the Panathenaia [1], on the twentieth of the month Thargelion or June, diſcourſed there concerning a republic with Polemarchus, Cephalus, Glauco, Adimantus, and Thraſymachus the ſophiſt. But on the following day he related this diſcourſe in the city to Timæus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth nameleſs perſon. On the third day they end the narration; and Timæus commences from hence his diſcourſe on the univerſe, before Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates; the ſame nameleſs perſon who was preſent at the ſecond narration being now abſent from the third.

With reſpect to the term *nature*, which is differently defined by different philoſophers, it is neceſſary to inform the reader, that Plato does not conſider either matter or material form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called nature; though nature has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper to call it ſoul; but eſtabliſhing its eſſence between ſoul and corporeal powers, he conſiders it as inferior to the former through its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of converſion to itſelf, but as ſurpaſſing the latter through its containing the reaſons of all

[1] Sacred to Minerva.

things, and generating and vivifying every part of the viſible world. For nature verges towards bodies, and is inſeparable from their fluctuating empire. But ſoul is ſeparate from body, is eſtabliſhed in herſelf, and ſubſiſts both from herſelf and another; from another, that is, from intellect through participation, and from herſelf on account of her not verging to body, but abiding in her own eſſence, and at the ſame time illuminating the obſcure nature of matter with a ſecondary life. Nature, therefore, is the laſt of the cauſes which fabricate this corporeal and ſenſible world, bounds the progreſſions of incorporeal eſſences, and is full of reaſons and powers through which ſhe governs mundane affairs. And ſhe is a goddeſs indeed, conſidered as deified; but not according to the primary ſignification of the word. For the word God is attributed by Plato, as well as by the antient theologiſts, to beings which participate of the Gods. Hence every pure intellect is, according to the Platonic philoſophy, a God according to union; every divine ſoul according to participation; every divine dæmon according to contact; divine bodies are Gods as ſtatues of the Gods; and even the ſouls of the moſt exalted men are Gods according to ſimilitude; while in the mean time ſupereſſential natures only are primarily and properly Gods. But nature governs the whole world by her powers, by her ſummit comprehending the heavens, but through theſe ruling over the fluctuating empire of generation, and every where weaving together partial natures in amicable conjunction with wholes.

But as the whole of Plato's philoſophy is diſtributed into the contemplation of intelligibles and ſenſibles, and this very properly, ſince there is both an intelligible and ſenſible world, as Plato himſelf aſſerts in the courſe of the dialogue; hence in the Parmenides he comprehends the doctrine of intelligibles, but in the Timæus of mundane natures. And in the former of theſe dialogues he ſcientifically exhibits all the divine orders, but in the latter all the progreſſions of ſuch as are mundane. Nor does the former entirely neglect the ſpeculation of what the univerſe contains, nor the latter of intelligibles themſelves. And this becauſe ſenſibles are contained in intelligibles paradigmatically, and intelligibles in ſenſibles according to ſimilitude. But the latter abounds more with phyſical ſpeculations, and the former with ſuch as are theological; and this in a manner adapted to the perſons after whom the dialogues are called: to Timæus on the one hand, who

who had compoſed a book on the univerſe, and to Parmenides on the other, who had written on true beings. The divine Jamblichus, therefore, aſſerts very properly, that the whole theory of Plato is comprehended in theſe two dialogues, the Parmenides and Timæus. For the whole doctrine of mundane and ſupermundane natures is accurately delivered in theſe, and in the moſt conſummate perfection; nor is any order of beings left without inveſtigation.

We may behold too the ſimilitude of proceeding in the Timæus to that in the Parmenides. For, as Timæus refers the cauſe of every thing in the world to the firſt artificer, ſo Parmenides ſuſpends the progreſſion of all things from *the one*. And as the former repreſents all things as participating of demiurgic providence, ſo the other exhibits beings participating of a uniform eſſence. And again, as Timæus prior to his phyſiology preſents us through images with the theory of mundane natures, ſo Parmenides prior to his theology excites us to an inveſtigation of immaterial forms. For it is proper, after being exerciſed in diſcourſes about the beſt polity, to proceed to a contemplation of the univerſe; and, after an athletic contention through ſtrenuous doubts about ideas, to betake ourſelves to the myſtic ſpeculation of the unities of beings. And thus much for the hypotheſis or argument of the dialogue.

But as a more copious and accurate inveſtigation of ſome of its principal parts will be neceſſary, even to a general knowledge of the important truths which it contains, previous to this I ſhall preſent the reader with an abſtract of that inimitable theory reſpecting the connection of things, which is the baſis of the preſent work, and of the whole philoſophy of Plato. For by a comprehenſive view of this kind we ſhall be better prepared for a minute ſurvey of the intricate parts of the dialogue, and be convinced how infinitely ſuperior the long loſt *philoſophy* of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* is to the *experimental farrago* of the *moderns*.

Since the firſt cauſe is *the good*[1], and this is the ſame with *the one*, as is evident from the Parmenides, it is neceſſary that the whole of things ſhould be the moſt excellent, that is, the moſt united that can poſſibly be conceived. But perfect union in the whole of things can no otherwiſe take place than

[1] See the ſixth Book of the Republic.

by the extremity of a ſuperior order coaleſcing, κατα σχεσιν, through habitude or alliance, with the ſummit of an order which is proximately inferior. Again, with reſpect to all beings, it is neceſſary that ſome ſhould move or be motive only, and that others ſhould be moved only; and that between theſe there ſhould be two mediums, the ſelf-motive natures, and thoſe which move and at the ſame time are moved. Now that which is motive only, and conſequently eſſentially immovable, is intellect, which poſſeſſes both its eſſence and energy in eternity; the whole intelligence of which is firmly eſtabliſhed in indiviſible union, and which though a cauſe prior to itſelf participates of deific illumination. For it poſſeſſes, ſays Plotinus, twofold energies; one kind indeed as intellect, but the other in conſequence of becoming as it were intoxicated, and deifying itſelf with nectar. But that which is ſelf-motive is ſoul, which, on account of poſſeſſing its energy in tranſition and a mutation of life, requires the circulations of time to the perfection of its nature, and depends on intellect as a more antient and conſequently ſuperior cauſe. But that which moves and is at the ſame time moved is nature, or that corporeal life which is diſtributed about body, and confers generation, nutrition and increaſe to its fluctuating eſſence. And laſtly, that which is moved only is body, which is naturally paſſive, imbecil and inert.

Now, in conſequence of the profound union ſubſiſting in things, it is neceſſary that the higheſt beings or intelligibles ſhould be wholly ſuper-eſſential, κατα σχεσιν, according to proximity or alliance; that the higheſt intellects ſhould be beings, the firſt of ſouls intellects, and the higheſt bodies lives, on account of their being wholly abſorbed as it were in a vital nature. Hence, in order that the moſt perfect union poſſible may take place between the laſt of incorporeals and the firſt of bodies, it is neceſſary that the body of the world ſhould be conſummately vital; or indeed, according to habitude and alliance, life itſelf. But it is neceſſary that a body of this kind ſhould be perpetually generated, or have a ſubſiſtence in perpetually *becoming to be*. For after intellect, which eternally abides the ſame both in eſſence and energy, and ſoul, which is eternally the ſame in eſſence but mutable in energy, that nature muſt ſucceed which is perpetually mutable both in eſſence and energy, and which conſequently ſubſiſts in a perpetual diſperſion of temporal extenſion, and is co-extended with time. Such a body, therefore,

fore, is very properly ſaid to be generated, at the ſame time that this generation is perpetual; becauſe, on account of its diviſibility and extenſion, it alone derives its exiſtence from an external cauſe: likewiſe, becauſe it is a compoſite, and becauſe it is not at once wholly that which it is, but poſſeſſes its being in continual generation. This body, too, on account of the perpetuity of its duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity, may be very properly called a whole with a total ſubſiſtence: for every thing endued with a total ſubſiſtence is eternal; and this may be truly aſſerted of the body of the world, when we conſider that its being is co-extended with the infinite progreſſions of time. Hence, this divine or celeſtial body may be properly called ὅλος ὁλικως, or *a whole totally*, juſt as the limb of an animal is μερος μερικως, or *a part partially*. But between *whole totally* and *part partially* two mediums are neceſſarily required, viz. *part totally* and *whole partially* (μερος ὁλικως and ὅλος μερικως). The *parts*, therefore, with a *total ſubſiſtence* which the world contains, are no other than the celeſtial orbs, which are conſequently eternal and divine, after the ſame manner as the whole body of the world, together with the ſpheres of the elements; and the *wholes partially* are no other than the individuals of the various ſpecies of animals, ſuch as a man, a horſe, and the like.

Now this divine body, on account of its ſuperiority to ſublunary natures, was called by Ariſtotle *a fifth body*, and was ſaid by Plato to be compoſed for the moſt part from fire. But in order to a more perfect comprehenſion of its nature, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the two elements which, according to Plato, are ſituated in the extremes, are fire and earth, and that the characteriſtic of the former is *viſibility*, and of the latter *tangibility*; ſo that every thing becomes viſible through fire, and tangible through earth. Now the whole of this celeſtial body, which is called by the antients heaven, conſiſts of an unburning vivific fire, like the natural heat which our bodies contain, and the illuminations of which give life to our mortal part. But the ſtars are for the moſt part compoſed from this fire, containing at the ſame time the ſummits of the other elements. Hence, heaven is wholly of a fiery characteriſtic, but contains in a cauſal manner the powers of the other elements; as, for inſtance, the ſolidity and ſtability of earth, the conglutinating and unifying nature of water, and the tenuity and tranſparency of air.

For,

For, as earth comprehends all things in a terreſtrial manner, ſo the heavens contain all things according to a fiery characteriſtic.

But the following extraordinary paſſage from Proclus admirably unfolds the nature of this divine body, and the various gradations of fire and the other elements. "It is neceſſary to underſtand (ſays he [1]) that the fire of the heavens is not the ſame with ſublunary fire, but that this is a divine fire conſubſiſtent with life, and an imitation of intellectual fire; while that which ſubſiſts in the ſublunary region is entirely material, generated and corruptible. Pure fire, therefore, ſubſiſts in the heavens, and there the whole of fire is contained; but earth according to cauſe, ſubſiſting there as another ſpecies of earth, naturally aſſociating with fire, as it is proper it ſhould, and poſſeſſing nothing but ſolidity alone. For, as fire there is illuminative, and not burning, ſo earth there is not groſs and ſluggiſh, but each ſubſiſts according to that which is the ſummit of each. And as pure and true fire is there, ſo true earth ſubſiſts here, and the *wholeneſs*, ὁλοτης, of earth [2]; and fire is here according to participation, and materially, as earth is according to a primary ſubſiſtence. So that in heaven the ſummit of earth is contained, and in earth the dregs and ſediment of fire. But it is evident that the moon has ſomething ſolid and dark, by her obſtructing the light; for obſtruction of light is alone the province of earth. The ſtars too obſtruct our ſight, by caſting a ſhadow of themſelves from on high. But ſince fire and earth ſubſiſt in heaven, it is evident that the middle elements muſt be there alſo; air firſt of all, as being moſt diaphanous and agile, but water, as being moſt vaporous: each at the ſame time ſubſiſting far purer than in the ſublunary region, that all things may be in all, and yet in an accommodated manner in each.

"However, that the whole progreſſion and gradations of the elements may become apparent, it is neceſſary to deduce the ſpeculation of them from on high. Theſe four elements, then, fire, air, water, and earth, ſubſiſt firſt of all in the demiurgus of wholes, uniformly according to cauſe. For all

[1] In Tim. p. 152.

[2] For it is neceſſary that the firſt ſubſiſtence of each of the elements ſhould be, as we have before obſerved, according to *part total*, in order to the perfect union of the world; and this *part total* is called by the Platoniſts ὁλοτης, or a *wholeneſs*.

cauſes

cauſes are previouſly aſſumed in him, according to one comprehenſion; as well the intellectual, divine, pure, and vigorous power of fire, as the containing and vivific cauſe of air; and as well the prolific and regerminating eſſence of water, as the firm, immutable, and undeviating form of earth. And this the theologiſt Orpheus knowing, he thus ſpeaks concerning the demiurgus:

His body 's boundleſs, ſtable, full of light.

And

Th' extended region of ſurrounding air
Forms his broad ſhoulders, back and boſom fair.

Again,

His middle zone 's the ſpreading ſea profound.

And

The diſtant realms of Tartarus obſcure
Within earth's roots his holy feet ſecure;
For theſe earth's utmoſt bounds to Jove belong,
And form his baſis, permanent and ſtrong.

"But from theſe demiurgic cauſes a progreſſion of the elements into the univerſe takes place, but not immediately into the ſublunary world. For how can the moſt immaterial things give ſubſiſtence to the moſt material without a medium; or things immovable be immediately hypoſtatic of ſuch as are moved in all directions? Since the progreſſion of things is nowhere without a medium, but ſubſiſts according to a well-ordered ſubjection; and generations into theſe material, diſſipated, and dark abodes, take place through things of a proximate order. Since, therefore, the elements in the demiurgus are intellects and imparticipable intellectual powers, what will be their firſt progreſſion? Is it not manifeſt that they will yet remain intellectual powers, but will be participated by mundane natures? For from imparticipable intellect the proximate progreſſion is to that which is participated. And, univerſally, progreſſion takes place from imparticipables to things participated, and from ſupermundane to mundane forms. But what are theſe things which yet reman intellectual, but are participated, and what ſubjection do they poſſeſs? Is it not evident that they are no longer intellectual (i. e. eſſentially intellectual)? But I call thoſe natures intellectual which are the forms of intellect, and of a truly intellectual eſſence. But becoming

becoming participated, and being no longer intellectual, it is evident that they are no longer immovable natures. But, not being immovable, they must be self-motive. For these are proximately suspended from immovable natures; and from things essentially intellectual a progression takes place to such as are so according to participation, and from things immovable to such as are self-motive. These elements, therefore, subsist in life, and are self-motive and intellectual according to participation. But the progression from this must be manifest. For the immediate descent from life is to animal; since this is proximate to life. And from that which is essentially self-motive, to that which is self-motive according to a participation of life. For, so far as it proceeds from life to animal, it suffers a mutation. But so far as it proceeds from that which is immaterial to things immaterial [1], (that is, such as may be called immaterial when contrasted with mutable matter,) and from divine life to a divine essence, it becomes assimilated to them. If, therefore, you take away from hence that which is immaterial and immutable, you will produce that which is mutable and material. And through this, indeed, they are diminished from such as are before them; but on account of the symmetry and order of their motions, and their immutability in their mutations, they become assimilated to them. If, therefore, you take away this order, you will behold the great confusion and inconstancy of the elements; and this will be the last progression, and the very dregs and sediment of all the prior gradations of the elements.

"Of the elements, therefore, some are immovable, imparticipable, intellectual and demiurgic; but others are intellectual and immovable according to essence, but participated by mundane natures. Others again are self-motive, and essentially lives; but others are self-motive and vital, but are not lives. Some again are alter-motive, or moved by another, but are moved in an orderly manner; and, lastly, others have a disordered, tumultuous, and confused subsistence."

Such then is the progression of the elements, and such the nature of a celestial body. But, if the body of the world be spherical, and this must necessarily be the case, as a sphere is the most perfect of figures, and the world the best of effects, there must be some part in it corresponding to a

[1] He means the divine bodies of the stars, and the body of the heavens; which, compared with sublunary bodies, may be justly called *immaterial bodies*.

centre,

centre, and this can be no other than earth. For, in an orderly progreſſion of things, that which is moſt diſtant, and the laſt, is the worſt; and this we have already ſhown is the earth. But in a ſphere, that which is moſt diſtant from the ſuperficies is the centre; and, therefore, earth is the centre of the world. This concluſion, indeed, will doubtleſs be ridiculed by every *ſagacious* modern, as too abſurd in ſuch an *enlightened* age as the preſent to deſerve the labour of a confutation. However, as it follows by an inevitable conſequence from the preceding theory, and this theory is founded on the harmonious union of things, we may ſafely aſſert that it is conſubſiſtent with the univerſe itſelf. At ſuch a period, indeed, as the preſent, when there is ſuch a dire perverſion of religion, and men of every deſcription are involved in extreme impiety, we cannot wonder that the ſpirit of profane innovation ſhould cauſe a ſimilar confuſion in the ſyſtem of the world. For men of the preſent day being deſtitute of true ſcience, and not having the leaſt knowledge of the true nature and progreſſions of things, in the firſt place make the univerſe an unconnected production, generated in time, and of courſe naturally ſubject to diſſolution; and, in the next place, allow of no eſſential diſtinction in its principal parts. Hence, the earth is by them hurled into the heavens, and rolled about their central ſun in conjunction with the celeſtial orbs. The planets are ſuppoſed to be heavy bodies ſimilar to our ſluggiſh earth; the fixed ſtars are all ſo many ſuns; and the ſun himſelf is a denſe, heavy body, occaſionally ſuffering dimneſs in his light, and covered with dark and fuliginous ſpots. With reſpect to this laſt particular, indeed, they boaſt of ocular conviction through the aſſiſtance of the teleſcope; and what reaſoning can invalidate the teſtimony of the eyes? I anſwer, that the eyes in this particular are more deceived when aſſiſted by glaſſes, than when truſting to their own naked power of perceiving. For, in reality, we do not perceive the heavenly bodies themſelves, but their inflammations in the air: or, in other words, certain portions of air enkindled by the ſwiftneſs of their courſe. This at leaſt cannot be denied to be poſſible; and, if ſo, it is not at all wonderful that a groſs aërial inflammation ſhould, when viewed through a teleſcope, appear dim and clouded with ſpots. But this is not an hypotheſis of my own invention, but is derived from Ammonius Hermeas, who, as we are informed by Olympiodorus in the Phædo, was of this opinion, as alſo was Heraclitus long before him; who, ſpeaking (ſays Olympiodorus)

piodorus) in his obſcure way concerning the ſun, ſays of that luminary "*enkindling meaſures and extinguiſhing meaſures*,"—that is, enkindling an image of himſelf in the air when he riſes, the ſame becoming extinguiſhed when he ſets.

Nor let the moderns fondly imagine that their ſyſtem of aſtronomy was adopted by Pythagoras and his followers, for this opinion is confuted by Spanheim and Dickinſon; and this, ſays Fabricius [1], with no contemptible arguments: and we are informed by Simplicius [2], long before them, that the Pythagoreans by the fire in the middle did not mean the ſun, but a demiurgic vivific fire, ſeated in the centre of the earth. The prophecy of Swift, therefore, in his Gulliver's Travels, that the boaſted theory of gravitation would at one time or other be exploded, may certainly be conſidered as a moſt true prediction, at leaſt ſo far as relates to the celeſtial orbs.

But to return from this digreſſion. The inerratic ſphere, according to the Platonic philoſophy, has the relation of a monad to the multitude of ſtars which it contains; or, in other words, it is the proximate cauſe of this multitude which it contains, and with which it has a coordinate ſubſiſtence. But, according to the ſame philoſophy, all the planets are fixed in ſolid ſpheres, in conformity to the motions of which they perpetually revolve; but, at the ſame time, have peculiar motions of their own beſides thoſe of the ſpheres [3]. Theſe ſpheres too are all concentric, or have the ſame centre with the earth and the univerſe, and do not conſiſt of hard impenetrable matter, as the moderns have ignorantly ſuppoſed; for being divine or immaterial bodies, ſuch as we have already deſcribed, they have nothing of the denſity and gravity of this our earth, but are able to permeate each other without diviſion, and to occupy the ſame place together; juſt like the illuminations emitted from ſeveral lamps, which paſs through the whole of the ſame room at once, and pervade each other without confuſion, divulſion, or any apparent diſtinction. So that theſe ſpheres are ſimilar to mathematical bodies, ſo far as they are immaterial, free from contrariety, and exempt from every paſſive quality; but are different from them, ſo far as they are full of motion and life. But they are concealed from our ſight through the

[1] Vid. Biblioth. Græc. vol. 1. de Orpheo.

[2] In Ariſtot. de Cœlo, lib. 2.

[3] For Plato makes no mention of epicycles and eccentric circles.

tenuity

tenuity and ſubtility of their nature, while, on the contrary, the fire of the planets which are carried in them is viſible through the ſolidity which it poſſeſſes. So that earth is more predominant in the planets than in the ſpheres; though each ſubſiſts, for the moſt part, according to the characteriſtic of fire. But let it be carefully remembered, that the peculiarity of all fire is the *being viſible*, but that neither heat nor fluidity belongs to every ſpecies of fire: and that the property of all earth is the *being tangible*, but that gravity and ſubſiding downwards do not belong to all.

But, in conſequence of each of theſe ſpheres being a ὁλοτης, or *part with a total ſubſiſtence*, as we have already explained, it follows that every planet has a number of ſatellites ſurrounding it, analogous to the choir of the fixed ſtars; and that every ſphere is full of Gods, angels, and dæmons, ſubſiſting according to the properties of the ſpheres in which they reſide. This theory indeed is the grand key to the theology of the antients, as it ſhows us at one view why the ſame God is ſo often celebrated with the names of other Gods; which led Macrobius formerly to think that all the Gods were nothing more than the different powers of the ſun; and has induced certain ſuperficial moderns, to frame hypotheſes concerning the antient theology ſo ridiculous, that they deſerve to be conſidered in no other light than the ravings of a madman, or the undiſciplined conceptions of a child. But that the reader may be fully convinced of this, let him attend to the following extraordinary paſſages from the divine commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus. And, in the firſt place, that every planet is attended with a great number of ſatellites, is evident from the following citation;—"There are other divine animals attending upon the circulations of the planets, the leaders of which are the ſeven planets; and theſe revolve and return in their circulations in conjunction with their leaders, juſt as the fixed ſtars are governed by the circulation of the inerratic ſphere."—Ειδεναι και αλλα ζωα θειa εiη ουρανια συνεπομενα ταις των πλανωμενων περιφοραις, ὡν ἡγεμονες εισιν οἱ ἑπτα.—Και συμπεριπολει, και συναποκαθιστανται ταις ἑαυτων αρχαις, ὡσπερ και τα απλανη κρατειται ὑπο της ὁλης περιφορας [1]. And in the ſame place he informs us, that the revolution of theſe ſatellites is ſimilar to that of the planets which they attend; and this, he acquaints us a little before, is according to Plato a ſpiral revolution. Και γαρ ταυτα τρεπομενα εστι, και πλανην εχοντα τοιαυτην, ὁιαν ειρηκεν περι των ἑπτα μικρῳ προτερον.

[1] Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 279.

Again, with reſpect to their number—" about every planet there is a number (of ſatellites) analogous to the choir of the fixed ſtars, all of them ſubſiſting with proper circulations of their own [1]."—Εστι γαρ καθ' ἑκαστην αριθμος αναλογον τῳ των αστρων χορῳ, συνυφεστος ταις οικειαις περιφοραις.—And if it ſhould be inquired why, with reſpect to the fixed ſtars, there is one monad, the *wholeneſs* (ὁλοτης) of them; but among the planets there is both a ὁλοτης, *wholeneſs* or *totality*, that is the ſphere of each, and a leader beſides in each, that is the apparent orb; he anſwers in the ſame place, that as the motion of the planets is more various than that of the fixed ſtars, ſo their poſſeſſion of government is more abundant, for they proceed into a greater multitude. He adds—But in the ſublunary regions there is ſtill a greater number of governors; for the *monads* (that is, *totalities*) in the heavens generate a number analogous to themſelves. So that the planets being ſecondary to the fixed ſtars, require a twofold government; one of which is more total and the other more partial.

But with reſpect to the ſatellites, the firſt in order about every planet are Gods; after theſe, dæmons revolve in lucid orbicular bodies; and theſe are followed by partial ſouls ſuch as ours, as the following beautiful paſſage abundantly evinces. " But that in each of theſe (the planetary ſpheres) there is a multitude coordinate to each, you may infer from the extremes. For if the inerratic ſphere has a multitude coordinate to itſelf, and earth is, with reſpect to terreſtrial animals, what the inerratic ſphere is to ſuch as are celeſtial, it is neceſſary that every *wholeneſs* ſhould poſſeſs certain partial animals coordinate to itſelf, through which alſo the ſpheres derive the appellation of *wholeneſſes*. But the natures ſituated in the middle are concealed from our ſenſe, while, in the mean time, thoſe contained in the extremes are apparent; one ſort through their tranſcendently lucid eſſence, and the other through their alliance to ourſelves. But if partial ſouls are diſſeminated about theſe ſpheres, ſome about the ſun, ſome about the moon, and others about each of the remaining ſpheres [2]; and if prior to ſouls there are dæmons filling up the herds of which they are the leaders; it is evidently beautifully ſaid that each of the ſpheres is a world. And this is agreeable to the doctrines of theologiſts, when they teach us that there are Gods in every ſphere

[1] Page 275. [2] This Plato himſelf aſſerts in the following dialogue.

prior

prior to dæmons, the government of ſome receiving its perfection under that of others. As for inſtance with reſpect to our queen the Moon, that ſhe contains the goddeſs Hecate and Diana; and with reſpect to our ſovereign the Sun, and the Gods which he contains, theologiſts celebrate Bacchus as ſubſiſting there,

> The Sun's aſſeſſor, who with watchful eye
> Inſpects the ſacred pole:

They alſo celebrate Jupiter as ſeated there, Oſiris, and a ſolar Pan, as likewiſe other divinities, of which the books of theologiſts and theurgiſts are full; from all which it is evident how true it is that each of the planets is the leader of many Gods, which fill up its proper circulation [1]."—Ὁτι δε και εν ἑκαστῃ τουτων πληθος εστιν ἑκαστῃ συστοιχον, κατασκευασειας αν απο των ακρων. Ει γαρ ἡ απλανης εχει συστοιχον ἑαυτῃ πληθος, και ἡ γη των χθονιων ζωων εστι, ὡς εκεινη των ουρανιων, αναγκη και ἑκαστην ὁλοτητα παντως εχειν μερικα αττα συστοιχα προς αυτῃ ζωα, δια και ὁλοτητες λεγονται. Λανθανει δε ἡμων τα μεσα την αισθησιν, των ακρων δηλων οντων, των μεν, δια την ὑπερλαμπρον ουσιαν, των δε δια την προς ἡμας συγγενειαν. Ει δε και μερικαι ψυχαι περι αυτους εσπαρησαν, αλλαι μεν περι ἡλιον, αλλαι δε περι σεληνην, αλλαι δε περι ἑκαστον των λοιπων, και προ των ψυχων δαιμονες συμπληρουσι τας αγελας ὡν εισιν ἡγεμονες, δηλον ὁτι καλως ειρηται κοσμον ἑκαστην ειναι των σφαιρων, και των Θεολογων ἡμας ταυτα διδασκοντων, ὁποταν περι ἑκαστους Θεους εν αυτοις ειναι, προ των δαιμονων, αλλους ὑπο των αλλων τελουντας ἡγεμονιαν, ὁιον, και περι της δεσποινης ἡμων Σεληνης, ὁτι και ἡ Ἑκατη Θεα εστιν εν αυτῃ, και ἡ Αρτεμις, και περι του βασιλεως Ἡλιου και των εκει Θεων, τον εκει Διονυσον ὑμνουντες, Ἡλιος παρεδρος επισκοπεων πολον αγνον, τον Δια τον εκει, τον Οσιριν, τον Πανα τον ἡλιακον, τους αλλους, ὡν ὁι βιβλοι πληρεις εισι των Θεολογων και των Θεουργων, εξ ὡν ἁπαντων δηλον, ὁπως αληθες, και των πλανωμενων ἑκαστον αγελαρχην ειναι πολλων Θεων, συμπληρουντων αυτου την ἰδιαν περιφοραν.

Now, from this extraordinary paſſage, we may perceive at one view why the Sun in the Orphic hymns is called Jupiter, why Apollo is called Pan, and Bacchus the ſun; why the Moon ſeems to be the ſame with Rhea, Ceres, Proſerpine, Juno, Venus, &c. and, in ſhort, why any one divinity is celebrated with the names and epithets of ſo many of the reſt. For from this ſublime theory it follows that every ſphere contains a Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Veſta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, and in ſhort every deity, each ſphere at the ſame time conferring on theſe Gods the peculiar characteriſtic of its nature; ſo that, for inſtance,

[1] Procl. in Tim. p. 279.

in

in the ſun they all poſſeſs a ſolar property, in the moon a lunar one, and ſo of the reſt. From this theory too we may perceive the truth of that divine ſaying of the antients, that all things are full of Gods; for more particular orders proceed from ſuch as are more general, the mundane from the ſupermundane, and the ſublunary from the celeſtial; while earth becomes the general receptacle of the illuminations of all the Gods. "Hence (ſays Proclus [1]) there is a terreſtrial Ceres, Veſta, and Iſis, as likewiſe a terreſtrial Jupiter and a terreſtrial Hermes, eſtabliſhed about the one divinity of the earth; juſt as a multitude of celeſtial Gods proceeds about the one divinity of the heavens. For there are progreſſions of all the celeſtial Gods into the earth; and earth contains all things, in an earthly manner, which heaven comprehends celeſtially. Hence we ſpeak of a terreſtrial Bacchus, and a terreſtrial Apollo, who beſtows the all-various ſtreams of water with which the earth abounds, and openings prophetic of futurity." And if to all this we only add that all the other mundane Gods ſubſiſt in the twelve above mentioned, and that the firſt triad of theſe is *demiurgic* or *fabricative*, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; the ſecond, Veſta, Minerva, Mars, *defenſive*; the third, Ceres, Juno, Diana, *vivific*; and the fourth, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, *elevating* and *harmonic*:—I ſay, if we unite this with the preceding theory, there is nothing in the antient theology that will not appear admirably ſublime and beautifully connected, accurate in all its parts, ſcientific and divine. Such then being the true account of the Grecian theology, what opinion muſt we form of the wretched ſyſtems of modern mythologiſts; and which moſt deſerves our admiration, the impudence or ignorance of the authors of ſuch ſyſtems? The ſyſtems indeed of theſe men are ſo monſtrouſly abſurd, that we may conſider them as inſtances of the greateſt diſtortion of the rational faculty which can poſſibly befall human nature, while connected with ſuch a body as the preſent. For one of theſe conſiders the Gods as merely ſymbols of agriculture, another as men who once lived on the earth [2], and a third as the patriarchs and prophets of the Jews. Surely ſhould theſe ſyſtems be tranſmitted to poſterity, the hiſtorian by whom they are related muſt either be conſidered by future generations as an impoſtor, or his narration muſt be viewed in the light of an extravagant romance.

I only add, as a concluſion to this ſublime theory, that though the whole

[1] In Tim. p. 282.

[2] See my notes on the Cratylus.

of

of the celeſtial region is compoſed from the four elements, yet in ſome places fire in conjunction with earth (*i. e.* earth without gravity and denſity) predominates; in others fire, with the ſummit of water; and in others again fire with the ſummit of air: and according to each of theſe an all-various mutation ſubſiſts. Hence ſome bodies in the heavens are viſible, and theſe are ſuch as have fire united with the ſolid; but others are ſtill more viſible [1], and theſe are ſuch as have fire mingled with the ſplendid and diaphanous nature of air. And hence the ſpheres of the planets, and the inerratic ſphere itſelf, poſſeſs a more attenuated and diaphanous eſſence; but the ſtars are of a more ſolid compoſition. But fire every where prevails, and all heaven is characterized through the power of this exalted element. And neither is the fire there cauſtic (for this is not even the property of the firſt of the ſublunary elements, which Ariſtotle calls *fiery*, πυροειδες) nor corruptive of any thing, nor of a nature contrary to earth; but it perpetually ſhines with a pure and tranſparent light, with vivific heat, and illuminating power.

And ſuch are the outlines of the ſyſtem of the world, according to Pythagoras and Plato; which, ſtrange as the aſſertion may ſeem, appears to have been but little known from the æra of the emperor Juſtinian to the preſent time. That beautiful mode in which as we have ſhown the elements ſubſiſt both in the heavens and the earth, has not been even ſuſpected by modern natural philoſophers to have any exiſtence; and aſtronomers have been very far from the truth in their aſſertions concerning the celeſtial ſpheres. In conſequence of indolence, or ignorance, or prejudice, or from all three in conjunction, the moderns have invented ſyſtems no leſs diſcordant with the nature of things than different from each other. They have juſt been able to gain a glimpſe of the beautiful union of things in the vegetable and animal tribes belonging to the earth, and have diſcovered that the loweſt of the animal ſpecies and the higheſt of the vegetable approximate ſo near to each other, that the difference between the two can ſcarcely be perceived; but this is the very ſummit of their reſearches; they are unable to trace the connection of things any further, and reſt ſatisfied in admitting that

The chain continues, but with links unknown.

[1] That is, in themſelves: but they are inviſible to us, on account of their poſſeſſing but little of the reſiſting nature of earth; and this is the reaſon why we cannot ſee the celeſtial ſpheres.

The divine nature of the celeſtial bodies cannot be ſeen through the teleſcope, and incorporeals are not to be viewed with a microſcopic eye: but theſe inſtruments are at preſent the great ſtandards of truth; and whatever oppoſes or cannot be aſcertained by the teſtimony of theſe, is conſidered as mere conjecture, idle ſpeculation, and a perverſion of the reaſoning power.

But let us now proceed to a ſummary view of ſome of the principle parts of this moſt intereſting dialogue. And, in the firſt place, with reſpect to the hiſtory which is related in the beginning, concerning a war between the inhabitants of the Atlantic iſland and the Athenians:—Crantor, the moſt early of Plato's commentators, conſidered this relation (ſays Proclus) as a mere hiſtory unconnected with allegory; while other Platoniſts, on the contrary, have conſidered it as an allegory alone. But both theſe opinions are confuted by Proclus and the beſt of the Platoniſts; becauſe Plato calls it a very wonderful, but at the ſame time true, narration. So that it is to be conſidered as a true hiſtory, exhibiting at the ſame time an image of the oppoſition of the natures which the univerſe contains. But according to Amelius [1] it repreſents the oppoſition between the inerratic ſphere and the fixed ſtars; according to Origen [2], the conteſt between dæmons of a ſuperior and thoſe of an inferior order; according to Numenius, the diſagreement between more excellent ſouls who are the attendants of Pallas, and ſuch as are converſant with generation under Neptune. Again, according to Porphyry, it inſinuates the conteſt between dæmons deducing ſouls into generation, and ſouls aſcending to the Gods. For Porphyry gives a three-fold diſtinction to dæmons; aſſerting that ſome are divine, that others ſubſiſt according to habitude, κατα σχεσιν, among which partial ſouls rank when they are allotted a dæmoniacal condition, and that others are evil and noxious to ſouls. He aſſerts, therefore, that this loweſt order of dæmons always contends with ſouls in their aſcent and deſcent, eſpecially weſtern dæmons; for, according to the Egyptians, the weſt is accommodated to dæmons of this deſcription. But the expoſition of Jamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus is doubtleſs to be preferred, as more conſiſtent with the nature of the dialogue; which refers it to the oppoſition perpetually flouriſhing in the univerſe between unity and

[1] A diſciple of Plotinus contemporary with Porphyry.

[2] Not the father, of that name, but a diſciple of Ammonius Saccas, and contemporary with Plotinus.

multitude,

multitude, bound and infinity, sameneſs and difference, motion and permanency, from which all things, the firſt cauſe being excepted, are compoſed. Likewiſe, being has either an eſſential or accidental ſubſiſtence, and is either incorporeal or corporeal: and if incorporeal, it either verges or does not verge to body. But bodies are either ſimple and immaterial, as the celeſtial bodies, or ſimple and material, as thoſe of an aërial nature, or compoſite and material, as thoſe of earth. So that the oppoſition of all theſe is occultly ſignified by that antient war; the higher and more excellent natures being every where implied by the Athenians, and thoſe of a contrary order by the inhabitants of the Atlantic iſland.

That the reader, however, may be convinced that Plato's account of the Atlantic iſland is not a fiction of his own deviſing, let him attend to the following relation of one Marcellus, who wrote an hiſtory of Æthiopian affairs, according to Proclus [1]:—"That ſuch, and ſo great, an iſland once exiſted, is evinced by thoſe who have compoſed hiſtories of things relative to the external ſea. For they relate that in their times there were ſeven iſlands in the Atlantic ſea, ſacred to Proſerpine: and beſides theſe, three others of an immenſe magnitude; one of which was ſacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and another, which is the middle of theſe, and is of a thouſand ſtadia, to Neptune. And beſides this, that the inhabitants of this laſt iſland preſerved the memory of the prodigious magnitude of the Atlantic iſland, as related by their anceſtors; and of its governing for many periods all the iſlands in the Atlantic ſea. And ſuch is the relation of Marcellus in his Æthiopic hiſtory." *Ὁτι μεν εγενετο τοιαυτη τις νησος και τηλικαυτη, δηλουσι τινες των ἱστορουντων τα περι της ἐξω Θαλαττης. ειναι γαρ και εν τοις αυτων χρονοις ἑπτα μεν νησους εν εκεινῳ τῳ πελαγει Περσεφονης ἱερας, τρεις δε αλλας απλετους, την μεν Πλουτωνος, την δε Αμμωνος, μεσην δε τουτων αλλην Ποσειδωνος, χιλιων σταδιων το μεγεθος. Και τους οικουντας εν αυτῃ μνημην απο των προγονων διασωζειν περι της Ατλαντιδος οντως γενομενης εκει νησου παμμεγαθεστατης, ην επι πολλας περιοδους δυναστευσαι πασων των εν Ατλαντικῳ πελαγει νησων. Ταυτα μεν ουν ὁ Μαρκελλος εν τοις Αιθιοπικοις γεγραφεν.*

Indeed it is not at all wonderful that ſo large an iſland ſhould once have exiſted, nor improbable that many more ſuch exiſt at preſent, though to us unknown, if we only conſider the Platonic theory concerning the earth, of which the reader will find an account in the Introduction to the Phædo, and

[1] In Tim. p. 55.

which the following extraordinary paſſage from Proclus [1] abundantly confirms. "It is here (ſays he) requiſite to remember the Platonic hypotheſes concerning the earth. For Plato does not meaſure its magnitude after the ſame manner as mathematicians; but thinks that its interval is much greater, as Socrates aſſerts in the Phædo. In which dialogue alſo he ſays, that there are many habitable parts ſimilar to our abode [2]. And hence he relates that an iſland and continent of this kind exiſt in the external or Atlantic ſea. For, indeed, if the earth be naturally ſpherical, it is neceſſary that it ſhould be ſuch according to its greateſt part. But the parts which we inhabit, both internally and externally, exhibit great inequality. In ſome parts of the earth, therefore, there muſt be an expanded plain, and an interval extended on high. For, according to the ſaying of Heraclitus, he who paſſes through a very profound region will arrive at the Atlantic mountain, whoſe magnitude is ſuch, according to the relation of the Æthiopian hiſtorians, that it touches the æther, and caſts a ſhadow of five thouſand ſtadia in extent; for from the ninth hour of the day the ſun is concealed by it, even to his perfect demerſion under the earth. Nor is this wonderful: for Athos, a Macedonian mountain, caſts a ſhadow as far as to Lemnos, which is diſtant from it ſeven hundred ſtadia. Nor are ſuch particulars as theſe, which Marcellus the Æthiopic hiſtorian mentions, related only concerning the Atlantic mountain; but Ptolemy alſo ſays that the lunar mountains are of an immenſe height; and Ariſtotle, that Caucaſus is enlightened by the rays of the ſun a third part of the night after ſun-ſet, and a third part before the riſing of the ſun. And if any one conſiders the whole magnitude of the earth,

[1] In Tim. p. 56.

[2] The latter Platoniſts appear to have been perfectly convinced that the earth contains two quarters in an oppoſite direction to Europe and Aſia; and Olympiodorus even conſiders Plato as of the ſame opinion, as the following paſſage from his commentary on this part of the Phædo clearly evinces.—"Plato (ſays he) directs his attention to four parts of the globe, as there are two parts which we inhabit, i. e. Europe and Aſia; ſo that there muſt be two others, in conſequence of the antipodes." Κατάστοχαζεται δε των τεσσαρων (τοπων) επειδη δυο καθ'ημας εισιν, η Ευρωπη και η Ασια, ωστε δυο αλλοι κατα τους αντιποδας. Now in conſequence of this, as they were acquainted with Africa, the remaining fourth quarter muſt be that which we call America. At the ſame time let it be carefully remembered, that theſe four quarters are nothing more than four holes with reſpect to the whole earth, which contains many ſuch parts; and that conſequently they are not quarters of the earth itſelf, but only of a ſmall part of the earth in which they are contained, like a ſmall globe in one of a prodigious extent.

bounded

bounded by its elevated parts, he will conclude that it is truly of a prodigious magnitude, according to the aſſertion of Plato."

In the next place, by the fable of Phaëton we muſt underſtand the deſtruction of a conſiderable part of the earth through fire, by means of a comet being diſſolved of a ſolar nature. Likewiſe, when he mentions a deluge, it is neceſſary to remember, that through the devaſtations of theſe two elements, fire and water, a more prolific regeneration of things takes place at certain periods of time; and that when Divinity intends a reformation, the heavenly bodies concur with this deſign in ſuch a manner, that when a conflagration is about to take place, then, according to Beroſus [1] the Chaldæan, all the planets are collected together in Cancer; but when a deluge, then the planets meet in Capricorn. With reſpect to Pallas and Neptune, who are mentioned in this part of the dialogue, as the reader will find an account of theſe Divinities in the Notes to the Cratylus, I ſhall only add at preſent, that, according to Proclus, Minerva moſt eminently preſides in the celeſtial conſtellation called the Ram, and in the equinoctial circle, where a power motive of the univerſe principally prevails.

Again, it is neceſſary to underſtand, that when the world is ſaid by Plato to be *generated*, this term expreſſes its flowing and compoſite nature, and does not imply any temporal commencement of its exiſtence. For, as the world was neceſſarily produced according to eſſential power, this being the moſt perfect of all modes of operation, it is alſo neceſſary that it ſhould be coexiſtent with its artificer; juſt as the ſun produces light coexiſtent with itſelf, fire heat, and ſnow coldneſs. The reader muſt, however, carefully obſerve, that when we ſay it is neceſſary that the cauſe of the univerſe ſhould operate according to power, we do not underſtand a neceſſity which implies violence or conſtraint; but that neceſſity which Ariſtotle [2] defines as the perfectly ſimple, and which cannot have a multifarious ſubſiſtence. And hence this term, when applied to the moſt exalted natures, to whom alone in this ſenſe it belongs, ſignifies nothing more than an impoſſibility of ſubſiſting otherwiſe than they do, without falling from the perfection of their nature. Agreeably to this definition, Neceſſity was called by antient theologiſts Adraſtia and Themis, or the perfectly right and juſt:

[1] Vid. Senec. Natural. Quæſt. III. 29.

[2] Metaphyſ. lib. 5.

and if men of the preſent day had but attended to this ſignification of the word, i. e. if any edition of Ariſtotle's works, with a *copious index* mentioning this ſenſe of neceſſity, had fortunately exiſted, they would not have ignorantly ſuppoſed that this word, when applied to divine natures, ſignified conſtraint, violence, and over-ruling power. As intellect, therefore, is eternal, both according to eſſence and energy, and as ſoul is eternal in eſſence, but temporal in energy, ſo the world is temporal both in eſſence and energy. Hence, every thing prior to ſoul always *is*, and is never generated; but ſoul both *is*, and is perpetually generated; and the world never *is*, but is always generated: and whatever the world contains in like manner never is; but inſtead of being always generated, like the whole world, is ſo at ſome particular time. Becauſe the world therefore is converſant with perpetual motion and time, it may be ſaid to be always generated, or advancing towards being; and therefore never truly is. So that it reſembles the image of a mountain beheld in a torrent, which has the appearance of a mountain without the reality, and which is continually renewed by the continual renovation of the ſtream. But ſoul, which is eternal in eſſence, and temporal in energy, may be compared to the image of the ſame rock beheld in a pool, and which, of courſe, when compared with the image in the torrent, may be ſaid to be permanently the ſame. In fine, as Proclus well obſerves, Plato means nothing more by *generation* than the formation of bodies, i. e. a motion or proceſſion towards the integrity and perfection of the univerſe.

Again, by the *demiurgus* and *father* of the world we muſt underſtand Jupiter, who ſubſiſts at the extremity of the *intellectual triad*[1]; and αυτο ζωον, or *animal itſelf*, which is the exemplar of the world, and from the contemplation of which it was fabricated by Jupiter, is the laſt of the *intelligible triad*, and is ſame with the Phanes of Orpheus: for the theologiſt repreſents Phanes as an animal with the heads of various beaſts, as may be ſeen in our Notes to the Parmenides. Nor let the reader be diſturbed on finding that, according to Plato, the firſt cauſe is not the immediate cauſe of the univerſe; for this is not through any defect or imbecility of nature, but, on the contrary, is the conſequence of tranſcendency of power. For, as the firſt cauſe

[1] See the Notes on the Cratylus and Parmenides.

is

is the ſame with *the one*, a unifying energy muſt be the prerogative of his nature; and as he is likewiſe perfectly ſupereſſential, if the world were his immediate progeny, it muſt be as much as poſſible ſupereſſential and profoundly one: but as this is not the caſe, it is neceſſary that it ſhould be formed by intellect and moved by ſoul. So that it derives the unity and goodneſs of its nature from the firſt cauſe, the orderly diſpoſition and diſtinction of its parts from Jupiter its artificer, and its perpetual motion from ſoul; the whole at the ſame time proceeding from the firſt cauſe through proper mediums. Nor is it more difficult to conceive matter after this manner inveſted with form and diſtributed into order, than to conceive a potter making clay with his own hands, giving it a ſhape when made, through the aſſiſtance of a wheel, and, when faſhioned, adorning it through another inſtrument with figures; at the ſame time being careful to remember, that in this latter inſtance different inſtruments are required through the imbecility of the artificer, but that in the former various mediums are neceſſary from the tranſcendency of power which ſubſiſts in the original cauſe. And from all this it is eaſy to infer, that matter was not prior to the world by any interval of time, but only in the order of compoſition; priority here implying nothing more than that which muſt be conſidered as firſt in the conſtruction of the world. Nor was it hurled about in a diſordered ſtate prior to order; but this only ſignifies its confuſed and tumultuous nature, when conſidered in itſelf, diveſted of the ſupervening irradiations of form.

With reſpect to the four elements, I add, in addition to what has been ſaid before, that their powers are beautifully diſpoſed by Proclus as follows, viz:

Fire.	Air.
Subtle, acute, movable.	Subtle, blunt, movable.
Water.	Earth.
Denſe, blunt, movable.	Denſe, blunt, immovable.

In which diſpoſition you may perceive how admirably the two extremes fire and earth are connected, though indeed it is the peculiar excellence of the Platonic philoſophy to find out in every thing becoming mediums through that part of the dialectic art called diviſion; and it is owing to this that the philoſophy

philoſophy itſelf forms ſo regular and conſiſtent a whole. But I have invented the following numbers for the purpoſe of repreſenting this diſtribution of the elements arithmetically.

Let the number 60 repreſent fire, and 480 earth; and the mediums between theſe, viz. 120 and 240, will correſpond to air and water. For as 60 : 120 :: 240 : 480. But $60 = 3 \times 5 \times 4$. $120 = 3 \times 10 \times 4$. $240 = 6 \times 10 \times 4$. and $480 = 6 \times 10 \times 8$. So that theſe numbers will correſpond to the properties of the elements as follows:

FIRE:	AIR::
3 × 5 × 4:	3 × 10 × 4::
Subtle, acute, movable:	Subtle, blunt, movable.
WATER:	EARTH.
6 × 10 × 4::	6 × 10 × 8
Denſe, blunt, movable::	Denſe, blunt, immovable.

With reſpect to fire it muſt be obſerved, that the Platoniſts conſider *light*, *flame*, and *a burning coal*, φως, φλοξ, ανθραξ, as differing from each other; and that a ſubjection or remiſſion of fire takes place from on high to the earth, proceeding, as we have before obſerved, from that which is more immaterial, pure, and incorporeal, as far as to the moſt material and denſe bodies: the laſt proceſſion of fire being ſubterranean; for, according to Empedocles, there are many rivers of fire under the earth. So that one kind of fire is material and another immaterial, i. e. when compared with ſublunary matter; and one kind is corruptible, but another incorruptible; and one is mixed with air, but another is perfectly pure. The characteriſtic too of fire is neither heat nor a motion upwards, for this is the property only of our terreſtrial fire; and this in conſequence of not ſubſiſting in its proper place: but the eſſential peculiarity of fire is viſibility; for this belongs to all fire, i. e. to the *divine*, the *mortal*, the *burning*, and the *impetuous*. It muſt, however, be carefully obſerved, that our eyes are by no means the ſtandards of this viſibility: for we cannot perceive the celeſtial ſpheres, on account of fire and air in their compoſition ſo much predominating over earth; and many terreſtrial bodies emit no light when conſiderably heated,

owing

owing to the fire which they contain being wholly abſorbed, as it were, in groſs and ponderous earth.

In like manner, with reſpect to earth, the characteriſtic of its nature is ſolidity and tangibility, but not ponderoſity and a tendency downwards; for theſe properties do not ſubſiſt in every ſpecies of earth. Hence, when we conſider theſe two elements according to their oppoſite ſubſiſtence, we ſhall find that fire is always in motion, but earth always immovable; that fire is eminently viſible, and earth eminently tangible; and that fire is of a moſt attenuated nature through light, but that earth is moſt denſe through darkneſs. So that as fire is eſſentially the cauſe of light, in like manner, earth is eſſentially the cauſe of darkneſs; while air and water ſubſiſting as mediums between theſe two, are, on account of their diaphanous nature, the cauſes of viſibility to other things, but not to themſelves. In the mean time moiſture is common both to air and water, connecting and conglutinating earth, but becoming the ſeat of fire, and affording nouriſhment and ſtability to its flowing nature.

With reſpect to the compoſition of the mundane ſoul, it is neceſſary to obſerve that there are five genera of being, from which all things after the firſt being are compoſed, viz. *eſſence*, *permanency*, *motion*, *ſameneſs*, *difference*. For every thing muſt poſſeſs *eſſence*; muſt *abide* in its cauſe, from which alſo it muſt *proceed*, and to which it muſt be *converted*; muſt be the *ſame* with itſelf and certain other natures, and at the ſame time *different* from others and diſtinguiſhed in itſelf. But Plato, for the ſake of brevity, aſſumes only three of theſe in the compoſition of the ſoul, viz. *eſſence*, *ſameneſs*, and *difference*; for the other two muſt neceſſarily ſubſiſt in conjunction with theſe. But by a nature impartible, or without parts, we muſt underſtand intellect, and by that nature which is diviſible about body, corporeal life. The mundane ſoul, therefore, is a medium between the mundane intellect and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. We muſt not, however, ſuppoſe that when the ſoul is ſaid to be mingled from theſe two, the impartible and partible natures are conſumed in the mixture, as is the caſe when corporeal ſubſtances are mingled together; but we muſt underſtand that the ſoul is of a middle nature between theſe, ſo as to be different from each, and yet a participant of each.

The firſt numbers of the ſoul are theſe; 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27; but the other numbers are,

6

8	9
9	12
12	18
16	27
18	36
24	54
32	81
36	108
48	162

But in order to underſtand theſe numbers mathematically, it is neceſſary to know, in the firſt place, what is meant by arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic proportion. Arithmetical proportion, then, is when an equal exceſs is preſerved in three or more given numbers; geometrical, when numbers preſerve the ſame ratio; and harmonic, when the middle term is exceeded by the greater, by the ſame part of the greater as the exceſs of the middle term above the leſſer exceeds the leſſer. Hence, the numbers 1, 2, 3, are in arithmetical proportion; 2, 4, 8, in geometrical, ſince as 2 is to 4, ſo is 4 to 8; and 6, 4, 3, are in harmonic proportion, for 4 is exceeded by 6 by 2, which is a third part of 6, and 4 exceeds 3 by 1, which is the third part of 3. Again, ſeſquialter proportion is when one number contains another and the half of it beſides, ſuch as the proportion of three to 2; but ſeſquitertian proportion takes place when a greater number contains a leſſer, and beſides this, a third part of the leſſer, as 4 to 3; and a ſeſquioctave ratio is when a greater number contains a leſſer one, and an eighth part of it beſides, as 9 to 8; and this proportion produces in muſic an entire tone, which is the principle of all ſymphony. But a tone contains five ſymphonies, viz. the *diateſſaron*, or ſeſquitertian proportion, which is compoſed from two tones, and a ſemitone, which is a ſound leſs than a tone; the *diapente*, or ſeſquialter proportion, which is compoſed from three tones and a ſemitone; the *diapaſon*, or duple proportion, i. e. four to two, which is compoſed from ſix tones; the *diapaſon diapente*, which conſiſts of nine tones and

and a ſemitone; and the *diſdiapaſon*, or quadruple proportion, i. e. four to one, which contains twelve tones.

But it is neceſſary to obſerve further concerning a tone, that it cannot be divided into two equal parts; becauſe it is compoſed from a ſeſquioctave proportion, and 9 cannot be divided into two equal parts. Hence, it can only be divided into two unequal parts, which are uſually called ſemitones; but by Plato λειμματα, or *remainders*. But the leſſer part of a tone was called by the Pythagoreans *dieſis*, or *diviſion*; and this is ſurpaſſed by a ſeſquitertian proportion by two tones; and the remaining greater part, by which the tone ſurpaſſes the leſs ſemitone, is called *apotome*, or *a cutting off*.

But as it is requiſite to explain the different kinds of harmony, in order to a knowledge of the compoſition of ſymphonies, let the reader take notice that harmony receives a triple diviſion, into the Diatonic, Enharmonic, and Chromatic. And the Diatonic genus takes place when its diviſion continually proceeds through a leſs ſemitone and two tones. But the Enharmonic proceeds through two dieſes. And the Chromatic is that which aſcends through two unequal ſemitones and three ſemitones; or τριημιτονιον, according to the appellation of the antient muſicians. And to theſe three genera all muſical inſtruments are reduced, becauſe they are all compoſed from theſe harmonies. But though there were many different kinds of inſtruments among the antients, yet the Pythagorean and Platonic philoſophers uſed only three—the Monochord, the Tetrachord, and the Polychord; to which three they refer the compoſition of all the other inſtruments. From among all theſe, therefore, Plato aſſumes the *diatonic* harmony, as more agreeable to nature; in which the tetrachord proceeds through a leſs ſemitone and two tones; tending by this means from a leſs to a greater ſemitone, as from a more ſlender to a more powerful matter, which poſſeſſes a ſimple form, and is at the ſame time both gentle and robuſt. And hence, as all inſtruments are converſant with theſe three kinds of harmony, Plato, ſays Proclus, in conſequence of preferring the diatonic harmony, alone uſes two tones when he orders us to fill up the ſeſquitertian, ſeſquioctave and ſemitone intervals.

With reſpect to the firſt numbers, which are evidently thoſe deſcribed by Plato, the firſt three of theſe, 1, 2, 3, as Syrianus beautifully obſerves, may

be conſidered as repreſenting the ſoul of the world, abiding in, proceeding from, and returning to, herſelf, viz. abiding according to that firſt part, proceeding through the ſecond, and this without any paſſivity or imbecility, but returning according to the third: for that which is perfective accedes to beings through converſion. But as the whole of the mundane ſoul is perfect, united with intelligibles, and eternally abiding in intellect, hence ſhe providentially preſides over ſecondary natures; in one reſpect indeed over thoſe which are as it were proximately connected with herſelf, and in another over ſolid and compacted bulks. But her providence over each of theſe is twofold. For thoſe which are connected with her eſſence in a following order, proceed from her according to the power of the fourth term (4), which poſſeſſes generative powers; but return to her according to the fifth (9), which reduces them to one. Again, ſolid natures, and all the ſpecies which are diſcerned in corporeal maſſes, proceed according to the octuple of the firſt part (i. e. according to 8), which number is produced by two, is ſolid, and poſſeſſes generative powers proceeding to all things; but they return according to the number 27, which is the regreſſion of ſolids, proceeding as it were from the ternary, and exiſting of the ſame order according to nature: for ſuch are all odd numbers.

And thus much for the firſt ſeries of numbers, in which duple and triple ratios are comprehended; but after this follows another ſeries, in which the duple are filled with ſeſquitertian and ſeſquialter ratios, and the ſeſquitertian ſpaces receive a tone. And here, in the firſt place, in the duple progreſſion between 6 and 12, we may perceive two mediums, 8 and 9. And 8 indeed ſubſiſts between 6 and 12 in an harmonic ratio; for it exceeds 6 by a third part of 6, and it is in like manner exceeded by 12 by a third part of 12. Likewiſe 8 is in a ſeſquitertian ratio to 6, but 12 is ſeſquialter to 8. Beſides, the difference between 12 and 8 is 4, but the difference between 8 and 6 is 2. And hence, 4 to 2, as well as 12 to 6, contains a duple ratio: and theſe are the ratios in which the artifice of harmony is continually employed. We may likewiſe compare 9 to 6 which is ſeſquialter, 12 to 9 which is ſeſquitertian, and 9 to 8 which is ſeſquioctave, and forms a tone; and from this compariſon we ſhall perceive that two ſeſquitertian ratios are bound together by this ſeſquioctave, viz. 8 to 6 and 9 to 12. Nor is an arithmetical medium wanting in theſe numbers; for 9 exceeds 6 by 3, and is by the ſame number

exceeded

exceeded by 12. And in the ſame manner we may proceed in all the following duple ratios, binding the duple by the ſeſquitertian and ſeſquialter, and connecting the two ſeſquitertians by a ſeſquioctave ratio. We may run through the triple proportions too in a ſimilar manner, excepting in the tone. But becauſe ſeſquitertian ratios are not alone produced from two tones, but from a ſemitone, and this a leſſer, which is deficient from a full tone by certain ſmall parts, hence Plato ſays, that in the ſeſquitertian ratios a certain ſmall portion remains [1]. And thus much may ſuffice for an epitome of the mode in which the duple and triple intervals are filled.

But the words of Plato reſpecting theſe intervals plainly ſhow, as Proclus well obſerves, that he follows in this inſtance the doctrine of the antient theologiſts. For they aſſert, that in the artificer of the univerſe there are ſeparating and connecting powers, and that through the former he ſeparates his government from that of his father Saturn, but through the latter applies the whole of his fabrication to his paternal unity; and they call theſe operations inciſions and bonds. Hence the demiurgus, dividing the eſſence of the ſoul, according to theſe powers in demiurgic bounds, is ſaid to cut the parts from their totality, and again to bind the ſame with certain bonds, which are μεσοτητες, *middles* or *mediums*, and through which he connects that which is divided, in the ſame manner as he divides, through ſections, that which is united. And as the firſt numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, repreſented thoſe powers of the ſoul by which ſhe abides in, proceeds from, and returns to, herſelf, and cauſes the progreſſion and converſion of the parts of the univerſe—ſo, in theſe ſecond numbers, the ſeſquitertian, ſeſquialter, and other ratios conſtitute the more particular ornament of the world; and, while they ſubſiſt as wholes themſelves, adorn the parts of its parts.

I only add, that we muſt not ſuppoſe theſe numbers of the ſoul to be a multitude of unities; but we muſt conceive them to be vital ſelf-motive natures, which are indeed the images of intellectual numbers, but the exemplars of ſuch as are apparent to the eye of ſenſe. In like manner, with reſpect to harmony, ſoul is neither harmony itſelf, nor that which ſubſiſts in harmonized natures. For harmony itſelf is uniform, ſeparate, and exempt from the whole of things harmonized; but that which ſubſiſts in things har-

[1] The proportion of 256 to 243 produces what is called in muſic λειμμα, *limma*, or that which remains.

monized is dependent on others, by which alſo it is naturally moved. But the harmony of the ſoul ſubſiſts in the middle of theſe two, imparting harmony to others, and being the firſt participant of it herſelf.

In order to underſtand the figure of the ſoul, in the firſt place, mathematically, conceive all the above-mentioned numbers to be deſcribed in a certain ſtraight rule, according to the whole of its breadth; and conceive this rule to be afterwards divided according to its length. Then all theſe ratios will ſubſiſt in each part of the ſection. For, if the diviſion were made according to breadth, it would be neceſſary that ſome of the numbers ſhould be ſeparated on this ſide, and others on that. Afterwards let the two lengths of the rule be mutually applied to each other, viz. in the points which divide theſe lengths in half: but let them not be ſo applied as to form right angles, for the intended circles are not of this kind. Again, let the two lengths be ſo incurvated, that the extremes may touch each other; then two circles will be produced, one interior and the other exterior, and they will be mutually oblique to each other. But one of theſe will be the circle of *ſameneſs*, and the other of *difference*; and the one will ſubſiſt according to the equinoctial circle, but the other according to the zodiac: for every circle of difference is rolled about this, as of identity about the equinoctial. Hence, theſe rectilinear ſections ought not to be applied at right angles, but according to the ſimilitude of the letter X, agreeably to the mind of Plato, ſo that the angles in the ſummit only may be equal; for neither does the zodiac cut the equinoctial at right angles. And thus much for the mathematical explanation of the figure of the ſoul.

But again, ſays Proclus, referring the whole of our diſcourſe to the eſſence of the ſoul, we ſhall ſay that, according to the mathematical diſciplines, continuous and diſcrete quantity ſeem in a certain reſpect to be contrary to each other; but in ſoul both concur together, i. e. union and diviſion. For ſoul is both unity and multitude, and one reaſon and many; and ſo far as ſhe is a whole ſhe is continuous, but ſo far as number ſhe is divided, according to the reaſons which ſhe contains. Hence, according to her continuity, ſhe is aſſimilated to the union of intelligibles; but, according to her multitude, to their diſtinction. And if you are willing to aſcend ſtill higher in ſpeculations, ſoul, according to her union, poſſeſſes a veſtige and reſemblance of *the one*, but according to her diviſion ſhe exhibits the multitude

of

of divine numbers. Hence we muſt not ſay that ſhe alone poſſeſſes an arithmetical eſſence, for ſhe would not be continuous; nor alone a geometrical eſſence, for ſhe would not be divided: ſhe is therefore both at once, and muſt be called both arithmetical and geometrical. But ſo far as ſhe is arithmetical, ſhe has at the ſame time harmony conjoined with her eſſence; for the multitude which ſhe contains is elegant and compoſite, and receives in the ſame and at once both that which is eſſential quantity and that which is related. But ſo far as ſhe is geometrical, ſhe has that which is ſpherical connected with her eſſence. For the circles which ſhe contains are both immovable and moved; immovable indeed according to eſſence, but moved according to a vital energy; or, to ſpeak more properly, they may be ſaid to poſſeſs both of theſe at once, for they are ſelf-motive: and that which is ſelf-motive is both moved and is at the ſame time immovable, ſince a motive power ſeems to belong to an immovable nature. Soul, therefore, eſſentially pre-aſſumes all diſciplines; the geometrical, according to her totality, her forms, and her lines; the arithmetical, according to her multitude and eſſential unities; the harmonical, according to the ratios of numbers; and the ſpherical, according to her double circulations. And, in ſhort, ſhe is the eſſential, ſelf-motive, intellectual, and united bond of all diſciplines, purely comprehending all things; figures in an unfigured manner; unitedly ſuch things as are divided; and without diſtance ſuch as are diſtant from each other.

We are likewiſe informed by Proclus, that, according to Porphyry, a character like the letter X comprehended in a circle was a ſymbol with the Egyptians of the mundane ſoul; by the right lines, perhaps (ſays he), ſignifying its biformed progreſſion, but by the circle its uniform life and intellective progreſs, which is of a circular nature. But of theſe circles the exterior, or the circle of ſameneſs, repreſents the dianoëtic power of the ſoul; but the interior, or the circle of difference, the power which energizes according to opinion: and the motion which is perpetually revolved in ſameneſs, and which comprehends the ſoul, is intellect.

Again, we have before obſerved that, according to the Platonic philoſophy, the planets revolve with a kind of ſpiral motion; while variouſly wandering under the oblique zodiac, they at one time verge to the ſouth, and at another to the north, ſometimes advance, and ſometimes retreat, and being at one time

time more diſtant from and at another nearer to the earth. And this motion, indeed, very properly belongs to them, from their middle poſition, as it is a medium between the right-lined motion of the elements and the circular motion of the inerratic ſphere: for a ſpiral is mixed from the right line and circle. Add too, that there are ſeven motions in the heavens; the circular, before, behind, upwards, downwards, to the right hand, and to the left. But the ſpheres alone poſſeſs a circular motion. And the ſtars in the inerratic ſphere revolve about their centres; but at the ſame time have an advancing motion, becauſe they are drawn along towards the weſt by the ſphere in which they are fixed. But they are entirely deſtitute of the other five motions. On the contrary, the planets have all the ſeven. For they revolve about their own centres, but are carried by the motions of their ſpheres towards the eaſt. And beſides this, they are carried upwards and downwards, behind and before, to the right hand and to the left. Every ſtar, too, by its revolution about its own centre, imitates the energy of the ſoul which it contains about its own intellect; but by following the motion of its ſphere, it imitates the energy of the ſphere about a ſuperior intellect. We may likewiſe add, that the uniformity in the motions of the fixed ſtars confers union and perſeverance on inferior concerns; but that the manifold and oppoſite motions of the planets contribute to the production, mingling and governing of things various and oppoſite.

And here, as the reader will doubtleſs be deſirous of knowing why earth is called by Plato the firſt and moſt antient of the Gods within the heavens, I doubt not but he will gratefully receive the following epitome of the beautiful account given by Proclus of the earth in his ineſtimable commentaries on this venerable dialogue.—"Earth (ſays he) firſt proceeds from the intelligible earth which comprehends all the intelligible orders of the Gods, and from the intellectual earth which is co-ordinated with heaven. For our earth, being analogous to theſe, eternally abides, as in the centre of heaven; by which being every way comprehended, it becomes full of generative power and demiurgic perfection. The true earth, therefore, is not this corporeal and groſs bulk, but an animal endued with a divine ſoul and a divine body. For it contains an immaterial and ſeparate intellect, and a divine ſoul energizing about this intellect, and an ethereal body proximately depending on this ſoul; and, laſtly, this viſible bulk, which is on all ſides animated and filled

filled with life from its inſpiring ſoul, and through which it generates and nouriſhes lives of all-various kinds. For one ſpecies of life is rooted in the earth, and another moves about its ſurface. For how is it poſſible that plants ſhould live while abiding in the earth, but when ſeparated from it die, unleſs its viſible bulk was full of life? Indeed it muſt univerſally follow that wholes muſt be animated prior to parts: for it would be ridiculous that man ſhould participate of a rational ſoul and of intellect, but that earth and air ſhould be deprived of a ſoul, ſublimely carried in theſe elements as in a chariot, governing them from on high, and preſerving them in the limits accommodated to their nature. For, as Theophraſtus well obſerves, wholes would poſſeſs leſs authority than parts, and things eternal than ſuch as are corruptible, if deprived of the poſſeſſion of ſoul. Hence there muſt neceſſarily be a ſoul and intellect in the earth, the former cauſing her to be prolific, and the latter connectedly containing her in the middle of the univerſe. So that earth is a divine animal, full of intellectual and animaſtic eſſences, and of immaterial powers. For if a partial ſoul, ſuch as ours, in conjunction with its proper ethereal vehicle, is able to exerciſe an exuberant energy in a material body, what ought we to think of a ſoul ſo divine as that of the earth? Ought we not to aſſert, that by a much greater priority ſhe uſes theſe apparent bodies through other middle vehicles, and through theſe enables them to receive her divine illuminations?

"Earth then ſubſiſting in this manner, ſhe is ſaid, in the firſt place, to be our nurſe, as poſſeſſing, in a certain reſpect, a power equivalent to heaven; and becauſe, as heaven comprehends divine animals, ſo earth appears to contain ſuch as are earthly. And, in the ſecond place, as inſpiring our life from her own proper life. For ſhe not only yields us fruits, and nouriſhes our bodies through theſe, but ſhe fills our ſouls with illuminations from her own divine ſoul, and through her intellect awakens ours from its oblivious ſleep. And thus, through the whole of herſelf, ſhe becomes the nurſe of our whole compoſition.

"But we may conſider the poles as powers which give ſtability to the univerſe, and excite the whole of its bulk to intelligible love; which connect a diviſible nature indiviſibly, and that which poſſeſſes interval in an united and indiſtant manner. But the axis is one divinity congregating the centres of the univerſe, connecting the whole world, and moving its

divine circulations; about which the revolutions of the ſtars ſubſiſt, and which ſuſtains the whole of the heavens by its power. And hence it is called Atlas, from the immutable and unwearied energy with which it is endued. Add too that the word τεταμενον, *extended*, ſignifies that this one power is Titanic, guarding the circulations of the wholes which the univerſe contains.

"Earth is likewiſe called the guardian and fabricator of night and day. And that ſhe cauſes the night indeed is evident; for her magnitude and figure give that great extent to the conical ſhadow which ſhe produces. But ſhe is the fabricator of the day, conſidered as giving perfection to the day which is conjoined with night; ſo that earth is the artificer of both theſe in conjunction with the ſun.

"But ſhe is the moſt antient and firſt of the Gods in the heavens, conſidered with reſpect to her ſtability and generative power, her ſymphony with heaven, and her poſition in the centre of the univerſe. For the centre poſſeſſes a mighty power in the univerſe, as connecting all its circulations; and hence it was called by the Pythagoreans the tower of Jupiter, from its containing a demiurgic guard. And if we recollect the Platonic hypotheſis concerning the earth (which we have mentioned before), that our habitable part is nothing but a dark hollow, and very different from the true earth, which is adorned with a beauty ſimilar to that of the heavens, we ſhall have no occaſion to wonder at her being called the firſt and moſt antient of the celeſtial Gods."

Again, according to the Platonic philoſophy, ſome of the fixed ſtars are ſometimes ſo affected, that for a conſiderable ſpace of time they become inviſible to us; and in this caſe, both when they withdraw themſelves from our view, and when they again make their appearance, they are ſaid by ſuch as are ſkilled in theſe affairs, according to the information of Proclus [1], both to produce and ſignify mighty events. But though it is evident from the very words of Plato, in this part of the dialogue, that this opinion concerning certain ſtars diſappearing and becoming again viſible was entertained by all the aſtronomers of his time, and by the Pythagoreans prior to him,

[1] In Tim. p. 285. And in p. 333 he informs us, that the fixed ſtars have periods of revolution, though to us unknown, and that different ſtars have different periods. See alſo Chalcidius in Plat. Tim. p. 218.

yet

yet this moſt intereſting circumſtance ſeems to have been utterly unknown to the moderns. Hence, not in the leaſt ſuſpecting this to be the caſe, they have immediately concluded from ſtars appearing of which we have no account, and others diſappearing which have been obſerved in the heavens for many ages, that the ſtars are bodies, like earthly natures, ſubject to generation and decay. But this is not wonderful, if we conſider that ſuch men as theſe have not the ſmalleſt conception that the univerſe is a perfect whole; that every thing perfect muſt have a firſt, middle, and laſt; and that, in conſequence of this, the heavens alone can rank in the firſt place, and earth in the laſt.

As the univerſe, indeed, as well as each of its principal parts or *wholes*, is *perpetual*, and as this perpetuity being temporal can only ſubſiſt by periodical circulation, hence all the celeſtial bodies, in order that all the poſſible variety of things may be unfolded, form different periods at different times; and their appearings and diſappearings are nothing more than the reſtitutions of their circulations to their priſtine ſtate, and the beginnings of new periods. For according to theſe eſpecially, ſays Proclus, they turn and tranſmute mundane natures, and bring on abundant corruptions and mighty mutations, as Plato aſſerts in the Republic.

In the next place, from the ſublime ſpeech of the demiurgus to the junior or mundane Gods, the reader may obtain full conviction that the Gods of the antients were not dead men deified; for they are here repreſented as commanded by the mundane artificer to fabricate the whole of the mortal race. And with reſpect to the properties of the ſublunary Gods, which Plato comprehends in nine divinities, Proclus beautifully obſerves that *Heaven* bounds, *Earth* corroborates, and *Ocean* moves, the whole of generation. That *Tethys* eſtabliſhes every thing in its proper motion, intellectual natures in intellectual, middle natures in animal, and corporeal natures in phyſical motion; *Ocean* at the ſame time moving all things collected together in one. But *Saturn* diſtributes intellectually only, *Rhea* viviſies, *Phorcys* ſcatters ſpermatic reaſons, *Jupiter* gives perfection to things apparent from unapparent cauſes, and *Juno* evolves according to the all-various mutations of apparent natures. And thus through this ennead the ſublunary world is in a becoming manner diſtributed and filled; divinely indeed from the Gods, angelically from angels, and dæmoniacally from

dæmons. And again, the Gods ſubſiſting about bodies, ſouls, and intellects; angels exhibiting their providence about ſouls and bodies; and dæmons being divided about the fabrication of nature, and the care of bodies. But it may be aſked, Why does Plato comprehend the whole extent of the Gods producing generation, in theſe nine divinities? Becauſe, ſays Proclus, this ennead accompliſhes the fabrication of generation. For in the ſublunary regions there are bodies and natures, ſouls and intellects, and theſe both totally and partially. And all theſe ſubſiſt in both reſpects, that is both totally and partially, in each of the elements, becauſe wholes and parts ſubſiſt together. Hence, as each element ranks as a monad, and contains bodies and natures, ſouls and intellects, both totally and partially, an ennead will evidently be produced in each. But *Heaven* and *Earth* generate the unapparent eſſences of theſe, the former according to union, and the latter according to multiplication: but *Ocean* and *Tethys* give perfection to their common and diſtributed motion; at the ſame time that the motion of each is different. In like manner, with reſpect to the wholes which are adorned, *Saturn* diſtributes things partial from ſuch as are total, but in an intellectual manner. But *Rhea* calls forth this diſtribution from intellectual natures into all-various progreſſions, and as far as to the ultimate forms of life, in conſequence of her being a vivific Goddeſs. But *Phorcys* produces the Titanic diſtinction, as far as to natural reaſons. And after theſe three, the fathers of compoſite natures ſucceed. And Jupiter indeed orderly diſpoſes ſenſible natures totally, in imitation of *Heaven*. For in the intellectual order, and in the royal ſeries, he proceeds analogous to *Heaven*[1]. But Juno moves the wholes, fills them with powers, and unfolds them according to every progreſſion. And the Gods poſterior to theſe fabricate the partial works of ſenſible natures, according to the characteriſtics by which they are diſtinguiſhed; viz. the demiurgic, the vivific, the perfective, and the connective, unfolding and diſtributing themſelves as far as to the laſt of things. For theſe laſt are all of them analogous to the Saturnian order, from whoſe government the diſtributive characteriſtic originally proceeds.

Again, by the *Crater* in which the mundane ſoul was mingled, we muſt

[1] For there are ſix kings, according to Orpheus, who preſide over the univerſe—Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus; and of theſe Saturn proceeds analogous to Phanes, and Jupiter to Heaven.

underſtand

underſtand the viviſic Goddeſs Juno; by the term *mingling*, a communion of eſſence; and by a ſecond mixture in a certain reſpect the ſame, but yet deficient from the firſt in a ſecond and third degree, the ſimilitude and at the ſame time inferiority of partial to total ſouls, and the order ſubſiſting among partial ſouls. For ſome of theſe are pure and undefiled, aſſociating with generation but for a ſhort time, and this for the God-like purpoſe of benefiting more ingenious ſouls; but others wander from their true country for very extended periods of time. For between ſouls which abide on high without defilement, and ſuch as deſcend and are defiled with vice, the medium muſt be ſuch ſouls as deſcend, indeed, but without defilement.

But when the artificer of the univerſe is ſaid to have diſtributed ſouls equal in number to the ſtars, this muſt not be underſtood as if one partial ſoul was diſtributed under one of the ſtars, and that the quantity of ſouls is equal to that of the ſtarry Gods; for this would be perfectly inconſiſtent with what Plato aſſerts a little before, that the artificer diſſeminated ſome of theſe into the earth, ſome into the ſun and ſome into the moon, thus ſcattering a multitude into each of the inſtruments of time. But, as Proclus well obſerves, equality of number here muſt not be underſtood monadically, but according to analogy. For in numbers, ſays he, ten is analogous to unity, thirty to three, fifty to five, and entirely all the numbers poſterior to the decad, to all within the decad. And hence five is not equal to fifty in quantity, nor three to thirty, but they are only equal according to analogy. After this manner, therefore, the equal in number muſt be aſſumed in partial ſouls; ſince there is a number of theſe accommodated to every divine ſoul, and which each divine ſoul uniformly pre-aſſumes in itſelf. And hence, when it unfolds this number, it bounds the multitude of partial ſouls diſtributed under its eſſence. Likewiſe, with reſpect to theſe depending ſouls, ſuch as are firſt ſuſpended from a divine ſoul are leſs in number, but greater in power; but ſuch as are ſecond in progreſſion are leſs in power, but more extended in number; while at the ſame time each is analogous to the divine cauſe from which it proceeds.

Obſerve, too, that when Plato uſes the term *the moſt pious of animals*, man alone is not implied, but the inhabitants likewiſe or partial ſouls of the ſeveral ſpheres and ſtars: for, ſays Proclus, between eternal animals [1], and

[1] i. e. ſtars and ſpheres.

ſuch as live but for a ſhort period [1], (viz. whoſe periods of circulation are ſhort) it is neceſſary there ſhould be a ſpecies of rational animals more divine than man, and whoſe exiſtence is of a very extended duration. It is likewiſe worthy of obſervation, that the ſoul is conjoined with this groſs body through two vehicles as mediums, one of which is ethereal and the other aërial: and of theſe the ethereal vehicle is *ſimple and immaterial*, but the aërial *ſimple and material*; and this denſe earthly body is *compoſite and material*.

Again, when our ſouls are repreſented after falling into the preſent body as ſuffering a tranſmutation into brutes, this, as Proclus beautifully obſerves, muſt not be underſtood as if our ſouls ever became the animating principles of brutal bodies, but that by a certain ſympathy they are bound to the ſouls of brutes, and are as it were carried in them, juſt as evil dæmons inſinuate themſelves into our phantaſy, through their own depraved imaginations. And by the circulations of the ſoul being merged in a profound river and impetuouſly borne along, we muſt underſtand by the river, not the human body alone, but the whole of generation (with which we are externally ſurrounded) through its ſwift and unſtable flowing. For thus, ſays Proclus, Plato in the Republic calls the whole of generated nature the river of Lethe, which contains both Lethe and the meadow of Ate, according to Empedocles [2]; the devouring jaws of matter and the light-hating world, as it is called by the Gods; and the winding rivers under which many are drawn down, as the oracles [3] aſſert. But by the circulations of the ſoul the dianoëtic and doxaſtic powers are ſignified; the former of which, through the ſoul's conjunction with the body, is impeded in its energies, and the latter is Titanically torn in pieces under the irrational life.

Again, if we conſider man with reference to a contemplative life, which is the true end of his formation, we ſhall find that the head, which is the inſtrument of contemplation, is the principal member, and that the other members were only added as miniſtrant to the head. With reſpect to ſight,

[1] i. e. men.

[2] Εν ᾗ και ἡ Λήθη, και ὁ της Ατης λειμων, ὡς φησιν Εμπεδοκλης, και το λαβρον της ὑλης, και ὁ μισοφαινης κοσμος, ὡς οἱ θεοι λεγουσι, και τα σκολια ρειθρα, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοι κατασυρονται, ὡς τα λογια φησιν. Procl. in Tim. p. 339. See more concerning this in my Diſſertation on the Eleuſinian and Bacchic Myſteries.

[3] Viz. the oracles of Zorpaſter.

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it muſt be obſerved that Democritus, Heraclitus, the Stoics, many of the Peripatetics and antient geometricians, together with the Platoniſts, were of opinion that viſion ſubſiſts through a lucid ſpirit emitted from the eyes: and this ſpirit, according to Plato and his followers, is an unburning vivific fire ſimilar to celeſtial fire, from which it originally proceeds. But this fire, the illuminations of which, as we have already obſerved, give life to our mortal part, is abundantly collected in the eye as in a fat diaphanous ſubſtance, whoſe moiſture is moſt ſhining and whoſe membranes are tender and tranſparent, but yet ſufficiently firm for the purpoſe of preſerving the inherent light. But a moſt ſerene ray ſhines through the more ſolid pupil; and this ray originates internally from one nerve, but is afterwards derived through two ſmall nerves to the two eyes. And theſe nerves, through the fat humours of the eyes, winding under the tunics, arrive at length at the pupils. But a light of this kind, thus preſerved in the ſmall nerves, and burſting through the narrow pupils as ſoon as it ſhines forth into diſperſed rays, as it commenced from one ray, ſo it immediately returns into one, from the rays naturally uniting in one common ray: for the eyes alſo, on account of their lubricity, roundneſs, and ſmooth ſubſtance, are eaſily moved hither and thither, with an equal and ſimilar revolution. This viſual ray, however, cannot proceed externally and perceive objects at a diſtance, unleſs it is conjoined with external light proceeding conically to the eyes; and hence our ray inſinuating itſelf into this light, and becoming ſtrengthened by the aſſociation, continues its progreſſion till it meets with ſome oppoſing object. But when this is the caſe, it either diffuſes itſelf through the ſuperficies of the object, or runs through it with wonderful celerity, and becomes immediately affected with the quality of the object. And a reſiſtance, motion, and affection of this kind produces viſion, viz. from the vibration of the ray thus affected gradually arriving at the inſtrument of ſight, and by this means exciting that image of the object which is naturally inherent in the inſtrument, and through which when excited perception enſues. For there are three particulars which belong in general to all the ſenſes; firſt, an image or mark of the ſenſible thing impreſſed in the ſenſitive inſtrument; and this conſtituted both in paſſion and energy in a certain ſimilitude to the ſenſible object: but afterwards we muſt conſider an impreſſion of this kind as now perfect, and ending in ſpecies, viz. in the common compoſite life:

and

and, in the third place, that inherent reaſon of the ſoul enſues, which germinates from the ſenſitive ſoul, is accommodated to ſpecies of this kind, and is that through which ſenſitive judgment and cogitation ſubſiſt.

But further, the Platoniſts admit, with Democritus and Empedocles, that certain material images of things flow through the pores of bodies, and preſerve, to a certain diſtance, not only the qualities but likewiſe the ſhape of the bodies from which they flow. And theſe radial images are intimated by Plato in this dialogue, in the Sophiſta, and in the ſeventh book of his Republic; in commenting on the laſt of which, Proclus obſerves as follows: "According to Plato, (ſays he) repreſentations of things are hypoſtaſes of certain images fabricated by a dæmoniacal art, as he teaches us in the Sophiſta; for ſhadows, of which they ſay images are the companions, poſſeſs a nature of this kind. For theſe are the effigies of bodies and figures, and have an abundant ſympathy with the things from which they fall; as is evident from what the arts of magicians are able to effect, and from what they tell us concerning images and ſhadows. But why ſhould I ſpeak of the powers of magicians, when irrational animals are able to operate through images and ſhadows, prior to all reaſon? for they ſay that the hyæna, by trampling on the ſhadow of a dog ſeated on an eminence, will hurl him down and devour him; and Ariſtotle ſays, that if a woman, during her menſtrua, looks into a mirror, ſhe will defile both the mirror and the apparent image."—Ὅτι κατὰ Πλατωνα αἱ εμφασεις ὑποστασεις εισιν ειδωλων τινων δαιμονιᾳ μηχανῃ δημιουργουμεναι, καθαπερ αυτος εν τῳ σοφιστῃ διδασκει. Και γαρ αἱ σκιαι αἷς τα ειδωλα συζυγειν φησι τοιαυτην εχουσι φυσιν. Και γαρ αυται σωματων εισι και σχηματων εικονες, και παμπολυν εχουσι προς τα αφ' ὧν εμπιπτουσι συμπαθειαν, ὡς δηλουσι και ὁσα μαχων (lege μαγων) τεχναι προς τε τα ειδωλα δραν και επαγγελλονται και τας σκιας. Και τι λεγω τας εκεινων δυναμεις ἃ και τοις αλογοις ηδη ζωοις ὑπαρχη προ λογου παντος ενεργειν. Ἡ γαρ ὑαινα φασιν την του κυνος εν ὑψει καθημενου πατησασα σκιαν καταβαλλει, και θοινην ποιηται τον κυνα. Και γυναικος καθαιρουμενης φησιν Αριστοτελης, εις ενοπτρον ιδουσης, αἱματουται, το τε ενοπτρον, και το εμφαινομενον ειδωλον[i].—And he likewiſe informs us in the ſame place, that theſe images, on account of their ſlender exiſtence, cannot otherwiſe become viſible to our eyes, than when, in conſequence of being eſtabliſhed, reſtored, and illuminated in mirrors, they again receive their priſtine power and the ſhape of their originals. Hence, ſays he, denſity

[i] Vid. Procl. in Plat. Polit. p. 430.

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is required in the body which receives them, that the image may not be diſſipated from the rarity of the receptacle, and that from many defluxions it may paſs into one form. But ſmoothneſs likewiſe is required, leſt the aſperity of the receptacle, on account of the prominency of ſome of its parts and the depth of others, ſhould be the cauſe of inequality to the image. And, laſtly, ſplendour is required; that the image, which naturally poſſeſſes a ſlender form, may become apparent to the ſight.

In the next place, with reſpect to matter, and the various epithets by which Plato calls it in this dialogue, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that as in an aſcending ſeries of ſubjects we muſt arrive at length at ſomething which is better than all things, ſo in a deſcending ſeries our progreſſion muſt be ſtopped by ſomething which is worſe than all things, and which is the general receptacle of the laſt proceſſion of forms. And this is what the antients called matter, and which they conſidered as nothing more than a certain indefiniteneſs of an incorporeal, indiviſible, and intellectual nature, and as ſomething which is not formally impreſſed and bounded by three dimenſions, but is entirely remitted and reſolved, and is on all ſides rapidly flowing from being into non-entity. But this opinion concerning matter, ſays Simplicius [1], ſeems to have been adopted by the firſt Pythagoreans among the Greeks; and after theſe by Plato, according to the relation of Moderatus. For he ſhows us—" that, according to the Pythagoreans, there is a *firſt one* ſubſiſting prior to the eſſence of things and every ſubſtance; that after this, true being and intelligible or forms ſubſiſt: and, in the third place, that which pertains to ſoul, and which participates of *the one* and of intellectual forms. But after this (ſays he) the laſt nature, which is that of ſenſibles, ſubſiſts; which does not participate of the preceding natures, but is thus affected and formed according to the repreſentation of theſe; ſince the matter of ſenſible natures is the ſhadow of that non-being which primarily ſubſiſts in quantity, or rather may be ſaid to depend upon, and be produced by, this." Hence Porphyry, in his ſecond book on Matter, ſays Simplicius, obſerves that Plato calls matter, quantity, which is formleſs, indiviſible, and without figure; but capacious, and the receptacle of form, figure, diviſion, quality, and other things of a ſimilar kind. And this quantity and form, conſidered according

[1] In Ariſtot. Phyſ. p. 50, b.

to the privation of a uniform reaſon, which comprehends all the reaſons of beings in itſelf, is the paradigm of the matter of bodies; which, ſays Porphyry, both Plato and the Pythagoreans call a quantum, not after the ſame manner as form is a quantum, but according to privation and analyſis, extenſion and divulſion, and its mutation from being. Matter, therefore, according to this doctrine, as Simplicius well obſerves, is nothing elſe than the permutation and viciſſitude of ſenſible forms, with reſpect to intelligibles; ſince from thence they verge downwards, and extend to perfect non-entity, or the laſt of things—that is, to matter itſelf. Hence, ſays he, becauſe dregs and matter are always the laſt of things, the Egyptians aſſert that matter, which they enigmatically denominate water, is the dregs of the firſt life; ſubſiſting as a certain mire or mud, the receptacle of generable and ſenſible natures; and which is not any definite form, but a certain conſtitution of ſubſiſtence, in the ſame manner as that which is indiviſible, immaterial and true being, is a conſtitution of an intelligible nature. And though all forms ſubſiſt both in intelligibles and in matter, yet in the former they ſubſiſt without matter, indiviſibly and truly; but in the latter diviſibly, and after the manner of ſhadows. And on this account every ſenſible form is diſſipated through its union with material interval, and falls from the ſtability and reality of being.

But the following profound and admirable deſcription of matter by Plotinus (Ennead. 3, lib. 6) will, I doubt not, be gratefully received by the Platonic reader.—"Since matter (ſays he) is neither ſoul, nor intellect, nor life, nor form, nor reaſon, nor bound, but a certain indefiniteneſs; nor yet capacity, for what can it produce? ſince it is foreign from all theſe, it cannot merit the appellation of being; but is deſervedly called non-entity. Nor yet is it non-entity in the ſame manner as *motion* and *permanency* are non-beings, conſidered as different from being: but it is true non-entity; the mere ſhadow and imagination of bulk, and the deſire of ſubſiſtence; remaining fixed without abiding, of itſelf inviſible, and avoiding the deſire of him who is anxious to perceive its nature. Hence, when no one perceives it, it is then in a manner preſent; but cannot be viewed by him who ſtrives intently to behold it. Again, in itſelf contraries always appear; the ſmall and the great, the leſs and the more, deficience and exceſs. So that it is a phantom, neither abiding nor yet able to fly away; capable of no one denomination,

and

and poſſeſſing no power from intellect; but is conſtituted in the defect and ſhade, as it were, of all real being. Hence, too, in each of its vaniſhing appellations, it eludes our ſearch: for, if we think of it as ſomething great, it is in the mean time ſmall; if as ſomething more, it becomes leſs; and the apparent being which we meet with in its image is non-being, and, as it were, a flying mockery. So that the forms which appear in matter are merely ludicrous; ſhadows falling upon ſhadow, as in a mirror, where the poſition of the apparent is different from that of the real object; and which, though apparently full of forms, poſſeſſes nothing real and true. But the things which enter into, and depart from, matter, are nothing but imitations of being, and ſemblances flowing about a formleſs ſemblance. They ſeem, indeed, to effect ſomething in the ſubject matter, but in reality produce nothing; from their debile and flowing nature being endued with no ſolidity and no rebounding power. And ſince matter likewiſe has no ſolidity, they penetrate it without diviſion, like images in water, or as if any one ſhould fill a vacuum with forms."

Such, then, being the true condition of matter and her inherent ſhadowy forms, we may ſafely conclude that whatever becomes corporeal in an eminent degree has but little power of recalling itſelf into one; and that a nature of this kind is ready by every trifling impulſe to remain as it is impelled; to ruſh from the embraces of bound, and haſten into multitude and non-entity. Hence, as Plotinus beautifully obſerves, (Ennead. 3, lib. 6,)—"thoſe who only place *being* in the genus of body, in conſequence of impulſes and concuſſions, and the phantaſms perceived through the ſenſes, which perſuade them that ſenſe is alone the ſtandard of truth, are affected like thoſe in a dream, who imagine that the perceptions of ſleep are true. For ſenſe is alone the employment of the dormant ſoul; ſince as much of the ſoul as is merged in body, ſo much of it ſleeps. But true elevation and true vigilance are a reſurrection from, and not with, the dull maſs of body. For, indeed, a reſurrection with body is only a tranſmigration from ſleep to ſleep, and from dream to dream, like a man paſſing in the dark from bed to bed. But that elevation is perfectly true which entirely riſes from the dead weight of bodies; for theſe, poſſeſſing a nature repugnant to ſoul, poſſeſs ſomething oppoſite to eſſence. And this is further evident from their gene-

ration, their continual flowing and decay; properties entirely foreign from the nature of being, ſubſtantial and real."

Laſtly, when Plato compoſes the elements from mathematical planes, it is neceſſary to obſerve that, as theſe are phyſical planes, they muſt not only have length and breadth, but likewiſe depth, that they may be able to ſubſiſt as principles in natural effects.—"For the Pythagoreans (ſays Simplicius [1]) conſidered every phyſical body as a figured quantity, and as in itſelf matter, but faſhioned with different figures. That, beſides this, it differs from a mathematical body in being material and tangible, receiving its tangibility from its bulk, and not either from heat or cold. Hence, from the ſubject matter being impreſſed with different figures, they aſſert that the four elements of the elements ſubſiſt. For theſe elements rank more in the nature of principles, as for inſtance, the cubic of earth; not that earth has wholly a cubic figure, but that each of the parts of earth is compoſed from many cubes, which through their ſmallneſs are inviſible to our ſight; and in the ſame manner the other elements from other primary figures. They add too, that from this difference of figures all the other properties of the elements enſue, and their mutations into each other. For, if it is inquired why much air is produced from a little water, they can very readily aſſign the cauſe by ſaying, that the elements of water are many, and that, the icoſaedrons of water being divided, many octaedrons, and conſequently a great quantity of air, will be produced."

Simplicius likewiſe informs us, that the more antient of Plato's interpreters, among which the divine Jamblichus ranks, conſidered Plato as ſpeaking ſymbolically in this part concerning the figures of the elements; but the latter Platonic philoſophers, among whom Proclus, in my opinion, ranks as the moſt eminent, explained this part according to its literal meaning. And Simplicius, in the ſame book, has fortunately preſerved the arguments of Proclus in defence of Plato's doctrine reſpecting theſe planes, againſt the objections of Ariſtotle.

Should it be aſked in what this doctrine concerning planes differs from the dogma of Democritus, who aſſerted that natural bodies were faſhioned

[1] De Cœlo, lib. iv. p. 139.

according

according to figures, we may anſwer with Simplicius [1], that Plato and the Pythagoreans by a plane denoted ſomething more ſimple than a body [2], atoms being evidently bodies; that they aſſigned commenſuration and a demiurgic analogy [3] to their figures, which Democritus did not to his atoms; and that they differed from him in their arrangement of earth.

And thus much may ſuffice at preſent for an epitome of ſome of the principal parts of this moſt intereſting dialogue. For, as it is my deſign at ſome future period to publiſh as complete a commentary as I am able from the ineſtimable commentaries of Proclus on this dialogue, with additional obſervations of my own, a more copious introduction might at preſent be conſidered as ſuperfluous. The difficulty, indeed, of proceeding any further, might alone very well apologiſe for the want of completion in this compendium. For the commentary of Proclus, though conſiſting of five books, is imperfect [4], and does not even extend ſo far as to the doctrine of viſion, which in the preſent introduction I have endeavoured to explain. I truſt, therefore, that the candid and liberal reader will gratefully accept theſe fruits of my application to the Platonic philoſophy; and as this introduction and the following tranſlation were the reſult of no moderate labour and perſeverance, I earneſtly hope they may be the means of awakening ſome few at leaſt from the ſleep of oblivion, of recalling their attention from fluctuating and deluſive objects to permanent and real being; and thus may at length lead them back to their paternal port, as the only retreat which can confer perfect ſecurity and reſt.

[1] De Cœlo, p. 142.

[2] Viz. than any viſible ſublunary body.

[3] i. e. active and fabricative powers.

[4] It is a circumſtance remarkably unfortunate, as I have before obſerved, that not one of the invaluable commentaries of this philoſopher has been preſerved entire. For that he wrote a complete commentary on this dialogue, is evident from a citation of Olympiodorus on Ariſtotle's Meteors from it, which is not to be found in any of the books now extant. In like manner, his treatiſe on Plato's theology is imperfect, wanting a ſeventh book; his commentaries on the Parmenides want many books; his ſcholia on the Cratylus are far from being complete; and this is likewiſe the caſe with his commentary on the Firſt Alcibiades.

THE TIMÆUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, TIMÆUS, || CRITIAS, HERMOCRATES.

Soc.

I SEE one, two, three, but where, friend Timæus, is that fourth perſon, who being received by me yeſterday at a banquet of diſputation, ought now in his turn to repay me with a ſimilar repaſt?

Tim. He labours, Socrates, under a certain infirmity; for he would not willingly be abſent from ſuch an aſſociation as the preſent.

Soc. It remains therefore for you, O Timæus, and the company preſent, to fill up the part of this abſent gueſt.

Tim. Entirely ſo, Socrates. And we ſhall endeavour, to the utmoſt of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to ſuch an employment unaccompliſhed. For it would be by no means juſt that we, who were yeſterday entertained by you, in ſuch a manner as gueſts ought to be received, ſhould not return the hoſpitality with readineſs and delight.

Soc. Do you recollect the magnitude and nature of the things which I propoſed to you to explain?

Tim. Some things, indeed, I recollect; but ſuch as I have forgotten do you recall into my memory. Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a curſory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly eſtabliſhed in our memory.

Soc. Let it be ſo. And to begin: The ſum of yeſterday's diſpute was,

what

what kind of republic appeared to me to be the beſt, and from what ſort of men ſuch a republic ought to be compoſed.

Tim. And by us, indeed, Socrates, all that you ſaid was approved in the higheſt degree.

Soc. Did we not, in the firſt place, ſeparate huſbandmen and other artificers from thoſe whom we conſidered as the defenders of the city?

Tim. Certainly.

Soc. And when we had aſſigned to every one that which was accommodated to his nature, and had preſcribed only one particular employment to every particular art, we likewiſe aſſigned to the military tribe one province only, I mean that of protecting the city; and this as well from the hoſtile incurſions of internal as of external enemies; but yet in ſuch a manner as to adminiſter juſtice mildly to the ſubjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with warlike fierceneſs againſt their enemies in battle.

Tim. Entirely ſo.

Soc. For we aſſerted, I think, that the ſouls of the guardians ſhould be of ſuch a nature, as at the ſame time to be both iraſcible and philoſophic in a remarkable degree; ſo that they might be gentle to their friends, and bold and ferocious to their enemies.

Tim. You did ſo.

Soc. But what did we aſſert concerning their education? Was it not that they ſhould be inſtructed in gymnaſtic exerciſes, in muſic, and other becoming diſciplines?

Tim. Entirely ſo.

Soc. We likewiſe eſtabliſhed, that thoſe who were ſo educated ſhould neither conſider gold, or ſilver, or any goods of a ſimilar kind, as their own private property; but that rather, after the manner of adjutants, they ſhould receive the wages of guardianſhip from thoſe whom they defend and preſerve; and that their recompenſe ſhould be no more than is ſufficient to a moderate ſubſiſtence. That, beſides this, they ſhould uſe their public ſtipend in common, and for the purpoſe of procuring a common ſubſiſtence with each other; ſo that, neglecting every other concern, they may employ their attention ſolely on virtue, and the diſcharge of their peculiar employment.

Tim. Theſe things alſo were related by you.

Soc.

Soc. Of women too we aſſerted, that they ſhould be educated in ſuch a manner, as to be aptly conformed ſimilar to the natures of men; with whom they ſhould perform in common both the duties of war, and whatever elſe belongs to the buſineſs of life.

Tim. This too was aſſerted by you.

Soc. But what did we eſtabliſh concerning the procreation of children? Though perhaps you eaſily remember this, on account of its novelty. For we ordered that the marriages and children ſhould be common; as we were particularly careful that no one might be able to diſtinguiſh his own children, but that all might conſider all as their kindred; that hence thoſe of an equal age might regard themſelves as brothers and ſiſters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might eſteem the younger as their children and grandſons.

Tim. Theſe things, indeed, as you ſay, are eaſily remembered.

Soc. But that they might from their birth acquire a diſpoſition as far as poſſible the beſt, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites ſhould, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league the worthy were mingled with the worthy; that no diſcord may ariſe in this connection when it does not prove proſperous in the end; but that all the blame may be referred to fortune, and not to the guardians of ſuch a conjunction.

Tim. We remember this likewiſe.

Soc. We alſo ordered that the children of the good ſhould be properly educated, but that thoſe of the bad ſhould be ſecretly ſent to ſome other city; yet ſo that ſuch of the adult among theſe as ſhould be found to be of a good diſpoſition ſhould be recalled from exile; while, on the contrary, thoſe who were retained from the firſt in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, ſhould be ſimilarly baniſhed.

Tim. Juſt ſo.

Soc. Have we, therefore, ſufficiently epitomized yeſterday's diſputation; or do you require any thing further, friend Timæus, which I have omitted?

Tim. Nothing, indeed, Socrates; for all this was the ſubject of your diſputation.

Soc. Hear now how I am affected towards this republic which we have deſcribed; for I will illuſtrate the affair by a ſimilitude. Suppoſe then that ſome

ſome one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether repreſented in a picture, or really alive, but in a ſtate of perfect reſt, ſhould deſire to behold them in motion, and ſtruggling as it were to imitate thoſe geſtures which ſeem particularly adapted to the nature of bodies; in ſuch a manner am I affected towards the form of that republic which we have deſcribed. For I ſhould gladly hear any one relating the conteſts of our city with other nations, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during ſuch an engagement in a manner worthy of its inſtitution, both with reſpect to practical achievements and verbal negotiations. For indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conſcious of my own inability to praiſe ſuch men and ſuch a city according to their deſert. Indeed, that I ſhould be incapable of ſuch an undertaking is not wonderful, ſince the ſame imbecility ſeems to have attended poets both of the paſt and preſent age. Not that I deſpiſe the poetic tribe; but it appears from hence evident, that, as theſe kind of men are ſtudious of imitation, they eaſily and in the beſt manner expreſs things in which they have been educated; while, on the contrary, whatever is foreign from their education they imitate with difficulty in actions, and with ſtill more difficulty in words. But with reſpect to the tribe of Sophiſts, though I conſider them as ſkilled both in the art of ſpeaking and in many other illuſtrious arts; yet, as they have no ſettled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, I am afraid leſt, with reſpect to the inſtitutions of philoſophers and politicians, they ſhould not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of thoſe concerns which wiſe and politic men are engaged in with individuals, in warlike undertakings, both in actions and diſcourſe. It remains, therefore, that I ſhould apply to you, who excel in the ſtudy of wiſdom and civil adminiſtration, as well naturally as through the aſſiſtance of proper diſcipline and inſtitution. For Timæus here of Locris, an Italian city governed by the beſt of laws, excluſive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has arrived in his own city at the higheſt poſts of government and honours. Beſides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of the particulars of which we are now ſpeaking. Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, ſince a multitude of circumſtances evince that he is both by nature and education adapted to all ſuch concerns. Hence, when you yeſterday requeſted me to diſpute about the inſtitution of a republic, I readily complied with your requeſt;

being perſuaded that the remainder of the diſcourſe could not be more conveniently explained by any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its diſcuſſion. For, unleſs you properly adapt the city for warlike purpoſes, there is no one in the preſent age from whom it can acquire every thing becoming its conſtitution. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with your requeſt, I ſhall now require you to comply with mine in the above-mentioned particulars. Nor have you indeed refuſed this employment, but have with common conſent determined to repay my hoſpitality with the banquet of diſcourſe. I now, therefore, ſtand prepared to receive the promiſed feaſt.

HERM. But we, O Socrates, as Timæus juſt now ſignified, ſhall cheerfully engage in the execution of your deſire; for we cannot offer any excuſe ſufficient to juſtify neglect in this affair. For yeſterday, when we departed from hence and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accuſtomed to reſide, both in his apartment and prior to this in the way thither we diſcourſed on this very particular. He therefore related to us a certain antient hiſtory, which I wiſh, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his requeſt.

CRIT. It is requiſite to comply, if agreeable to Timæus, the third aſſociate of our undertaking.

TIM. I aſſent to your compliance.

CRIT. Hear then, O Socrates, a diſcourſe ſurpriſing indeed in the extreme, yet in every reſpect true, as it was once related by Solon, the moſt wiſe of the ſeven wiſe men. Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropis, as he himſelf often relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias, (as the old man himſelf informed us,) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheleſs were buried in oblivion, through length of time and the deſtruction of mankind. In particular he informed me of one undertaking more illuſtrious than the reſt, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by ſuch a relation I may offer my tribute of praiſe to the Goddeſs in the preſent ſolemnity, by celebrating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, juſtly and in a manner agreeable to truth.

SOC. You ſpeak well. But what is this antient achievement which was

not

not only actually related by Solon, but was once really accomplished by this city?

CRIT. I will acquaint you with that antient history, which I did not indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in years; for at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I myself was about ten. When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us which is known by the name of *Cureotis Apaturiorum* [1], nothing was omitted which boys in that festivity are accustomed to perform. For, when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time entirely new. But then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry the most ingenious of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted; and said, laughing—If Solon, O Amynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair, but had made it, as others do, a serious employment; and if through seditions and other fluctuations of the state, in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown. In consequence of this, Amynander inquired of Critias what that history was. To which he answered, that it was concerning an affair the greatest and most celebrated

[1] The *Apaturia*, according to Proclus and Suidas, were festivals in honour of Bacchus, which were publicly celebrated for the space of three days. And they were assigned this name, δι' απατην, that is, on account of the deception through which Neptune is reported to have vanquished Xanthus. The first day of these festivals was called δορπεια, in which, as the name indicates, those of the same tribe feasted together; and hence (says Proclus) on this day ευωχιαι και δειπνα πολλα, splendid banquets and much feasting took place. The second day was called αναρρυσις, *a sacrifice*, because many victims were sacrificed in it; and hence the victims were called αναρρυματα, because ερυομενα ανω εθυετο, *they were drawn upwards, and sacrificed.* The third day, of which Plato speaks in this place, was called κουρεωτης, because on this day κειροι, that is, boys or girls, were collected together in tribes, with their hair shorn. And to these some add a fourth day, which they call επιδα, or *the day after.* Proclus further informs us, that the boys who were collected on the third day were about three or four years old.

which this city ever performed; though through length of time, and the deſtruction of thoſe by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the preſent age. But I beſeech you, O Critias, (ſay Amynander,) relate this affair from the beginning; and inform me what that event was which Solon aſſerted as a fact, and on what occaſion, and from whom he received it.

There is then (ſays he) a certain region of Egypt called Delta, about the ſummit of which the ſtreams of the Nile are divided. In this place a government is eſtabliſhed called Saitical; and the chief city of this region of Delta is Sais, from which alſo king Amaſis derived his origin. The city has a preſiding divinity, whoſe name is in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. Theſe men were friends of the Athenians, with whom they declared they were very familiar, through a certain bond of alliance. In this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himſelf relates, very honourably received. And upon his inquiring about antient affairs of thoſe prieſts who poſſeſſed a knowledge in ſuch particulars ſuperior to others, he perceived, that neither himſelf, nor any one of the Greeks, (as he himſelf declared), had any knowledge of very remote antiquity. Hence, when he once deſired to excite them to the relation of antient tranſactions, he for this purpoſe began to diſcourſe about thoſe moſt antient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the traditions concerning the firſt Phoroneus and Niobe, and after the deluge, of Deucalion and Pyrrha, (as deſcribed by the mythologiſts,) together with their poſterity; at the ſame time paying a proper attention to the different ages in which theſe events are ſaid to have ſubſiſted. But upon this one of thoſe more antient prieſts exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there any ſuch thing as an aged Grecian among you! But Solon, when he heard this—What (ſays he) is the motive of your exclamation? To whom the prieſt:—Becauſe all your ſouls are juvenile; neither containing any antient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any diſcipline hoary from its exiſtence in former periods of time. But the reaſon of this is the multitude and variety of deſtructions of the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be: the greateſt of theſe, indeed, ariſing from fire and water; but the leſſer from ten thouſand other contingencies. For the relation ſubſiſting among you, that Phaeton, the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time

attempting

attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and periſhed himſelf, blaſted by thunder—is indeed conſidered as fabulous, yet is in reality true. For it expreſſes the mutation of the bodies revolving in the heavens about the earth; and indicates that, through long periods of time, a deſtruction of terreſtrial natures enſues from the devaſtations of fire. Hence, thoſe who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, periſh more abundantly than thoſe who dwell near rivers, or on the borders of the ſea. To us indeed the Nile is both ſalutary in other reſpects, and liberates us from the fear of ſuch-like depredations. But when the Gods, purifying the earth by waters, deluge its ſurface, then the herdſmen and ſhepherds inhabiting the mountains are preſerved, while the inhabitants of your cities are hurried away to the ſea by the impetuous inundation of the rivers. On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the waters deſcending from on high pour with deſolation on the plains; but they are naturally impelled upwards from the boſom of the earth. And from theſe cauſes the moſt antient traditions are preſerved in our country. For, indeed, it may be truly aſſerted, that in thoſe places where neither intenſe cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of mankind is always preſerved, though ſometimes the number of individuals is increaſed, and ſometimes ſuffers a conſiderable diminution. But whatever has been tranſacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of which we have heard the report, every thing of this kind is to be found deſcribed in our temples, and preſerved to the preſent day. While, on the contrary, you and other nations commit only recent tranſactions to writing, and to other inventions which ſociety has employed for tranſmitting information to poſterity; and ſo again, at ſtated periods of time, a certain celeſtial defluxion ruſhes on them like a diſeaſe; from whence thoſe among you who ſurvive are both deſtitute of literary acquiſitions and the inſpiration of the Muſes. Hence it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the events which happened in antient times, as well among us as in the regions which you inhabit.

The tranſactions, therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, differ very little from puerile fables. For, in the firſt place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, when at the ſame time many have hap-

pened. And, in the next place, you are ignorant of a moſt illuſtrious and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country; from whence you and your whole city deſcended, though a ſmall ſeed only of this admirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this affair is owing to the poſterity of this people, who were for many ages deprived of the uſe of letters, and became as it were dumb. For prior, O Solon, to that mighty deluge which we have juſt mentioned, a city of Athenians exiſted, informed according to the beſt laws both in military concerns and every other duty of life; and whoſe illuſtrious actions and civil inſtitutions are celebrated by us as the moſt excellent of all that have exiſted under the ample circumference of the heavens. Solon, therefore, upon hearing this, ſaid that he was aſtoniſhed; and, burning with a moſt ardent deſire, entreated the prieſts to relate accurately all the actions of his antient fellow-citizens. That afterwards one of the prieſts replied:—Nothing of envy, O Solon, prohibits us from complying with your requeſt. But for your ſake, and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and eſpecially on account of that Goddeſs who is allotted the guardianſhip both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been educated and founded: yours, indeed, by a priority to ours of a thouſand years, receiving the ſeed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth. But the deſcription of the tranſactions of this our city during the ſpace of eight thouſand years, is preſerved in our ſacred writings. I will, therefore, curſorily run over the laws and more illuſtrious actions of thoſe cities which exiſted nine thouſand years ago. For when we are more at leiſure we ſhall proſecute an exact hiſtory of every particular, receiving for this purpoſe the ſacred writings themſelves.

In the firſt place, then, conſider the laws of theſe people, and compare them with ours: for you will find many things which then ſubſiſted in your city, ſimilar to ſuch as exiſt at preſent. For the prieſts paſſed their life ſeparated from all others. The artificers alſo exerciſed their arts in ſuch a manner, that each was engaged in his own employment without being mingled with other artificers. The ſame method was likewiſe adopted with ſhepherds, hunters and huſbandmen. The ſoldiers too, you will find, were ſeparated from other kind of men; and were commanded by the laws to engage in nothing but warlike affairs. A ſimilar armour too, ſuch as that of ſhields and darts, was employed by each. Theſe we firſt uſed in Aſia;

the

the Goddeſs in thoſe places, as likewiſe happened to you, firſt pointing them out to our uſe. You may perceive too from the beginning what great attention was paid by the laws to prudence and modeſty; and beſides this, to divination and medicine, as ſubſervient to the preſervation of health. And from theſe, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding to the invention of ſuch as are merely human, procured all ſuch other diſciplines as follow from thoſe we have juſt enumerated. From ſuch a diſtribution, therefore, and in ſuch order, the Goddeſs firſt eſtabliſhed and adorned your city, chooſing for this purpoſe the place in which you were born; as ſhe foreſaw that, from the excellent temperature of the region, men would ariſe diſtinguiſhed by the moſt conſummate ſagacity and wit. For, as the Goddeſs is a lover both of wiſdom and war, ſhe fixed on a ſoil capable of producing men the moſt ſimilar to herſelf; and rendered it in every reſpect adapted for the habitation of ſuch a race. The antient Athenians, therefore, uſing theſe laws, and being formed by good inſtitutions, in a ſtill higher degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region; ſurpaſſing all men in every virtue, as it becomes thoſe to do who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods.

But though many and mighty deeds of your city are contained in our ſacred writings, and are admired as they deſerve, yet there is one tranſaction which ſurpaſſes all of them in magnitude and virtue. For theſe writings relate what prodigious ſtrength your city formerly tamed, when a mighty warlike power, ruſhing from the Atlantic ſea, ſpread itſelf with hoſtile fury over all Europe and Aſia. For at that time the Atlantic ſea was navigable, and had an iſland before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this iſland was greater than both Libya and all Aſia together, and afforded an eaſy paſſage to other neighbouring iſlands; as it was likewiſe eaſy to paſs from thoſe iſlands to all the continent which borders on this Atlantic ſea. For the waters which are beheld within the mouth which we juſt now mentioned, have the form of a bay with a narrow entrance; but the mouth itſelf is a true ſea. And laſtly, the earth which ſurrounds it is in every reſpect truly denominated the continent. In this Atlantic iſland a combination of kings was formed, who with mighty and wonderful power ſubdued the whole iſland, together with many other iſlands and parts of the continent; and, beſides this, ſubjected to their dominion all Libya, as far as to Egypt; and Europe, as far as to the Tyrrhene ſea. And when

when they were collected in a powerful league, they endeavoured to enslave all our regions and yours, and besides this all those places situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sea. Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength. For, as its armies surpassed all others both in magnanimity and military skill, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, and became situated in extreme danger, yet still it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those who were not yet enslaved it liberated from danger; and procured the most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules. But in succeeding time prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking place, and bringing with them desolation in the space of one day and night, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present innavigable, arising from the gradually impeding mud which the subsiding island produced. And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon.

But when yesterday you was discoursing about a republic and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history: for I perceived how divinely, from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon. Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as, from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remembrance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. I considered it, therefore, necessary that I should first of all diligently revolve the whole in my mind. And on this account I yesterday immediately complied with your demands: for I perceived that we should not want the ability of presenting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Hermocrates has informed you, immediately as we departed from hence, by communicating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair. And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood abides in the memory with a wonderful stability.

For, with reſpect to myſelf, for inſtance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of yeſterday's diſcourſe, yet I ſhould be very much aſtoniſhed if any thing ſhould eſcape my remembrance which I had heard in ſome paſt period of time very diſtant from the preſent. Thus, as to the hiſtory which I have juſt now related, I received it from the old man with great pleaſure and delight; who on his part very readily complied with my requeſt, and frequently gratified me with a repetition. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in remain indelible, ſo all theſe particulars became firmly eſtabliſhed in my memory. In conſequence of this, as ſoon as it was day I repeated the narration to my friends, that together with myſelf they might be better prepared for the purpoſes of the preſent aſſociation. But now, with reſpect to that for which this narration was undertaken, I am prepared, O Socrates, to ſpeak not only ſummarily, but ſo as to deſcend to the particulars of every thing which I heard. But the citizens and city which you fabricated yeſterday as in a fable, we ſhall transfer to reality; conſidering that city which you eſtabliſhed as no other than this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived as no other than thoſe anceſtors of ours deſcribed by the Egyptian prieſt. And indeed the affair will harmonize in every reſpect; nor will it be foreign from the purpoſe to aſſert that your citizens are thoſe very people who exiſted at that time. Hence, diſtributing the affair in common among us, we will endeavour, according to the utmoſt of our ability, to accompliſh in a becoming manner the employment which you have aſſigned us. It is requiſite, therefore, to conſider, O Socrates, whether this diſcourſe is reaſonable, or whether we ſhould lay it aſide, and ſeek after another.

Soc. But what other, O Critias, ſhould we receive in preference to this? For your diſcourſe, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the preſent ſacred rites of the Goddeſs. And beſides this, we ſhould conſider, as a thing of the greateſt moment, that your relation is not a mere fable, but a true hiſtory. It is impoſſible, therefore, to ſay how, and from whence, neglecting your narration, we ſhould find another more convenient. Hence it is neceſſary to confeſs that you have ſpoken with good fortune; and it is equally neceſſary that I, on account of my diſcourſe yeſterday, ſhould now reſt from ſpeaking, and be wholly attentive to yours.

Crit. But now conſider, Socrates, the manner of our diſpoſing the mutual

banquet

banquet of diſputation. For it ſeems proper to us that Timæus, who is the moſt aſtronomical of us all, and is particularly knowing in the nature of the univerſe, ſhould ſpeak the firſt; commencing his diſcourſe from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the law of Solon, as to proper judges, ſhould render them members of this city; as being in reality no other than thoſe Athenians which were deſcribed as unknown to us in the report of the ſacred writings. And that in future we ſhall diſcourſe concerning them as about citizens and Athenians.

Soc. I ſeem to behold a copious and ſplendid banquet of diſputation ſet before me. It is, therefore, now your buſineſs, O Timæus, to begin the diſcourſe; having firſt of all, as is highly becoming, invoked the Gods according to law.

Tim. Indeed, Socrates, ſince thoſe who participate but the leaſt degree of wiſdom, in the beginning of every undertaking, whether ſmall or great, call upon Divinity, it is neceſſary that we (unleſs we are in every reſpect unwiſe) who are about to ſpeak concerning the univerſe, whether it is generated or without generation, invoking the Gods and Goddeſſes, ſhould pray that what we aſſert may be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the enſuing diſcourſe we may be conſiſtent with ourſelves. And ſuch is my prayer to the Gods, with reference to myſelf; but as to what reſpects the preſent company, it is neceſſary to pray that you may eaſily underſtand, and that I may be able to explain my meaning about the propoſed ſubjects of diſputation. In the firſt place, therefore, as it appears to me, it is neceſſary to define what that is which is always *real being* [1], but is without generation; and

[1] It is well obſerved here by Proclus, that Plato, after the manner of geometricians, aſſumes, prior to demonſtrations, definitions and hypotheſes, through which he frames his demonſtrations, and previouſly delivers the principles of the whole of phyſiology. For, as the principles of muſic are different from thoſe of medicine, and thoſe of arithmetic from thoſe of mechanics, in like manner there are certain principles of the whole of phyſiology, which Plato now delivers: and theſe are as follow. *True being is that which is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reaſon: that which is generated, is the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational ſenſe: every thing generated is generated from a cauſe: that which does not ſubſiſt from a cauſe is not generated: that of which the paradigm is eternal being, is neceſſarily beautiful: that of which the paradigm is*

and what that is *which is generated indeed*, or *conſiſts in a ſtate of becoming to be*, but which never *really is*. The former of theſe indeed is apprehended by *intelligence* in conjunction with *reaſon*, ſince it always ſubſiſts according to *ſame*. But the latter is perceived by *opinion* in conjunction with *irrational ſenſe*; ſince it ſubſiſts in a ſtate of generation and corruption, and never truly is. But whatever is generated is neceſſarily generated from a certain cauſe. For it is every way impoſſible that any thing ſhould be generated without a cauſe. When, therefore, an artificer, in the fabrication of any work, looks to that which always ſubſiſts according to *ſame*, and, employing a paradigm of this kind, expreſſes the idea and power in his work, it is then neceſſary that the whole of his production ſhould be beautiful. But when he beholds that which is in generation, and uſes a generated paradigm, it is alike neceſſary that his work ſhould be far from beautiful.

I denominate, therefore, this univerſe *heaven*, or *the world*, or by any other appellation in which it may particularly rejoice. Concerning which, let us in the firſt place conſider that which, in the propoſed inquiry about the univerſe, ought in the very beginning to be inveſtigated; whether it always was, having no principle of generation [1], or whether it was generated,

is generated, is not beautiful: the univerſe is denominated heaven, or the world. For from theſe principles he produces all that follows. Hence, ſays Proclus, he appears to me to ſay *what* eternal is, and *what* that which is generated is, but not to ſay *that* each of them is. For the geometrician alſo informs us *what* a point is and *what* a line is, prior to his demonſtrations, but he by no means teaches us *that* each of theſe has a ſubſiſtence. For how will he act the part of a geometrician, if he diſcourſes about the exiſtence of his proper principles? After the ſame manner the phyſiologiſt ſays *what* eternal being is, for the ſake of the future demonſtrations, but by no means ſhows *that* it is; ſince in ſo doing he would paſs beyond the limits of phyſiology. As, however, Timæus being a Pythagorean differs from other phyſiologiſts, and Plato in this dialogue exhibits the higheſt ſcience, hence he afterwards, in a manner perfectly divine, proves *that* true being has a ſubſiſtence; but at preſent he employs the definition of *what* it is, preſerving the limits of phyſiology. He appears, indeed, to inveſtigate the definition of eternal being, and of that which is generated, that he may diſcover the cauſes which give completion to the univerſe, viz. form and matter: for that which is generated requires theſe. But he aſſumes the third hypotheſis, that he may diſcover the fabricative cauſe of the univerſe; the fourth, becauſe the univerſe was generated according to a paradigmatic cauſe; and the fifth concerning the name of the univerſe, that he may inveſtigate the participation of *the good* and *the ineffable* by the world.

[1] That is denominated generated, ſays Proclus (in Tim. p. 85.) which has not the whole of its eſſence or energy eſtabliſhed in one, ſo as to be perfectly immutable. And of this kind are, this ſenſible

rated, commencing its generation from a certain cauſe. It was generated. For this univerſe is viſible, and has a body. But all ſuch things are ſenſible. And ſenſibles are apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with ſenſe. And ſuch things appear to have their ſubſiſtence in becoming to be, and in being generated. But we have before aſſerted, that whatever is generated is neceſſarily generated from ſome cauſe. To diſcover, therefore, the *artificer* and *father* of the univerſe is indeed difficult; and when found it is impoſſible to reveal him through the miniſtry of diſcourſe to all men.

Again: this is to be conſidered concerning him, I mean, according to what paradigm extending himſelf, he fabricated the world—whether towards an exemplar, ſubſiſting according to that which is always the ſame, and ſimilarly affected, or towards that which is generated. But, indeed, if this world is beautiful, and its artificer good, it is evident that he looked towards an eternal exemplar in its fabrication. But if the world be far from beautiful, which it is not lawful to aſſert, he neceſſarily beheld a generated inſtead of an eternal exemplar. But it is perfectly evident that he regarded an

ſenſible world, time in things moved, and the tranſitive intellection of ſouls. But that every motion ſubſiſts according to a part, and that the whole of it is not preſent at once, is evident. And if the eſſence of the world poſſeſſes generation, and the perpetuity of it is according to a temporal infinity, it may be inferred, that between things eternally perpetual, and ſuch as are generated in a part of time, it is neceſſary that nature ſhould ſubſiſt which is generated infinitely. It is alſo requiſite that a nature of this kind ſhould be generated infinitely in a twofold reſpect, viz. either that the whole of it ſhould be perpetual through the whole of time, but that the parts ſhould ſubſiſt in the parts of time, as is the caſe with the ſublunary elements, or that both the whole and the parts of it ſhould be co-extended with the perpetuity of all time, as is the caſe with the heavenly bodies. For the perpetuity according to eternity is not the ſame with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as neither is the infinity of eternity and time the ſame; becauſe eternity is not the ſame with time, the former being infinite life at once total and full, or, the whole of which is ever preſent to itſelf, and the latter being a flowing image of ſuch a life.

Further ſtill, ſays Proclus, the term generated has a multifarious meaning. For it ſignifies that which has a temporal beginning, every thing which proceeds from a cauſe, that which is eſſentially a compoſite, and that which is naturally capable of being generated, though it ſhould not be generated. The term generated, therefore, being multifariouſly predicated, that which is generated according to time poſſeſſes all the modes of generation. For it proceeds from a cauſe, is a compoſite, and is naturally capable of being generated. Hence, as that which is generated in a part of time begins at one time, and arrives at perfection in another, ſo the world, which is generated according to the whole of time, is always beginning, and always perfect. And it has indeed a certain beginning of generation, ſo far as it is perfected by its cauſe, but has not a certain beginning ſo far as it has not a beginning of a certain partial time.

eternal

eternal paradigm. For the world is the moſt beautiful of generated natures, and its artificer the beſt of cauſes. But, being thus generated, it is fabricated according to that which is comprehenſible by reaſon and intelligence, and which ſubſiſts in an abiding ſameneſs of being. And from hence it is perfectly neceſſary that this world ſhould be the reſemblance of ſomething. But to deſcribe its origin according to nature is the greateſt of all undertakings. In this manner, then, we muſt diſtinguiſh concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are allied to the things of which they are the interpreters, hence it is neceſſary, when we ſpeak of that which is ſtable [1] and firm, and intellectually apparent, that our reaſons ſhould be in like manner ſtable and immutable, and as much as poſſible irreprehenſible, with every perfection of a ſimilar kind. But that, when we ſpeak concerning the image of

[1] That which Plato now calls *ſtable* and *firm*, he before called eternal being, ſubſiſting after the ſame manner, and apprehended by intelligence; denominating it *ſtable* inſtead of *eternal being*, and *intellectually apparent*, inſtead of *that which is apprehended by intelligence*. He alſo ſays, that the reaſonings about it ſhould be *ſtable* indeed, that through the ſameneſs of the appellation he may indicate the ſimilitude of them to things themſelves; but *immutable*, that they may ſhadow forth the firmneſs of the thing; and *irreprehenſible*, that they may imitate that which is apprehended by intelligence, and may ſcientifically accede. For it is neceſſary that reaſonings, if they are to be adapted to intelligibles, ſhould poſſeſs the accurate and the ſtable, as being converſant with things of this kind. For, as the knowledge of things eternal is immutable, ſo alſo is the *reaſoning*; ſince it is evolved knowledge. However, as it proceeds into multitude, is allotted a compoſite nature, and on this account falls ſhort of the union and impartibility of the thing, he calls the former in the ſingular number *ſtable* and *firm*, and *intellectually apparent*, but the latter in the plural number ſtable, immutable and irreprehenſible *reaſons*. And ſince in *reaſon* there is a certain ſimilitude to its paradigm, and there is alſo a certain diſſimilitude, and the latter is more abundant than the former, he employs one appellation in *common*, *the ſtable*; but the other epithets are different. And as, with reſpect to our knowledge, ſcientific reaſoning cannot be confuted by it, (for there is nothing in us better than ſcience,) but is confuted by the thing itſelf, as not being able to comprehend its nature ſuch as it is, and as it comes into contact with its impartibility, hence he adds, *as much as poſſible*. For ſcience itſelf conſidered as ſubſiſting in ſouls is irreprehenſible, but is reprehended by intellect, becauſe it evolves the impartible, and apprehends the ſimple in a compoſite manner. Since the phantaſy alſo reprehends ſenſe, becauſe its knowledge is attended with paſſion according to mixture, from which the phantaſy is pure; opinion the phantaſy, becauſe it knows in conjunction with type and form, to which opinion is ſuperior; ſcience opinion, becauſe the latter knows without being able to aſſign the cauſe, the ability of effecting which eſpecially characterizes the former; and intellect as we have ſaid ſcience, becauſe the latter divides the object of knowledge tranſitively, but the former apprehends every thing at once in conjunction with eſſence. Intellect, therefore, is alone unconquerable; but ſcience and ſcientific reaſoning are vanquiſhed by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.

that which is immutable, we ſhould employ only probable arguments, which have the ſame analogy to the former as a reſemblance to its exemplar. And, indeed, as eſſence [1] is to generation, ſo is truth to faith. You muſt not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, ſince many things are aſſerted by many concerning

[1] Plato, ſays Proclus, had prior to this made two things the leaders, the intelligible and that which is generated, or paradigm and image, and had aſſumed two things analogous to theſe, ſcience and probability, or truth and faith, truth being to an intelligible paradigm as faith to a generated image; and now he geometrically adds the alternate proportion. For, if as truth is to the intelligible, ſo is faith to that which is generated, it will be alternately as truth is to faith, ſo the intelligible to that which is generated. Plato, therefore, clearly divides reaſonings and knowledges with the things known; and Parmenides alſo, though obſcure through his poetry, yet at the ſame time ſays, that there are twofold knowledges, truth and faith, of twofold things, viz. of beings and non-beings; and the former of theſe knowledges he calls ſplendour, as ſhining with intellectual light, but he deprives the latter of ſtable knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now aſſumes appears to be different from that of which he ſpeaks in the ſixth book of his Republic, in the ſection of a line; for that is irrational knowledge, whence alſo it is divided from conjecture, but is arranged according to ſenſe. But the preſent faith is rational, though it is mingled with irrational knowledges, employing ſenſe and conjecture; and hence it is filled with much of the unſtable. For, receiving *that* a thing is from ſenſe or conjecture, it thus aſſigns the cauſes: but theſe knowledges poſſeſs much of the confuſed and unſtable. Hence Socrates in the Phædo very much blames the ſenſes, becauſe we neither ſee nor hear any thing accurately. How then can knowledge, originating from ſenſe, poſſeſs the accurate and irreprehenſible? For thoſe powers that employ ſcience alone collect with accuracy every thing which is the object of their knowledge; but thoſe powers that energize with ſenſe err and fall off from the accurate, through ſenſe, and through the unſtable nature of the thing known. For what can any one aſſert of that which is material, ſince it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide for a moment? And with reſpect to a celeſtial nature, in conſequence of being very remote from us, it is not eaſily known, nor ſcientifically apprehended; but we muſt be ſatisfied with an approximation to the truth, and with probability in the ſpeculation of it. For every thing which is in place requires a reſidence there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. But the intelligible is not a thing of this kind, ſince it is not to be apprehended by our knowledge in place. For where any one ſtops his dianoëtic power, there, in conſequence of the intelligible being every where preſent, he comes into contact with truth. And if it is poſſible to aſſert any thing ſtable concerning a celeſtial nature, this alſo is poſſible, ſo far as it partakes of being, and ſo far as it is to be apprehended by intelligence. For it is through geometrical demonſtrations, which are univerſal, that we are alone able to collect any thing neceſſary concerning it; but, ſo far as it is ſenſible, it is with difficulty apprehended, and with difficulty ſurveyed.

With reſpect to truth, however, Plato, following the theologiſts, eſtabliſhes it as manifold. For one kind of truth is characterized by the nature of *the one*, being the light proceeding from *the good*, which, in the Philebus, he ſays, imparts purity, and, in the Republic, union, to intelligibles. Another kind is that which proceeds from intelligibles, which illuminates the intellectual orders, which

cerning the Gods and the generation of the univerſe, if I ſhould not be able to produce the moſt approved and accurate reaſons on ſo difficult a ſubject. But you ought to rejoice if it ſhall appear that I do not employ reaſons leſs probable than others: at the ſame time remembering, that I who diſcourſe, and that you who are my judges, poſſeſs the human nature in common; ſo that you ſhould be ſatisfied if my aſſertions are but aſſimilative of the truth.

Soc. You ſpeak excellently well, Timæus; and we ſhall certainly act in every reſpect as you adviſe. This introduction, indeed, of your diſcourſe we wonderfully approve: proceed, therefore, with the ſubſequent diſputation.

Tim. Let us declare then on what account the compoſing artificer conſtituted generation and the univerſe. The artificer, indeed, was good; but in that which is good envy never ſubſiſts about any thing which has being. Hence, as he was entirely void of envy, he was willing to produce all things as much as poſſible ſimilar to himſelf. If, therefore, any one receives this moſt principal cauſe of generation and the world from wiſe and prudent men, he will receive him in a manner the moſt perfect and true. For, as the Divinity was willing that all things ſhould be good, and that as much as poſſible nothing ſhould be evil; hence, receiving every thing viſible, and which was not in a ſtate of reſt, but moving with confuſion [1] and diſorder, he

which an eſſence unfigured, uncoloured, and untouched firſt receives, and where alſo the plain of truth is ſituated, as it is written in the Phædrus. A third kind of truth is that which is connate with ſouls, which comes into contact with being through intelligence, and ſcience ſubſiſting in conjunction with the objects of ſcience: for the light pertaining to the ſoul is the third from the intelligible; ſince the intellectual is filled from the intelligible, and that pertaining to the ſoul from the intellectual order. This truth, therefore, ſubſiſting in ſouls, muſt be now aſſumed, ſince we have admitted a correſponding faith, and not that which is irrational, and deſtitute of all logical conſideration; and the one muſt be conjoined with intelligibles, but the other with ſenſibles.

[1] Plato being willing to indicate the providence of the demiurgus pervading the univerſe, together with the gifts of intellect and the preſence of ſoul, and to ſhow the magnitude of the good which theſe impart to the world, ſurveys prior to this the whole corporeal conſtitution by itſelf, and how, thus conſidered, it is confuſed and diſordered; that alſo, beholding by itſelf the order proceeding from ſoul and demiurgic ornament, we may be able to define what a corporeal nature is in itſelf, and what orderly diſtribution it is allotted from fabrication. The world, indeed, always had a ſubſiſtence, but diſcourſe divides the thing generated from the maker, and produces according to time things which ſubſiſt at once together, becauſe every thing generated is a compoſite.

he reduced it from this wild inordination into order, conſidering that ſuch a conduct was by far the beſt. For it neither ever was lawful, nor is, for the beſt of cauſes to produce any other than the moſt beautiful of effects. In conſequence of a reaſoning [1] proceſs, therefore, he found that among the things naturally viſible [2] there was nothing, the whole of which, if void of intelligence, could ever become more beautiful than the whole of that which is endued with intellect: and at the ſame time he diſcovered, that it was impoſſible for intellect to accede to any being, without the intervention of ſoul. Hence, as the reſult of this reaſoning, placing intellect in ſoul and ſoul in body, he fabricated the univerſe; that thus it might be a work naturally the moſt beautiful and the beſt. In this manner, therefore, according

poſite. To which we may add, that demiurgic fabrication being twofold, one being corporeal, and the other ornamental, Plato, beginning from the ornamental, very properly repreſents every thing corporeal moved in a confuſed and diſordered manner, becauſe ſuch is its motion from itſelf when conſidered as not yet animated by an intellectual ſoul.

It alſo deſerves to be noticed that Plato, in giving ſubſiſtence to the confuſed and diſordered, prior to the fabrication of the world, imitates the antient theologiſts. For, as they introduce the battles and ſeditions of the Titans againſt the Olympian Gods, ſo Plato pre-ſuppoſes theſe two, the unadorned, and the fabricator of the world, that the former may be adorned and participate of order. They, however, introduce theſe theologically; for they oppoſe the powers that preſide over bodies to the Olympian deities: but Plato philoſophically; for he transfers order from the Gods to the ſubjects of their government.

[1] The demiurgus of the univerſe, through the plenitude of his power, fabricates different things by different powers; for, ſince he comprehends in himſelf the cauſe of all fabrications, he after one manner gives ſubſiſtence to the whole world, and after another to its parts. Hence, by one intelligence he adorns the whole world, and generates it collectively, according to which energy the world alſo is one animal; but by reaſoning he produces its parts, and theſe as wholes, becauſe he is the demiurgus of total natures, viz. of total intellect, total ſoul, and all the bulk of body. In conſequence of this, when compoſing parts, he is ſaid to fabricate by reaſoning. For reaſoning here ſignifies a diſtributive cauſe of things; ſince it is not the reaſoning of one doubting. For neither does art doubt, nor ſcience; but artiſts and the ſcientific then doubt when they are indigent of their proper habits. If theſe, therefore, do not doubt when they are perfect, can it be ſuppoſed that intellect doubts, or the fabricator and father of the univerſe?

[2] That is, intelligibles: for that theſe are viſible is evident from the words of Plato further on, where he ſays—"Whatever ideas intellect perceived in animal itſelf," &c. But that theſe are *naturally* viſible will be evident, as Proclus beautifully obſerves, if we conſider that ſome things are viſible to us, and others according to nature. And the things, indeed, which are viſible to us, are in their own nature dark and obſcure; but things naturally viſible are truly known, and are reſplendent with divine light. And ſuch are intelligibles.

to an aſſimilative reaſon, it is neceſſary to call the world an animal, endued with intellect, and generated through the providence of Divinity.

This being determined, let us conſider what follows; and, in the next place, after the ſimilitude of what animals the compoſing artificer conſtituted the world. Indeed, we muſt by no means think that he faſhioned it ſimilar to ſuch animals as ſubſiſt in the form of a part, or have a partial ſubſiſtence: for, if it had been aſſimilated to an imperfect animal, it certainly would not have been beautiful. But we ſhould rather eſtabliſh it as the moſt ſimilar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both conſidered ſeparately and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts. For this, indeed, contains all intelligible animals comprehended in itſelf; juſt as this world contains us and the other animals which are the objects of ſight. For, the Divinity being willing to aſſimilate this univerſe in the moſt exquiſite degree to that which is the moſt beautiful and every way perfect of intelligible objects, he compoſed it one viſible animal, containing within itſelf all ſuch animals as are allied to its nature. Do we therefore rightly conclude that there is but one univerſe; or is it more right to aſſert that there are many and infinite? But indeed there can be but one, if it be only admitted that it is fabricated according to an exemplar. For that which comprehends all intelligible animals whatever can never be the ſecond to any other. For another animal again would be required about theſe two, of which they would be parts; and it would be more proper to aſſert that the univerſe is aſſimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the other two. That the world, therefore, from its being ſingular or alone, might be ſimilar to all-perfect animal—on this account the artificer neither produced two nor infinite worlds; but heaven, or the univerſe, was generated and will be one and only begotten.

But ſince it is neceſſary that a corporeal nature ſhould be viſible and tangible, and ſince nothing can be viſible without fire, and nothing tangible without ſomething ſolid, and nothing ſolid without earth—hence the Divinity, beginning to fabricate, compoſed the body of the univerſe from fire and earth. But it is impoſſible for two things alone to cohere together without the intervention of a third; for a certain collective bond is neceſſary in the middle of the two. And that is the moſt beautiful of bonds which renders both itſelf and the natures which are bound remarkably one. But the

moſt beautiful analogy naturally produces this effect. For when either in three numbers, or maſſes, or powers, as is the middle to the laſt, ſo is the firſt to the middle; and again, as is the laſt to the middle, ſo is the middle to the firſt: then the middle becoming both firſt and laſt, and the laſt and the firſt paſſing each of them into a middle poſition, they become all of them neceſſarily the ſame, as to relation to each other. But, being made the ſame with each other, all are one. If, then, it were neceſſary that the univerſe ſhould be a ſuperficies only, and have no depth, one medium would indeed be ſufficient, both for the purpoſe of binding itſelf and the natures which it contains. But now it is requiſite that the world ſhould be a ſolid; and ſolids are never harmonized together by one, but always with two mediums. Hence, the Divinity placed water and air in the middle of fire and earth, and fabricated them as much as poſſible in the ſame ratio to each other; ſo that fire might be to air as air to water; and that as air is to water ſo water might be to earth. And from this conjunction and compoſition he rendered the world viſible and tangible. Hence, from things of this kind, which are four in number, it muſt be confeſſed that the body of the univerſe was generated through analogy, conſpiring into friendſhip with itſelf from their conjunction, and ſo aptly cohering in all its parts, as to be indiſſoluble except by its artificer, who bound it in this union and conſent.

The compoſition of the world, therefore, received one *whole* of each of theſe four natures. For its compoſing artificer conſtituted it from *all* fire, water, air, and earth; leaving no part of any one of theſe, nor any power external to the world. For by a reaſoning proceſs he concluded that it would thus be a whole animal, in the higheſt degree perfect from perfect parts: that, beſides this, it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other ſuch nature might be produced; and laſtly, that it would be neither obnoxious to old age nor diſeaſe. For he perceived that the heat and cold from which bodies are compoſed, and all ſuch things as poſſeſs vigorous powers, when ſurrounding bodies externally, and acceding to them unſeaſonably, diſſolve their union, and, introducing diſeaſes and old age, cauſe them to periſh by decay. Hence, through this cauſe and this reaſoning proceſs, he fabricated the univerſe one whole, compoſed from all wholes, perfect, undecaying, and without diſeaſe. He likewiſe gave to it a figure becoming and allied to its nature. For to the animal which was deſtined to comprehend

comprehend all animals in itſelf, that figure muſt be the moſt becoming which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence, he faſhioned it of a ſpherical ſhape, in which all the radii from the middle are equally diſtant from the bounding extremities; as this is the moſt perfect of all figures, and the moſt ſimilar to himſelf. For he conſidered that the ſimilar was infinitely more beautiful than the diſſimilar.

Beſides this, he accurately poliſhed the external circumference of the ſpherical world, and rendered it perfectly ſmooth [1]. Nor was the addition of eyes [2] requiſite to the univerſe; for nothing viſible remained external to itſelf.

[1] It is well obſerved here by Proclus, that, the whole univerſe being luminous, it is moſt lucid according to its external ſuperficies, and full of divine ſplendour. For through this the poets alſo place Olympus at the extremity of the world, this being entirely luminous and ſelf-ſplendid.

There a white ſplendour ſpreads its radiance round,

ſays Homer. But of this luminous ſubſiſtence ſmoothneſs is a ſymbol. Why, therefore, are the extremities of the univerſe ſmooth? We reply, That it may be ſpontaneouſly conjoined with ſoul and intellect, and that it may be harmoniouſly adapted to ſupermundane lights, through its ſimilitude to them. Smoothneſs, therefore, is ſignificant of extreme aptitude, through which the univerſe is able to receive the illuminations proceeding from intellect and ſoul; juſt as mirrors, by their ſmoothneſs, receive the repreſentations of things. Proclus further obſerves, that a mirror was aſſumed by antient theologiſts as a ſymbol of the aptitude of the univerſe to be filled with intellectual illumination. Hence, ſays he, they ſay that Vulcan made a mirror for Bacchus, into which the God looking, and beholding the image of himſelf, proceeded into the whole of a diviſible fabrication. And you may ſay that the ſmoothneſs of the external ſurface of the univerſe, which is now mentioned by Plato, reminds us of the above-mentioned catoptric apparatus. The whole body of the univerſe, therefore, being externally ſmooth, becomes connate with its own intellect, and with that of the demiurgus. Hence, poets eſtabliſh the demiurgus on the lofty ſummit of the world, which is allotted from him ſuch an aptitude, in order to its participation of intelligible cauſes.

[2] By theſe words, ſays Proclus, Plato appears to do nothing elſe than to take away from the univerſe a diviſible life, and diviſible organs, which being ſuſpended from us deſcend into generation, or the whole of a viſible nature. For, while we remain on high, we are in no want of any one of theſe multiform lives and diviſible inſtruments; but our lucid vehicle is ſufficient, which contains in itſelf unitedly all the ſenſes. As, therefore, when we are liberated from generation we are purified from every life of this kind, what ought we to think reſpecting the univerſe? Is it not this, that it has one ſimple life, to which the whole of it is excited, and that it is equally on all ſides prepared to be filled with one life? Or ought we not much more to admit theſe things of the univerſe? For wholes are more divine than parts, and things which comprehend than thoſe which are comprehended.

Plato, however, muſt not be ſuppoſed in what he now ſays to deprive the world of ſenſe; for, according

itſelf. Nor were ears neceſſary; as there was nothing externally audible. Nor was the univerſe inveſted with ſurrounding air, that it might be indigent of reſpiration. Nor, again, was it in want of any organ through which it might receive nutriment into itſelf, and diſcharge it when concocted: for there was no poſſibility that any thing could either accede to or depart from its nature, ſince there was nothing through which ſuch changes could be produced. For, indeed, the univerſe affords nutriment to itſelf through its own conſumption; and, being artificially fabricated, ſuffers and acts all things in itſelf, and from its own peculiar operations. For its compoſing artificer conſidered that it would be much more excellent if ſufficient to itſelf, than if indigent of foreign ſupplies. But he neither thought that hands [1] were neceſſary to the world, as there was nothing for it either to receive

cording to him, the world is an animal, and an animal is characterized by ſenſe. In order, therefore, to underſtand what the nature of that ſenſe is which the world poſſeſſes, it will be neceſſary to make the following diviſion. Of ſenſe, therefore, the firſt and moſt principal is that which imitates intellect For every where things which rank as firſt poſſeſs an imitation of things prior to them. Hence, that is conjoined with firſt natures which has a ſenſible perception of itſelf, comprehended in itſelf, not paſſing from one thing to another, for this would be divided ſenſe, nor proceeding to externals, for this is imperfect, but poſſeſſing the whole of that which is ſenſible in itſelf, and which may be rather called conſciouſneſs than ſenſe. The next to this is that which proceeds indeed, and does not abide like the former, but yet proceeds according to a perfect energy, and always, on all ſides, ſimilarly apprehends that which is known; which is likewiſe purified from all paſſion, and from all that imbecility which is peculiar to diviſible and material organs. The third is that which is paſſive to things external, and is mingled from paſſion and knowledge; originating, indeed, from paſſion, but ending in knowledge. The laſt ſenſe is that with which a moſt obſcure knowledge is preſent, which is full of paſſion, and is proximate to phyſical ſympathy, as not knowing the forms of ſenſibles; as, for inſtance, that what operates is hot or cold, but that what falls upon it is alone pleaſant or painful; for ſuch is the ſenſe of plants, as Timæus informs us in the courſe of this dialogue, being the apprehenſion of that which is alone pleaſant and painful from things ſenſible. Senſe, therefore, thus ſupernally proceeding, the world is ſenſitive according to the firſt ſenſe. For it is viſible, and an eye, according to the whole of itſelf, ſince the ſun alſo is called an eye, and each of the ſtars. The world, therefore, is wholly ſight and the thing ſeen, and is *truly* to be comprehended by ſenſe and opinion. Hence, it contains all-perfect knowledge, indiviſible ſenſe, and is itſelf ſenſible, the inſtrument of ſenſe, and ſenſe; juſt as alſo its artificer is intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. And as it comprehends partial bodies in its whole body, ſo likewiſe it contains many ſenſes in its total ſenſe.

[1] Theſe things, ſays Proclus, are by no means in the univerſe, though after another manner it contains both ſenſe and motion. For, ſince every thing ſenſible is comprehended in it, and it is

receive or reject; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are ſubſervient to progreſſion and reſt. For from among the ſeven ſpecies of local motion he ſelected one, which principally ſubſiſts about intellect and intelligence, and aſſigned it to the world as properly allied to its ſurrounding body. Hence, when he had led it round according to *ſame*, in *ſame*, and in itſelf, he cauſed it to move with a circular revolution. But he ſeparated the other ſix motions from the world, and framed it void of their wandering progreſſions. Hence, as ſuch a converſion was by no means indigent of feet, he generated the univerſe without legs and feet. When, therefore, that God who is a perpetually reaſoning divinity cogitated about the God who was deſtined to ſubſiſt at ſome certain period of time, he produced his body ſmooth and equable; and every way from the middle even and whole, and perfect from the compoſition of perfect bodies. But, placing ſoul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the whole; and beſides this, he externally inveſted the body of the univerſe with ſoul; and, cauſing circle to revolve in a circle, eſtabliſhed the world one ſingle, ſolitary nature, able through virtue to converſe with itſelf, indigent of nothing external, and ſufficiently known and friendly to itſelf. And on all theſe accounts he ren-

is itſelf the firſt ſenſible, it has alſo one ſenſe conjoined with ſenſible of this kind; juſt as the intelligence of the demiurgus is conjoined with the whole of the intelligible, in conſequence of which he is ſaid by Orpheus to abſorb the univerſe in himſelf. After this manner, therefore, the world abſorbs itſelf by the ſenſible perception of itſelf, and comprehends the thing known by a connate knowledge. It alſo poſſeſſes powers which rule over, and are the guardians of, all things; and theſe are its hands. It likewiſe poſſeſſes perfective orders, which are analogous to nutritive parts; and receives vivific cauſes which correſpond to the members of reſpiration. Further ſtill, it alſo contains other powers, ſome of which fill it with unapparent cauſes, and others connect it with intelligible light. And of theſe powers, ſome are analogous to ſight, and others to hearing. With this ſenſe it likewiſe poſſeſſes an analogous motion; for, as it poſſeſſes a ſenſible perception of itſelf, ſo alſo it contains motion in itſelf, and a revolving about itſelf; and both theſe according to the ſimilitude of its paradigm. For in Phanes, or animal itſelf, there is intelligence verging to itſelf, a life converted to itſelf, and a knowledge not ſubſiſting according to tranſition and diviſion, but ſelf-perfect, and united with intelligibles themſelves. For ſuch is the intellect which is there, which in conſequence of its being abſorbed in ſupereſſential light may be ſaid to energize prior to energy; becauſe, according to the Chaldaic oracle, it has not proceeded, but abides in the paternal profundity, and in the adytum, according to a ſilence which is nouriſhed by Deity.

dered the univerſe a happy [1] God. But indeed the artificer did not produce ſoul, as we juſt now began to ſay, junior to body: for he who conjoined theſe would never permit that the more antient nature ſhould be ſubſervient to the younger. But we, as being much converſant with that which caſually occurs, aſſert things of this kind in an aſſimilative way; while, on the contrary, the artificer of the world conſtituted ſoul both in generation and virtue prior to, and more antient than, body, as being the proper lord and ruler of its ſervile nature; and that in the following manner:

From an eſſence impartible [2], and always ſubſiſting according to ſameneſs of

[1] The happineſs of any being is the proper perfection of that being; and hence, as the perfections of beings differ, ſo alſo do their felicities. A felicity, therefore, in the preſent caſe muſt be aſſumed, adapted to the univerſe. For, ſince the world is ſuſpended from a paternal intellect and a total fabricative energy, and lives according to thoſe cauſes, it is happy in a degree conſequent to theſe. The world, therefore, living according to the will of the father, and preſerving immutably the intellectual good which is thence imparted, is very juſtly ſaid to be happy. But the firſt form of felicity, ſays Proclus, and which is all-perfect, is that of the world. The ſecond is that of the mundane Gods, whom Plato in the Phædrus calls happy divinities, following the mighty Jupiter. The third is that which ſubſiſts in the genera ſuperior to our nature, viz. angels, dæmons, and heroes; for the felicity of each of theſe is different. The fourth is that which ſubſiſts in undefiled ſouls, who make blameleſs deſcents into mortality, and exhibit an inflexible and untamed life; ſuch as were the ſouls of Hercules, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, &c. The fifth is the felicity of partial ſouls; and this is multiform: for a ſoul the attendant of the moon is not happy after the ſame manner as the ſoul that is ſuſpended from the ſolar order; but as the form of life is different, ſo alſo the perfection is limited by different meaſures. And the laſt form of felicity is that which is ſeen in irrational animals.

[2] The Orphic writers, ſays Proclus, (in Tim. p. 184.) do not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual order, but, according to them, there is ſomething better than this appellation; juſt as, with reſpect to other names, they do not adapt king and father to all orders. Where, then, ſhall we firſt perceive the indiviſible according to Orpheus, that we may thus underſtand the divinely intellectual conception of Plato? Orpheus, therefore, eſtabliſhing one demiurgus of all divided fabrication, who is analogous to the one father that generates total fabrication, produces from him the whole mundane intellectual multitude, the number of ſouls, and corporeal compoſitions. This demiurgus, (viz. Bacchus) therefore, generates all theſe unitedly; but the Gods who are placed about him divide and ſeparate his fabrications. Orpheus ſays, that all the other fabrications of this divinity were ſeparated into parts by the diſtributive Gods, but that his heart alone was preſerved indiviſible by the providence of Minerva. For, as he gave ſubſiſtence to intellects, ſouls and bodies, and ſouls and bodies receive in themſelves much diviſion and ſeparation into parts, but intellect remains united and undivided, being all things in one, and comprehending

of being, and from a nature diviſible about bodies, he mingled from both a third form of eſſence, having a middle ſubſiſtence between the two. And again, between that which is impartible and that which is diviſible about bodies, he placed the nature of *ſame* and *different*. And taking theſe, now they are three, he mingled them all into one idea. But as the nature of *different* could not without difficulty be mingled in *ſame*, he harmonized them together by employing force in their conjunction. But after he had mingled theſe two with eſſence, and had produced one from the three, he again divided this whole into becoming parts; at the ſame time mingling each part from *ſame*, *different*, and *eſſence*. But he began to divide as follows:—In the firſt place, he received one part from the whole. Then he ſeparated a ſecond part, double of the firſt; afterwards a third, ſeſquialter of the ſecond, but triple of the firſt: then a fourth, double of the ſecond; in the next place a fifth, triple of the third; a ſixth, octuple of the firſt; and laſtly a ſeventh, twenty-ſeven times more than the firſt. After this, he filled up the double and triple intervals, again cutting off parts from the whole; and placed them ſo between the intervals, that there might be two mediums in every interval;

prehending in one intelligence total intelligibles,—hence he ſays, that intellectual eſſence alone, and an intellectual number, were ſaved by Minerva. For, ſays he,

The intellectual heart alone was ſaved:

openly denominating it intellectual. If, therefore, the indiviſible heart is intellectual, it will evidently be intellect and an intellectual number; not that it will, indeed, be every intellect, but that which is mundane; for this is the indiviſible heart, ſince the divided God was the fabricator of this. But Orpheus calls intellect the indiviſible eſſence of Bacchus; and denominates his prolific power that life which is diſtributed about body, which is phyſical and productive of ſeeds, and which he ſays Diana, who preſides over all the generation in nature, and leads into light phyſical reaſons, ſupernally extends as far as to ſubterranean natures. All the remaining body of the God is, according to Orpheus, mythologically conſidered as the compoſition pertaining to the ſoul, and is divided into ſeven parts. "All the parts into which they divided the boy were ſeven *," ſays the theologiſt, ſpeaking concerning the Titans; juſt in the ſame manner as Timæus divides the ſoul into ſeven parts. And, perhaps, when Timæus ſays that ſoul is extended through the whole world, he reminds us of the Orphic Titanic diviſion, through which not only the ſoul is ſpread round the univerſe like a veil, but is alſo extended through every part of it. With great propriety, therefore, does Plato call that eſſence impartible which is proximately placed above ſoul, following the Orphic fables, and wiſhing, as it were, to be an interpreter of what is ſaid in the myſteries.

* Ἑπτα δε παντα μερη κουρου διεμοιρησαντο φησιν ὁ Θεολογος περι των Τιτανων.

and

and that one of theſe might by the ſame part exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other; and that the other part might by an equal number ſurpaſs one of the extremes, and by an equal number be ſurpaſſed by the other. But as from hence ſeſquialter, ſeſquitertian, and ſeſquioctave intervals were produced, from thoſe bonds in the firſt ſpaces, he filled with a ſeſquioctave interval all the ſeſquitertian parts, at the ſame time leaving a part [1] of each of theſe. And then again the interval of this part being

[1] It is well obſerved here by Proclus, (in Tim. p. 211.) that from each of the ſpheres from which the univerſe conſiſts there are certain defluxions which extend as far as to the ſubterranean regions, and alſo certain dregs mingled together, of the elements themſelves, poſſeſſing much of the tumultuous, dark and material, but at the ſame time contributing to the whole compoſition and harmony of the world. Plato (ſays he) placing the cauſe of this in the ſoul of the univerſe calls it a remainder (λειμμα), a term ſignificant of ultimate ſubjection.

Proclus further obſerves, "that theologiſts alſo eſtabliſh about ſubterranean places the powers of the higheſt Gods; and that Jupiter himſelf is repreſented by them as adorning thoſe places in order to adapt them to the participation of ſuch mighty Gods. That, if this be the caſe, we ought much more to think, concerning the ſoul of the univerſe, that it adorns every thing which appears to have a diſordered ſubſiſtence, poſſeſſes the cauſe of its exiſtence, and arranges it in a becoming manner according to this cauſe. For, how can it govern the univerſe, or conduct all things according to intellect, unleſs it orderly diſpoſes that which is diſordered, and co-harmonizes things laſt with the one life of the world? If alſo the cauſes of theſe preſubſiſt in the demiurgus, as Orpheus ſays, what wonder is it that the whole ſoul which poſſeſſes all ſuch things in a manner adapted to itſelf, as a divine intellect poſſeſſes demiurgically, ſhould alſo comprehend the cauſe of things laſt in the world, and of that which is as it were the ſediment of wholes? For ſoul prior to the apparent and ſenſible comprehends an unapparent world."

Proclus concludes with obſerving, that the whole number of the eſſential monads in the ſoul is 105,947*; the ſoul thus proceeding according to all the orders of numbers. For it proceeds decadically indeed, that it may become the mundane ſoul; ſince the decad is the number of the world: but pentadically, that it may be converted to itſelf; for the pentad is ſelf-convertive. It alſo proceeds enneadically (or according to the number 9), that it may not only connect the univerſe monadically, but may proceed to the laſt of things after departing from the monad: tetradically, as collecting the quadripartite diviſion of things into one, and hebdomadically (or according to the number 7), as converting all things to the monad, to which the hebdomad is alone referred, this number being motherleſs and maſculine. And the whole of this number is indeed in the ſoul of the world totally, viz. has a total ſubſiſtence; but in divine ſouls, as energizing towards the mundane ſoul, it is contained totally and partially. In dæmoniacal ſouls, as energizing yet more partially, it ſubſiſts on the contrary partially and totally; and in human ſouls partially and gnoſtically alone.

* In the original μυριαδες δεκα, χιλιαδες πεντε, εκατονταδες τεσσαρες; but from what Proclus immediately after obſerves, it is evident that inſtead of εκατονταδες τεσσαρες we ſhould read εννεακοντακαδες τεσσαρακοντες.

aſſumed, a compariſon is from thence obtained in terms of number to number, ſubſiſting between 256 and 243. But now the whole of that mixture from which theſe were ſeparated was conſumed by ſuch a ſection of parts. Hence he then cut the whole of this compoſition according to length, and produced two from one; and adapted middle to middle, like the form of the letter X. Afterwards he bent them into a circle, connecting them, both with themſelves and with each other, in ſuch a manner that their extremities might be combined in one directly oppoſite to the point of their mutual interſection; and externally comprehended them in a motion revolving according to ſameneſs, and in that which is perpetually the ſame. And beſides this, he made one of the circles external, but the other internal; and denominated the local motion of the exterior circle, the motion of that nature which ſubſiſts according to *ſameneſs*; but that of the interior one, the motion of the nature ſubſiſting according to *difference*. He likewiſe cauſed the circle partaking of *ſameneſs* to revolve laterally towards the right hand; but that which partakes of *difference* diametrically towards the left. But he conferred dominion on the circulation of that which is *ſame* and *ſimilar:* for he ſuffered this alone to remain undivided. But as to the interior circle, when he had divided it ſix times, and had produced ſeven unequal circles, each according to the interval of the double and triple; as each of them are three, he ordered the circles to proceed in a courſe contrary to each other:—and three of the ſeven interior circles he commanded to revolve with a ſimilar ſwiftneſs; but the remaining four with a motion diſſimilar to each other, and to the former three; yet ſo as not to deſert order and proportion in their circulations.

After, therefore, the whole compoſition of the ſoul was completed according to the intention of its artificer, in the next place he fabricated within ſoul the whole of a corporeal nature; and, conciliating middle with middle, he aptly harmonized them together. But ſoul [1] being every way extended

[1] Soul proceeding ſupernally as far as to the laſt receſſes of the earth, and illuminating all things with the light of life, the world being converted to it, becomes animated from its extremities, and alſo according to its middle, and the whole of its interval. It alſo externally enjoys the intellectual illumination of ſoul. Hence ſoul is ſaid to obtain the middle of the univerſe, as depoſiting in it its powers, and a ſymbol of its proper preſence. It is alſo ſaid to extend itſelf to the extremities of heaven, as vivifying it on all ſides; and to inveſt the univerſe as with a veil, as poſſeſſing powers exempt from diviſible bulks.

from

from the middle to the very extremities of the univerſe, and inveſting it externally in a circle, at the ſame time herſelf revolving [1] within herſelf, gave riſe to the divine commencement of an unceaſing and wiſe life, through the whole of time. And, indeed, the body of the univerſe was generated viſible; but ſoul is inviſible, participating of a rational energy and harmony [2], and ſubſiſting as the beſt of generated natures, through its artificer, who is the beſt of intelligible and perpetual beings. Since, therefore, ſoul was compoſed from the mixture of the three parts *ſame*, *different*, and *eſſence*, and was diſtributed and bound according to analogy, herſelf at the ſame time returning by a circular energy towards herſelf; hence, when ſhe touches [3] upon any thing endued with a diſſipated eſſence, and when upon that which is indiviſible, being moved through the whole of herſelf, ſhe pronounces concerning the nature of each—aſſerts what that is with which any thing is the ſame [4], from what it is different, to what it is related, where it is ſituated, how

[1] Plato here evidently evinces, that the converſion of the ſoul to herſelf is a knowledge of herſelf, of every thing which ſhe contains, and of every thing prior to and proceeding from her. For all knowledge may be ſaid to be a converſion and adaptation to that which is known; and hence truth is an harmonious conjunction of that which knows with the object of knowledge. Converſion, however, being twofold, one as to *the good*, and the other as to *being*, the vital converſion of all things is directed to *the good*, and the gnoſtic to *being*.

[2] Harmony has a threefold ſubſiſtence; for it is either *harmony itſelf*, i. e. ideal harmony in a divine intellect; or *that which is firſt harmonized, and is ſuch according to the whole of itſelf*; or *that which is ſecondarily harmonized, and partly participates of harmony*. The firſt of theſe muſt be aſſigned to intellect, the ſecond to ſoul, and the third to body.

[3] Plato calls the gnoſtic motions of the ſoul *touchings*, indicating by this their immediate apprehenſion of the objects of knowledge, and their impartible communion with them. Since, however, one of the circles, viz. the dianoëtic power, knows intelligibles, and the other, i. e. the doxaſtic power, ſenſibles, what is it which ſays that theſe objects are different from each other, and that the one is a paradigm, but the other an image? We reply, that in the ſame manner as the common ſenſe knows viſibles and audibles, the former through ſight, and the latter through hearing, and, in conſequence of aſſerting that theſe are different from each other, muſt neceſſarily have a knowledge of both,—ſo this reaſon of which Plato now ſpeaks, being different from the two circles, aſſerts through the whole ſoul ſome things concerning intelligibles, and others concerning ſenſibles. For, in as much as the ſoul is one eſſence, ſhe poſſeſſes this one gnoſtic energy, which he calls reaſon: and hence we ſimply ſay that the whole ſoul is rational. This reaſon then is the one knowledge of the ſoul, which through the circle of ſameneſs underſtands an impartible eſſence, and through the circle of difference that which is diſſipated.

[4] The ſoul of the world, ſays Proclus (in Tim. p. 234.) comprehends all ſenſibles, together with

how it ſubſiſts; and when any thing of this kind happens either *to be* or *to ſuffer* both in things which are generated and in ſuch as poſſeſs an eternal ſameneſs of being. Reaſon indeed, which is *becoming* [1] *to be* true according to ſameneſs, when it is converſant as well with *different* as *ſame*, evolving itſelf without voice or ſound in that which is moved by itſelf; when in this caſe it ſubſiſts about a ſenſible nature, and the circle characterized by *difference* properly revolving, enunciates any circumſtance to every part of the ſoul with which it is connected; then ſtable and true opinions and belief are produced. But when again it evolves itſelf about that which is logiſtic [2], and the circle of *ſameneſs* aptly revolving announces any particular thing, intellect

every thing which they either do or ſuffer. For, ſince the univerſe is one animal, it ſympathizes with itſelf, ſo that all generated natures are parts of the life of the world, as of one drama. Juſt as if a tragic poet ſhould compoſe a drama in which Gods make their appearance, and heroes and other perſons ſpeak, and ſhould permit ſuch players as were willing, to utter the heroic ſpeeches, or the ſpeeches of other characters, he at the ſame time comprehending the one cauſe of all that is ſaid. Thus ought we to conceive reſpecting the whole ſoul: that giving ſubſiſtence to all the life of the world, this life being one and various, and ſpeaking like a many-headed animal with all its heads, partly in Grecian and partly in Barbaric language, it comprehends the cauſes of all generated natures; knowing particulars by univerſals, accidents by eſſences, and parts by wholes, but all things ſimply by the divinity which it contains. For a God ſo far as a God knows things partial, contrary to nature, and in ſhort all things, even though you ſhould ſay matter itſelf. For every thing, whatever it may be, is one, ſo far as it proceeds from *the one*. The knowledge, therefore, of all things ſimply and directly, is divine.

[1] This reaſon is the one power of the eſſence of the ſoul, according to which the ſoul is one, juſt as it is twofold according to *the ſame* and *different*. This reaſon, therefore, being one, knows according to *ſameneſs*. For it does not at one time know the intelligible, and at another time a ſenſible nature, like our reaſon, which is unable to energize about both according to the ſame. Plato very properly ſays of this reaſon, that it is *becoming to be* true (αληθες γιγνομενος) about intelligibles and ſenſibles, but is not *abſolutely* true like intellect, in conſequence of its tranſitive knowledge according to both theſe. Hence, by aſſerting that it knows according to *ſameneſs*, he ſignifies the difference between the knowledge of a divine and partial ſoul; but when he ſays that it is *becoming to be* true, he indicates the difference between the knowledge of ſoul and intellect. You may alſo ſay, that it is *becoming to be* true, as being tranſitive in its twofold knowledges; but that it is true *according to the ſame*, as always comprehending the whole form of every thing which it knows, and not like our reaſon evolving every form, but with reſpect to every thing which it ſees beholding the whole at once. For we ſee every thing according to a part, and not according to ſameneſs.

[2] It appears from the comment of Proclus on this part, that we ſhould read λογιστικον, and not λογικον as in all the printed editions of the Timæus. Proclus alſo well obſerves, that by *logiſtic*, here, we muſt underſtand *the intelligible*; for Plato oppoſes this to *the ſenſible*. He adds, that

intellect and ſcience are neceſſarily produced in perfection by ſuch an operation. Whoever, therefore, aſſerts that this [1] is ingenerated in any other nature than ſoul, aſſerts every thing rather than the truth.

But when the generating father underſtood that this generated reſemblance of the eternal Gods [2] moved and lived, he was delighted with his work, and in conſequence of this delight conſidered how he might fabricate it ſtill more ſimilar to its exemplar. Hence, as that is an eternal animal, he endeavoured to render this univerſe ſuch, to the utmoſt of his ability. The nature indeed of the animal its paradigm is eternal, and this it is impoſſible to adapt perfectly to a generated effect. Hence he determined by a dianoëtic energy to produce a certain movable image of eternity: and thus, while he was adorning and diſtributing the univerſe, he at the ſame time formed an

Plato appears to call *the intelligible the logiſtic*, after the ſame manner as he afterwards calls *the ſenſible, ſenſitive*, (το αισθητον, αισθητικον). For *the ſenſible* is motive of ſenſe, and *the intelligible* of the reaſoning of the ſoul. After this he obſerves as follows: "By *aptly revolving* we muſt underſtand the intellectual, the unimpeded in tranſition, the circular, and the conſummation of vigour, perfection in intellections, the energizing about a divine nature, the beneficent, and moving about the intelligible as a centre;"—"haſtening to conjoin yourſelf with the centre of reſounding light," ſays ſome one of the Gods. By *intellect* Plato here ſignifies intellect according to habit. For intellect is threefold: the firſt, that which is divine, ſuch as the demiurgic; the ſecond, that which is participated by the ſoul, but is at the ſame time eſſential and ſelf-perfect; and the third, that which ſubſiſts according to habit, and through which the ſoul is intellectual. *Science* here ſignifies the firſt knowledge filled from intelligibles, and which has an undeviating and immutable ſubſiſtence. But it differs from intellect, ſo far as intellect is beheld in ſimple projections alone of the ſoul; for through this the ſoul underſtands at once the whole of every thing which is the object of intellection. For an energy at once collective is the peculiarity of intellect; but that of ſcience conſiſts in a knowledge from cauſe; ſince the compoſition and diviſion of forms conſtitute the idiom of ſcience.

[1] By *this*, ſays Proclus, we muſt underſtand *intellect* and *ſcience*. Every thing, therefore, which is the recipient of intellect and ſcience, of opinion and faith, is ſoul. For all the knowledges of the ſoul are rational and tranſitive. And becauſe they are rational, indeed, they are exempt from irrational powers; but, becauſe they are tranſitive, they are ſubordinate to intellectual knowledge. For, if ſcience and intellect are in intelligibles, they are not *ingenerated* in them, as Plato here ſays they are in the ſoul.

[2] By the *eternal Gods* here we muſt not underſtand, as Proclus well obſerves, the *mundane Gods*; for Plato does not alone ſpeak of the corporeal nature of the univerſe, but alſo diſcourſes about it as animated, and an intellectual animal, which comprehends in itſelf the mundane Gods. We muſt underſtand, therefore, that the world is the reſemblance of the intelligible Gods: for it is filled from them with deity, and the progreſſions into it of the mundane are as it were certain rivers and illuminations of the intelligible Gods.

eternal image flowing according to number, of eternity abiding in one; and which receives from us the appellation of time. But beſides this he fabricated the generation of days [1] and nights, and months and years, which had no

[1] What day and night, month and year, are, ſays Proclus, and how theſe are ſaid to be parts of time, but *was* and *will be* ſpecies, and not parts, requires much diſcuſſion and profound conſideration. If then we ſhould ſay that day is air illuminated by the ſun, in the firſt place, we ſhould ſpeak of ſomething which takes place in day, and not that which day is; for, when we ſay that the day is long or ſhort, we certainly do not predicate an increaſe or decreaſe of the air; and, in the next place, it is difficult to deviſe how this will be a part of time. But if we ſay that day is the temporal interval according to which the ſun proceeds from the eaſt to the weſt, we ſhall perhaps avoid the former objections, but we ſhall fall into more impervious difficulties. For whether, ſurveying this interval itſelf without relation to the ſun, we ſay that it is day, how does it happen, ſince the ſame interval is every where according to the ſame, that day is not every where? And if we conſider this interval in connection with the ſolar motion, if it is ſimply ſo conſidered, day will always be in the heavens, and there will be no night; and how is it poſſible that a part of time ſhould not be every where? for night, day, and month, are here clearly ſaid to be parts of time. But if we connect this interval with the circulation of the ſun, not ſimply, but aſſert that day is the portion of the ſun's courſe from eaſt to weſt, but night that portion which is produced by his courſe from weſt to eaſt, the heavens will not poſſeſs thoſe nights and days which are ſaid to be parts of time; and it is alſo evident that neither will they poſſeſs months and years. But we aſſert of time, both conſidered according to the whole of itſelf, and every part of its progreſſion, that it is preſent to the whole world: for one and the ſame *now* is every where the ſame. It is neceſſary, therefore, that day and the other parts of time ſhould be every where the ſame, though they are participated partibly, and with diviſion by ſenſible fabrications. Aſſigning, therefore, to theſe a more principal ſubſiſtence, conformably to the cuſtom of our father *, we muſt ſay, that night and day are demiurgic meaſures of time, exciting and convolving all the apparent and unapparent life and motion, and orderly diſtribution of the inerratic ſphere: for theſe are the true parts of time, are preſent after the ſame manner to all things, and comprehend the primary cauſe of apparent day and night, each of theſe having a different ſubſiſtence in apparent time; to which alſo Timæus looking reminds us how time was generated together with the world. Hence he ſays in the plural number *nights* and *days*, as alſo *months* and *years*. But theſe are obvious to all men: for the unapparent cauſes of theſe have a uniform ſubſiſtence prior to things multiplied, and which circulate infinitely. Things immovable alſo ſubſiſt prior to ſuch as are moved, and intellectual natures are prior to ſenſibles. Such, therefore, muſt be our conceptions of night and day according to their firſt ſubſiſtence.

By *month* we muſt underſtand that truly divine temporal meaſure which convolves the lunar ſphere, and every termination of the other † circulation. But *year* is that which perfects and connects the whole of middle fabrication, according to which the ſun is ſeen poſſeſſing the

* Meaning his preceptor Syrianus, as being his true father, the father of his ſoul.

† Viz. of the circulation about the zodiac.

no ſubſiſtence prior to the univerſe, but which together with it roſe into exiſtence. And all theſe, indeed, are the proper parts of time. But the terms *it was* and *it will be*, which expreſs the ſpecies of generated time, are transferred by us to an eternal eſſence, through oblivion of the truth. For we aſſert of ſuch an eſſence that it *was*, *is*, and *will be*; while according to truth the term *it is* is alone accommodated to its nature. But we ſhould affirm, that *to have been* and *to be hereafter* are expreſſions alone accommodated to generation, proceeding according to the flux of time: for theſe

greateſt ſtrength, and meaſuring all things in conjunction with time. For neither day nor night, nor month, is without the ſun, nor much more year, nor any other mundane nature. I do not here ſpeak according to the apparent fabrication of things alone, for the apparent ſun is the cauſe of theſe meaſures, but alſo according to that fabrication which is unapparent. For, aſcending higher, we ſhall find that the more true * ſun meaſures all things in conjunction with time, being itſelf in reality time of time, according to the oracle † of the Gods concerning it. For that Plato not only knew theſe apparent parts of time, but alſo thoſe divine parts to which theſe are homonymous, is evident from the tenth book of his Laws. For he there aſſerts that we call hours and months divine, as having the ſame divine lives, and divine intellects preſiding over them, as the univerſe. But, if he now ſpeaks about the apparent parts of time, it is by no means wonderful; becauſe now his deſign is to phyſiologize. Let theſe, therefore, be the parts of time, of which ſome are accommodated to the inerratic Gods, others to the Gods that revolve about the poles of the oblique circle, and others to other Gods, or attendants of the Gods, or to mortal animals, or the more ſublime or more abject parts of the univerſe.

But Plato ſays that *was* and *will be* are ſpecies and not parts of time, in the ſame manner as days and nights, and months and years: for by theſe he repreſents to us thoſe divine orders which give completion to the whole ſeries of time; and on this account he calls them parts of time. But *was* and *will be* are entirely beheld according to each of theſe; and hence they are certain ſpecies, not having as it were a peculiar matter; I mean a diurnal or nocturnal matter, or any other of this kind. If then theſe are the ſpecies of time which was generated together with the world, there was no generation prior to the world. Neither, therefore, was there any motion: for in every motion there are theſe ſpecies of time, becauſe there are prior and poſterior. But, if there was not motion, neither was there inordinate motion. In vain, therefore, do the followers of Atticus ſay, that there was time prior to the generation of the world, but not ſubſiſting in order: for where time is there alſo there is paſt and future; and where theſe are, *was* and *will be* muſt likewiſe be found. But *was* and *will be* are ſpecies of time generated by the demiurgus: and hence time was not prior to the fabrication of the world. Proclus after this obſerves, that *was* indicates the perfective order of time, but *will be* the unfolding, in the ſame manner as *is*, the connective order of time. For time unfolds things which yet are not, connects things preſent, and perfects things paſt, and introduces a boundary to them adapted to their periods.

* Viz. the ſun conſidered according to its ſubſiſtence in the ſupermundane order of Gods.

† Viz. one of the Chaldæan Oracles.

parts of time are certain motions. But that which perpetually ſubſiſts the ſame and immovable, neither becomes at any time older or younger; neither has been generated in ſome period of the paſt, nor will be in ſome future circulation of time; nor receives any circumſtance of being, which generation adapts to natures hurried away by its impetuous whirl. For all theſe are nothing more than ſpecies of time imitating eternity, and circularly rolling itſelf according to number. Beſides this, we likewiſe frequently aſſert that a thing which was *generated*, IS *generated:* that what ſubſiſts in BECOMING TO BE, IS *in generation*; that what WILL BE, IS TO BE; and that NON-BEING IS NOT: no one of which aſſertions is accurately true. But perhaps a perfect diſcuſſion of theſe matters is not adapted to the preſent diſputation.

But time [1] was generated together with the univerſe, that being produced together they might together be diſſolved, if any diſſolution ſhould ever happen

[1] Plato, ſays Proclus, aſſerts that time was generated together with the univerſe, animated and endued with intellect, becauſe the world firſt participates of time according to ſoul and according to a corporeal nature. But when he ſays, "that, being produced together, they may together be diſſolved, if any diſſolution ſhould ever happen to theſe," he clearly ſhows that the univerſe is unbegotten and incorruptible. For, if it was generated, it was generated in time; but, if it was generated together with time, it was not generated in time: for neither is time generated in time, leſt there ſhould be time prior to time. If, therefore, the univerſe was generated together with time, it was not generated *: for it is neceſſary that every thing which is generated ſhould be poſterior to time; but the univerſe is by no means poſterior to time. Again, if every thing which is diſſolved, is diſſolved on a certain time, but time cannot be diſſolved in a part of itſelf, time can never be diſſolved; ſo that neither will the univerſe be diſſolved, ſince it is indiſſoluble, as long as time is indiſſoluble. Time alſo is indiſſoluble through the ſimplicity of its nature, unleſs ſome one ſhould denominate the contrariety which ariſes through its proceſſion from, and regreſſion to, the demiurgus, generation and diſſolution: for thus alſo the univerſe poſſeſſes diſſolution and generation according to cauſe. Juſt, therefore, as if ſome one, wiſhing to indicate that the circulations of the other nature † are odd in number, ſhould ſay that the heptad is conſubſiſtent with them, that if at any time the heptad ſhould become an even number, thoſe circulations alſo may become even, ſignifying that the circulations will never be changed into an even number,—after the ſame manner muſt we conceive reſpecting the all-various indiſſolubility of the world and of time, in conſequence of time poſſeſſing an indiſſoluble nature. One cauſe, therefore, of time being generated together with the univerſe is, that the univerſe may be indiſſoluble

* Viz. it was not generated according to the uſual acceptation of the word generated.

† Viz. the circulations about the zodiac.

and

happen to theſe. And time was generated according to the exemplar of an eternal nature, that this world might be the moſt ſimilar poſſible to ſuch a nature. For its exemplar is permanent being, through the whole of eternity; but the univerſe alone *was* generated, *is*, and *will be*, through the whole of time. After this manner, therefore, and from ſuch a dianoëtic energy of Divinity about the generation of time [1], that he might give birth to its flowing ſubſiſtence, he generated the ſun and moon, and the five other ſtars, which are denominated planets, for the purpoſe of diſtinguiſhing and guarding the numbers of time. But the Divinity, as ſoon as he had produced the bodies of theſe ſtars, placed them, being ſeven in number, in the ſeven circulations formed by the revolution of the nature diſtinguiſhed by *difference*. The moon, indeed, he fixed in the firſt circulation about the earth; the ſun in the ſecond above the earth; the ſtar called Lucifer [2], and that which is ſacred to Mercury, in circulations revolving with a ſwiftneſs equal to the ſun, to whom at the ſame time they are allotted a contrary power; in conſequence

and perpetual; but a ſecond cauſe is, that it may become moſt ſimilar to its paradigm. How, therefore, does the univerſe become more ſimilar to its paradigm animal itſelf (αυτο ζωον) through time? Becauſe, ſays Plato, as the intelligibles from which animal itſelf conſiſts receive all the power of eternity, which is unific, and connective, and ſubſiſts at once, collectively and unitedly, ſo the world receives partibly and diviſibly all the meaſured motion of time; through which it was, and is, and will be, not poſſeſſing theſe three in the whole of time, but each in a part of time.

[1] The one monad itſelf of time (ſays Proclus) is an all-perfect number; but from this monad there is alſo in each of the celeſtial revolutions a proper meaſure, Saturnian, or Jovian, or Lunar, receiving its peculiarity from the ſoul and motive deity contained in each of the ſpheres. For one number is adapted to the ſun, another to a horſe, and another to a plant; but the mundane number is common to all that the world contains. Hence alſo we ſay that the ſame time is every where. For the world has one life, in the ſame manner as it has one nature, and one intellect. But if it has one life, it has alſo one temporal meaſure. And as, with reſpect to the parts which it contains, each lives according to the nature which ſubſiſts in the world as a whole, ſo alſo it is meaſured according to *total* time; and this is the common meaſure of all things. But after this monad there is a triad, of which the ſummit is the meaſure of the firſt circulation, viz. of the motion of the inerratic ſphere; but the middle is the meaſure of the revolutions of the planets, (for there is one life, one period, and one time, reſtoring things to their priſtine condition, of all the planets as of one animal), and the third is the meaſure of the circular motion in generation. For through this the mutations of the elements, and the oppoſition and regeneration of the things moved, again receive their ſubſiſtence. But, after this triad, time proceeds according to different numbers, meaſuring wholes, and bounding all things by appropriate meaſures.

[2] Venus.

of

of which, theſe ſtars, the Sun, Lucifer, and Mercury, mutually comprehend and are mutually comprehended by each other in a ſimilar manner. But with reſpect to the other [1] ſtars, if any one ſhould think proper to inveſtigate their circulations, and through what cauſes they are eſtabliſhed, the labour would be greater than that of the diſcourſe itſelf, for the ſake of which they were introduced. An accurate diſcuſſion, therefore, of theſe particulars may, perhaps, be undertaken by us hereafter, if convenient leiſure ſhould fall to our lot.

When, therefore, each of the natures neceſſary to a joint fabrication of time had obtained a local motion adapted to its condition, and their bodies became animals through the connecting power of vital bonds, they then learned their preſcribed order; that according to the oblique revolution of the circle of *difference*, which moves in ſubjection to the circle of *ſameneſs*, theſe orbs ſhould, by their revolution, partly form a more ample and partly a more contracted circle; and that the orb which formed a leſſer circle ſhould revolve ſwifter; but that which produced a greater, more ſlow:—but that in conſequence of the motion of the circle of *ſameneſs*, the orbs which circu-

[1] By the *other ſtars*, ſays Proclus, Plato means Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; and by the word *eſtabliſhed*, he ſignifies the perpetual and incorruptible fabrication of them. After this Proclus obſerves, that it is here requiſite to call to mind the order of all the mundane ſpheres, which is as follows:—The inerratic ſphere ranks as a monad, being the cauſe to all mundane natures of an invariable ſubſiſtence. But of the triad under this monad, viz. Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the firſt is the cauſe of connected comprehenſion, the ſecond of ſymmetry, and the third of ſeparation. And again, the moon is a monad, being the cauſe of all generation and corruption; but the triad conſiſts from the elements * in generation under the moon; and the planets whoſe courſe is equal † ſubſiſt between theſe. And the Sun, indeed, unfolds truth into light, Venus beauty, and Mercury the ſymmetry of reaſons, or the productive principles of nature. Or, you may ſay that the Moon is the cauſe of nature to mortals, ſhe being the ſelf-conſpicuous image of ſontal ‡ nature. But the Sun is the demiurgus of every thing ſenſible, ſince he is alſo the cauſe of ſeeing and being ſeen. Mercury is the cauſe of the *motions* of the phantaſy; for the ſun gives ſubſiſtence to the phantaſtic *eſſence*. Venus is the cauſe of the appetites of deſire; and Mars of all natural iraſcible motions. Jupiter is the common cauſe of all vital, and Saturn of all gnoſtic powers. For all the irrational forms are divided into theſe, and the cauſes of theſe are comprehended in the celeſtial ſpheres.

* Viz. from fire, air, and water.

† Viz. Mercury and Venus ſubſiſt between the triad Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, and the Moon.

‡ Viz. of Nature, conſidered as ſubſiſting in its divine cauſe Rhea.

late

late moſt ſwiftly, comprehending other orbs as they revolve, ſhould themſelves appear to be comprehended by the revolution of the more ſlow. But all theſe circles revolve with a ſpiral motion, becauſe they are agitated at one and the ſame time in two contrary directions: and in conſequence of this, the ſphere endued with the ſloweſt revolution is neareſt to that to which its courſe is retrograde, and which is the ſwifteſt of all. And that theſe circles might poſſeſs a certain conſpicuous meaſure of ſlowneſs and ſwiftneſs with reference to each other, and that the motion of the eight circulations might be manifeſt, the Divinity enkindled a light which we now denominate the Sun [1], in the ſecond revolution from the earth; that the heavens might

[1] Plato, ſays Proclus, here delivers the one and the leading cauſe of apparent time. For, as the demiurgus gives ſubſiſtence to unapparent, ſo the ſun to apparent time, which meaſures the motion of bodies: for the ſun, through light, leads into the apparent every temporal interval, bounds all periods, and exhibits the meaſures of reſtorations to a priſtine ſtate. Very properly, therefore, does Plato call the ſun a *conſpicuous meaſure*, as eſpecially unfolding the progreſſion * of time into the univerſe, according to number. For it has a more accurate period than the five planets, being freed from advancing and receding motions, and alſo revolves more accurately than the moon, in conſequence of always bounding its progreſſions to the north and ſouth, according to the ſame ſign. But, if it has a more accurate period, it is deſervedly ſaid to be the meaſure of meaſures, and to know from itſelf the periodic meaſures of the other planets, the ratios which they contain, and the ſwiftneſs of ſome of them compared with others. It alſo imitates in a greater degree than the other planets the permanency of eternity, through perpetually revolving after the ſame invariable manner. Such then is its difference with reſpect to the planets.

But the ſun is after another manner a more conſpicuous meaſure of the inerratic ſphere; ſince this ſphere alſo has a certain appropriate meaſure, and an appropriate interval, and one invariable number of its proper motion. The ſolar light, however, makes this meaſure, and all the evolution of apparent time, conſpicuous and known. Hence Plato ſays "that theſe circles might poſſeſs a certain conſpicuous meaſure;" for though there is a certain meaſure in the other ſtars, yet it is not *conſpicuous*. But the ſun unfolds into light both other intelligibles and time itſelf. You muſt not, however, ſay, that the ſolar light was therefore generated for the ſake of meaſuring; for how is it poſſible that wholes can have a ſubſiſtence for the ſake of parts, governing natures for the ſake of the governed, and things eternal for the ſake of ſuch as are corruptible? But we ſhould rather ſay that light manifeſts total time, poſſeſſing an unfolding power, and calls forth its ſupermundane monad, and one meaſure, to a menſuration of the periods of bodies. It is the light of the ſun, therefore, which makes every thing that is moved to have a conſpicuous meaſure. And this, indeed, is its total good. But after wholes it alſo ſecondarily benefits parts; for it gives the generation of number and a meaſure to ſuch things as are fit participants of theſe.

* In the original περιοδον, but the ſenſe requires we ſhould read προοδον.

For

might become eminently apparent to all things, and that ſuch animals might participate of number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical

For irrational natures are deſtitute of theſe; but the genera of dæmons follow the periods of the Gods, and men become partakers of number and meaſure. The communications, therefore, of the ſun, ſupernally beginning from wholes, deſcend as far as to parts, conferring good through light. And if, commencing from things apparent, you are willing to ſpeak of things unapparent, the ſun illuminates the whole world, makes the corporeal nature of it divine, and the whole of it to be totally filled with life. It alſo leads ſouls through undefiled light, and imparts to them an undefiled and elevating power, and by its rays governs the world. It likewiſe fills ſouls with empyrean fruits. For the order of the ſun proceeds ſupernally from ſupermundane natures; and hence Plato does not here give ſubſiſtence to its light from a certain place, but ſays that the demiurgus *enkindled* it, as forming this ſphere from his own eſſence, and emitting from the ſolar fountain a divulſed and naſcent life; which alſo theologiſts aſſert concerning the ſupermundane firmaments. On this account, alſo, Plato appears to me to deliver a twofold generation of the ſun; one together with the ſeven governors of the world, when he faſhions their bodies and places them in their revolving ſpheres; but the other the *enkindling* of its light, according to which he imparts to it ſupermundane power. For it is one thing to generate itſelf by itſelf, the whole bulk of the ſun, and another to generate it together with a governing idiom, through which it is called the king of every thing viſible, and is eſtabliſhed as analogous to the one fountain of good. For, as *the good itſelf*, being better than *the intelligible*, illuminates both intellect and the intelligible, ſo the ſun, being better than the viſible eſſence, illuminates ſight, and whatever is viſible. But if the ſun is above the viſible eſſence, it will have a ſupermundane nature: for the world is viſible and tangible, and poſſeſſes a body. We muſt, therefore, ſurvey the ſun in a twofold reſpect; as one of the ſeven mundane governors, and as the leader of wholes, as mundane and as ſupermundane, according to which alſo he illuminates with divine light. For, as *the good* generates truth, which deifies both the intelligible and intellectual orders; as Phanes, according to Orpheus, emits intelligible light, which fills all the intellectual Gods with intelligence; and as Jupiter enkindles an intellectual and demiurgic light in all ſupermundane natures, ſo the ſun illuminates every thing viſible through this undefiled light. But that which illuminates is always in an order more elevated than the things which are illuminated. For neither is *the good* intelligible, nor is Phanes intellectual, nor Jupiter ſupermundane. From this reaſoning, therefore, the ſun being ſupermundane emits the fountains of light. And the moſt myſtic of diſcourſes place the *wholeneſs* of the ſun in the ſupermundane order; for there a ſolar world and total light ſubſiſt, as the oracles of the Chaldæans ſay, and as I am perſuaded. And thus much concerning theſe particulars.

Proclus afterwards, near the end of his commentary on this part, obſerves, that if by the heavens here we underſtand that which is moved in a circle, the ſun does not illuminate the whole of this: for there are ſhadows there, through the obſcurations of the ſtars and the moon. But nothing in the world is pure from ſhadow, (as neither is there any thing mundane pure from matter, ſupermundane natures alone being without ſhadow and immaterial,) except

numerical information from the revolution of a nature ſimilar and the ſame. From hence, therefore, night and day aroſe; and through theſe revolving bodies the period of one moſt wiſe circulation was produced.

And *month* indeed was generated, when the moon having run through her circle paſſed into conjunction with the ſun. But *year*, when the ſun had completely wandered round his orb. As to the periods of the other ſtars, they are not underſtood except by a very few of mankind; nor do the multitude diſtinguiſh them by any peculiar appellation; nor do they meaſure them with relation to each other, regarding the numbers adapted to this purpoſe. Hence, it may be ſaid, they are ignorant that the wanderings of theſe bodies are in reality time; as theſe wanderings are endued with an infinite multitude, and an admirable variety of motions. But it is eaſy to conceive, that a perfect number of time will then accompliſh a perfect year, when the eight circulations concurring in their courſes with each other become bounded by the ſame extremity; being at the ſame time meaſured by the circle ſubſiſting according to ſameneſs. But the ſtars, whoſe revolutions are attended with a proceſſion through the heavens, were generated, that the whole of this viſible animal the univerſe might become moſt ſimilar to the moſt perfect intelligible animal from an imitation of a perpetual nature.

the ſun. Hence, the ſun is truly ſhadowleſs and without generation, every thing elſe receiving at different times different illuminative additions. Why, then, ſome one may ſay, was not the light of the ſun enkindled in the firſt of the periods from the earth? Becauſe, I reply, the effulgence of the ſun is of itſelf incommenſurate with generation; but the moon, exiſting as a medium, and firſt receiving his light, renders it more commenſurate with generation. For, as Ariſtotle ſays, the moon is, as it were, a leſſer ſun. And it is requiſite that what is proximately above generation ſhould not be the moſt ſplendid and luminous. For it is not lawful that a thing of this kind ſhould approach to that which is dark; but what is proximate to the darkneſs of generation muſt neceſſarily be luminous in a ſecondary degree, always poſſeſſing, indeed, its proper light, but evincing a mutation in its participation of a more excellent light. It is likewiſe requiſite that it ſhould exhibit this mutation in an orderly manner, that through this mutation it may be the paradigm of that very mutable nature which matter introduces to generated things.

But that the ſtars, and all heaven, receive light from the ſun, may be eaſily perceived. For that which is common in many things derives its ſubſiſtence from one cauſe, which is either exempt or coordinate; and the coordinate cauſe is that which firſt participates of that form. But that firſt participates in which this form eſpecially ſubſiſts the firſt. If, therefore, light eſpecially ſubſiſts in the ſun, the ſun will be the firſt light, and from this the light in other things will be derived.

And

And indeed the artificer fabricated other forms, as far as to the generation of time, according to the ſimilitude of the world's exemplar.

But as the univerſe did not yet contain all animals in its capacious receptacle, in this reſpect it was diſſimilar to its exemplar. Its artificer, therefore, ſupplied this defect by impreſſing it with forms, according to the nature of its paradigm. Whatever ideas, therefore, intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itſelf, ſuch and ſo many he conceived it neceſſary for the univerſe to contain. But theſe ideas are four: One, the celeſtial genus of Gods; another, winged and air-wandering; a third, the aquatic form; and a fourth, that which is pedeſtrial and terrene. The idea, therefore, of that which is divine, or the inerratic ſphere, he for the moſt part fabricated from fire, that it might be moſt ſplendid and beautiful to behold. And as he meant to aſſimilate it to the univerſe, he rendered it circular; placed it in the wiſdom of the beſt nature; ordered it to become the attendant of that which is beſt; and gave it a circular diſtribution about the heavens, that it might be a *true world*, adorned with a fair variety in its every part. But he adapted to each of the divine bodies two motions; one by which they might revolve in *ſame* according to *ſame*, by always cogitating the ſame things in themſelves about *ſame*; the other through which they might be led with an advancing motion from the dominion of the *ſame* and *ſimilar* circulation. He likewiſe rendered them immovable and ſtable as to the other five motions, that each of them might become in an eminent degree the beſt. And on this account ſuch of the ſtars as are inerratic were generated, which are divine animals; and, in conſequence of this, always abide revolving in that which is *ſame*. But, the ſtars, which both revolve and at the ſame time wander in the manner we have deſcribed above, were produced next to theſe. But he fabricated the earth the common nouriſher of our exiſtence; which being conglobed about the pole extended through the univerſe, is the guardian and artificer of night and day, and is the firſt and moſt antient of the Gods which are generated within the heavens. But the harmonious progreſſions of theſe divinities, their concurſions with each other, the revolutions and advancing motions of their circles, how they are ſituated with relation to each other in their conjunctions and oppoſitions, whether direct among themſelves or retrograde, at what times and in what manner they become concealed, and, again emerging to our view,

cauſe terror, and exhibit tokens of future events to ſuch as are able to diſcover their ſignification—of all this to attempt an explanation, without inſpecting the reſemblances of theſe divinities, would be a fruitleſs employment. But of this enough; and let this be the end of our diſcourſe concerning the nature of the viſible and generated Gods.

But to ſpeak concerning the other dæmons [1], and to know their generation, is a taſk beyond our ability to perform. It is, therefore, neceſſary in this caſe

[1] Plato here calls the ſublunary Gods who proximately preſide over, and orderly diſtribute, the realms of generation, dæmons; for a God who proximately preſides over any thing is a dæmon according to analogy.

Proclus, in ſpeaking concerning dæmons who fill up all the middle ſpace between Gods and men, obſerves as follows:—"There is a triad which conjoins our ſouls with the Gods, proceeding analogous to the three * primary cauſes of things, though Plato is accuſtomed to call the whole of it dæmoniacal. For the angelic preſerves an analogy to the intelligible, which firſt unfolds itſelf into light from the arcane and occult fountain of things; on which account it alſo unfolds the Gods, and announces their occult nature. The dæmoniacal is analogous to infinite life; and hence it proceeds every where according to many orders, and poſſeſſes various ſpecies and a multitude of forms. But the heroic ſubſiſts according to intellect and a convertive energy; and hence it is the inſpective guardian of purification, and a magnificently operating life. Again, the angelic proceeds according to the intellectual life of the demiurgus; and hence it alſo is eſſentially intellectual, and interprets and tranſmits a divine intellect to ſecondary natures. The dæmoniacal governs according to the demiurgic providence and nature of wholes, and rightly gives completion to the order of all the world. But the heroic ſubſiſts according to a providence convertive of all theſe. Hence this genus is ſublime, elevates ſouls on high, and is the cauſe of the grand and robuſt. And ſuch are the triple genera which are ſuſpended from the Gods, viz. from the celeſtial Divinities, and from the inſpective guardians of generation. For about each of theſe Gods there is an appropriate number of angels, dæmons, and heroes: for each is the leader of a multitude which receives the form of its ruling Deity. And on this account the angels, dæmons, and heroes of the celeſtial Gods are celeſtial; of the Gods that preſide over generation, they are generative; of thoſe that elevate ſouls on high, they are anagogic; of thoſe that are immutable, they are immutable; and ſo on. And again, in thoſe Gods of an anagogic characteriſtic, the angels, dæmons, and heroes of the Saturnian Gods are ſaturnine, but thoſe of the Solar Gods are ſolar. And in thoſe that are viviſic, the attendants of the Lunar Deities are lunar, and of the Mercurial Gods, mercurial: for they derive their appellations from the Deities from which they are ſuſpended, as being continuous with them, and receiving one idea with remiſſion. And why is this wonderful, ſince partial ſouls alſo, knowing their preſiding and leading Gods, call themſelves by their names? Or, whence did the Æſculapiuses, the Bacchuses, and the Dioſcuri

* Viz. *Being*, *life*, and *intellect*, which conſidered according to their firſt ſubſiſtence form the intelligible triad, or the firſt proceſſion from the ineffable principle of things. See the Parmenides.

caſe to believe in antient men; who being the progeny of the Gods, as they themſelves aſſert, muſt have a clear knowledge of their parents. It is impoſſible, therefore, not to believe in the children of the Gods, though they ſhould ſpeak without probable and neceſſary arguments: but as they declare that their narrations are about affairs to which they are naturally allied, it is proper that, complying with the law, we ſhould aſſent to their tradition. In this manner, then, according to them, the generation of theſe Gods is to be deſcribed:

That Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of heaven and earth. That from hence Phorcys, Saturn, and Rhea, and ſuch as ſubſiſt together with theſe, were produced. That from Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all ſuch as we know are called the brethren of theſe deſcended. And laſtly, others which are reported to be the progeny of theſe. When, therefore, all ſuch Gods as viſibly revolve, and all ſuch as become apparent when they pleaſe, were generated, the Artificer of the univerſe thus addreſſed them: "Gods of Gods [1], of whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated by

receive their appellations? As, therefore, in the celeſtial Gods, ſo alſo in thoſe that preſide over generation, it is requiſite to ſurvey about each of them a coordinate, angelic, dæmoniacal, and heroic multitude; the number ſuſpended from each bearing the name of its monad, ſo that there is a celeſtial God, dæmon, and hero. With reſpect to Earth, alſo, Ocean, and Tethys, it is requiſite to conſider that theſe proceed into all orders, and in a ſimilar manner other Gods. For there is a Jovian, Junonian, and Saturnian multitude, which is denominated through the ſame name of life. Nor is there any thing abſurd in this, ſince we call man both intelligible and ſenſible, though the reſtoration to their priſtine condition is in theſe more abundant. And thus much in common concerning the generation-producing Gods and dæmons, that, conjoined with the Gods, we may alſo ſurvey the diſcourſe about dæmons: for Plato comprehends each of the genera in the ſame names. And he ſeems to call the ſame powers both dæmons and Gods on this account, that we may underſtand that the dæmoniacal genus is ſuſpended at the ſame time together with theſe Gods, and that we may alſo adapt the names as to Gods. This he alſo does in other places, indicating the every way extended nature of the theory, and the eye of ſcience ſurveying all things together and in connection."

[1] The ſcope of this ſpeech, ſays Proclus, is, as we have ſaid, to infert demiurgic power and providence in the mundane genera of Gods, to lead them forth to the generation of the remaining kinds of animals, and to place them over mortals, analogouſly to the father of wholes over the one orderly diſtribution of the univerſe. For it is neceſſary that ſome things ſhould be primarily generated by the demiurgic monad, and others through other media; the demiurgus, indeed, producing all things from himſelf, at once and eternally, but the things produced in order, and firſt proceeding

by me is indiſſoluble, ſuch being my will in its fabrication. Indeed every thing which is bound is diſſoluble; but to be willing to diſſolve that which is

proceeding from him, producing, together with him, the natures poſterior to themſelves. Thus, for inſtance, the celeſtial produce ſublunary Gods, and theſe generate mortal animals; the demiurgus at the ſame time fabricating theſe in conjunction with the celeſtial and ſublunary Divinities. For in ſpeaking he underſtands all things, and by underſtanding all things he alſo makes the mortal genera of animals; theſe requiring another proximate generating cauſe, ſo far as they are mortal, and through this receiving a progreſſion into being. But the character of the words is enthuſiaſtic, ſhining with intellectual intuitions, pure and venerable as being perfected by the father of the Gods, differing from and tranſcending human conceptions, delicate, and at the ſame time terrific, full of grace and beauty—at once conciſe and perfectly accurate. Plato, therefore, particularly ſtudies theſe things in the imitations of divine ſpeeches; as he alſo evinces in the Republic, when he repreſents the Muſes ſpeaking ſublimely, and the prophet aſcending to a lofty ſeat. He alſo adorns both theſe ſpeeches with conciſeneſs and venerableneſs, employing the accurate powers of colons, directly ſhadowing forth divine intellections through ſuch a form of words. But in the words before us he omits no tranſcendency either of the grand and robuſt in the ſentences and the names adapted to theſe devices, or of magnitude in the conceptions and the figures which give completion to this idea. Beſides this, alſo, much diſtinction and purity, the unfolding of truth, and the illuſtrious prerogatives of beauty, are mingled with the idea of magnitude, this being eſpecially adapted to the ſubject things, to the ſpeaker, and to the hearers. For the objects of this ſpeech are, the perfection of the univerſe, an aſſimilation to all-perfect animal, and the generation of all mortal animals; the maker of all things at the ſame time preſubſiſting and adorning all things, through exempt tranſcendency, but the ſecondary fabricators adding what was wanting to the formation of the univerſe. All, therefore, being great and divine, as well the perſons as the things, and ſhining with beauty and a diſtinction from each other, Plato has employed words adapted to the form of the ſpeech.

Homer alſo, when energizing enthuſiaſtically, repreſents Jupiter ſpeaking, converting to himſelf the twofold coordinations of Gods, becoming himſelf, as it were, the centre of all the divine genera in the world, and making all things obedient to his intellection. But at one time he conjoins the multitude of Gods with himſelf without a medium, and at another through Themis as the medium.

> But Jove to Themis gives command to call
> The Gods to council.

This Goddeſs pervading every where collects the divine number, and converts it to the demiurgic monad. For the Gods are both ſeparate from mundane affairs, and eternally provide for all things, being at the ſame time exempt from them through the higheſt tranſcendency, and extending their providence every where. For their unmingled nature is not without providential energy, nor is their providence mingled with matter. Through tranſcendency of power they are not filled with the ſubjects of their government, and, through beneficent will, they make all things ſimilar to themſelves; in permanently abiding, proceeding, and in being ſeparated from all things, being

is beautifully harmonized, and well compoſed, is the property of an evil nature. Hence, ſo far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor in every

being ſimilarly preſent to all things. Since, therefore, the Gods that govern the world, and the dæmons the attendants of theſe, receive after this manner unmingled purity and providential adminiſtration from their father; at one time he converts them to himſelf without a medium, and illuminates them with a ſeparate, unmingled, and pure form of life. Whence alſo I think he orders them to be ſeparated from all things, to remain exempt in Olympus, and neither convert themſelves to Greeks nor Barbarians; which is juſt the ſame as to ſay, that they muſt tranſcend the twofold orders of mundane natures, and abide immutably in undefiled intellection. But at another time he converts them to a providential attention to ſecondary natures, through Themis, and calls upon them to direct the mundane battle, and excites different Gods to different works. Theſe Divinities, therefore, eſpecially require the aſſiſtance of Themis, who contains in herſelf the divine laws according to which providence is intimately connected with wholes. Homer, therefore, divinely delivers twofold ſpeeches, accompanying the twofold energies of Jupiter; but Plato through this one ſpeech comprehends thoſe twofold modes of diſcourſe. For the demiurgus renders the Gods unmingled with ſecondary natures, and cauſes them to provide for, and give exiſtence to, mortals. But he orders them to fabricate in imitation of himſelf: and in an injunction of this kind both theſe are comprehended, viz. the unmingled through the imitation of the father, for he is ſeparate, being exempt from mundane wholes; but providential energy, through the command to fabricate, nouriſh and increaſe mortal natures. Or rather, we may ſurvey both in each; for in imitating the demiurgus they provide for ſecondary natures, as he does for the immortals; and in fabricating they are ſeparate from the things fabricated. For every demiurgic cauſe is exempt from the things generated by it; but that which is mingled with and filled from them is imbecil and inefficacious, and is unable to adorn and fabricate them. And thus much in common reſpecting the whole of the ſpeech.

Let us then, in the firſt place, conſider what we are to underſtand by "Gods of Gods," and what power it poſſeſſes: for that this invocation is collective and convertive of multitude to its monad, that it calls upwards the natures which have proceeded to the one fabricator of them, and inſerts a boundary and divine meaſure in them, is clear to thoſe who are not entirely unacquainted with ſuch-like diſcourſes. But how thoſe that are allotted the world by their father are called Gods of Gods, and according to what conception, cannot eaſily be indicated to the many; for there is an unfolding of one divine intelligence in theſe names. Proclus then proceeds to relate the explanations given by others of theſe words; which having rejected as erroneous, he very properly, in my opinion, adopts the following, which is that of his preceptor, the great Syrianus. All the mundane Gods are not ſimply Gods, but they are wholly Gods which participate: for there is in them that which is ſeparate, unapparent, and ſupermundane, and alſo that which is the apparent image of them, and has an orderly eſtabliſhment in the world. And that, indeed, which is unapparent in them is primarily a God, this being undiſtributed and one; but this vehicle which is ſuſpended from their unapparent eſſence is ſecondarily a God. For if, with reſpect to us, man is twofold, one inward, according to the ſoul, the other apparent, which we ſee, much more muſt both theſe be aſſerted of the Gods; ſince Divinity alſo is twofold, one

every reſpect indiſſoluble: yet you ſhall never be diſſolved, nor become ſubject to the fatality of death; my will being a much greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation. Learn, therefore, what I now ſay to you indicating my deſire. Three genera of mortals yet remain to be produced. Without the generation of theſe, therefore, the univerſe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of animal in its ſpacious extent. But it ought to contain them, that it may become ſufficiently perfect. Yet if theſe are generated, and participate of life through me, they will become equal to the Gods. That mortal natures, therefore, may ſubſiſt, and that the univerſe may be truly all, convert yourſelves, according to your nature, to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation. And whatever among theſe is of ſuch a nature as to deſerve the ſame appellation with immortals, which obtains ſovereignty in theſe, and willingly purſues juſtice, and reverences you—of this I myſelf will deliver the ſeed and beginning: it is your buſineſs to accompliſh the reſt; to weave [1] together

unapparent and the other apparent. This being the caſe, we muſt ſay that "Gods of Gods" is addreſſed to all the mundane Divinities, in whom there is a connection of unapparent with apparent Gods; for they are Gods that participate. In ſhort, ſince twofold orders are produced by the demiurgus, ſome being ſupermundane and others mundane, and ſome being without and others with participation,—if the demiurgus now addreſſed the ſupermundane orders, he would have alone ſaid to them, "Gods:" for they are without participation, are ſeparate and unapparent:—but ſince the ſpeech is to the mundane Gods, he calls them Gods of Gods, as being participated by other apparent Divinities. In theſe alſo dæmons are comprehended; for they alſo are Gods, as to their order with reſpect to the Gods, whoſe idiom they indiviſibly participate. Thus alſo Plato, in the Phædrus, when he calls the twelve Gods the leaders of dæmons, at the ſame time denominates all the attendants of the Divinities Gods, adding, 'and this is the life of the Gods.' All theſe, therefore, are Gods of Gods, as poſſeſſing the apparent connected with the unapparent, and the mundane with the ſupermundane.

[1] It is well obſerved here by Proclus, that the animal ſpirit (το πνευμα) comprehends the ſummits of the irrational life, which ſummits ſubſiſt eternally with the vehicle of the ſoul, as being produced by the demiurgus; but that theſe, being extended and diſtributed, make this life which the junior Gods weave together, being indeed mortal, becauſe the ſoul muſt neceſſarily lay aſide this diſtribution, when, being reſtored to her priſtine ſtate, ſhe obtains purification, but ſubſiſting for a much longer time than the life of this body; and that, on this account, the ſoul alſo in Hades chooſes a life of this kind. For, in conſequence of verging to a corporeal nature, ſhe receives this mortal life from the junior Gods. If theſe things then be admitted, the demiurgus gives

together the mortal and immortal nature; by this means fabricating and generating animals, cauſing them to increaſe by ſupplying them with aliment, and receiving them back again when diſſolved by corruption."

Thus ſpoke the demiurgus; and again into the ſame crater [1], in which mingling he had tempered the ſoul of the univerſe, he poured mingling the remainder [2] of the former mixture: in a certain reſpect indeed after the ſame

gives ſubſiſtence to the *ſummit* of the irrational life, but does not produce this life; ſince, giving ſubſiſtence to dæmons, he certainly alſo produces the irrational life which they contain, but not this life which the junior Gods weave together in us; for this is alone adapted to ſouls falling into generation. The mundane Gods, therefore, illuminate their depending vehicles with rational lives; for they poſſeſs intellectual ſouls. But thoſe dæmons who are properly defined according to reaſon uſe irrational powers, which they keep in ſubjection; but our ſouls much more poſſeſs a life in the vehicle, which is irrational with relation to them. It ſuperabounds however by receiving another irrational life, which is an apoſtacy from that life in the vehicle which was woven by the junior Gods. All *that* is immortal, therefore, which ſouls poſſeſs according to an imitation of wholes, but the addition of the ſecondary life is mortal. If, therefore, in the ſummit of the irrational life, there is one impaſſive ſenſe, this in the pneumatic vehicle will generate one paſſive ſenſe; and this latter will produce in the ſhelly body many and paſſive ſenſes. The orectic or appetitive power, alſo, in this ſummit, will produce many orectic powers in the ſpirit, poſſeſſing ſomething ſeparate from the ſhelly body, and capable of being diſciplined; and theſe will produce in the body ultimate and material appetitive powers.

[1] Viz. the vivific Goddeſs Juno.

[2] It is well obſerved here by Proclus, that ſouls poſſeſs eſſential differences, and not differences according to energies only. For, ſays he, ſome ſouls look to total and others to partial intellects; and ſome employ undefiled intellections, but others at times depart from the contemplation of true beings. Some perpetually fabricate and adorn wholes, but others only ſometimes revolve with the Gods. And ſome always move and govern fate, but others ſometimes ſubſiſt under the dominion of fate, and are ſubject to its laws. Some are the leaders to intelligible eſſence, and others are ſometimes allotted the order of thoſe that follow. Some are divine only, and others are transferred into a different order, dæmoniacal, heroical, human. Some employ horſes that are good, but others ſuch as are mingled from good and evil. And ſome poſſeſs that life alone which they received from the one fabrication of things, but others the mortal form of life, which was woven to their nature by the junior Gods. Some energize according to all their powers, but others at different times draw forth different lives. By no means, therefore, do our ſouls poſſeſs the ſame eſſence with divinity: for the rational nature is different in the two, being in the Gods intellectual, but in our ſouls mingled with the irrational; and in the middle genera it is defined according to their middle ſubſiſtence. In like manner, with reſpect to every thing elſe, ſuch as reaſons, the form of life, intelligence and time, theſe ſubſiſt divinely in divine ſouls, but in a human manner in ours.

Proclus alſo further obſerves, that the common definition of all ſouls is as follows: Soul is an eſſence ſubſiſting between true eſſence and generation, being mingled from middle genera, divided

ſame manner [1], yet not ſimilarly incorruptible according to the ſame, but deficient from the firſt in a ſecond and third degree. And having thus compoſed

into eſſential number, bound with all media, diatonically harmonized, living one and a twofold life, and being gnoſtic in one and a twofold manner.

[1] Timæus, ſays Proclus, by theſe words indicates the ſimilitude, ſubjection and different progreſſion of partial to total ſouls. For he not only deſcribes their difference together with their alliance, according to firſt and ſecond demiurgic energy, nor alone according to their union with and ſeparation from the crater of life, nor yet alone according to exceſs or defect of genera, but alſo according to the mode of mixture, which is the ſame, and yet not the ſame. For neither is the temperament of the genera ſimilar, nor the unmingling of difference; ſince this is more abundant in partial ſouls. Hence, of the horſes in theſe, one is good, but the other contrary, and conſiſting from contraries, as it is ſaid in the Phædrus, in conſequence of difference having dominion. For the whole mixture is no longer incorruptible, according to the ſame, and after the ſame manner, but in a ſecond and third degree; ſince in theſe there are ſubjection and order. But by *incorruptible*, here, we muſt underſtand the immutable, the undeviating, the inflexible, the immaculate form of eſſence, that which is not converted to ſecondary natures, and which does not receive mutation, or ſubjection of life, that which is eſtabliſhed beyond the reach of mortality, and that which is exempt from the laws of fate: for theſe things are common to every genus of ſouls which perpetually tranſcend generation. But the contraries of theſe are adapted to powers which deſcend into generation, viz. a mutation of life from intelligence to action, the becoming ſometimes ſubject to fate, and the being mingled with mortal affairs. Neither is the immovable preſent with theſe according to the ſame, ſince they ſometimes proceed into generation, nor, when it is preſent, is it preſent after the ſame manner: for that which always underſtands is better than that which ſometimes departs from its proper intellection. Since, however, in theſe ſouls alſo there is an order, and ſome are undefiled, rarely aſſociating with generation and deſerting their own order, but others are rolled in all-various flowers, and wander myriads of periods,—hence Timæus indicates the difference of theſe, when he ſays "in a ſecond and third degree." For ſouls which deſcend, and become defiled with evil, are very much ſeparated from thoſe that perpetually abide on high, and are free from evil: but ſouls of a middle order are ſuch as deſcend indeed, but are not defiled. For, vice verſa, it is not lawful to be defiled, and yet abide on high; ſince evil is not in the Gods, but in the mortal place, and in material things.

Again, therefore, from theſe things it appears that the firſt genus of ſouls is divine; for every where that which is the recipient of deity has a leading order, in eſſences, in intellects, in ſouls and in bodies. But the ſecond genus is that which is perpetually conjoined with the Gods, that, through this, ſouls which ſometimes depart from may again be recalled to the Gods. The third genus is that which falls into generation, but deſcends with purity, and changes a ſubordinate for a more divine life, but is exempt from vice and paſſions; for this genus is continuous with ſouls that perpetually abide on high, and are perpetually undefiled. But the fourth and laſt genus is that which abundantly wanders, which deſcends as far as to Tartarus, and is again excited from its dark profundities, evolving all-various forms of life, employing various manners, and at different times different paſſions. It alſo obtains various forms of animals, dæmoniacal, human, irrational,

but

poſſeſſ the univerſe, he diſtributed ſouls equal in number to the ſtars, inſerting each in each: and cauſing them to aſcend as into a vehicle [1], he pointed out to

but is at the ſame time corrected by Juſtice, returns from earth to heaven, and is circularly led from matter to intellect, according to certain orderly periods of wholes. By the words, therefore, "in a certain reſpect indeed after the ſame manner, yet not ſimilarly incorruptible according to the ſame," he ſignifies that partial ſouls are in a certain reſpect incorruptible, as for inſtance, according to their eſſence alone, but that in a certain reſpect they are not incorruptible, viz. being mingled in their energies with all-various deſtinies, and converſant with mortal things, and not poſſeſſing theſe energies with invariable ſameneſs, and entire, but ſometimes more, and at others leſs, an all-various inequality ſubſiſting in ſouls, according to their habitude to mortal natures, from which they derive the privation of incorruptibility according to life.

[1] Vulcan, who is the artificer of the whole of a corporeal eſſence, gives ſubſiſtence to the vehicles of the ſoul; for he receives ſouls ſent into the world from the intelligible region, and gives different habitations to different ſouls. The demiurgus of all things alſo gives ſubſiſtence to theſe vehicles; for he is the fabricator of animals, and the completions of the univerſe, ſo that he not only produces ſouls, but alſo produces them with their proper vehicles. As Proclus likewiſe well obſerves, the conception of Plato here is truly wonderful: for he does not repreſent the demiurgus as faſhioning theſe vehicles from the *wholeneſſes* which are now produced, but he ſays that he makes theſe, the junior Gods lending parts, and from them compoſing bodies. But this is an evident argument, that each of theſe vehicles is in a certain reſpect ſelf-compoſed, and not fabricated by an ablation from other things, leſt it ſhould require to be again poured back into ſomething elſe. For every thing which ſubſiſts by an abſciſſion from other things, being cut off with a diminution of the whole to which it belonged, muſt neceſſarily be returned to the whole from which it was cut off. For it is neceſſary that every whole in the univerſe ſhould perpetually remain a whole: and hence every ſuch vehicle is perpetual, and the ſame vehicle is always ſuſpended from the ſoul. Beſides, how can the ſoul be any longer ſaid to be mundane, if its vehicle is corrupted? for that of which there is nothing in the univerſe cannot be mundane. For, if partial ſouls are ſuperior to a life in conjunction with vehicles, they will alſo be ſuperior to divine ſouls: but if they are inferior to ſuch a life, how does the demiurgus immediately after their generation introduce them into theſe vehicles? And how can they uſe them in Hades, and in the Heavens, unleſs they had them perpetually ſuſpended from their eſſence? For, that they uſe them in Hades, is evident from what Socrates ſays in the Phædo, viz. that ſouls aſcending into their vehicles proceed to Acheron: and that they alſo uſe them in the Heavens, is evident from the Phædrus, in which Socrates ſays that the vehicles of the Gods proceed equally balanced, but thoſe of the attendants of the Gods, with great difficulty.

From this, alſo, we may perceive the difference between partial and divine ſouls: for with reſpect to the latter the demiurgus is ſaid to place their bodies in their ſouls, as being every way comprehended by them, theſe ſouls not being converted to the objects of their government, but employing one immutable intellection: but, with reſpect to partial ſouls, he is ſaid to cauſe theſe to aſcend into their vehicles; for theſe are naturally adapted to be frequently in ſubjection to bodies, and to convert themſelves to the ſubjects of their government; when they alſo become

to them the nature of the univerſe, and announced to them the laws of fate; ſhowing them that the firſt generation orderly diſtributed to all was one, leſt any particular ſoul ſhould be allotted a leſs portion of generation than another. But when he had diſſeminated them through the ſeveral inſtruments of time adapted to each, he declared to them it was neceſſary that an animal the moſt religious of all others ſhould make its appearance. But as the human nature is twofold, he ſhowed them that the more excellent kind was that which would afterwards be called man. And as ſouls are from neceſſity engrafted in bodies, and as ſomething accedes to and ſomething departs from ſuch bodies, he declared to them that, in the firſt place, one connate ſenſe [1] produced by violent

parts of the univerſe as well as their vehicles, act in ſubſerviency to the laws of fate, and no longer live with purity under the divine light of Providence. It muſt likewiſe be obſerved, that the demiurgus among other cauſes contains that of Nature in himſelf, to which alſo he converts ſouls. For, by ſhowing Nature to ſouls, he alſo beholds it himſelf. But he alone beholds things prior to and in himſelf. Now, therefore, he beholds Nature in himſelf, which he comprehends ſupernaturally, or according to cauſe.

[1] The demiurgus, ſays Proclus, comprehends the whole of a material and mortal life in three boundaries, and eſtabliſhes the cauſes of it in ſouls, that they may obtain dominion over it: for dominion is not derived from any thing elſe than eſſential precedency. The irrational life, therefore, ſubſiſts *intellectually* in the demiurgus, but *rationally* in ſouls. Nor is this wonderful, ſince body alſo ſubſiſts incorporeally in the intelligible cauſes of all things. But this connate ſenſe produced by violent paſſions, of which Plato now ſpeaks, is that corporeal life which is gnoſtic of things falling upon it externally, which produces this knowledge through inſtruments, does not ſubſiſt from itſelf, but from the natures by which it is uſed, is mingled with material maſſes, and knows what it knows with paſſion. For it is neceſſary to ſenſation, that a certain agitation ſhould be produced about the inſtruments of ſenſe; ſince neither do the motions in the ſoul pervade every where, and as far as to the body, but there is a motion of the ſoul belonging to itſelf by itſelf, ſuch as is that which is intellectual; nor does every thing about the body extend as far as to the ſoul, but there is alſo a certain corporeal paſſion, which through its obſcurity is not able to move the ſoul. Senſe, therefore, is produced not from all paſſions, but from ſuch as are violent, and which are attended with much agitation. And this is corporeal ſenſe, which is diviſible and material, and forms its judgment mingled with paſſions. But there is another ſenſe prior to this, in the vehicle of the ſoul, which with reſpect to this is immaterial, and is a pure impaſſive knowledge, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf, but which is not liberated from form, becauſe it alſo is corporeal, as being allotted its ſubſiſtence in body. And this ſenſe, indeed, has the ſame nature with the phantaſy; for the being of both is common; but externally proceeding it is called ſenſe, and abiding internally, and ſurveying in the ſpirit (εν τῳ πνευματι) forms and figures, it is called phantaſy. So far alſo as it is divided about the ſpirit, it is ſenſe. For, again, the baſis of the rational life is opinion; but the phantaſy is the ſummit of the ſecond, or the irrational life.

Opinion

violent paſſions was neceſſary to all; and, in the ſecond place, love mingled with pleaſure and grief. That after theſe, fear and anger were neceſſary, with whatever elſe is either conſequent to theſe, or naturally diſcordant from a contrary nature. That ſuch ſouls as ſubdue theſe would live

Opinion alſo and phantaſy are conjoined with each other, and the ſecond is filled from the more excellent with powers. But the middle of the irrational life does not receive the impreſſion of the natures ſuperior to it, but is alone the recipient of things external. It is common, however, to this alſo to know that which is ſenſible with paſſivity: but external ſenſe alone pertains to things externally falling upon and moving it, not being able to poſſeſs ſpectacles in itſelf, ſince it is partible and not one; for it is diſtributed about the organs of ſenſe. There is one ſenſe, therefore, which is impaſſive and common, another which is common and paſſive, and a third which is diſtributed and paſſive. The firſt of theſe belongs to the firſt vehicle of the ſoul, the ſecond, to the irrational life, and the third, to the animated body.

After ſenſe, Plato arranges deſire. And this indeed is life, and is alſo corporeal; but it is a life which perpetually unweaves the body, and affords a ſolace to its wants, and about which pleaſure and pain are beheld. For theſe paſſions are alſo preſent to other parts of the ſoul; ſince you may perceive pleaſures and pains, both in reaſon and anger. But corporeal pleaſure and pain are produced according to deſire. For, with reſpect to the body, a way contrary to nature, and a privation of life, produce pain in it; but a regreſſion according to nature, and an adaptation to life, are the ſources of its pleaſure. And that which is afflicted or delighted in theſe is the deſiderative part of the ſoul. But ſince theſe two paſſions are primary, and the fountains of the other paſſions, as Plato ſays in the Philebus and the Laws, through the mixture of theſe giving a generation to the other paſſions, he alſo denominates love a mixture of pleaſure and pain. For, ſo far as it is converſant with the lovely, it is preſent with pleaſure, but, ſo far as it is not yet preſent with it in energy, it is mingled with pain. But he characterizes all the life of deſire through love, becauſe this paſſion is moſt vehement about it.

In the third place, therefore, he enumerates anger. Anger then is alſo life, but a life which removes every thing painful, and which diſturbs the body. Exceſs and defect alſo are ſurveyed about it, ſuch as raſhneſs and timidity, and the things conſequent to theſe, ambition and contention, and all ſuch particulars as take place about mortal concerns. And ſuch is the order of theſe three generated powers. For as ſoon as the body is formed it participates of ſenſe: ſince it would not be an animal, nor would poſſeſs appetite, if it were not ſenſitive. For appetites ſubſiſt in conjunction with ſenſe, but the ſenſes are not entirely in conjunction with appetites; and hence the animal is more characterized by the ſenſitive than by the appetitive nature. But after the poſſeſſion of ſenſe the animal appears to be pleaſed and pained, afflicted by the cold, but cheriſhed by the bandages, and led to a condition according to nature. After deſire, as age advances, the animal is angered: for anger is the power of a more robuſt nature. Hence alſo, among irrational animals, ſuch as are more material alone live according to deſire, and partake of pleaſure and pain; but ſuch as are more perfect are allotted a more irateible life. But prior to theſe appetites, as we alſo ſaid of ſenſe, there is a certain ſummit of them in the ſpirit of the ſoul, which ſummit is a power impulſive and motive of the ſpirit, guarding and connecting its eſſence, at one time extending and diſtributing itſelf, and at another being led to bound and order, and meaſured by reaſon.

juſtly,

juſtly, but ſuch as are vanquiſhed by them unjuſtly. And again, that he who lived well during the proper time of his life, ſhould, again returning to the habitation of his kindred ſtar [1], enjoy a bleſſed life. But that he whoſe conduct was depraved, ſhould in his ſecond generation be changed into the nature of a woman. * That both theſe, at the expiration of a thouſand years, ſhould return to the allotment and choice of a ſecond life; each ſoul receiving a life agreeable to its choice. That in this election the human ſoul ſhould paſs into the life of a brute: * and that in caſe the inclination to evil ſhould not even then ceaſe, but the defilement of vice remain according to a ſimilitude of the mode of generation, then the ſoul ſhould be changed into the nature of a brute correſpondent to its diſpoſition. And that it ſhould not be freed from the allotment of labours [2], till, following the

[1] Since Plato now diſcourſes concerning ſouls that are reſtored to their priſtine ſtate in their legitimate ſtar, after their firſt generation, and ſays that on leaving the body they poſſeſs a happy life, it may be aſked how this accords with what is ſaid in the Phædrus? For, there, he who chooſes a philoſophic life is reſtored to his priſtine ſtate through three lives. We reply, with Proclus, that Plato does not here aſſert that the ſoul paſſes into that very ſtate whence it came, for this is accompliſhed through three chiliads of periods, but that the ſoul returns to the ſtar under which it was eſſentially arranged, and leads a life in common with it. For it is poſſible for thoſe that are not philoſophers to be elevated by Juſtice to a certain place in the heavens, and there to live in a manner adapted to their life while in a human form: for this is aſſerted in the Phædo reſpecting the ſouls of ſuch as are not philoſophers; ſince the reſtoration to the ſame condition again is one thing, and the aſcent to the kindred ſtar another. And the former of theſe requires three periods, but the latter may be effected by one period. The former alſo leads back the ſoul to the intelligible, from which it deſcended, but the latter to a ſubordinate form of life. For there are meaſures of felicity, and the aſcent is twofold; one, of thoſe that have yet to aſcend ſtill higher, and the other, of thoſe that have no further flight to take. So that it is poſſible for the ſoul having arrived at its kindred ſtar, either to be conjoined with the mundane powers of its God, or to proceed ſtill higher; but to be led back to the intelligible requires a period of three thouſand years. For through this the higheſt flight is accompliſhed.

* The tranſlation of the part between the two ſtars is omitted by Ficinus.

[2] The one ſafety of the ſoul herſelf, ſays Proclus, which is extended by the demiurgus, and which liberates her from the circle of generation, from abundant wandering, and an inefficacious life, is her return to the intellectual form, and a flight from every thing which naturally adheres to us from generation. For it is neceſſary that the ſoul which is hurled like ſeed into the realms of generation, ſhould lay aſide the ſtubble and bark, as it were, which ſhe obtained from being diſſeminated into theſe fluctuating realms; and that, purifying herſelf from every thing circumjacent, ſhe ſhould become an intellectual flower and fruit, delighting in an intellectual life inſtead of doxaſtic nutriment, and purſuing the uniform and ſimple energy of the period of ſameneſs, in-

the revolution of that *ſame* and *ſimilar* nature contained in its eſſence, it vanquiſhes thoſe abundantly turbulent affections, tumultuous and irrational, adhering to it afterwards from fire, water, air, and earth, and returns to the firſt and beſt diſpoſition of its nature.

When he had inſtructed ſouls in all theſe particulars, that he might be in no reſpect the cauſe of the future evil of each, he diſſeminated ſome of them into the earth, others into the moon, and others into the remaining different inſtruments of time. But after this ſemination he delivered to the junior Gods the province of fabricating mortal bodies, and generating whatever elſe remained neceſſary to the human ſoul; and gave them dominion over

ſtead of the abundantly wandering motion of the period which is characterized by difference. For ſhe contains each of theſe circles and twofold powers. And of her horſes, one is good, and the other the contrary: and one of theſe leads her to generation, but the other from generation to true being; the one alſo leads her round the circle of ſenſe, but the other round an intellectual eſſence. For the period of the ſame and the ſimilar elevates to intellect, and an intelligible nature, and to the firſt and moſt excellent habit. But this habit is that according to which the ſoul being winged governs the whole world, becoming aſſimilated to the Gods themſelves. And this is the univerſal form of life in the ſoul, juſt as that is the partial form when ſhe falls into the laſt body, and becomes ſomething belonging to an individual inſtead of belonging to the univerſe. The middle of theſe alſo is the partial univerſal, when ſhe lives in conjunction with her middle vehicle, as a citizen of generation. Diſmiſſing, therefore, her firſt habit, which ſubſiſts according to an alliance to the whole of generation, and laying aſide the irrational nature which connects her with generation, likewiſe governing her irrational part by reaſon, and extending intellect to opinion, ſhe will be circularly led to a happy life, from the wandering about the regions of ſenſe; which life thoſe that are initiated by Orpheus in the myſteries of Bacchus and Proſerpine pray that they may obtain, together with the allotments of the ſphere, and a ceſſation of evil. But if our ſoul neceſſarily lives well, when living according to the circle of ſameneſs, much more muſt this be the caſe with divine ſouls. It is, however, poſſible for our ſoul to live according to the circle of ſameneſs, when purified, as Plato ſays. Cathartic virtue, therefore, alone muſt be called the ſalvation of ſouls; ſince this cuts off and vehemently obliterates material natures, and the paſſions which adhere to us from generation, ſeparates the ſoul, and leads it to intellect, and cauſes it to leave on earth the vehicles with which it is inveſted. For ſouls deſcending receive from the elements different vehicles, aërial, aquatic, and terreſtrial; and thus at laſt enter into this groſs bulk. For how, without a medium, could they proceed into this body from immaterial ſpirits? Hence, before they come into this body, they poſſeſs the irrational life, and its vehicle, which is prepared from the ſimple elements, and from theſe they enter into the tumultuous, which is ſo called as being foreign to the connate vehicle of ſouls, compoſed from all various veſtments, and cauſing ſouls to become heavy. In ſhort, the connate vehicle makes the ſoul mundane, the ſecond vehicle, a citizen of generation, and the ſhelly body, (το οστρεωδες,) terreſtrial.

every

every thing conſequent to their fabrications. He likewiſe commanded them to govern as much as poſſible in the beſt and moſt beautiful manner the mortal animal, that it might not become the cauſe of evil to itſelf. At the ſame time he who orderly diſpoſed all theſe particulars remained in his own accuſtomed abiding habit. But in conſequence of his abiding, as ſoon as his children underſtood the order of their father, they immediately became obedient to this order; and receiving the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which they ſhould reſtore back again; and conglutinated the received parts together, not with the ſame indiſſoluble bonds which they themſelves participated, but gave them a tenacious adherence from thick ſet nails, inviſible through their ſmallneſs; fabricating the body of each, one from the compoſition of all; and binding the circulations of the immortal ſoul in the influxive and effluxive nature of body.

But theſe circulations [1], being merged in a profound river, neither govern nor are governed, but hurry and are hurried along with violence: in conſequence

[1] Plato, ſays Proclus, immediately conjoining the ſoul to the body, omits all the problems pertaining to the deſcent of the ſoul, ſuch as the prophet, the allotments, the lives, the elections, the dæmon, the reſidence in the plain of oblivion, the ſleeping, the oblivious potion, the thunders, and all ſuch particulars as the fable in the Republic diſcuſſes. But neither does he here deliver ſuch things as pertain to the ſoul after its departure from the body, ſuch as the terrors, the rivers, Tartarus, thoſe ſavage and fiery dæmons, the thorns, the bellowing mouth, the triple road, and the judges, concerning which the fable in the Republic, in the Gorgias, and in the Phædo, inſtructs us. What, then, you will ſay, is the cauſe of this omiſſion? We reply, Becauſe Plato preſerves that which is adapted to the deſign of the dialogue. For here he admits whatever is phyſical in the theory reſpecting the ſoul, and its aſſociation with the body.

It is requiſite, however, to inquire why ſouls fall into bodies. And we may reply, with Proclus, Becauſe they wiſh to imitate the providential energies of the Gods, and on this account proceed into generation, and leave the contemplation of true being: for, as Divine perfection is twofold, one kind being intellectual, and the other providential, and one kind conſiſting in an abiding energy, and the other in motion, hence ſouls imitate the prolific, intellectual, and immutable energy of the Gods by contemplation, but their providential and motive characteriſtic through a life converſant with generation. As the intelligence, too, of the human ſoul is partial, ſo likewiſe is her providence; but, being partial, it aſſociates with a partial body. But ſtill further, the deſcent of the ſoul contributes to the perfection of the univerſe; for it is neceſſary that there ſhould not only be immortal and intellectual animals, ſuch as are the perpetual attendants of the Gods,

quente of which, the whole animal is indeed moved, yet in a diſorderly manner; ſince from every kind of motion its progreſſion is fortuitous and irrational. For it proceeds backwards and forwards, to the right and left, upwards and downwards, and wanders every way according to the ſix differences of place. For though the inundating [1] and effluxive waves pour along

Gods, nor yet mortal and irrational animals only, ſuch as are the laſt progeny of the demiurgus of the univerſe, but likewiſe ſuch as ſubſiſt between theſe, and which are by no means immortal *, but are capable of participating reaſon and intellect. And in many parts of the univerſe there are many animals of this kind; for man is not the only rational and mortal animal, but there are other ſuch-like ſpecies, ſome of which are more dæmoniacal, and others approximate nearer to our eſſence. But the deſcents of a partial ſoul contribute to the perfect compoſition of all animals, which are at the ſame time mortal and rational.

Should it be again aſked, Why, therefore, are partial ſouls deſcending into generation filled with ſuch material perturbation, and ſuch numerous evils? we reply, that this takes place through the inclination ariſing from their free will; through their vehement familiarity with body; through their ſympathy with the image of ſoul, or that diviſible life which is diſtributed about body; through their abundant mutation from an intelligible to a ſenſible nature, and from a quiet energy to one entirely converſant with motion; and through a diſordered condition of being, naturally ariſing from the compoſition of diſſimilar natures, viz. of the immortal and mortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect, of the indiviſible and that which is endued with interval. For all theſe become the cauſe to the ſoul of this mighty tumult and labour in the realms of generation; ſince we purſue a flying mockery which is ever in motion. And the ſoul, indeed, by verging to a material life, kindles a light in her dark tenement the body, but ſhe herſelf becomes ſituated in obſcurity; and by giving life to the body, ſhe deſtroys herſelf and her own intellect, in as great a degree as theſe are capable of receiving deſtruction. For thus the mortal nature participates of intellect, but the intellectual part of death, and the whole becomes a prodigy, as Plato beautifully obſerves in his Laws, compoſed of the mortal and immortal, of the intellectual, and that which is deprived of intellect. For this phyſical law, which binds the ſoul to the body, is the death of the immortal life, but is the cauſe of vivification to the mortal body.

[1] The philoſopher here, ſays Proclus, refers the whole of this tumult to two cauſes, viz. the nutritive and ſenſitive life; and theſe are the appetitive and gnoſtic powers of all the irrational part, into which we are accuſtomed to divide all the powers of the ſoul, aſſerting that ſome of them are vital, and others gnoſtic. For the nutritive life, verging to bodies, produces in them an abundant flux; through their material moiſture ſending forth a great efflux, and through vital heat receiving an influx of other things. But the ſenſitive life ſuffers from the external bodies of fire and air, earth and water, falling upon it; and, conſidering all the paſſions as mighty, through the vileneſs of its life, cauſes tumult to the ſoul. And to all theſe things, indeed, thoſe that are arrived at maturity are accuſtomed; but to thoſe that are recently born, the ſmalleſt things,

* For the whole compoſite which we call man is not immortal, but only the rational ſoul.

along with impetuous abundance, which afford nutrition to the animal; yet a ſtill greater tumult and agitation is produced through the paſſions ariſing from external impulſions: and this either when the body is diſturbed by the ſudden incurſion of external fire, or by the ſolidity of earth, or receives an injury from the whirling blaſts of the air. For from all theſe, through the medium of the body, various motions are hurried along, and fall with moleſtation on the ſoul. But on this account all theſe were afterwards, and are even now, denominated ſenſes. And theſe, indeed, both at firſt and at preſent [1], are the ſources of an abundant and mighty motion, in conjunction with

through their being unuſual, become the cauſes of aſtoniſhment. For, what a great fire is to the former, that the flame of a lamp is to the latter; and what the magnitude of the higheſt mountains is to men, that the ſmalleſt ſtone in the fields is to infants. And what whirlwinds and cataracts of rain are to others, that a weak motion of the air, or the falling of a little moiſture, is to thoſe that are recently born. For ſenſe, being agitated by all theſe particulars, aſtoniſhes the ſoul of infants, and leads them to deſperation and tumult. Theſe, then, in ſhort, are the cauſes of the diſturbance of ſouls, viz. the motions of the nutritive part, and the impulſes of ſenſe. We muſt not, however, ſuppoſe that the ſoul ſuffers any thing through theſe particulars. For, as if ſome one ſtanding on the margin of a river ſhould behold the image and form of himſelf in the floating ſtream, he indeed will preſerve his face unchanged, but the ſtream being all-variouſly moved will change the image, ſo that at different times it will appear to him different, oblique and upright, and perhaps divulſed and continuous. Let us ſuppoſe, too, that ſuch a one, through being unaccuſtomed to the ſpectacle, ſhould think that it was himſelf that ſuffered this diſtortion, in conſequence of ſurveying his ſhadow in the water, and, thus thinking, ſhould be afflicted and diſturbed, aſtoniſhed and impeded. After the ſame manner the ſoul, beholding the image of herſelf in body, borne along in the river of generation, and variouſly diſpoſed at different times, through inward paſſions and external impulſes, is indeed herſelf impaſſive, but thinks that ſhe ſuffers, and, being ignorant of, and miſtaking her image for, herſelf, is diſturbed, aſtoniſhed, and perplexed. This paſſion particularly takes place in infants: but it is alſo ſeen in the dreams of thoſe that have arrived at maturity; as when ſome one, in conſequence of nature being wearied in the concoction of food, thinks in a dream that he is wearied through long journeys, or carrying heavy burdens, or ſuffers ſomething elſe of this kind. But to return to the words of Plato, the *waves* do not ſignify, ſays Proclus, the externally blowing wind, as ſome ſay, but the collected agitation, and abundant influx and efflux which take place in youth. But the *inundation* firſt ſtrikes upon and makes the pneumatic vehicle heavier, for it is this which expreſſes ſtains and vapours; and in the ſecond place it ſtrikes upon the ſoul, for ſhe alſo is diſturbed by the collected and the ſudden.

[1] Senſe, ſays Proclus, is of the preſent, in the ſame manner as memory is of the paſt, but hope of the future. Senſe, therefore, excites ſouls in the preſent time, and this in conjunction with the nutritive power, which by influxions applies a remedy to the perpetual effluxions of the

with that perpetually flowing river, moving and vehemently agitating the circulations of the ſoul, every way fettering the revolution of the nature characterized by *ſameneſs*, through flowing in a contrary direction, and reſtraining its energies by their conquering and impetuous progreſſions. But they agitate and tear in pieces the circulation of the nature diſtinguiſhed by *difference*. Hence, they whirl about with every kind of revolution each of the three intervals of the double and triple, together with the mediums and conjoining bonds of the ſeſquitertian, ſeſquialter, and ſeſquioctave ratios, which cannot be diſſolved by any one except the artificer by whom they were bound: and beſides this, they induce all the fractures and diverſities of circles which it is poſſible to effect; ſo that, ſcarcely being connected with each other, they are borne along indeed, yet in an irrational manner, at one time in a contrary, at another time in an oblique, and then again in a reſupine ſituation. Juſt as if any one, in an inverted poſition, ſhould fix his head on the earth and raiſe his feet on high; for in ſuch a ſituation both the inverted perſon and the ſpectators would mutually imagine the right hand parts to be on the left, and the left to be on the right. So with reſpect to the circulations of the ſoul, the very ſame affections, and others of a ſimilar kind, vehemently

the body, and again compoſes what was analyſed, after the manner of Penelope's web. For this is the perpetually flowing river, which is properly ſo called, as being a part of the whole river of generation. Hence, in conjunction with this, it agitates and diſturbs the periods of the immortal ſoul, and *fetters*, indeed, the circle of *ſameneſs*, but *agitates* the circle of *difference*. For, as there are twofold circles in the ſoul in imitation of divine ſouls, the dianoëtic circle, which contemplates intelligibles, is only reſtrained in its energy, but ſuſtains no diſtortion: but the doxaſtic circle is diſtorted; and this very properly, ſince it is poſſible to opine not rightly, but it is not poſſible to know ſcientifically falſely. If it ſhould be ſaid that the dianoëtic part may be ignorant in a twofold reſpect, and that a thing which ſuffers this is diſtorted; we reply, that twofold ignorance does not ſimply belong to the dianoëtic part, but, originating indeed from thence, is implanted in the doxaſtic part. For, ſo far as it is ignorance, and a privation of ſcience, ſo far, being an immobility of the ſcientific power, it originates from the dianoëtic part. For ſcience and ignorance ſubſiſt about the ſame thing. But, ſo far as it alſo adds a falſe opinion of knowledge, it ſubſiſts in the doxaſtic part. And ignorance is the inſanity of the dianoëtic part, poſſeſſing, indeed, but concealing, the productive principles of knowledge; but falſe conception is the inſanity of opinion, of which it is alſo the diſtortion. For, being falſe, it alſo depraves its poſſeſſor; ſince what vice is in action, that falſehood is in knowledge. The period of ſameneſs, therefore, is alone fettered, and is ſimilar to thoſe that are bound, and on this account are impeded in their energies; but the period of difference is agitated, being filled with falſe opinions. For its proximity to the irrational nature cauſes it to receive a certain paſſion from externals.

take place; and hence, when this is the caſe, if any thing external occurs, characterized by the nature of *ſame* or *different*, they denominate things the ſame with, or different from, others in a manner contrary to the truth. Hence they become falſe, and deſtitute of intelligence; nor is any revolution to be found among them in ſuch a ſituation which energizes with the authority of a ruler and chief.

But when certain ſenſes, borne along externally, ſtrike againſt the ſoul and attract the whole of its receptacle, then the circulations which are in reality in ſubjection appear to have dominion: and hence, in conſequence of all theſe paſſions, the ſoul becomes inſane at preſent, and was ſo from the firſt period of her being bound in a mortal body. However, when the river of increaſe and nutrition flows along with a more gentle and leſs abundant courſe, the circulations, being again reſtored to tranquillity, proceed in their proper path; in proceſs of time become more regular and ſteady, and paſs into a figure accommodated to their nature. Hence, in this caſe, the revolutions of each of the circles becoming direct, and calling both *ſame* and *different* by their proper appellations, they render the being by whom they are poſſeſſed prudent and wiſe. If any one, therefore, receives a proper education in conjunction with convenient nutriment, ſuch a one will poſſeſs perfect health, and will every way avoid the moſt grievous diſeaſe. But when this is neglected by any individual, ſuch a one, proceeding along the path of life in a lame condition, will again paſs into Hades imperfect and deſtitute of intelligence. Theſe are particulars, however, which happen poſterior to the production of mankind. But it is our buſineſs at preſent to diſcourſe more accurately concerning the firſt compoſition of our nature, and to ſhow, in the firſt place, from aſſimilative reaſons, through what cauſe and providence of the Gods the ſeveral members of the body were accommodated to the ſeveral employments of the ſoul.

In the firſt place, then, the Gods bound the two divine circulations of the ſoul in a ſpherical body, in imitation of the circular figure of the univerſe: and this part of the body is what we now denominate the head; a moſt divine member, and the ſovereign ruler of our whole corporeal compoſition, through the decree of the Gods, who conſidered that it would participate of all poſſible motions. Leſt, therefore, the head, by rolling like a cylinder on the earth, which is diſtinguiſhed by all-various heights and depths, ſhould

be

be unable to paſs over its inequalities and aſperities, the Gods ſubjected this upright figure of the body, as a pliable vehicle to the head. Hence, in conſequence of the body being endued with length, they extended four naturally flexible members; Divinity fabricating a progreſſion through which the body might apprehend any object, might receive a ſtable ſupport, and might be able to paſs through every place, bearing on high the head, our moſt divine and ſacred habitation. For this purpoſe, therefore, they furniſhed us with legs and hands. And as the Gods conſidered that the anterior parts are more honourable and adapted to rule than the poſterior, they gave us a motion for the moſt part conſiſting of a forward progreſſion. Beſide this, it was requiſite that the anterior parts of our body ſhould be divided from each other, and be diſſimilar: and on this account they firſt placed about the cavity of the head the face; fixed in it organs ſubſervient to all the providential energies of the ſoul, and determined that the natural government of man ſhould conſiſt in this anterior part of the body. But they fabricated the luciferous eyes the firſt of all the corporeal organs, binding them in the face on the following account. Of that fire which does not burn, indeed, but which comprehends our proper diurnal light, the Gods fabricated the orbs of the eyes. For the fire contained within our body, and which is the genuine brother of this diurnal fire, they cauſed to flow through the eyes with ſmoothneſs, and collected abundance, condenſed indeed in the whole, but eſpecially in the middle of theſe lucid orbs; ſo as that the more denſe fire might remain concealed within the receſſes of the eyes, and the pure might find a paſſage and fly away. When, therefore, the diurnal light ſubſiſts about the effluxive river of the light, then, ſimilar concurring and being mingled with ſimilar, one domeſtic body is conſtituted according to the direct proceſſion of the eyes; and this too in that part where the internally emitted light reſiſts that which is externally adduced. But the whole becoming ſimilarly paſſive through ſimilitude, when it either touches any thing elſe or is itſelf touched by another, then the motion produced by this contact diffuſing itſelf through the whole body of the eye, as far as to the ſoul, cauſes that ſenſation which we denominate ſight. But when this kindred fire departs into night, the conjunction being diſſolved, ſight loſes its power. For in this caſe, proceeding into a diſſimilar nature, it is changed, and becomes extinct: ſince it is by no means connate with the proximate ſurrounding air, which is naturally

deſtitute

deſtitute of fire. Hence it ceaſes from ſeeing; and, beſides this, becomes the introducer of ſleep. For the Gods fabricated the nature of the eye-lids as a ſalutary guardian of the ſight; that, theſe being compreſſed, the inward fiery power of the eye might be reſtrained from any further emiſſion; that, beſides this, they might ſprinkle over and equalize the eye's internal motions; and that, when equalized, reſt might be produced.

But when much reſt takes place, ſleep attended with few dreams is produced. On the contrary, if certain more vehement motions remain, then ſuch as is the nature of theſe relics, and the places in which they were produced, ſuch and ſo many will be the ſimilar phantaſms within, and of which we ſhall poſſeſs the remembrance when we are externally rouſed. But with reſpect to the images produced in mirrors, and all ſuch things as are viſible in that which is apparent and ſmooth, there is nothing in theſe difficult of ſolution. For, from the communication of the external and internal fire with each other, and from that fire which ſubſiſts about the ſmooth body, and becomes abundantly multiplied, all ſuch appearances are neceſſarily produced as take place when the fire of the eyes mingles itſelf with the fire diffuſed about the ſmooth and ſplendid object of viſion. But the right hand parts appear to be the left, becauſe a contact takes place between the contrary parts of the ſight and the contrary parts of the object, different from the accuſtomed mode of perception. On the contrary, the right hand parts appear on the right, and the left hand on the left, when the mingled light leaps forth, together with that with which it is mingled. When the ſmoothneſs of the mirrors receives this here and there in an elevated manner, it repels the right hand part of the ſight to the left of the mirror, and the left to the right. But if the mirror is turned according to the length of the countenance, it cauſes the whole face to appear reſupine, by repelling the downward part of the ſplendour towards the upward part, and again the upper towards the downward part. All ſuch particulars as theſe, therefore, are but cauſal aſſiſtants, which the Divinity employed as ſubſervient to rendering the idea of that which is beſt as far as poſſible complete. *But the multitude are of opinion that theſe are not cauſal aſſiſtants, but the real cauſes of all things; I mean ſuch things as are capable of giving cold and heat, rarity and denſity, with whatever produces ſuch-like affections, but is incapable of poſſeſſing reaſon and intellect.* For ſoul muſt be conſidered as the only thing among beings by which intellect

can be poſſeſſed. And this is inviſible. But fire and water, air and earth, are all of them viſible bodies. *It is, however, neceſſary that the lover of intellect and ſcience ſhould explore the firſt cauſes of prudent nature; and that he ſhould conſider ſuch things as are moved by others, and at the ſame time neceſſarily give motion to other things, as nothing more than ſecondary cauſes.* Hence it is proper that we ſhould ſpeak concerning both kinds of cauſes; ſeparately of ſuch as fabricate things beautiful and good in conjunction with intellect, and of ſuch as, being left deſtitute of wiſdom, produce each particular in a caſual and diſorderly manner. Concerning the ſecond cauſes of the eyes, therefore, which contribute to the poſſeſſion of the power they are now allotted, what has been already ſaid is ſufficient.

But the greateſt employment of the eyes, with reſpect to the uſe for which they were beſtowed on us by the Divinity, we ſhall now endeavour to explain. For, in my opinion, the ſight is the cauſe of the greateſt emolument to us on the preſent occaſion; ſince what we are now diſcourſing concerning the univerſe could never have been diſcovered without ſurveying the ſtars, the ſun, and the heavens. But now, from beholding day and night, we are able to determine by arithmetical calculation the periods of months and years; to acquire a conception of time, and to ſcrutinize the nature of the univerſe. But from all this we obtain the poſſeſſion of philoſophy; a greater good than which never was nor ever will be beſtowed by the Gods on the mortal race. And this is what I call the greateſt benefit of the eyes. But why ſhould I celebrate other particulars of leſs conſequence, which he who is not a philoſopher, ſince deſtitute of ſight, may attempt to explore, but will explore in vain? By us, indeed, it is aſſerted that Divinity beſtowed ſight on us for this purpoſe, that on ſurveying the circulations of intellect in the heavens we may properly employ the revolutions of our dianoëtic part, which are allied to their circulations; and may recall the tumultuous motions of our diſcurſive energies to the orderly proceſſions of their intellectual periods. That beſides this, by learning theſe and participating right reaſon according to nature, and imitating the revolutions of Divinity which are entirely inerratic, we may give ſtability to the wanderings of our dianoëtic energy.

But concerning voice and hearing, we again aſſert that they were beſtowed on us by the Gods on the ſame account. For the acquiſition of ſpeech pertains to theſe, and is of the greateſt advantage to their poſſeſſion.

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And whatever utility muſical voice brings to the ſenſe of hearing, was beſtowed for the ſake of harmony. But harmony, poſſeſſing motions allied to the revolutions of our ſoul, is uſeful to the man who employs the Muſes in conjunction with intellect; but is of no advantage to irrational pleaſure, though it appears to be ſo at preſent. Indeed, it was given us by the Muſes for the purpoſe of reducing the diſſonant circulation of the ſoul to an order and ſymphony accommodated to its nature. Rhythm too was beſtowed on us for this purpoſe; that we might properly harmonize that habit in our nature, which for the moſt part is void of meaſure, and indigent of the Graces. And thus far, a few particulars excepted, have we ſhown the fabrications of intellect. But it is likewiſe requiſite to give a place in our diſcourſe to the productions of neceſſity. For, the generation of the world being mingled, it was produced from the compoſition of intellect and neceſſity. But intellect ruling over neceſſity perſuaded it to lead the moſt part of generated natures to that which is beſt; and hence neceſſity being vanquiſhed by wiſe perſuaſion, from theſe two as principles the world aroſe. If, then, any one truly aſſerts that the univerſe was generated according to theſe, he ſhould alſo mingle with it the form of an erratic cauſe, which it is naturally adapted to receive. In this manner then let us return; and, aſſuming a convenient principle of theſe, again diſcourſe concerning them as about the former particulars, commencing our diſcuſſion from their origin. Let us, therefore, ſpeculate the nature and paſſions of fire and water, air and earth, prior to the generation of the heavens. No one, indeed, as yet has unfolded the generation of theſe: but we ſpeak of fire, and the other elements, as if the nature of each was known; and place them as the principles of the univerſe, when at the ſame time they ought not to be aſſimilated to elements, not even as in the rank of ſyllables, by men who in the ſmalleſt degree merit the appellation of wiſe. But now we ſhall not ſpeak of the principle or principles, or whatever other denomination they may receive, of all things; and this for no other reaſon than the difficulty of delivering what appears to be the truth about theſe in the preſent mode of diſputation. Neither, therefore, is it proper that you ſhould expect me to ſpeak, nor that I ſhould perſuade myſelf into a belief of being able to ſpeak with perfect rectitude on ſo difficult a ſubject. But it is proper, as I told you in the beginning of this diſcourſe, that, preſerving all the force of aſſimilative reaſons, we ſhould endeavour to

deliver that which is not leſs aſſimilative of the truth than the doctrine of others; and that in this manner we ſhould diſcourſe from the beginning concerning particulars and the whole. In the firſt place, therefore, invoking the Divinity who is the ſaviour of diſcourſe, and beſeeching him to lead us from an abſurd and unuſual expoſition to an aſſimilative doctrine, we ſhall again begin to ſpeak.

But it is neceſſary that the beginning of our preſent diſputation ſhould receive a more ample diviſion than the former one. For then we made a diſtribution into two ſpecies: but now a third ſort muſt be added. In the former diſputation two ſpecies were ſufficient; one of which was eſtabliſhed as the form of an exemplar, intelligible and always ſubſiſting according to *ſame*; but the other was nothing more than the imitation of the paradigm, generated and viſible. But we did not then diſtribute a third, becauſe we conſidered theſe two as ſufficient. However, now reaſon ſeems to urge as a thing neceſſary, that we ſhould endeavour to render apparent by our diſcourſe the ſpecies which ſubſiſts as difficult and obſcure. What apprehenſion then can we form of its power and nature? Shall we ſay that it is in an eminent degree the receptacle, and as it were nurſe, of all generation? Such an aſſertion will, indeed, be true; but it is requiſite to ſpeak more clearly concerning it. And this will certainly be an arduous undertaking on many accounts, but principally becauſe it will be neceſſary to doubt previous to its diſcuſſion concerning fire and the reſt of the elements, why any one of theſe ſhould be called water rather than fire, or air rather than earth; or why any one ſhould be denominated ſome definite particular rather than all. For it is indeed difficult to frame any certain opinion, or to employ any ſtable diſcourſe about ſuch intricate forms. After what manner, then, and in what reſpect, and what of an aſſimilative nature ſhall we aſſert in this dubious inquiry?

In the firſt place, then, that which we now denominate water, when it loſes its fluidity by concretion, appears to become ſtones and earth; but, when liquefied and diſperſed, it forms vapour and air. Likewiſe, air when burnt up becomes fire. And, on the contrary, fire becoming concrete and extinct paſſes again into the form of air. And again, air becoming collected and condenſed produces miſts and clouds. But from theſe ſtill more compreſſed rain deſcends. And from water, again, earth and ſtones derive

their ſubſiſtence. And thus, as it appears, they mutually confer on each other generation in a certain circular progreſſion. But ſince theſe never appear to be the ſame, who without being covered with confuſion can confidently aſſert that any one of theſe is this rather than that? Certainly, no one. Hence it will be far the moſt ſafe method of proceeding to ſpeak about them as follows: That the nature which we always perceive becoming ſomething different at different times, ſuch, for inſtance, as fire, is not fire abſolutely, but ſomething fiery. And again, that the nature which we denominate water is not abſolutely ſo, but ſuch-like, or watery; and that it is not at any time any thing elſe, as if it poſſeſſed any ſtability of eſſence. And laſtly, that they cannot be diſtinguiſhed by any word, ſuch as we are accuſtomed to employ when endeavouring to ſhow that any particular is either this thing or that. For they fly away, incapable of ſuſtaining the affirmation which aſſerts them to be *this thing*, *of ſuch a nature*, *belonging to this*; and all ſuch appellations as would evince them to be ſomething permanent and real. Hence, we ought not to denominate any one of theſe either this, or that; but ſomething ſuch-like, and a perpetually-revolving ſimilitude. Thus, we ſhould aſſert that fire is every where *ſuch-like*, and ſhould ſpeak in the ſame manner of every thing endued with generation. But we ſhould alone diſtinguiſh by the appellations of this, or that, the ſubject in which each of theſe appears to be generated, and again to ſuffer a diſſolution. But this ſubject is by no means to be denominated *ſuch-like*, as for inſtance hot or white, or any quality belonging to contraries, or any thing which contraries compoſe. However, let us endeavour to explain more clearly what we mean to expreſs. For if any one, faſhioning all poſſible figures from gold, ſhould without ceaſing transform each figure into all; and if, during this operation, ſome one who is preſent ſhould, pointing to one of theſe figures, inquire what it is; it might moſt ſafely, with reſpect to truth, be replied, that it was gold: but he who ſhould aſſert that it is a triangle, or any other of the figures which are continually generated, and which ought by no means to be denominated beings, would fall from the truth in the midſt of his aſſertion. But we ought to be content with that anſwer as moſt ſafe, which denominates it *ſuch-like*, or of ſuch a determinate nature.

In the ſame manner we ſhould ſpeak concerning that nature which is the general receptacle of all bodies. For it never departs from its own proper power,

power, but perpetually receives all things; and never contracts any form in any reſpect ſimilar to any one of the intromitted forms. It lies indeed in ſubjection to the forming power of every nature, becoming agitated and figured through the ſupernally intromitted forms: and through theſe it exhibits a different appearance at different times. But the forms which enter and depart from this receptacle are the imitations of perpetually true beings; and are figured by them in a manner wonderful and difficult to deſcribe, as we ſhall afterwards relate. At preſent, however, it is neceſſary to conſider three ſorts of things: one, that which is generated; another, that in which it is generated; and the third, that from which the generated nature derives its ſimilitude. But it is proper to aſſimilate that which receives to a mother; that from whence it receives to a father; and the nature ſituated between theſe to an offspring. It is likewiſe neceſſary to underſtand that the figured nature can never become diſtinguiſhed with an all-poſſible variety of forms, unleſs its receptacle is well prepared for the purpoſe, and is deſtitute of all thoſe forms which it is about to receive. For, if it were ſimilar to any one of the ſupernally intromitted forms, when it received a nature contrary to that to which it is ſimilar, or any form whatever, it would very imperfectly expreſs its ſimilitude, while at the ſame time it exhibited the very ſame appearance with the ſupernally acceding form. And hence it is neceſſary, that the receptacle which is deſtined to receive all poſſible forms ſhould itſelf be deſtitute of every form. Juſt as thoſe who are about to prepare ſweet-ſmelling unguents, ſo diſpoſe a certain humid matter as the ſubject of the enſuing odour, that it may poſſeſs no peculiar ſmell of its own; and as thoſe who wiſh to impreſs certain figures in a ſoft and yielding matter, are careful that it may not appear impreſſed with any previous figure, but render it as much as poſſible exquiſitely ſmooth. In the ſame manner, it is neceſſary that the ſubject which is ſo often deſtined to receive in a beautiful manner, through the whole of itſelf, reſemblances of eternal beings, ſhould be naturally deſtitute of all that it receives. Hence, we ſhould not denominate this mother and receptacle of that which is generated, viſible and every way ſenſible, either earth, or air, or fire, or water; nor, again, any one of the compoſites from theſe, or any thing from which theſe are generated: but we ſhould call it a certain inviſible ſpecies, and a formleſs univerſal recipient, which in the moſt dubious and ſcarcely explicable manner partici-

pates of an intelligible nature. Of itſelf, indeed, we cannot ſpeak without deception; but ſo far as it is poſſible to apprehend its nature from what has been previouſly ſaid, we may with the greateſt rectitude aſſert as follows: that fire appears to be its inflamed part; water its moiſt part; and that earth and air are its parts in a ſimilar manner, ſo far as it receives the imitations of theſe. But we ought rather thus to inquire about theſe, diſtinguiſhing and ſeparating them by a reaſoning proceſs; whether there is a certain fire, itſelf ſubſiſting in itſelf; and whether this is the caſe with all ſuch particulars which we perpetually aſſert to ſubſiſt from themſelves; or whether ſuch things alone as are the objects of ſight, and which are perceived through the miniſtry of the body, poſſeſs being and truth; ſo that nothing beſides theſe has in any reſpect any ſubſiſtence; that we in vain aſſert there is a certain intelligible form of each of theſe; and that all ſuch forms are nothing but words. Indeed, whether ſuch a doctrine is true or not, muſt not be aſſerted raſhly and without examination: nor is it proper to add to the preſent diſputation, which is naturally prolix, any thing tedious and foreign from the purpoſe. But if any definition can be employed in this affair, comprehending things of great moment in a ſhort compaſs, ſuch a one will be very opportune to our preſent deſign. In this manner then I ſhall relate my opinion on the ſubject.

If intellect and true opinion are two kinds of things, it is every way neceſſary that there ſhould be forms, ſubſiſting by themſelves, which are not the objects of ſenſe, but which are apprehended by intelligence alone. But if, as appears to ſome, true opinion differs in no reſpect from intellect, every thing which is perceived through body is to be conſidered as poſſeſſing the moſt certain and ſtable nature. But in reality theſe ought to be denominated two diſtinct things, becauſe they are generated ſeparate from each other, and are diſſimilar. For the one of theſe ſubſiſts in us through learning, but the other through perſuaſion. And the one is indeed always attended with true reaſon, but the other is irrational. The one is not to be moved by perſuaſion; the other, on the contrary, is ſubject to this mutation. And laſtly, of true opinion every man participates; but of intellect all the Gods, and but a few of mankind. Such then being the caſe, we muſt confeſs that the form which ſubſiſts according to *ſame*, is unbegotten and without decay; neither receiving any thing into itſelf externally, nor itſelf proceeding

ceeding into any other nature. That it is inviſible, and imperceptible by ſenſe; and that this is the proper object of intellectual ſpeculation. But the form which is ſynonymous and ſimilar to this, muſt be conſidered as ſenſible, generated, always in agitation, and generated in a certain place, from which it again recedes, haſtening to diſſolution; and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with ſenſe. But the third nature is that of place; which never receives corruption, but affords a ſeat to all generated forms. This indeed is tangible without tangent perception; and is ſcarcely by a certain ſpurious reaſoning the object of belief. Beſides, when we attempt to behold this nature, we perceive nothing but the deluſions of dreams, and aſſert that every being muſt neceſſarily be ſomewhere, and be ſituated in a certain place: and we by no means think that any thing can exiſt, which is neither in the earth nor comprehended by the heavens. All theſe, and all ſuch opinions as are the ſiſters of theſe, we are not able to ſeparate from our cogitation of that which ſubſiſts about a vigilant and true nature: and this becauſe we cannot rouſe ourſelves from this fallacious and dreaming energy, and perceive that in reality it is proper for an image to ſubſiſt in ſomething different from itſelf; ſince that in which it is generated has no proper reſemblance of its own, but perpetually exhibits the phantaſm of ſomething elſe; and can only participate of eſſence in a certain imperfect degree, or it would become in every reſpect a perfect non-entity. But to true being, true reaſon bears an aſſiſting teſtimony, through the accuracy of its deciſions; affirming, that as long as two things are different from each other, each can never become ſo ſituated in either, as to produce at the ſame time one thing, and two things eſſentially the ſame.

This, then, is ſummarily my opinion:—that, prior to the generation of the univerſe, theſe three things ſubſiſted in a triple reſpect, viz. being, place, and generation. And that the nurſe of generation, fiery and moiſt, receiving the forms of earth and air, and ſuffering ſuch other paſſions as are the attendants of theſe, appeared of an all-various nature to the view. But becauſe it was neither filled with ſimilar powers, nor with ſuch as are equally balanced, it poſſeſſed no part in equilibrium; but through the perfect inequality of its libration it became agitated by theſe paſſions, and again through its motion gave agitation to theſe. But the parts in motion, being ſeparated from each other, were impetuouſly hurried along in different

directions, ſimilar to the agitations and ventilations which take place in the operations of textorial inſtruments, and ſuch as are employed in the purgation of corn. For in this caſe the denſe and the heavy parts are borne along one way, and the rare and the light are impelled into a different ſeat. In the ſame manner, theſe four natures being agitated by their receptacle tumultuouſly moving like the inſtrument of corn, ſuch as were diſſimilar became far ſeparated from each other, and ſuch as were ſimilar became again amicably united. And hence they paſſed into different ſeats before the univerſe was from the mixture of theſe diſtributed into beautiful order; but at the ſame time they all ſubſiſted irrationally, and without the limitation of meaſure.

But when the artificer began to adorn the univerſe, he firſt of all figured with forms and numbers fire and earth, water and air, which poſſeſſed indeed certain traces of the true elements, but were in every reſpect ſo conſtituted, as it becomes any thing to be from which Deity is abſent. But we ſhould always perſevere in aſſerting that Divinity rendered them as much as poſſible the moſt beautiful and the beſt, when they were in a ſtate of exiſtence oppoſite to ſuch a condition. I ſhall now, therefore, endeavour to unfold to you the diſtribution and generation of theſe by a diſcourſe unuſual indeed, but, to you who have trod in all the paths of erudition, through which demonſtration is neceſſarily obtained, perſpicuous and plain. In the firſt place, then, that fire and earth, water and air, are bodies, is perſpicuous to every one. But every ſpecies of body poſſeſſes profundity; and it is neceſſary that every depth ſhould comprehend the nature of a plane. Again, the rectitude of the baſe of a plane is compoſed from triangles. But all triangles originate from two ſpecies; one of which poſſeſſes one right angle, and the other two acute angles. And one of theſe contains one right angle diſtributed with equal ſides; but in the other unequal angles are diſtributed with unequal ſides. Hence, proceeding according to aſſimilative reaſons, conjoined with neceſſity, we ſhall eſtabliſh a principle of this kind, as the origin of fire and all other bodies. The ſupernal principles of theſe indeed are known to Divinity, and to the man who is in friendſhip with Divinity.

But it is neceſſary to relate by what means four moſt beautiful bodies were produced; diſſimilar indeed to each other, but which are able from certain diſſolutions into each other to become the ſources of each other's

generation.

generation. For, if we are able to accompliſh this, we ſhall obtain the truth concerning the generation of earth and fire, and of thoſe elements which are ſituated according to analogy between theſe. And then we ſhall not aſſent to any one who ſhould aſſert that there are viſible bodies more beautiful than theſe, each of which ſubſiſts according to one kind. We muſt endeavour, therefore, to harmonize the four ſorts of bodies excelling in beauty; and to evince by this means that we ſufficiently comprehend the nature of theſe. Of the two triangles indeed the iſoſceles is allotted one nature, but the oblong or ſcalene is characterized by infinity. We ought therefore to chooſe the moſt beautiful among infinites, if we wiſh to commence our inveſtigation in a becoming manner. And if any one ſhall aſſert that he has choſen ſomething more beautiful for the compoſition of theſe, we ſhall ſuffer his opinion to prevail; conſidering him not as an enemy, but as a friend. Of many triangles, therefore, we ſhall eſtabliſh one as moſt beautiful (neglecting the reſt); I mean the equilateral, which is compoſed from three parts of a ſcalene triangle. To aſſign the reaſon of this would indeed require a prolix diſſertation; but a pleaſant reward will remain for him who by a diligent inveſtigation finds this to be the caſe. We have, therefore, ſelected two triangles out of many, from which the body of fire and of the other elements is fabricated; one of which is iſoſceles, but the other is that which always has its longer ſide triply greater in power than the ſhorter.

But that which we formerly aſſerted without ſufficient ſecurity, it is now neceſſary more accurately to define. For it appeared to us, though improperly, that all theſe four natures were mutually generated from each other: but they are in reality generated from the triangles which we have juſt deſcribed:—three of them, indeed, from one triangle containing unequal ſides; but the fourth alone is aptly compoſed from the iſoſceles triangle. All of them, therefore, are not able, by a diſſolution into each other, to produce from many ſmall things a mighty few, or the contrary. This indeed can be effected by three of them. For, as all the three are naturally generated from one triangle, when the greater parts are diſſolved, many ſmall parts are compoſed from them, receiving figures accommodated to their natures. And again, when the many ſmall parts being ſcattered according to triangles produce a number of one bulk, they complete one mighty ſpecies

of

of a different kind. And thus much may ſuffice concerning their mutual generation.

It now remains that we ſhould ſpeak concerning the quality of each of their kinds, and relate from what concurring numbers they were collected together. The firſt ſpecies indeed is that which was compoſed from the feweſt triangles, and is the element of that which has its longer ſide twice the length of the ſhorter ſide, which it ſubtends. But two of theſe being mutually placed according to the diameter, and this happening thrice, the diameters and the ſhorter ſides paſſing into the ſame, as into a centre, hence one equilateral triangle is produced from ſix triangles. But four equilateral triangles being compoſed, according to three plane angles, form one ſolid angle; and this the moſt obtuſe of all the plane angles from which it is compoſed. Hence, from four triangles of this kind receiving their completion, the firſt ſolid ſpecies was conſtituted, diſtributive of the whole circumference into equal and ſimilar parts. But the ſecond was formed from the ſame triangles, but at the ſame time conſtituted according to eight equilateral triangles, which produced one ſolid angle from four planes: ſo that the ſecond body received its completion from the compoſition of ſix triangles of this kind. And the third aroſe from the conjunction of twice ſixty elements, and twelve ſolid angles, each of which having twenty equilateral baſes is contained by five plane equilateral triangles. In this manner, then, the other elements generated theſe. But the iſoſceles triangle, being conſtituted according to four triangles, and collecting the right angles at the centre, and forming one equilateral quadrangle, generated the nature of the fourth element. But ſix ſuch as theſe being conjoined produced eight ſolid angles, each of which is harmonized together, according to three plane right angles. Hence the figure of the body thus compoſed is cubical, obtaining ſix plane quadrangular equilateral baſes. There is alſo a certain fifth compoſition, which Divinity employed in the fabrication of the univerſe, and when he delineated thoſe forms the contemplation of which may juſtly lead ſome one to doubt whether it is proper to aſſert that the number of worlds is infinite or finite;—though indeed to affirm that there are infinite worlds, can only be the dogma of one who is ignorant about things in which it is highly proper to be ſkilful. But it may with much leſs abſurdity be doubted whether there is in reality but one world, or whether there are five. According to our opinion,

opinion, indeed, which is founded on aſſimilative reaſons, there is but one world: though ſome one, regarding in a certain reſpect other particulars, may be of a different opinion. But it is proper to diſmiſs any further ſpeculations of this kind.

Let us now, therefore, diſtribute the four ſorts of things which we have generated, into fire, earth, water, and air. And to earth indeed let us aſſign a cubical form: for earth is the moſt immovable of all theſe four kinds, and the moſt plaſtic, or adapted to formation, of all corporeal natures. But it is in the moſt eminent degree neceſſary that this ſhould be the caſe with that which poſſeſſes the moſt ſecure and ſtable baſes. Among the triangles, indeed, eſtabliſhed at the beginning, ſuch as are equilateral poſſeſs firmer baſes than ſuch as contain unequal ſides. And hence, among the plane figures compoſed from each, it will be found that the iſoſceles is neceſſarily more ſtable than the equilateral, and the ſquare than the triangle, both when conſidered according to parts and to the whole. On this account, by diſtributing this figure to the earth, we ſhall preſerve an aſſimilative reaſon. This will be the caſe too by aſſigning to water that figure which is more difficultly movable than the other three; to fire, the moſt eaſily movable form; and to air, that figure which poſſeſſes a middle nature. Beſides this, we ſhould aſſign the ſmalleſt body to fire, the greateſt to water, and one of a middle kind to air. And again, the moſt acute body to fire, the ſecond from this to air, and the third to water. But, among all theſe, it is neceſſary that the body which poſſeſſes the feweſt baſes, ſhould be the moſt eaſily movable: for, being every way the moſt acute, it becomes the moſt penetrating and inciſive of all. It is likewiſe the moſt light, becauſe compoſed from the feweſt parts. But that which is ſecond to this, poſſeſſes theſe properties in a ſecondary reſpect; and that which ranks as the third, in a third gradation. Hence, according to right and aſſimilative reaſon, the ſolid form of the pyramid is the element and ſeed of fire. But we muſt aſſign that form which is ſecond according to generation to air; and that which is the third to water. And it is neceſſary to conſider all theſe ſuch, with reſpect to their ſmallneſs, that no one of the ſeveral ſorts can be diſcerned by us, on account of its parvitude; but that, when many of them are collected together, their bulks become the objects of our perception. And beſides this, all theſe were accurately abſolved and harmonized by the Divinity, both

as to their multitude, motions, and powers, in ſuch a proportion as the willing and perſuaded nature of neceſſity was able to receive.

But, among all thoſe natures whoſe kinds we have above related, the following circumſtances appear to take place. And firſt with reſpect to earth: when it meets with fire, becoming diſſolved by its acuteneſs, it is borne along; and remains in this diſſolved ſtate either in fire, or in the bulk of air, or in that of water—till its parts, aſſociating themſelves together, and again becoming mutually harmonized, produce again a body of earth; for it can never paſs into another form. But water, when it is diſtributed into parts by fire or air, when its parts become again collected, produces one body of fire, but two bodies of air. And the ſections of air form from one diſſolved part two bodies of fire. Again, when fire receives into itſelf either air or water, or a certain earth, and, being itſelf ſmall, is moved in many natures; and beſides this, when, through oppoſing, being vanquiſhed by the agitated forms, it becomes broken in pieces, then two bodies of fire coaleſce into one form of air. And when air becomes vanquiſhed and ſeparated into parts, then, from two wholes and a half, one whole form of water is produced. But, again, let us conſider this matter as follows: When any one of the other forms, becoming inveſted by fire, is cut by the acuteneſs of its angles and ſides, then, paſſing into the nature of fire, it ſuffers no further diſcerption. For no ſpecies is ever able to produce mutation or paſſivity, or any kind of alteration, in that which is ſimilar and the ſame with itſelf: but as long as it paſſes into ſomething elſe, and the more imbecil contends with the more powerful, it will not ceaſe to be diſſolved.

Again, when the leſſer are comprehended in the greater many, and the few being lacerated are extinguiſhed,—if they are willing to paſs into the idea of the conquering nature, they ceaſe to be extinguiſhed, and air becomes generated from fire, and water from air. But if, when this tranſition is accompliſhed, the compoſite oppoſes any of the other ſpecies, the agitated parts will not ceaſe to be diſſolved, till, on account of their diſſoluble ſubſiſtence being every way impelled, they fly to their kindred nature; or being vanquiſhed, and becoming one from many, ſimilar to their vanquiſher, they abide with the victor in amicable conjunction. But, in conſequence of theſe paſſions, they all of them mutually change the receptacles which they once poſſeſſed. For the multitude of each kind is diſtinguiſhed, according to its proper

proper place, through the motion of its recipient ſeat. But ſuch as become diſſimilar to each other are borne along through the agitation to the place of the natures to which they are ſimilar. Such bodies, therefore, as are unmixed, and the firſt, are generated from ſuch cauſes as theſe. But that other genera are naturally inherent in theſe forms, is owing to the compoſition of each element; which not only from the firſt produces a triangle, together with magnitude, but alſo ſuch things as are greater and leſs: and this ſo many in number as there are different kinds in the forms themſelves. And hence, theſe being mingled in themſelves, and with each other, produce an infinite variety; which it is proper he ſhould contemplate who is about to employ aſſimilative reaſons in the inveſtigation of nature. He, therefore, who does not apprehend in what manner, and in conjunction with what particulars, the motion and compoſition of theſe take place, will find many impediments in the remaining part of this diſputation. And theſe indeed we have already partly diſcuſſed; but a part ſtill remains for our inveſtigation.

And, in the firſt place, motion is by no means willing to reſide in ſmoothneſs: for it is difficult, or rather impoſſible, that a thing in motion ſhould ſubſiſt without a mover, or a mover without that which is in motion. Hence, it is impoſſible that theſe ſhould be at any time equable and ſmooth. And, in conſequence of this, we ſhould always place an abiding nature in ſmoothneſs, and motion in that which is unequal and rough. Inequality, indeed, is the cauſe of roughneſs: and we have already treated concerning the generation of inequality. But we have by no means explained how the ſeveral ſorts, being undiſtributed according to their kinds, ceaſe to be moved and borne along through each other. This, therefore, muſt be the ſubject of our preſent diſcuſſion. The circulation then of the univerſe, ſince it comprehends the different ſorts of things in its circumference, being of a circular form, and naturally deſiring to paſs into union with itſelf, compreſſes all things within its ſpacious receptacle, and does not ſuffer a void place any where to ſubſiſt. On this account, fire in the moſt eminent degree penetrates through all things; and air next to this, ranking as the ſecond to fire, on account of the ſubtility and tenuity of its parts. And the ſame reaſoning muſt be extended to the other elements, which are poſterior to theſe. For ſuch as are compoſed from the greateſt parts leave alſo the greateſt vacuity in their compoſition; but, on the contrary, ſuch as are the ſmalleſt leave the

leaſt vacuity. But the coalition of compreſſion thruſts the ſmall parts into the void ſpaces of the large; and on this account, the ſmall parts being placed with the large, and the former ſeparating the latter, but the larger being mingled with the ſmaller, all of them are borne upwards and downwards to their reſpective places of abode. For each, upon changing its magnitude, changes alſo its ſituation. Hence, through theſe cauſes the generation of a nature contrary to ſmoothneſs being always preſerved, affords a perpetual motion of theſe, both at preſent and in all future periods of time.

But, in the next place, it is neceſſary to underſtand that there are many kinds of fire: as for inſtance, flame, and that which is enkindled from flame; which burns, indeed, but exhibits no light to the eyes—and which, when the flame is extinguiſhed, abides in the ignited nature. In like manner, with reſpect to air, one kind is moſt pure, which is denominated ether; but another moſt turbulent, and at the ſame time obſcure and dark; and after this another nameleſs kind is produced, through the inequality of the triangles. But, with reſpect to water, it is in the firſt place twofold; one kind of which is humid, but the other fuſile. The humid, therefore, through its participating ſuch parts as are ſmall and unequal, becomes movable, both from itſelf and another, through inequality and the idea of its figure. But that which is compoſed from large and ſmooth parts is more ſtable than this kind of water, and coaleſces into a heavy body through ſmoothneſs and equality of parts. But through fire entering into and diſſolving its compoſition, in conſequence of loſing its equability and ſmoothneſs, it participates more of a movable nature. Hence, becoming eaſily agile, driven about by the proximate air, and extended over the earth, it liquefies, which is denominated a purification of bulk, and falls upon the earth, which is called a defluxion. Again, fire flying upwards from hence, ſince it does not depart into a vacuum, the proximate air being agitated, impels the moiſt bulk as yet movable into the ſeats of fire, with which at the ſame time it mingles itſelf. But when the bulk becomes collectively thruſt downwards, and again receives equability and ſmoothneſs of parts, then [1] fire, the artificer of inequality, departing, the whole maſs paſſes into a ſameneſs with itſelf. And this departure of fire we denominate refrigeration; but the coalition which takes place when fire is

[1] Inſtead of οὔτε, in this part read ἅτε.

abſent

abſent we call a concretion, and cold rigidity. But among all thoſe which we denominate fuſile waters, that which, becoming moſt denſe from the moſt attenuated and equable parts, is of a uniform kind, and participates a ſplendid and yellow colour, is that moſt honoured and valuable poſſeſſion gold, which is uſually impelled through a rock. And a branch of gold, on account of its denſity moſt hard and black, is called a diamond. But that which contains parts proximate to gold, which poſſeſſes more than one ſpecies, ſurpaſſes gold in denſity, and participates but a ſmall and attenuated part of earth, ſo that it becomes of a harder nature, but from its internally poſſeſſing great intervals is lighter;—this is one kind of ſplendid and concrete waters, and is denominated braſs. But when an earthly nature, being mingled with this, is through antiquity ſeparated from other parts of the braſs, and becomes of itſelf conſpicuous, it is then denominated ruſt. In a ſimilar manner other particulars of this nature may be inveſtigated without much labour by the aſſiſtance of aſſimilative reaſons. And if any one, for the ſake of relaxation, omitting for a while the ſpeculation of eternal beings, ſhould purſue the aſſimilative arguments concerning generation, and ſhould by this means poſſeſs a pleaſure unattended with repentance, ſuch a one will eſtabliſh for himſelf in life a moderate and prudent diverſion.

This being admitted, let us run over the aſſimilative reaſons concerning the particulars which yet remain for diſcuſſion. When ſuch water then as is attenuated and moiſt is mingled with fire, (being denominated moiſt through its motion and rolling progreſſion on the earth, and likewiſe ſoft, becauſe its baſes being leſs ſtable than thoſe of earth eaſily yield to impulſion,) this, when ſeparated from fire and deſerted by air, becomes more equable, and through the departure of theſe is compelled into itſelf: and being thus collected, if it ſuffers this alteration above the earth, it becomes hail; but if upon the earth, ice; which then takes place in conſequence of extreme congelation. But when it is leſs congealed, if this happens above the earth, it becomes ſnow; but when upon the earth, and this from collected dew, it then becomes froſt. But when many ſpecies of water are mingled with each other, the whole kind, which is ſtrained from the earth through plants, is called moiſture or liquor. Theſe liquors, being diſſimilar on account of their mixtures, exhibit many other nameleſs kinds: but four, which are of a fiery ſpecies, and which become in an eminent degree diaphanous, are allotted

appellations.

appellations. And that which heats the ſoul in conjunction with the body is called wine. But that which is ſmooth, and ſegregative of the ſight, and on this account ſplendid, refulgent, and unctuous to the view, is an oleaginous ſpecies, and is pitch, gum, oil, and other things endued with a ſimilar power. Again, that which poſſeſſes a power of diffuſing the things collected about the mouth, and this as far as nature will permit, at the ſame time bringing ſweetneſs with its power, is generally denominated honey. And laſtly, that which diſſolves the fleſh by burning, is of a frothy nature, and is ſecreted from all liquors, is called juice. But the ſpecies of earth ſtrained through water produces a ſtony body in the following manner:—When collected water fails in mingling, it paſſes into the form of air; but, becoming air, it returns to its proper place. Hence, as there is no vacuum, it impels the proximate air; and this, if the impulſion is weighty, being poured round the bulk of earth, becomes vehemently compreſſed, and betakes itſelf to thoſe ſeats from whence the new air aſcended. But earth, when indiſſolubly aſſociated with water, through the miniſtry of air compoſes ſtones: the more beautiful ſort indeed being ſuch as are reſplendent from equal and plane parts, but the deformed being of a contrary compoſition. But when all the moiſture is hurried away by the violence of fire, and the body by this means becomes more dry, then a ſpecies of earth which is denominated fictile is produced. Sometimes, likewiſe, when the moiſture is left behind, and the earth becomes fuſile through fire, then through refrigeration a ſtone with a black colour is generated. But when this ſpecies of ſtrained earth in a ſimilar manner through mixture is deprived of much moiſture, but is compoſed from more attenuated parts of earth, is ſalt and ſemiconcrete, and again emerges through water; then it is partly called nitre, a cathartic kind of oil, and earth, and partly ſalt, a ſubſtance moſt elegantly and legitimately adapted to the common wants of the body, and moſt grateful to divinity. But the parts common to both theſe are not ſoluble by water, but through ſome ſuch thing are thus collected together by fire. Again, fire and air do not liquefy the bulk of earth. For ſince theſe naturally conſiſt of parts ſmaller than the void ſpaces of earth, they permeate through its moſt capacious pores without any violence, and neither ſubject it to diſſolution nor liquefaction. But the parts of water, becauſe they are greater and paſs along with violence, diſſolve and liquefy the maſs of earth. Hence,

water

water alone diſſolves earth when violently compoſed, but fire alone when it is properly compoſed; for an entrance in this caſe is afforded to nothing but fire.

Again, fire alone permeates the moſt violent aſſociation of the parts of water; but both fire and air diffuſe themſelves through its more debile collection; air through its void, and fire through its triangular ſpaces. But nothing is capable of diſſolving air when collected together by violence, except it operates according to an element: but when it coheres together without force, it is reſolved by fire alone. Again, bodies which are ſo compoſed from water and earth that the water compreſſed by force obſtructs the void ſpaces of earth, cannot in this caſe afford an ingreſs to the water externally approaching; and in conſequence of this, the water flowing round ſuch a body ſuffers the whole maſs to remain without liquefaction. But the parts of fire entering into the void ſpaces of water, as water into thoſe of earth, and influencing water in the ſame manner as fire influences air, become in this caſe the cauſes of liquefaction to a common body. But theſe partly poſſeſs leſs water than earth; ſuch as the whole genus of glaſs, and ſuch ſtones as are denominated fuſile: and partly, on the contrary, they poſſeſs more of water; ſuch as all thoſe bodies which coaleſce into waxen and vaporific ſubſtances. And thus we have nearly exhibited all thoſe ſpecies, which are varied by figures, communications and mutations into each other; but it is now neceſſary that we ſhould endeavour to render apparent the cauſes through which the paſſions of theſe are produced.

In the firſt place, then, ſenſe ought always to be preſent with diſcourſes of this kind. But we have not yet run through the generation of fleſh, and ſuch things as pertain to fleſh, together with that part of the ſoul which is mortal. For all theſe are inſeparable from the paſſions ſubſiſting with ſenſe, and cannot without theſe paſſions be ſufficiently explained; though, indeed, even in conjunction with theſe, it is ſcarcely poſſible to unfold their production. We ſhould, therefore, firſt of all eſtabliſh other things; and then conſider ſuch things as are conſequent to theſe. That in our diſputation, therefore, the paſſions themſelves may follow the genera in ſucceſſion, let our firſt inveſtigations be concerning ſuch things as pertain to body and ſoul. Let us then firſt of all inquire why fire is called hot. And the reaſon of this we ſhall be able to perceive by conſidering the ſeparation and diviſion of fire about our bodies:

bodies: for that this *paſſion* is a certain ſharpneſs is nearly evident to all. But we ought to conſider the tenuity of its angles, the ſharpneſs of its ſides, the ſmallneſs of its parts, and the velocity of its motion, through all which it becomes vehement and penetrating, and ſwiftly divides that with which it meets; calling to mind for this purpoſe the generation of its figure. For fire, indeed, and no other nature, ſeparating our bodies and diſtributing them into ſmall parts, produces in us that *paſſion* which is very properly denominated heat. But the *paſſion* contrary to this, though ſufficiently manifeſt, ought not to paſs without an explanation. For the moiſt parts of bodies larger than our humid parts, entering into our bodies, expel the ſmaller parts; but, not being able to penetrate into their receptacles, coagulate our moiſture, and cauſe it through equability to paſs from an unequable and agitated ſtate into one immovable and collected. But that which is collected together contrary to nature, naturally oppoſes ſuch a condition, and endeavours by repulſion to recall itſelf into a contrary ſituation. In this conteſt and agitation a trembling and numbneſs takes place; and all this *paſſion*, together with that which produces it, is denominated cold. But we call that hard to which our fleſh gives way; and ſoft, which yields to the preſſure of our fleſh. And we thus denominate them with reference to each other. But every thing yields to preſſure which is eſtabliſhed on a ſmall baſe. But that which reſts on triangular baſes, on account of its being vehemently firm, is of a moſt reſiſting nature; and, becauſe it is denſe in the higheſt degree, ſtrongly repels all oppoſing preſſure.

Again, the nature of heavy and light will become eminently apparent, when inveſtigated together with upwards and downwards. But indeed it is by no means rightly aſſerted that there are naturally two certain places diſtant by a long interval from each other: one denominated downwards, to which all bodies tend endued with bulk, but the other upwards, to which every thing is involuntarily impelled. For, the whole univerſe being ſpherical, all ſuch things as by an equal departure from the middle become extremes, ought to become naturally extremes in a ſimilar manner. But the middle, being ſeparated from the extremes according to the ſame meaſures, ought to be conſidered as in a ſituation juſt oppoſite to all things. Such, then, being the natural diſpoſition of the world, he who places any one of the above-mentioned particulars either upwards or downwards, will juſtly appear

by ſuch appellations to wander from the truth. For the middle place in the univerſe cannot be properly called either naturally downwards or upwards, but can only be denominated that which is the middle. But that which environs is neither the middle, nor contains any parts in itſelf differing from each other with reference to the middle, nor does it poſſeſs any thing correſponding to an oppoſite direction. But to that which is every way naturally ſimilar how can any one with propriety attribute contrary names? For, if there be any thing ſolid, and endued with equal powers, in the middle of the univerſe, it will never tend to any part of the extremities, through the perfect ſimilitude which they every where poſſeſs. But if any one moves about this ſolid in a circle, he will often ſtand with his feet in oppoſite directions, and will denominate the ſame part of himſelf both upwards and downwards. Since the univerſe, therefore, as we have juſt obſerved, is of a ſpherical figure, it is not the part of a prudent man to aſſert that it has any place which is either upwards or downwards. But from whence theſe names originate, and, in what things exiſting, we transfer them from thence to the univerſe, it is our buſineſs at preſent to inveſtigate. If any one then ſhould be ſeated in that region of the world which for the moſt part belongs to the nature of fire, and to which it on all ſides tends, and if ſuch a one ſhould acquire a power of taking away the parts of fire, and of cauſing them to balance; or, placing the parts in a ſcale, ſhould violently ſeize on the beam, and, drawing out the fire, hurl it downwards into diſſimilar air—it is evident that in this caſe a leſs portion of fire would be more eaſily compelled than a greater. For, when two things are at the ſame time ſuſpended from one power, it is neceſſary that the leſs quantity ſhould more eaſily, and the greater with leſs readineſs, yield to the oppreſſive force. Hence, the one is called heavy, and tending downwards; but the other light, and tending upwards. The ſame thing happens to us who inhabit this terreſtrial region. For, walking on the earth, and ſeparating the terrene genera from each other, we ſometimes violently hurl a fragment of earth into its diſſimilar the air, and this with a motion contrary to its nature; each region at the ſame time retaining that to which it is allied. But the leſs portion, being more eaſily impelled into a diſſimilar place than the larger, firſt of all yields to the violence: and this we denominate light, and call the place into which it is violently hurled, upwards. But the paſſion contrary to this we denominate

heavy and downwards. Hence it is neceſſary that theſe ſhould mutually differ from each other; and this through the multitude of genera obtaining contrary ſituations. For that which is light in one place is contrary to that which is light in a contrary ſituation: likewiſe the heavy to the heavy, the downward to the downward, and the upward to the upward. For all theſe will be found to be contrary, tranſverſe, and every way different from each other. One thing however is to be underſtood concerning all theſe, that the progreſſion of each, tending to its kindred nature, renders the proceeding body heavy, and the place to which it tends, downwards. But this progreſſion influences in a different manner ſuch as are differently affected. And thus have I unfolded the cauſes of theſe paſſions.

But again, any one who beholds the cauſe of the *paſſion* of ſmoothneſs and roughneſs may be able to diſcloſe it to others. For hardneſs mingled with inequality produces the one, and equality with denſity the other. But among the common *paſſions* which ſubſiſt about the whole body, that is the greateſt which is the cauſe of pleaſure and pain: to which may be added, ſuch as through the parts of the body detain the ſenſes, and have in theſe pleaſures and pains as their attendants. In this manner, then, we ſhould receive the cauſes of every paſſion, both ſenſible and inſenſible, calling to mind the diſtinctions which we formerly eſtabliſhed concerning the eaſily and difficultly movable nature. For in this manner we ought to purſue all ſuch things as we deſign to apprehend. Thus, with reſpect to that which is naturally eaſily movable, when any ſlender paſſion falls upon it, the ſeveral parts give themſelves up to each other in a circular progreſſion, producing the ſame effect; till, having arrived at the ſeat of prudence, they announce the power of that by which the paſſion was induced. But that which is affected in a contrary manner, being ſtable and without a circular progreſſion, alone ſuffers; but does not move any of the parts to which it is proximate. Hence, the parts not mutually giving themſelves up to each other, and the firſt paſſion in them becoming immovable with reſpect to the whole animal, that which ſuffers is rendered void of ſenſation. This laſt caſe indeed happens about the bones and hairs, and ſuch other parts of our compoſition as are moſtly terrene. But the circumſtances belonging to the eaſily movable nature take place about the inſtruments of ſight and hearing, through their containing the moſt abundant power of fire and air. But it is neceſſary to conſider the peculiarities

of

of pleaſure and pain as follows:—When a *paſſion* is produced in us contrary to nature, and with violence and abundance, then it becomes the occaſion of pain. And again, when a *paſſion* conformable to our nature is excited, and this with abundance, it cauſes pleaſure and delight. But that which is contrary to theſe produces contrary effects. But a *paſſion*, the whole of which is induced with great facility, is eminently indeed the object of ſenſation, but does not participate of pleaſure and pain. And of this kind are the *paſſions* ſubſiſting about the ſight; to which, as we have above aſſerted, our body is allied. For ſuch objects as exhibit ſections and burnings, and other *paſſions* of a ſimilar kind, do not cauſe pain to the ſight; nor, again, does the ſight receive pleaſure when it is reſtored to the ſame form as before. But the moſt vehement and clear ſenſations influence it with pain, ſo far as it ſuffers any thing, ſtrikes againſt, or comes into contact with, any object. For no violence ſubſiſts in the ſeparation or concretion of the ſight. But ſuch bodies as are compoſed from larger parts, and which ſcarcely yield to impulſion, when they transfer the induced motions to the whole body, contain in themſelves pleaſures and pains; when varied, indeed, pains, but, when reſtored to their priſtine ſituation, pleaſures. Again, whatever bodies in a ſmall degree receive departures and evacuations of themſelves, accompanied at the ſame time with abundant repletions,—ſince ſuch bodies have no ſenſe of evacuation, but are ſenſible of repletion, they do not affect the mortal part of the ſoul with any pain, but, on the contrary, influence it with the greateſt delight. And the truth of this is manifeſt from the ſenſation of ſweet odours. But ſuch bodies as ſuffer an abundant variation, and are ſcarce able to be reſtored in a ſmall degree to their priſtine ſituation, are totally affected in a manner contrary to thoſe we have juſt deſcribed. And the truth of this is manifeſt in the burnings and ſections of the body. And thus have we nearly diſcuſſed the common paſſions of the whole body, and the appellations aſſigned to the cauſes by which they are produced.

Let us now endeavour to explain thoſe paſſions which take place in particular parts of our bodies, and relate from whence they ariſe, and by what cauſes they are induced. In the firſt place, let us if poſſible complete what we formerly left unfiniſhed concerning humours; ſince theſe are paſſions ſubſiſting about the tongue. But theſe, as well as many other things, appear to be produced by certain ſeparations and concretions; and, beſides this, to

employ ſmoothneſs and roughneſs more than the reſt. For certain ſmall veins extend themſelves from the tongue to the heart, and are the meſſengers of taſtes. And when any thing falls upon theſe ſo as to penetrate the moiſt and delicate texture of the fleſh, which through its terreſtrial nature is moderately liquefied, it then contracts and dries the veins. Hence, if theſe penetrating ſubſtances are of a more rough nature, they produce a ſharp taſte; but, if leſs rough, a ſour taſte. But ſuch things as are purgative of theſe veins, and which waſh away whatever is found adhering to the tongue, if they accompliſh this in an immoderate degree, ſo as to liquefy ſomething of the nature of the tongue, ſuch as is the power of nitre;—all ſuch as theſe are denominated bitter. But whatever is ſubordinate to this property of nitre, and purges in a more moderate degree, appears to us to be ſalt, without the roughneſs of bitterneſs, and to be more friendly to our nature. Again, ſuch things as, communicating with the heat of the mouth, and being rendered ſmooth by it, heat alſo in their turn the mouth—and which through their lightneſs are elevated towards the ſenſes of the head, at the ſame time dividing whatever they meet with in their aſcent;—all theſe, through powers of this kind, are denominated ſharp. But ſometimes theſe ſeveral particulars, becoming attenuated through rottenneſs, enter into the narrow veins, and compel the interior parts, as well the terrene as thoſe containing the ſymmetry of air, to be mingled together by moving about each other; and when mingled cauſe ſome of the parts to glide round, ſome to enter into others, and when entered to render them hollow and extended; and this in the place where a hollow moiſture is extended about the air. This moiſture too being at one time terrene and at another pure, a moiſt orbicular receptacle of air is produced from the hollow water. But that which is produced from pure water is on all ſides diaphanous, and is called a bubble. On the contrary, that which owes its ſubſiſtence to a more earthly moiſture, and which is at the ſame time agitated and elevated, is denominated fervid, and a fermentation. But the cauſe of all theſe paſſions receives the appellation of acute. And a paſſion contrary to all that has been aſſerted concerning theſe proceeds from a contrary cauſe. But when the compoſition of the things entering into moiſt ſubſtances is naturally accommodated to the quality of the tongue, it poliſhes and anoints its aſperities, and collects together or relaxes ſuch parts as were either aſſembled or diſſipated contrary to nature, and

reſtores

reſtores them to their proper and natural habit. Hence, all ſuch ſubſtances are pleaſant and friendly to every one, become the remedies of violent paſſions, and are denominated ſweet. And thus much may ſuffice concerning particulars of this kind.

There are, however, no ſpecies about the power of the noſtrils: for all odours are but half begotten. But it happens to no ſpecies to be commenſurate with any odour. And our veins, with reſpect to particulars of this kind, are too narrow to admit the genera of earth and water, and too broad to receive thoſe of fire and air; and hence no one ever perceives an odour of any one of theſe. But odours are always produced from the madefaction, corruption, liquefaction or evaporation of the elements. For, water becoming changed into air, and air into water, odours are generated in the middle of theſe. And all odours are either ſmoke or miſts. But, of theſe, that which paſſes from air into water is a miſt; but that which is changed from water into air, ſmoke. And hence it comes to paſs that all odours are more attenuated than water, and more denſe than air. But the truth of this is ſufficiently evident when any one, in conſequence of a diſagreeable ſmell, violently draws his breath inwards; for then no odour is waſhed off, but breath alone follows unattended by ſmell. On this account, the varieties of theſe ſubſiſt without a name; as they are neither compoſed from many nor from ſimple ſpecies. But two of theſe alone receive an appellation, the pleaſant and the diſagreeable: the latter of which diſturbs and violently aſſaults all that cavity which lies between the top of the head and the navel; but the former allures this part of the body, and by its amicable ingreſs preſerves it in a condition accommodated to its nature. But we ought to conſider the third ſenſitive part of our compoſition, hearing, in ſuch a manner that we may explain through what cauſes the paſſions with which it is converſant ſubſiſt. We ought, therefore, entirely to define voice a certain pulſation of the air, penetrating through the ears, brain, and blood, as far as to the ſoul: and we ſhould call the motion ariſing from hence, which commences from the head and ends in the ſeat of the liver, hearing. When this motion is ſwift, a ſharp ſound is produced; but, when ſlow, a flat ſound. And the former of theſe is equal and ſmooth, but the latter rough. Many voices too produce a great ſound, but a ſmall ſound is the reſult of a few. But it is neceſſary that we ſhould ſpeak about the ſymphonies of theſe in the ſubſequent part

of

of this diſcourſe. The fourth ſenſitive genus now remains for our diſcuſſion; which contains in itſelf an abundant variety, all which are denominated colours. But colour is a flame flowing from bodies, and poſſeſſing parts commenſurate to the ſight with reſpect to perception. But we have already conſidered the cauſes from which ſight is produced. It appears then that we may now ſpeak of colours according to aſſimilative reaſons as follows:

Of things which, proceeding from other parts, fall on the ſight, ſome are greater, others leſs, and others equal to the parts of the ſight. Such as are equal, therefore, cannot be perceived; and theſe we denominate diaphanous. But, among ſuch as are larger or ſmaller, ſome of theſe ſeparate, but others mingle the ſight, ſimilar to the operations of heat and cold about the fleſh, or to things ſour, acute and hot about the tongue. But things which affect the ſight in this manner are called black and white; which are indeed the paſſions of thoſe particulars we have juſt related, being their ſiſters, as it were, and the ſame with them in a different genus; but which, nevertheleſs, through theſe cauſes appear to be different. We ſhould, therefore, ſpeak of them as follows:—That the colour which is ſegregative of the ſight is white; but that which produces an effect contrary to this, black. But when a more acute motion, and of a different kind of fire, falls upon and ſeparates the ſight, as far as to the eyes, at the ſame time violently propelling and liquefying the tranſitions of the eyes, then æ collected ſubſtance of fire and water flows from thence, which we denominate a tear; but the motion itſelf is a fire meeting with the ſight in an oppoſite direction. And, indeed, when a fire, leaping as it were from a certain corruſcation, becomes mingled with another fire, penetrating and extinguiſhed by moiſture, from this mixture colours of all-various kinds are produced. In this caſe we call the paſſion a vibrating ſplendour, and that which produces it fulgid and rutilating. But a kind of fire which ſubſiſts in the middle of theſe, arriving at the moiſture of the eyes, and becoming mingled with it, is by no means ſplendid: but in conſequence of the rays of fire being mingled through moiſture, and producing a bloody colour, we denominate the mixture red. And when ſplendour is mingled with red and white, it generates a yellow colour. But to relate in what meaſure each of theſe is mingled with each, is not the buſineſs of one endued with intellect, even though he were well informed in this affair; ſince he would not be able to produce concerning theſe either a

neceſſary or an aſſimilative reaſon. But red, when mingled with black and white, produces a purple colour. And when to theſe, mingled and burnt together, more of black is added, a more obſcure colour is produced. A ruddy colour is generated from the mixture of yellow and brown; but brown from the mixture of black and white. A pallid colour ariſes from the mingling of white and yellow. But that which is ſplendid conjoined with white, and falling upon abundance of black, gives completion to an azure colour. And azure mingled with white generates a gray colour. But from the temperament of a ruddy colour with black, green is produced. All the reſt will be nearly evident from theſe, to any one who, imitating the former mixtures, preſerves aſſimilative reaſons in his diſcourſe. But if any one undertakes the inveſtigation of theſe, for the ſake of the things themſelves, ſuch a one muſt be ignorant of the difference between a divine and human nature: ſince a God is indeed ſufficient for the purpoſe of mingling many things into one, and of again diſſolving the one into many, as being at the ſame time both knowing and able: but there is no man at preſent who is able to accompliſh either of theſe undertakings, nor will there ever be one in any future circulation of time. But all theſe which thus naturally ſubſiſt from neceſſity, were aſſumed in the things which are generated by the artificer of that which is moſt beautiful and beſt, when he produced a ſelf-ſufficient and moſt perfect God; employing, indeed, cauſes which are ſubſervient to theſe, but operating himſelf in the beſt manner in all generated natures. On this account it is requiſite to diſtinguiſh two ſpecies of cauſes; the one neceſſary, but the other divine. And we ſhould inquire after the divine cauſe in all things, for the ſake of obtaining a bleſſed life in as great a degree as our nature is capable of receiving it; but we ſhould inveſtigate the neceſſary cauſe for the ſake of that which is divine. For we ſhould conſider, that without theſe two ſpecies of cauſes, the objects of our purſuit can neither be underſtood nor apprehended, nor in any other way become participated. But ſince to us at preſent, as to artificers, matter lies in ſubjection, the genera of cauſes ſerving as prepared materials from which the remaining diſcourſe is to be woven, let us again return with brevity to our firſt diſcuſſions, and ſwiftly paſs from thence to the place at which we are now arrived; by this means endeavouring to eſtabliſh an end and ſummit to our diſputation, which may harmonize with its beginning.

Indeed,

Indeed, as we aſſerted towards the commencement of our diſcourſe, when all ſenſible natures were in a diſordered ſtate of ſubſiſtence, Divinity rendered each commenſurate with itſelf, and all with one another, and connected them as much as poſſible with the bands of analogy and ſymmetry. For then nothing participated of order except by accident; nor could any thing with propriety be diſtinguiſhed by the appellation which it receives at preſent, ſuch for inſtance as fire, water, and the reſt of this kind. But the demiurgus in the firſt place adorned all theſe, afterwards eſtabliſhed the world from their conjunction, and rendered it one animal, containing in itſelf all mortal and immortal animals. And of divine natures, indeed, he himſelf became the author; but he delivered to his offspring the junior Gods the fabrication of mortal natures. Hence, theſe imitating their father's power, and receiving the immortal principle of the ſoul, faſhioned poſterior to this the mortal body, aſſigned the whole body as a vehicle to the ſoul, and fabricated in it another mortal ſpecies of ſoul, poſſeſſing dire and neceſſary paſſions through its union with the body. The firſt indeed of theſe paſſions is pleaſure, which is the greateſt allurement to evil; but the next is pain, which is the exile of good. After theſe follow boldneſs and fear, thoſe mad adviſers; anger, hard to be appeaſed; hope, which is eaſily deceived; together with irrational ſenſe, and love, the general invader of all things. In conſequence, therefore, of mingling theſe together, the junior Gods neceſſarily compoſed the mortal race. And religiouſly fearing leſt the divine nature ſhould be defiled through this rout of moleſtations more than extreme neceſſity required, they lodged the mortal part, ſeparate from the divine, in a different receptacle of the body; fabricating the head and breaſt, and placing the neck between as an iſthmus and boundary, that the two extremes might be ſeparate from each other.

In the breaſt, therefore, and that which is called the thorax, they ſeated the mortal genus of the ſoul. And as one part of it is naturally better, but another naturally worſe, they fabricated the cavity of the thorax; diſtributing this receptacle in the woman different from that of the man, and placing in the middle of theſe the midriff or diaphragm. That part of the ſoul, therefore, which participates of fortitude and anger, and is fond of contention, they ſeated nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck; that becoming obedient to reaſon, and uniting with it in amicable conjunction,

junction, it might together with reaſon forcibly repreſs the race of deſires, whenever they ſhould be found unwilling to obey the mandates of reaſon, iſſuing her orders from her lofty place of abode. But they eſtabliſhed the heart, *which is both the fountain of the veins, and of the blood, which is vehemently impelled through all the members of the body in a* CIRCULAR PROGRESSION, in an habitation correſponding to that of a ſatellite; that when the iraſcible part becomes inflamed, reaſon at the ſame time announcing that ſome unjuſt action has taken place externally, or has been performed by ſome one of the inward deſires, then every thing ſenſitive in the body may ſwiftly through all the narrow pores perceive the threatenings and exhortations, may be in every reſpect obedient, and may thus permit that which is the beſt in all theſe to maintain the ſovereign command.

But as the Gods previouſly knew that the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of dreadful events, and the effervescence of anger, and every kind of wrathful inflation, would be produced by fire, they implanted in the body the idea of the lungs, artificially producing them as a guardian to the heart. And, in the firſt place, they rendered them ſoft and bloodleſs, and afterwards internally perforated with hollow pipes like a ſponge; that through their receiving ſpirit and imbibing moiſture, they might become themſelves refrigerated, and might afford reſpiration and remiſſion to the heart in its exceſſive heat. Hence they deduced the arteries as ſo many canals through the ſubſtance of the lungs; and placed the lungs like a ſoft thicket round the heart, that when anger rages in it with too much vehemence it may leap into ſubmiſſion, and becoming refrigerated may be ſubject to leſs endurance, and may be able together with anger to yield with greater facility to the authority of reaſon. But they ſeated that part of the ſoul which is deſiderative of meats and drinks, and ſuch other things as it requires through the nature of body, between the præcordia and the boundary about the navel; fabricating all this place as a manger ſubſervient to the nutriment of the body, and binding in it this part of the ſoul as a ruſtic and ſavage animal. But it is neceſſary that this part ſhould nouriſh its conjoined body, if the mortal race has a neceſſary exiſtence in the nature of things. That this part, therefore, might be always fed at the manger, and might dwell remote from the deliberative part, moleſting it in the ſmalleſt degree with its tumults and clamours, and permitting it, as that which is moſt excellent in our compoſition, to conſult in quiet for the

common utility of the whole animal; on this account the Gods aſſigned it ſuch a ſubordinate ſituation.

However, as the Divinity perceived that this part would not be obedient to reaſon, but that it would naturally reject its authority in conſequence of every ſenſible impreſſion, and would be animaſtically hurried away by images and phantaſms both by day and night—conſidering this, he conſtituted the form of the liver, and placed it in the habitation of this deſiderative part; compoſing it denſe and ſmooth, ſplendid and ſweet, and at the ſame time mingled with bitterneſs; that the power of cogitations, deſcending from intellect into the liver as into a mirror receiving various reſemblances and exhibiting images to the view, might at one time terrify this irrational nature by employing a kindred part of bitterneſs and introducing dreadful threats, ſo that the whole liver being gradually mingled might repreſent bilious colours, and becoming contracted might be rendered throughout wrinkled and rough; and that, beſides this, it might influence its lobe, ventricle, and gates, in ſuch a manner, that by diſtorting and twiſting ſome of theſe from their proper diſpoſition, and obſtructing and ſhutting in others, it might be the cauſe of damages and pains. And again, that at another time a certain inſpiration of gentleneſs from the dianoëtic power, by deſcribing contrary phantaſms and affording reſt to bitterneſs, through its being unwilling either to excite or apply itſelf to a nature contrary to its own; and beſides this, by employing the innate ſweetneſs of the liver, and rendering all its parts properly diſpoſed, ſmooth, and free, might cauſe that part of the ſoul which reſides about the liver to become peaceful and happy, ſo that it might even refrain from exceſs in the night, and employ prophetic energies in ſleep: ſince it does not participate of reaſon and prudence. For thoſe who compoſed us, calling to mind the mandate of their father, that they ſhould render the mortal race as far as poſſible the beſt, ſo conſtituted the depraved part of our nature that it might become connected with truth; eſtabliſhing in this part a prophetic knowledge of future events. But that Divinity aſſigned divination to human madneſs may be ſufficiently inferred from hence; that no one while endued with intellect becomes connected with a divine and true prophecy; but this alone takes place either when the power of prudence is fettered by ſleep, or ſuffers ſome mutation through diſeaſe, or a certain enthuſiaſtic energy: it being in this caſe the employment of prudence to underſtand

underſtand what was aſſerted either ſleeping or waking by a prophetic and enthuſiaſtic nature; and ſo to diſtinguiſh all the phantaſtic appearances as to be able to explain what and to whom any thing of future, paſt, or preſent good is portended. But it is by no means the office of that which abides and is ſtill about to abide in this enthuſiaſtic energy, to judge of itſelf either concerning the appearances or vociferations. Hence it was well ſaid by the antients, that to tranſact and know his own concerns and himſelf, is alone the province of a prudent man. And on this account the law orders that the race of prophets ſhould preſide as judges over divine predictions; who are indeed called by ſome diviners—but this in conſequence of being ignorant that ſuch men are interpreters of ænigmatical viſions and predictions, and on this account ſhould not be called diviners, but rather prophets of divinations. The nature, therefore, of the liver was produced on this account, and ſeated in the place we have mentioned, viz. for the ſake of prediction. And beſides this, while each of ſuch like parts is living, it poſſeſſes clearer indications; but when deprived of life it then becomes blind, and the divination is rendered too obſcure to ſignify any thing ſufficiently clear. But an inteſtine which ſubſiſts for the ſake of the liver, is placed near it on the left hand, that it may always render the liver ſplendid and pure, and prepared like a mirror for the apt reception of reſemblant forms. On this account, when certain impurities are produced about the liver through bodily diſeaſe, then the ſpleen, purifying theſe by its rarity, receives them into itſelf from its being of a hollow and bloodleſs contexture. Hence, being filled with purgations, it increaſes in bulk, and becomes inflated with corruption. And again, when the body is purified, then becoming depreſſed it ſubſides into the ſame condition as before. And thus we have ſpoken concerning both the mortal and divine part of the ſoul, and have related where they are ſituated, in conjunction with what natures, and why they are ſeparated from each other. That all this indeed is unfolded according to indiſputable truth, can only be aſſerted when confirmed by the vocal atteſtation of a God: but that it is ſpoken according to aſſimilative reaſons, we ſhould not heſitate to evince both now and hereafter by a more diligent diſcuſſion of what remains.

It is proper to inveſtigate in a ſimilar manner the ſubſequent part of our diſputation; and this is no other than to relate how the other members

of the body were produced. It is becoming, therefore, in the moſt eminent degree that they ſhould be compoſed as follows: Thoſe artificers then of our race well knew that we ſhould be intemperate in the aſſumption of meats and drinks, and that we ſhould often through gluttony uſe more than was moderate and neceſſary. Hence, leſt ſudden deſtruction ſhould take place through diſeaſe, and the mortal race thus becoming imperfect ſhould preſently ceaſe to exiſt; the Gods previouſly perceiving this conſequence, fabricated in the lower parts a hollow receptacle for the purpoſe of receiving a ſuperabundance of ſolid and liquid aliment; and, beſides this, inveſted it with the ſpiral folds of the inteſtines, leſt, the aſſumed nutriment ſwiftly paſſing away, the body ſhould as ſwiftly require an acceſſion of new aliment; and, by producing an inſatiable appetite through gluttony, ſhould render our whole race void of philoſophy and the muſes, and unobedient to the moſt divine part of our compoſition. But the nature of the bones and fleſh, and other things of this kind, was conſtituted as follows: In the firſt place, the generation of the marrow ſerves as a principle to all theſe. For the bonds of that life which the ſoul leads through its conjunction with the body, being woven together in the marrow, become the ſtable roots of the mortal race. But the marrow itſelf is generated from other particulars. For, among the triangles, ſuch as are firſt, being unbent and ſmooth, were particularly accommodated to the generation of fire and water, air and earth; and the Divinity ſeparating each of theſe apart from their genera, and mingling them commenſurate with each other, compoſing by this means an all-various mixture of ſeeds for the mortal race, produced from theſe the nature of the marrow. But afterwards diſſeminating in the marrow, he bound in it the genera of ſouls. Beſides, in this firſt diſtribution, he immediately ſeparated as many figures and of ſuch kinds as it was requiſite the marrow ſhould poſſeſs. And he faſhioned indeed that part of the marrow in which as in a cultivated field the divine ſeed was to be ſown, every way globular, and called it εγκεφαλον, or the brain; becauſe in every animal, when it has acquired the perfection of its form, the receptacle of this ſubſtance is denominated the head. But he diſtinguiſhed with round and at the ſame time oblong figures, that receptacle of the body which was deſtined to contain the remaining and mortal part of the ſoul; and was willing that the whole ſhould receive the appellation of marrow. And beſides this, hurling from theſe as anchors the bonds of all

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the ſoul, he fabricated the whole of our body about the ſubſtance of the marrow, and inveſted it on all ſides with a covering of bones.

But he thus compoſed the nature of the bones. In the firſt place, bruiſing together pure and ſmooth earth, he mingled and moiſtened it with marrow; after this he placed it in fire, then merged it in water, then again ſeated it in fire, and after this dipped it in water. And thus, by often transferring it into each, he rendered it incapable of being liqueſied by both. Employing therefore this nature of bone, he faſhioned like one working with a wheel a bony ſphere, and placed it round the brain; leaving a narrow paſſage in the ſphere itſelf. And beſides this, forming certain vertebræ from bone about the marrow of the neck and back, he extended them like hinges, commencing from the head and proceeding through the whole cavity of the body. And thus he preſerved all the ſeed, by fortifying it round about with a ſtony veſtment. He likewiſe added joints, for the purpoſe of motion and inflection, employing the nature of that which is diſtinguiſhed by *difference* in their fabrication, as this is endued with a certain middle capacity. But, as he thought that the habit of the bony nature would become more dry and inflexible than it ought to be, and that, when it became heated and again cooled, it would in conſequence of ulceration ſwiftly corrupt the ſeed which it contained, on this account he faſhioned the genus of nerves and fleſh; that the nerves, by binding all the other members, and becoming ſtretched and remitted about thoſe hinges the vertebræ, might render the body apt to become inflected and extended as occaſion required: but that the fleſh might ſerve as a covering from the heat and a protection from the cold; and, beſides this, might defend it from falls, in the ſame manner as external ſupports, gently and eaſily yielding to the motions of the body. He likewiſe placed a hot moiſture in the nature of the fleſh, that, becoming in ſummer externally dewy and moiſt, it might afford a kindred refrigeration to the whole body; and that again in winter, through its own proper fire, it might moderately repel the externally introduced and ſurrounding cold. When, therefore, the plaſtic artificer of our bodies had perceived all this through a dianoëtic energy, having mingled and harmonized together water, fire, and earth, and added to the mixture a ſharp and ſalt ferment, he gradually compoſed ſoft and ſucculent fleſh.

But he mingled the nature of the nerves from bone and unfermented fleſh,

compoſing one middle ſubſtance from the power of both, and tingeing it with a yellow colour. And on this account it comes to paſs that the power of the nerves is more intenſe and viſcous than that of the fleſh, but more ſoft and moiſt than that of the bones. Hence, the Divinity bound the bones and marrow to each other with the nerves, and afterwards inveſted them all ſupernally with the fleſh, as with a dark concealing ſhade. Such of the bones, therefore, as were the moſt animated he covered with the leaſt fleſh; but ſuch as were the leaſt animated he inveſted with fleſh the moſt abundant and denſe. And, beſides this, he added but a ſmall quantity of fleſh to the joints of the bones, except where reaſon evinces the neceſſity of the contrary: and this leſt they ſhould be a hindrance to the inflections, and retard the motions of the body; and again, leſt in conſequence of their being many and denſe, and vehemently compreſſed in one another, they ſhould cauſe through their ſolidity a privation of ſenſe, a difficulty of recollection, and a remiſſion of the dianoëtic energy. On this account he inveſted with abundance of fleſh the bones of the groin, legs, loins, the upper part of the arms, and that part which extends from the elbow to the wriſt, and ſuch other parts of our bodies as are without articulation, together with ſuch inward bones as through the paucity of ſoul in the marrow are deſtitute of a prudential energy. But he covered with a leſs quantity of fleſh ſuch bones as are endued with prudence: unleſs, perhaps, the fleſhy ſubſtance of the tongue, which was produced for the ſake of ſenſation, is to be excepted. In other parts, the caſe is ſuch as we have deſcribed. For a nature which is generated and nouriſhed from neceſſity can by no means at one and the ſame time receive a denſe bone and abundant fleſh, united with acuteneſs of ſenſation. But this would be moſt eminently the caſe with the compoſition of the head, if all theſe were willing to coaleſce in amicable conjunction: and the human race, poſſeſſing a fleſhy, nervous, and robuſt head, would enjoy a life twice as long, or ſtill more abundantly extended, healthy and unmoleſted, than that which we at preſent poſſeſs.

Again, in conſequence of thoſe artificers of our generation conſidering whether they ſhould fabricate our race poſſeſſing a life more laſting indeed but of a worſe condition, or of a ſhorter extent but of a more excellent condition, it appeared to them that a ſhorter but more excellent life was by all means to be preferred to one more laſting but of a ſubordinate condition.

Hence

Hence they covered the head with a thin bone, but did not inveſt it with fleſh and nerves, becauſe it was deſtitute of inflections. On all theſe accounts, therefore, the head was added to the body as the moſt ſenſitive and prudent, but at the ſame time by far the moſt imbecil part of all the man. But through theſe cauſes, and in this manner, the Divinity placing the nerves about the extreme part of the head, conglutinated them in a circle about the neck, (after a certain ſimilitude), and bound with them thoſe lofty cheek-bones ſituated under the countenance; but he diſſeminated the reſt about all the members, connecting joint with joint. Beſides, thoſe adorners of our race ornamented us with the power of the mouth, teeth, tongue, and lips, and this for the ſake of things which are at the ſame time both neceſſary and the beſt; producing ingreſſion for the ſake of neceſſaries, but egreſſion for the ſake of ſuch as are beſt. Every thing, indeed, which being introduced affords nutriment to the body, is neceſſary; but the ſtream of words flowing forth externally, and becoming ſubſervient to prudence, is the moſt beautiful and beſt of all effluxions. Beſides, it was not poſſible that the head could remain without any other covering than that of a naked bone, through the extremities of heat and cold in the different ſeaſons; nor, again, could it become the inſtrument of knowledge when inveſted with darkneſs, dulled, and without ſenſation, through the perturbation of fleſh. Hence, a part of a fleſhy nature, not entirely dried, and ſurpaſſing the reſidue, was ſeparated from the reſt; and which is now denominated a membrane. This membrane paſſing into union with itſelf, and bloſſoming about the moiſture of the brain, circularly inveſts the head. But the moiſture flowing under the ſutures of the head irrigates this membrane, and, cauſing it to cloſe together at the crown, connects it, as it were, in a knot. But an all-various ſpecies of ſutures is generated through the power of the circulations and the nutriment; the variety becoming greater when theſe oppoſe each other with greater violence, but leſs when they are in a ſtate of leſs oppoſition. All this membrane the divine artificer of our bodies circularly pierced with fire. And hence, becoming as it were wounded, and the moiſture externally flowing through it, whatever is moiſt, hot, and pure, paſſes away; but whatever is mingled from the ſame natures as the membrane itſelf, this, in conſequence of receiving an external production, becomes extended into length, and poſſeſſes a tenuity equal to the punctuation of the membrane. But this

ſubſtance,

ſubſtance, from the ſlowneſs of its motion, being continually thruſt back by the externally ſurrounding ſpirit, again revolves itſelf under the membrane, and there fixes the roots of its progreſſion. Hence, from theſe paſſions the race of hairs ſprings up in the membrane of the head, being naturally allied to, and becoming, as it were, the reins of this membrane, at the ſame time that they are more hard and denſe through the compreſſion of cold. For every hair, when it proceeds beyond the membrane, becomes hardened through cold. After this manner, then, the artificer planted our head with hairs, employing for this purpoſe the cauſes which we have mentioned.

But at the ſame time he underſtood by a dianoëtic energy, that inſtead of fleſh a light covering was neceſſary for the ſecurity of the brain; which might ſufficiently ſhade and protect it like a garment from the extremities of heat and cold, but by no means hinder the acuteneſs of ſenſation. But that comprehenſion of nerve, ſkin, and bone about the fingers, being a mixture of three ſubſtances, and becoming of a drier nature, produced one common hard membrane from the whole. Theſe indeed were the miniſtrant cauſes of its fabrication; but the moſt principal cauſe conſiſts in that cogitation which produced this membrane for the ſake of future advantage. For thoſe artificers of our nature well knew that at ſome time or other women and other animals would be generated from men; and that nails would be of the greateſt advantage in many reſpects to the beſtial tribes. Hence they impreſſed in men the generation of nails, at the very period of their production. But from this reaſon, and through theſe cauſes, they planted the ſkin, hairs, and nails in the members ſituated at the extremities of the body. However, as all the parts and members of a mortal animal were generated in alliance with each other, and neceſſarily poſſeſſed their life in the union of fire and ſpirit, leſt the animal becoming reſolved and exhauſted by theſe ſhould ſwiftly decay, the Gods deviſed the following remedy:—For mingling a nature allied to the human with other forms and ſenſes, they planted, as it were, another animal; ſuch as thoſe mild trees, plants, and ſeeds, which, being now brought to perfection through the exerciſe of agriculture, are friendly to our nature; though prior to this they were of a ruſtic kind, being more antient than ſuch as are mild. For whatever participates of life we may juſtly and with the greateſt rectitude denominate an animal. But this which we are now ſpeaking of participates the third ſpecies of ſoul, which

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we place between the præcordia and the navel: and in which there is neither any thing of opinion, reaſon, or intellect; but to which a pleaſant and painful ſenſe, together with deſires, belongs. For it continually ſuffers all things. But when it is converted in itſelf, about itſelf, and, rejecting external, employs its own proper motion, it is not allotted by its generation a nature capable of conſidering its own concerns by any thing like a reaſoning energy. On this account it lives, and is not different from an animal; but, becoming ſtably rooted, abides in a fixed poſition, through its being deprived of a motion originating from itſelf.

But when thoſe ſuperior artificers of our compoſition had implanted all theſe genera for the purpoſe of ſupplying nutriment to our nature, they deduced various channels in our body as in a garden, that it might be irrigated as it were by the acceſſion of flowing moiſture. And, in the firſt place, they cut two occult channels under the concretion of the ſkin and fleſh, viz. two veins in the back, according to the double figure of the body on the right hand and the left. Theſe they placed with the ſpine of the back, ſo as to receive the prolific marrow in the middle, that it might thus flouriſh in the moſt eminent degree; and, by copiouſly flowing from hence to other parts, might afford an equable irrigation. But after this, cutting the veins about the head, and weaving them with each other in an oppoſite direction, they ſeparated them; inclining ſome from the right hand to the left hand parts of the body, and ſome from the left to the right, that the head, together with the ſkin, might be bound to the body, as it is not circularly divided with nerves about its ſummit; and beſides this, that the paſſion of the ſenſes might from each of theſe parts be deduced on all ſides through the whole of the body. In this manner, then, they deduced an aqueduct from hence; the truth of which we ſhall eaſily perceive by aſſenting to the following poſition. That all ſuch things as are compoſed from leſſer parts are able to contain ſuch as are greater; but ſuch as conſiſt from greater cannot inveſt thoſe compoſed from leſſer parts. But fire, among all the genera of things, is conſtituted from the ſmalleſt parts. Hence, it penetrates through water, earth, and air, and the compoſites from theſe; and this in ſuch a manner, that nothing can reſtrain its pervading power. The ſame muſt be underſtood of that ventricle our belly; that it is able to retain the intromitted meat and drink, but cannot ſtay ſpirit and fire, becauſe theſe conſiſt of ſmaller parts than thoſe from

which the belly is compoſed. Theſe, therefore, the Divinity employed for the purpoſe of producing an irrigation from the belly into the veins; weaving from fire and air a certain flexible ſubſtance like a bow-net, and which poſſeſſes a twofold gibboſity at the entrance. One of theſe he again wove together, divided into two parts; and circularly extended theſe parts from the curvatures like ropes through the whole body, as far as to the extremities of the net. All the interior parts therefore of the net-work he compoſed from fire; but the gibboſities and the receptacle itſelf from air. And laſtly, receiving theſe, he diſpoſed them in the animal new formed as follows:—In the firſt place, one of the gibbous parts he aſſigned to the mouth; but, as the gibboſity of this part is twofold, he cauſed one part to paſs through the arteries into the lungs, but the other along with the arteries into the belly. But having divided the other gibbous part according to each of its parts, he cauſed it to paſs in common to the channels of the noſe, ſo that, when the one part does not reach the mouth, all its ſtreams may be filled from this. But he placed the other cavity of this gibbous ſubſtance about the hollow parts of the body; and cauſed the whole of this at one time to flow together gently into the gibbous parts, as they were of an aërial texture, and at another time to flow back again through the convex receptacles. But he ſo diſpoſed the net, as being compoſed from a thin body, that it might inwardly penetrate and again emerge through this ſubſtance. Beſides this, he ordered that the interior rays of fire ſhould follow in continued ſucceſſion, the air at the ſame time paſſing into each of the parts; and that this ſhould never ceaſe to take place as long as the mortal animal continued to ſubſiſt. But, in aſſigning an appellation to a motion of this kind, we denominate it expiration and reſpiration. But all this operation and the whole of this paſſion in our nature take place in the body by a certain irrigation and refrigeration conducive to our nutriment and life. For, when the breath paſſes inwardly and outwardly, an interior fire attends it in its courſe; and being diffuſed through the belly, when it meets with ſolid and liquid aliments, it reduces them to a ſtate of fluidity; and, diſtributing them into the ſmalleſt parts, educes them as from a fountain through the avenues of its progreſſion: pouring theſe ſmall particles into the channels of the veins, and deducing rivers through the body as through a valley of veins.

But let us again conſider the paſſion of reſpiration, and inveſtigate through what

what cauſes it was generated, ſuch as we perceive it at preſent. We ſhould conſider it, therefore, as follows:—As there is no ſuch thing as a vacuum into which any thing in motion can enter, and as breath paſſes from us externally, it is evident to every one that it cannot proceed into a void ſpace, but muſt thruſt that which is neareſt to it from its proper ſeat; that again the repulſed nature muſt always expel its neighbour; and that from a neceſſity of this kind every thing which is impelled into that ſeat from which the emitted breath is excluded, muſt, when it has entered into and filled up this ſpace, attend on the breath in its progreſſion. And all this muſt take place like the revolution of a wheel, through the impoſſibility of a vacuum. Hence, when the breaſt and the lungs externally diſmiſs the breath, they are again repleniſhed through the air which ſurrounds the body entering into and riding round the avenues of the fleſh. But the air being again externally diſmiſſed, and flowing round the body, impels the reſpiration inward, through the paſſages of the mouth and noſtrils.

But we ſhould eſtabliſh the following as the cauſe from which the origin of theſe was derived. Every animal belonging to the univerſe poſſeſſes a heat in the veins and the blood, like a certain fountain of fire; and this heat we compared to a bow-net, extended through the middle of the body, and wholly woven from fire; all ſuch things as are external being compoſed from air. But it muſt be confeſſed that heat naturally proceeds externally into a region to which it is allied. But as there are two progreſſions, one according to the body externally, but the other again according to the mouth and noſtrils, hence, when the breath is impelled inward, it again thruſts back that by which it was impelled. And that which is drawn back, meeting with fire, becomes heated; while that which is exhaled becomes refrigerated. In conſequence, therefore, of the heat being changed, and ſuch things as ſubſiſt according to the other tranſition becoming more hot, and that again which is more fervid verging to its own nature,—hence, one thing ſtrikes againſt and repels another in its courſe; and as they always ſuffer and mutually influence each other in the ſame manner, leaping this way and that in a circular progreſſion, they give birth to the expiration and reſpiration of the breath. But in this manner alſo we ſhould inveſtigate the cauſes of thoſe paſſions which ariſe from medical cupping-glaſſes, from drinking, from

things violently hurled, whether upwards or on the ground; together with ſuch ſounds as appear ſwift and ſlow, ſharp and flat, and which are at one time borne along unharmoniouſly, through the diſſimilitude of the motion which they cauſe within us, and at another time attended with harmony, through the ſimilitude of motion which they produce. For, the motions of ſuch ſounds as are prior and ſwifter ceaſing, and proceeding to a nature ſimilar to their own, are comprehended by ſuch as are ſlower, which now ſucceed to the ſwifter, and ſet them again in motion. But during their comprehenſion of theſe they do not diſturb them by introducing another motion, but lead on the beginning of the ſlower lation in conformity to that of the ſwifter. And theſe, adapting to themſelves a ſimilitude of the ceaſing motion, mingle together one paſſion from the union of ſharp and flat. From whence they afford pleaſure to the unwiſe, but joy to the wiſe, through the imitation of divine harmony ſubſiſting in mortal motions. And, indeed, with reſpect to all effluxions of water, the falling of thunder, and the wonderful circumſtances obſerved in the attraction of amber, and of the Herculean ſtone;—in all theſe, nothing in reality of attraction takes place: but, as a vacuum cannot any where be found, and theſe particulars mutually impel each other,—hence, from the individuals when ſeparated and mingled together tending to their proper ſeats, and from theſe paſſions being interwoven with each other, ſuch admirable effects preſent themſelves to the view of the accurate inveſtigator. And indeed reſpiration (from whence our diſcourſe originated) is generated from theſe cauſes, and after this manner, as we aſſerted above. For fire, dividing the aliment and becoming elevated internally, attending at the ſame time the breath in its aſcent, fills the veins from the belly by this joint elevation; and this in conſequence of drawing upwards from thence the diſſected parts: ſo that by this means, through the whole body of every animal, the ſtreams of nutriment are abundantly diffuſed. But the parts which are recently diſſected and ſeparated from their kindred natures, ſome of which are fruits and others graſs, and which were produced by Divinity for the nouriſhment of our bodies, poſſeſs all-various colours through their mixture with each other: but for the moſt part a red colour predominates in them, whoſe nature is fabricated from a ſection of fire, and an abſterſion in a moiſt ſubſtance. And hence, the colour of that which flows about the

body is ſuch as appears to the ſight, and which we denominate blood; being the paſture of the fleſh and of the whole body; from whence an irrigation becoming every where diffuſed, it copiouſly repleniſhes all the exhauſted parts.

But the manner of impletion and evacuation is produced in the ſame way as in the univerſe the lation of every thing takes place, viz. from that cauſe through which every kindred nature tends to itſelf. For the natures by which we are externally inveſted perpetually liquefy and diſtribute our bodies, diſmiſſing every ſpecies to its kindred form. But the ſanguineous parts, being diſtributed and comprehended within us, as is the caſe with every animal conſtituted under the heavens, are compelled to imitate the local motion of the univerſe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being borne along to its kindred nature, repleniſhes again that which is void. But when the effluxions ſurpaſs the acceſſions, a corruption of the whole animal enſues; and when the contrary takes place, it receives an increaſe. The recent compoſition, therefore, of every animal poſſeſſing new triangles, like ſhips formed from timbers unimpaired by age, cauſes a ſtrong encloſure of them within each other: but the whole of its delicate bulk unites in amicable conjunction, as being generated from moſt recent marrow, and nouriſhed in milk. Thoſe triangles, therefore, from which the liquid and ſolid aliments are compoſed, approaching externally, and being received into the animal, as they are more antient and imbecil than its own proper triangles, are vanquiſhed and cut in pieces by the new triangles: and the animal is rendered of a large ſize, through its being nouriſhed from a multitude of ſimilar parts. But when it relaxes the root of its triangles, in conſequence of becoming wearied and tamed, through many conteſts with many particulars in a long courſe of time; then it is no longer able to reduce by ſection the received aliment into a ſimilitude of itſelf, but its own parts become eaſily diſſipated by the natures which are externally introduced. Hence the whole animal, becoming by this means vanquiſhed, decays; and the paſſion itſelf is denominated old age. But the end of its exiſtence then arrives, when the jointly harmonized bonds of the triangles about the marrow no longer poſſeſs a detaining power, but becoming ſeparated through the wearineſs of labour, deſert the bonds of the ſoul. The ſoul, however, in this caſe being concealed in a ſtate according to nature, flies away with pleaſure and delight. For every thing contrary to nature is painful; but that which happens naturally

rally is pleaſant. Hence, the death which is produced through wounds and diſeaſe is painful and violent; but that which is cauſed from old age, proceeding to an end according to nature, is of all deaths the moſt free from labour, and is rather accompanied with pleaſure than pain.

But it muſt be obvious to every one from whence diſeaſes are produced. For, ſince there are four genera from which the body is compoſed, viz. earth, fire, water, and air, the unnatural abundance and defect of theſe, and a tranſlation from their own proper to a foreign ſeat, in conſequence of which each of theſe does not receive that which is accommodated to its nature, together with all ſuch circumſtances as theſe, produce contentions and diſeaſe. For, each of theſe ſubſiſting and being transferred in a manner contrary to nature, ſuch things as were formerly heated become cold, ſuch as were once dry become moiſt, ſuch as were light heavy, and every thing receives all poſſible mutations. For we aſſert that when the ſame thing approaches to, and departs from, the ſame, in the ſame manner, and according to analogy, then alone it permits that which is the ſame to abide healthy and ſafe. But that which inordinately wanders, either in acceding or departing, produces all-various mutations, diſeaſes, and infinite corruptions. Likewiſe a ſecond apprehenſion of diſeaſes may be obtained by any one who is ſo diſpoſed, from the ſecond compoſitions of things conſtituted according to nature. For, ſince the concretion of marrow, bone, fleſh, and nerve, is derived from theſe, as likewiſe the blood, though from a different mode of coalition, hence many events happen in the ſame manner as thoſe we have mentioned above; but the greateſt and moſt ſevere diſeaſes ſubſiſt as follows: When the generation of theſe ſecond compoſitions takes place inverſely, then they become ſubject to corruption. For the fleſh and nerves are naturally generated from blood: the nerves indeed from fibres, through the alliance ſubſiſting between theſe; but the fleſh from the coalition of that which when ſeparated from the fibres paſſes into a ſtate of concretion. But that ſubſtance again which ariſes from nerves and fleſh, being glutinous and fat, increaſes at the ſame time by nutrition the fleſh, which for the moſt part ſubſiſts about the nature of the bones; and likewiſe the bone itſelf, with which the marrow is ſurrounded. And again, that which trickles through the denſity of the bones, being the moſt pure kind of the triangles, and the moſt ſmooth and unctuous, while it drops and diſtils from the bones, irrigates

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the marrow. And hence, when each particular ſubſiſts in this manner, a healthy condition of body is produced; but a diſeaſed condition when the contrary is the caſe. For, when the fleſh becoming liquefied again tranſmits the conſumption into the veins, then the blood, together with ſpirit, becoming abundant and all-various in the veins, diverſified with colours and denſity, and infected with acid and ſalt qualities, generates all-various bile, corruption, and phlegm. And all theſe, being again thus generated and corrupted, in the firſt place deſtroy the blood itſelf; and this, no longer affording nutriment to the body, is every where borne along through the veins, without obſerving a natural order in its circulations. But theſe indeed are unfriendly to each other, becauſe they derive no mutual advantages from the properties with which each is endued. They likewiſe war upon the natural habit of the body, and its perſeverance in its proper ſtate, by introducing diſſolutions and liquefactions.

A moſt antient portion of fleſh, therefore, when it is liquefied and rendered difficult of digeſtion, grows black through antient burning; but through its being entirely macerated it becomes bitter, and adverſe to all the other parts of the body which are not yet infected with corruption. And then indeed the black colour poſſeſſes ſharpneſs inſtead of bitterneſs; that which was bitter becoming more attenuated: and the bitterneſs, being again tinged with blood, poſſeſſes a redder colour; but, from the black which is mingled with this, becomes of a bilious nature. But, beſides this, a yellow colour is mingled with bitterneſs, when the new fleſh liquefies through the fire ſubſiſting about flame. And, indeed, either ſome phyſician will aſſign to all theſe the common appellation of bile, or ſome one who is able to conſider things many and diſſimilar, and to behold one genus in many particulars deſerving one denomination. But ſuch other things as are called ſpecies of bile receive an appellation peculiar to each, according to colour. But corruption (ἰχωρ), which is the defluxion or whey of the blood, is gentle and mild: but that which is the ſediment of black and ſharp bile is of a ferocious and ruſtic nature, when it is mingled through heat with a ſaline power. And a ſubſtance of this kind is denominated acid phlegm. But a portion of recent and delicate fleſh is often liquefied together with the air, and is afterwards inflated and comprehended by moiſture: and from this paſſion bubbles are produced, which taken ſeparately are inviſible on account of their ſmallneſs,

neſs, but which, when collected into a large bulk, become conſpicuous, and poſſeſs a white colour on account of the generation of froth. And we denominate all this liquefaction of delicate fleſh, and which is woven together with ſpirit, white phlegm. But we call the ſediment of recent phlegm tears and ſweat; together with every thing of that kind into which the body is every day reſolved. And all theſe, indeed, become the inſtruments of diſeaſe, when the blood does not naturally abound from liquid and ſolid aliment, but increaſes from contraries in ſuch a manner as to violate the laws of nature. When, therefore, any part of the fleſh is cut off, but at the ſame time the foundation of it remains, the calamity poſſeſſes but half its power; for it is capable of being eaſily recovered. But when that which binds the fleſh to the bones becomes diſeaſed, and the blood flowing from it and the nerves no longer nouriſhes the bones and binds the fleſh, but, inſtead of being fat, ſmooth, and glutinous, becomes rough and ſalt through bad diet; then, in conſequence of ſuffering all this, and being ſeparated from the bones, it is refrigerated under the fleſh and nerves. For the fleſh, falling from its roots, leaves the nerves bare, and drenched in a ſalt humour; and hence, gliding again into the circulation of the blood, it increaſes the number of the diſeaſes we have already deſcribed. And theſe paſſions, indeed, which ſubſiſt about the body, are of a grievous nature: but thoſe which precede theſe are ſtill more afflictive and troubleſome. But this takes place when the bone through the denſity of the fleſh does not admit ſufficient reſpiration, but, being heated through filthineſs, becomes rotten, receives no nutriment, but falls upon the fleſh, which is on the contrary refrigerated; and the fleſh again falls on the blood, ſo that by this means diſeaſes more ſevere than the former are produced. But the extremity of all maladies then happens, when the nature of the marrow becomes diſeaſed through ſome defect or exceſs: for then it produces the moſt vehement and fatal diſeaſes; as the whole nature of the body is in this caſe neceſſarily diſſipated and diſſolved.

But it is requiſite after this to underſtand that the third ſpecies of diſeaſes receives a tripartite diviſion. For one of the diviſions is produced by ſpirit, the other by phlegm, and the other by bile. For when the lungs, thoſe diſtributive guardians of the breath, being obſtructed by defluxions, cannot afford a free paſſage to the breath; then, as there is no emiſſion of the breath in one part, and more is received into another part than is requiſite, the parts without

without refrigeration become rotten; but that which is received in too great abundance paſſing through the veins, diſtorts them and liquefies the diaphragm ſituated in the middle of the body: and thus ten thouſand grievous diſeaſes ariſe from hence, together with an abundance of ſweat. But often, when the fleſh becomes ſeparated within the body, breath is produced; and this being incapable of departing externally, cauſes the ſame torments as the breath when entering from without. It produces, however, the greateſt pains, when ſurrounding the nerves and neighbouring veins it inflates them, and ſtretches and diſtorts the ligaments and nerves continued from the back. And theſe diſeaſes, from the ſtretching and inflating paſſion, are denominated tenſions and contortions from behind; and of which it is difficult to find a cure. For, fevers taking place diſſolve theſe diſeaſes in a moſt eminent degree. But the white phlegm poſſeſſing a difficulty of reſpiring externally, through the ſpirit of the bubbles, variegates the body indeed in a milder nature, yet ſprinkles it with white ſpots, and generates other diſeaſes of a ſimilar kind. But when this white phlegm is mingled with black bile, and becomes diffipated about the circulations of the head, which are of a moſt divine nature, then it diſturbs theſe circulations; and if this happens in ſleep, the perturbation is leſs violent; but if to thoſe who are awake, it cannot without difficulty be expelled. And as this is a diſeaſe of a ſacred nature, it is moſt juſtly denominated a ſacred diſeaſe.

A ſharp and ſalt phlegm is the fountain of all ſuch diſeaſes as are produced by a defluxion of humours: and becauſe the places into which this phlegm flows poſſeſs an omniform variety, it generates all-various diſeaſes. But whatever parts of the body are ſaid to be inflated are thus affected from the inflammation of bile: which, when it expires, produces externally various tumours from its fervid nature; but, when inwardly reſtrained, generates many inflammatory diſeaſes. It is, however, then greateſt, when, being mingled with pure blood, it removes the fibres from their natural order, which are ſcattered into the blood for this purpoſe, that it may poſſeſs tenuity and denſity in a commenſurate degree; and that it may neither through heat (as it is of a moiſt nature) flow from the thin body, nor, when becoming more denſe, and of conſequence more unadapted to motion, may ſcarcely be able to flow back again through the veins. The fibres, therefore, are very ſerviceable on this occaſion, which if any one ſhould collect together in the

blood when dead, and in a ſtate of frigidity, all the remaining blood would become diffuſed; and when poured forth they would be ſwiftly coagulated, together with the cold by which they are ſurrounded. But as the fibres poſſeſs this power in the blood, and the bile naturally becomes antient blood, and is again liquefied from fleſh into this, ſuch things as are hot and moiſt falling gradually the firſt of all, hence it becomes collected together through the power of the fibres. When the bile is coagulated and violently extinguiſhed, it cauſes a tempeſt and tremour within. But when it flows more abundantly, vanquiſhing the fibres by its own proper heat, and becoming fervid in an inordinate degree, it then preſerves the body: and if it retains its conquering power to the end, it penetrates into the marrow; and burning the bonds of the ſoul, as if they were the cables of a ſhip, diſſolves her union, and diſmiſſes her from thence entirely free. But when it flows with leſs abundance, and the body becoming liquefied oppoſes its paſſage, then finding itſelf vanquiſhed, it either falls through the whole body, or, being compelled through the veins into the upper or lower belly, like one flying from a ſeditious city, it eſcapes from the body and introduces defluxions, dyſenteries, or gripings of the inteſtines, and all diſeaſes of a ſimilar kind. When the body, therefore, is eminently diſeaſed through exceſs of fire, it then labours under continued burnings and fever; but when through exceſs of air, under quotidian fevers: under tertian through water, becauſe water is more ſluggiſh than fire and air; under quartan, through exceſs of earth. For earth, being the moſt ſluggiſh of all theſe, is purified in quadruple periods of time; and on this account introduces quartan fevers, which it is ſcarcely poſſible to diſperſe. And in this manner are the diſeaſes of the body produced.

But the diſeaſes of the ſoul, which ſubſiſt through the habit of the body, are as follow:—We muſt admit that the diſeaſe of the ſoul is folly, or a privation of intellect. But there are two kinds of folly; the one madneſs, the other ignorance. Whatever paſſion, therefore, introduces either of theſe muſt be called a diſeaſe. And we ſhould eſtabliſh exceſſive pleaſures and pains as the greateſt diſeaſes of the ſoul. For, when a man is too much elevated with joy or depreſſed with grief, while he haſtens immoderately either to retain the one or to fly from the other, he is not able either to perceive or hear any thing properly, but is agitated with fury, and is very little capable

of

of exerciſing the reaſoning power. But he who poſſeſſes a great quantity of fluid ſeed about the marrow, and who, like a tree laden with a ſuperabundance of fruit, riots in the exceſs,—ſuch a one being influenced by many pains and pleaſures in deſires, and their attendant offspring, will be agitated with fury for the greateſt part of his life through mighty pleaſures and pains: and though the ſoul of ſuch a one will be diſeaſed and unwiſe, from the body with which it is connected, yet it will be falſely conſidered not as diſeaſed, but as voluntarily bad. But in reality venereal intemperance for the moſt part becomes a diſeaſe of the ſoul, through a habit of one kind, from the tenuity of the bones, in a body fluid and moiſt. And, indeed, it may be nearly aſſerted, that all intemperance of pleaſures of whatever kind, and all diſgraceful conduct, is not properly blamed as the conſequence of voluntary guilt. For no one is voluntarily bad: but he who is depraved becomes ſo through a certain ill habit of body, and an unſkilful education. But theſe two circumſtances are inimical to all, and productive of a certain ill. And again, the ſoul, when influenced by pain, ſuffers much depravity from this through the body. For, when ſharp and ſalt phlegm, and likewiſe bitter and bilious humours, wandering through the body, are prevented from paſſing forth externally, but, revolving inwardly, mingle their exhalations with the circulation of the ſoul; in this caſe they produce all-various diſeaſes of the ſoul, in a greater and leſs degree, and leſs and more numerous. They are introduced, indeed, to three ſeats of the ſoul; and according to the diverſity of the place, each generates all-various ſpecies of difficulty and ſorrow, of boldneſs and timidity, and, ſtill further, of oblivion and indocility. But, beſides this, the vicious manners of cities, and diſcourſes both private and public, often contribute to increaſe this malady: nor are any diſciplines taught in the early part of life, which might ſerve as remedies for ſuch mighty ills. And thus all ſuch as are vicious are ſo through two involuntary cauſes; the exiſtence of which we ſhould always rather aſcribe to the planters than to the things planted, and to the educators rather than to the educated. We ſhould, therefore, endeavour to the utmoſt of our abilility, by education, ſtudies, and diſciplines, to fly from vice, and acquire its contrary, virtue. But theſe particulars, indeed, belong to another mode of diſcourſe.

Again, therefore, with reſpect to the contrary of theſe, it is now proper

to explain in a becoming manner by what culture, and from what cauſes, we may preſerve both the body and dianoëtic energies of the ſoul. For it is more juſt to diſcourſe concerning good things than of ſuch as are evil. But every thing good is beautiful; and that which is beautiful is not deſtitute of meaſure. An animal, therefore, which is about to be beautiful and good, muſt poſſeſs commenſuration. But, perceiving certain ſmall particulars of things commenſurate, we ſyllogize concerning them; while at the ſame time we are ignorant of ſuch as are greateſt and the chief. For, indeed, no ſymmetry and immoderation is of greater conſequence with reſpect to health and diſeaſe, virtue and vice, than that of the ſoul towards the body. But we conſider no circumſtance of theſe; nor do we perceive that when a more imbecil and inferior form is the vehicle of a robuſt and every way mighty ſoul, and when, on the contrary, theſe two paſs into a ſtate of concretion, then the whole animal cannot ſubſiſt in a beautiful manner: for it is incommenſurate through the want of the greateſt ſymmetry. But the animal whoſe compoſition is contrary to this, affords a ſpectacle to him who is able to behold it, of all ſpectacles the moſt beautiful and lovely. When the body, therefore, poſſeſſes legs immoderately large, or any other member ſurpaſſing its juſt proportion, and becomes through this incommenſurate with itſelf, it is rendered at the ſame time baſe, in the endurance of labour ſuffers many moleſtations and many convulſions, and through an aggregation of accidents becomes the cauſe of innumerable maladies to itſelf. The ſame too muſt be underſtood concerning that compoſition of body and ſoul which we denominate an animal. As, for inſtance, that when the ſoul in this compoſite is more robuſt than the body, and poſſeſſes it raging and tranſported, then the ſoul, agitating the whole of it, inwardly fills it with diſeaſes; and, when ſhe vehemently applies herſelf to certain diſciplines, cauſes it to liquefy and waſte away. Laſtly, when the ſoul employs herſelf in teaching and literary conteſts, both in public and private, through a certain ambitious ſtrife, then inflaming the body, ſhe diſſolves its conſtitution; and beſides this, introducing diſtillations of humours, ſhe deceives the moſt part of thoſe who are called phyſicians, and induces them to conſider theſe effects as proceeding from contrary cauſes.

But again, when a mighty body and above meaſure frigid is conjoined with a ſmall

a ſmall and imbecil dianoëtic part, ſince there are naturally twofold deſires in man, one of aliment through the body, but the other of prudence through the moſt divine part of our nature;—in this caſe, the motions of that which is more powerful prevail, and increaſe that which is their own: but render the dianoëtic part of the ſoul dull, indocile, and oblivious, and thus produce ignorance, which is the greateſt of all diſeaſes. But this one thing alone is the health and ſafety of both—neither to move the ſoul without the body, nor the body without the ſoul; that, being equally balanced in their mutual contentions, the health of the whole compoſite may be preſerved. Hence, he who vehemently applies himſelf to the mathematics, or to any other dianoëtic exerciſe, ſhould alſo employ the motion of the body, and be familiar with gymnaſtic. And again, he who is careful in forming his body aright ſhould at the ſame time unite with this the motions of the ſoul, employing muſic and all philoſophy; if he is to be rendered ſuch a one as can be juſtly called beautiful, and at the ſame time truly good. In the ſame manner, too, we ought to take care of the parts of the body, imitating the form of the whole. For when the body, through ſuch things as are introduced from without, is inflamed and refrigerated, and is again rendered dry and moiſt by externals, and ſuffers every thing conſequent to theſe affections; then, if any one in a quiet ſtate gives up his body to motions, he will be vanquiſhed by them and diſſolved. But if any one imitates that nature which we called the nouriſher of the univerſe, ſo as never to ſuffer the body to be in a ſtate of reſt, but perpetually moves and agitates it throughout, he will then aſſiſt the internal and external motions according to nature; and, in conſequence of a moderate agitation, will reduce into order and adorn the wandering paſſions and parts of the body, according to their alliance with each other. Such a one, indeed, as we ſaid in our former diſcourſe about the univerſe, will not, by placing foe againſt foe, ſuffer war and diſeaſe to be produced in the body; but, combining friend with friend, will thus render the body healthy and ſound. But, of all motions, that is the beſt in any nature which takes place in itſelf from itſelf: for this is particularly allied to the dianoëtic motion of the univerſe. But that motion is of the worſe kind which is produced by another. And that is the worſt of all motions, when the body, being in a recumbent and quiet ſtate, is moved by others according to parts. And hence,

hence, of all the purgations and concretions of the body, that is the beſt which ſubſiſts through gymnaſtic. The next to this is that which takes place through eaſy carriage, whether in a ſhip or any other convenient vehicle. But the third ſpecies of motion is only to be uſed when vehemently neceſſary, and at no other time by any one endued with intellect: and this is that medical motion which is performed by pharmaceutical purgations. For diſeaſes, unleſs they are extremely dangerous, are not to be irritated by medicines. For every compoſition of diſeaſes is in a certain reſpect ſimilar to the nature of animals. And indeed the aſſociation of the animal nature is allotted ſtated periods of life; both the whole genus, and every individual, containing in itſelf a fatal term of living, ſeparate from the paſſions which neceſſity produces. For the triangles, which from the very beginning poſſeſſed the power of each animal, are ſufficiently able to cohere together for a certain time: but life beyond this period cannot be extended to any one. The ſame mode of compoſition likewiſe ſubſiſts about diſeaſes; which if any one deſtroys by medicine before the fated time, he will only produce great diſeaſes from ſmall ones, and many from a few. On this account it is neceſſary to diſcipline all ſuch maladies by proper diet, according as every one's leiſure will permit; and to avoid irritating by medicines a moſt difficult diſeaſe. And thus much may ſuffice concerning the common animal and its corporeal part; and how theſe may be diſciplined and governed in ſuch a manner as to produce a life according to reaſon in the moſt eminent degree.

But that which is deſtined to govern, ought much more and by far the firſt to be furniſhed as much as poſſible with ſuch materials as may render it capable, of diſciplinative ſway, in a manner the moſt beautiful and the beſt. To diſcuſs accurately indeed particulars of this kind would require a treatiſe ſolely confined to ſuch a diſcuſſion: but if any one ſlightly conſiders this affair in a manner conſequent to what has been above delivered, ſuch a one by thus proceeding will not unſeaſonably arrive at the end of his purſuit. We have often then previouſly aſſerted that there are three ſpecies of ſoul within us, triply diſtributed; and that each has its own proper motions. And we ſhall now, therefore, briefly affirm, that when any one of them is in a torpid ſtate, and reſts from its own proper motions, it neceſſarily becomes

comes moſt imbecil; but that, when it is employed in convenient exerciſes, it becomes moſt vigorous and robuſt. We ſhould, therefore, be careful that the ſeveral ſpecies may preſerve their motions, ſo as to be commenſurate to each other.

With reſpect, however, to the moſt principal and excellent ſpecies of the ſoul, we ſhould conceive as follows: that Divinity aſſigned this to each of us as a dæmon; and that it reſides in the very ſummit of the body, elevating us from earth to an alliance with the heavens; as we are not terreſtrial plants, but bloſſoms of heaven. And this indeed is moſt truly aſſerted. For, from whence the firſt generation of the ſoul aroſe, from thence a divine nature being ſuſpended from our head and root, directs and governs the whole of our corporeal frame. In him, therefore, who vehemently labours to ſatisfy the cravings of deſire and ambition, all the conceptions of his ſoul muſt be neceſſarily mortal; and himſelf as much as poſſible muſt become entirely mortal, ſince he leaves nothing unaccompliſhed which tends to increaſe his periſhable part. But it is neceſſary that he who is ſedulouſly employed in the acquiſition of knowledge, who is anxious to acquire the wiſdom of truth, and who employs his moſt vigorous exertions in this one purſuit;—it is perfectly neceſſary that ſuch a one, if he touches on the truth, ſhould be endued with wiſdom about immortal and divine concerns; and that he ſhould participate of immortality, as far as human nature permits, without leaving any part of it behind. And beſides, as ſuch a one always cultivates that which is divine, and has a dæmon moſt excellently adorned reſiding in his eſſence, he muſt be happy in the moſt eminent degree. The culture of all the parts is indeed entirely one, and conſiſts in aſſigning proper nutriment and motion to each. But the motions which are allied to the divine part of our nature are the dianoëtic energies and circulations of the univerſe. Theſe, therefore, each of us ought to purſue; reſtoring in ſuch a manner thoſe revolutions in our head (which have been corrupted by our wanderings about generation), through diligently conſidering the harmonies and circulations of the univerſe, that the intellective power may become aſſimilated to the object of intelligence, according to its antient nature. For, when thus aſſimilated, we ſhall obtain the end of the beſt life propoſed by the Gods to men, both at preſent and in all the future circulations of time. And now

that diſputation which we announced at the beginning concerning the univerſe, as far as to the generation of man, has almoſt received its conſummation. For we ſhall briefly run over the generation of other animals, and this no further than neceſſity requires: for thus any one may appear to himſelf to preſerve a convenient meaſure in ſuch a diſputation. Let us, therefore, ſpeak concerning theſe as follows:

Thoſe who on becoming men are timid, and paſs through life unjuſtly, will according to aſſimilative reaſoning be changed into women in their ſecond generation. And at the ſame time through this cauſe the Gods deviſed the love of copulation; compoſing an animal or animated ſubſtance, and placing one in us, but another in the female nature. But they produced each in the following manner. That proceſſion of liquid aliment which paſſes through the lungs under the reins into the bladder, and which being compreſſed by the breath is emitted externally,—this the Gods receiving, they deduced it after the manner of a pipe into the concrete marrow, through the neck and ſpine of the back: and this is what we called ſeed in the former part of our diſcourſe. But this, in conſequence of being animated and receiving reſpiration, produces in the part where it reſpires a vital deſire of effluxion; and thus perfects in us the love of begetting. On this account, that nature which ſubſiſts about the privy parts of men, becoming refractory and imperious, and as it were an animal unobedient to reaſon, endeavours through raging deſire to poſſeſs abſolute ſway. In like manner the privities and matrix of women, forming an animal deſirous of procreating children, when it remains without fruit beyond the flower of its age, or for a ſtill more extended period, ſuffers the reſtraint with difficulty and indignation; and wandering every way through the body, obſtructs the paſſage of the breath, does not permit reſpiration to take place, introduces other extreme difficulties, and cauſes all-various diſeaſes; till the deſire and love of the parts educe ſeed like fruit from a tree: but, when educed, they ſcatter it into the matrix as into a field. Hence women conceive animals inviſible at firſt through their ſmallneſs, rude and unformed; when they become large, through diſperſion of the ſeed, nouriſh them within; and, laſtly, leading them into light perfect the generation of animals. In this manner, therefore, is the generation of women and every thing female performed. But the tribe of birds

ſucceeds

ſucceeds in the next place, faſhioned from men, and receiving wings inſtead of hairs. Theſe are produced from ſuch men as are indeed innocent, but inconſtant and light; who are curious about things ſituated on high; but are ſo infatuated as to think, from the teſtimony of the ſight, that demonſtrations about things of this kind are the moſt firm and incontrovertible of all. But the pedeſtrian and ſavage tribe of animals was generated from men [1], who being entirely deſtitute of philoſophy, never elevated their eyes to any object in the heavens; and this becauſe they never employed the circulations in the head, but followed the impulſe of thoſe parts of the ſoul which rule in the belly and breaſt. Hence from ſtudies of this kind drawing the anterior members and head to the ground, they fix them through proximity of nature in the earth. Beſides this, they poſſeſs long and all-various heads; as the circulations of each are through idleneſs compreſſed and broken: and by this means their race becomes quadruped and multiped; the Divinity aſſigning many feet to ſuch as are more unwiſe, that they may be more ſtrongly drawn towards the earth. But the moſt unwiſe of theſe, and every way extending all their body on the earth, as if there was no longer any occaſion of feet, the Gods generated without feet, and deſtined them to creep on the earth. The fourth genus is the aquatic, which was produced from ſuch men as were ſtupid and ignorant in the moſt remarkable degree; and whom thoſe transformers of our nature did not think deſerving of a pure reſpiration, on account of their poſſeſſing a ſoul in an unpurified ſtate, through extreme tranſgreſſion. And hence they impelled them into the turbid and profound reſpiration of water, inſtead of the attenuated and pure reſpiration of air: from whence the genus of fiſh and oyſters, and the multitude of all aquatic animals aroſe; and who are allotted habitations in the laſt regions of the univerſe, as the puniſhment of extreme ignorance. And thus after this manner, both formerly and now, animals migrate into each other; while they are changed by the loſs and acquiſition of *intellect and folly*. Our diſcourſe, therefore, concerning the univerſe has now obtained its concluſion.

[1] Plato here generating mortal animals through the human ſoul, after its polity in the heavens, leads it into the pedeſtrian genus, that he may completely produce man; and after this has acted erroneouſly, he again leads it into the winged, and into the pedeſtrian and ſavage genus, and afterwards into the aquatic.

For this world, comprehending and receiving its completion from mortal and immortal animals, is thus rendered a viſible animal containing viſible natures, the image of an intelligible God, ſenſible, the greateſt and beſt, the moſt beautiful and perfect; being no other than this one and only-begotten heaven.

THE END OF THE TIMÆUS.

THE

THE CRITIAS,

OR

ATLANTICUS.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CRITIAS,

OR

ATLANTICUS.

IT is a ſingular circumſtance, that though there is not, perhaps, any thing among the writings of the antients which has more generally attracted the attention of the learned in every age than the Atlantic hiſtory of Plato, yet no more than one ſingle paſſage of about twenty or thirty lines has, prior to my tranſlation of the Timæus, appeared in any modern language. Much has been ſaid and written by the moderns reſpecting the Atlantic iſland; but the extent of the original ſource has not even been ſuſpected.

That the authenticity of the following hiſtory ſhould have been queſtioned by many of the moderns, is by no means ſurpriſing, if we conſider that it is the hiſtory of an iſland and people that are aſſerted to have exiſted NINE THOUSAND years prior to Solon; as this contradicts the generally-received opinion reſpecting the antiquity of the world. However, as Plato expreſsly affirms, that it is a relation in *every reſpect true* [1]; and, as Crantor [2], the firſt interpreter of Plato, aſſerts, "that the following hiſtory was ſaid, by the Egyptian prieſts of his time, to be ſtill preſerved inſcribed on pillars," it appears to me to be at leaſt as well atteſted as any other narration in any antient hiſtorian. Indeed, he who proclaims that "truth is the ſource of every good both to Gods and men," and the whole of whoſe works conſiſts in detecting error and exploring certainty, can never be ſuppoſed to have

[1] Παντα παση γε μην αληθης.

[2] Ὁ πρωτος του Πλατωνος εξηγητης Κραντωρ. Procl. in Tim. p. 24. et mox—Μαρτυρουσι δε και οι προφηται φησι των Αιγυπτιων εν στηλαις ταις ετι σωζομεναις ταυτα γεγραφθαι λεγοντες.

wilfully

wilfully deceived mankind by publiſhing an extravagant romance as matter of fact, with all the preciſion of hiſtorical detail.

Some learned men have endeavoured to prove that America is the Atlantic iſland of Plato; and others have thought that the extreme parts of Africa towards the ſouth and weſt were regarded by Plato in this narration. Theſe opinions, however, are ſo obviouſly erroneous, that the authors of them can hardly be ſuppoſed to have read this dialogue, and the firſt part of the Timæus; for in theſe it is aſſerted that this iſland, in the ſpace of one day and night, was abſorbed in the ſea.

I only add, that this dialogue is an appendix, as it were, to the Timæus, and that it is not complete, Plato being prevented by death from finiſhing it, as we are informed by Plutarch in his life of Solon.

THE

THE CRITIAS,

OR

ATLANTICUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

TIMÆUS,	SOCRATES,
CRITIAS,	HERMOCRATES.

TIMÆUS.

AS pleaſant, Socrates, as is reſt after a long journey, ſo pleaſing to me is the preſent liberation from an extended diſcourſe. But I beſeech THE WORLD, that God, which was in reality generated formerly, though but recently in our diſcuſſion, to preſerve thoſe things which we have aſſerted with rectitude, but to inflict on us a becoming puniſhment if we have involuntarily ſaid any thing diſcordant. But the proper puniſhment of him who acts diſorderly and inelegantly, is to make him act with order and elegance. That we may, therefore, after this ſpeak rightly reſpecting the generation of the Gods, let us beſeech THAT DIVINITY, THE WORLD, to impart to us *the medicine ſcience, which is the moſt perfect and beſt of all medicines.* But having prayed, let us deliver, according to our agreement, the following diſcourſe to Critias.

CRIT. I receive it, O Timæus: and as you, at the beginning of your diſcuſſion, entreated pardon, as being about to ſpeak of great things; in like manner, I at preſent entreat the ſame. Indeed I think that I ought to ſolicit pardon in a ſtill greater degree for the enſuing diſcourſe, though I nearly know that this my requeſt is very ambitious, and more ruſtic than is proper; but, at the ſame time, let us begin the diſcourſe. For who endued with a

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ſound mind will attempt to ſay that the things which have been aſſerted by you have not been well ſaid? But that the particulars which remain to be diſcuſſed require greater indulgence, as being more difficult, this I will endeavour to ſhow. For he, O Timæus, who diſcourſes concerning the Gods to men, may more eaſily appear to ſpeak all that is ſufficient than he who diſcourſes concerning mortals to you. For the unſkilfulneſs and vehement ignorance of the auditors about things of this kind afford a great copia verborum to him who enters on the diſcuſſion of them: but we know how we are circumſtanced with reſpect to the Gods. However, that I may more plainly evince what I ſay, thus attend to me in what follows:—It is requiſite that all we ſhall ſay ſhould become in a certain reſpect an imitation and a reſemblance. But we ſee the facility and ſubtilty which take place in the repreſentation exhibited by pictures of divine and human bodies, in order that they may appear to the ſpectators to be apt imitations. We likewiſe ſee, with reſpect to the earth, mountains, rivers, woods, all heaven, and the revolving bodies which it contains, that at firſt we are delighted if any one is able to exhibit but a ſlender repreſentation to our view; but that afterwards, as not knowing any thing *accurately* about ſuch-like particulars, we neither examine nor blame the pictures, but uſe an immanifeſt and fallacious adumbration reſpecting them. But when any one attempts to repreſent our bodies, we acutely perceive what is omitted, through our continual and familiar animadverſion of them, and we become ſevere judges of him who does not perfectly exhibit all the requiſite ſimilitudes. It is likewiſe neceſſary to conſider the ſame thing as taking place in diſcourſe. For, with reſpect to things celeſtial and divine, we are delighted with aſſertions concerning them that are but in a ſmall degree adapted to their nature; but we accurately examine things mortal and human. And hence it is requiſite to pardon whatever in the enſuing diſcourſe may be delivered in an unbecoming manner. For it is proper to think, that to aſſimilate mortal concerns to opinion, is not an eaſy but a difficult taſk. I have ſaid all this, Socrates, being willing to remind you, and to ſolicit not leſs but greater pardon for the following diſcourſe. But if my requeſt ſhall appear to you to be juſt, do you willingly impart this gift.

Soc. Why ſhould we not, O Critias, impart it? And beſides this, the ſame pardon muſt be granted by us to a third. For it is evident that Hermocrates,

mocrates [1], who is to ſpeak ſhortly after, will make the ſame requeſt. That he, therefore, may make a different exordium, and may not be obliged to repeat what you have ſaid, let him know that pardon is granted him, and let him, therefore, prepare to ſpeak. But I previouſly announce to you, friend Critias, the conceptions of the theatre [2]. For the poet has approved in a wonderful manner the perſon who ſpoke in it before; ſo that you will require abundant pardon in attempting to diſcharge the office of his ſucceſſor.

Her. You announce the ſame thing to me, Socrates, as to him. But deſponding men, Critias, never erect a trophy. It is, therefore, requiſite to proceed in a virile manner to the diſcourſe, and, invoking Pæan and the Muſes, to exhibit and celebrate antient citizens who were excellent men.

Crit. O friend Hermocrates, as you are to ſpeak on the following day, having another to ſpeak before you, on this account you are courageous. But he will, perhaps, manifeſt to you how this is to be accompliſhed. You, therefore, thus exhorting and encouraging me, I ſhall obey; and beſides thoſe Gods which you have mentioned, I ſhall invoke others, and eſpecially Mnemoſyne. For nearly the greateſt reaſons and diſcuſſions are contained for us in this Divinity. If, then, we can ſufficiently remember and relate the narration which was once given by the Egyptian prieſts, and brought hither by Solon, you know that we ſhall appear to this theatre to have ſufficiently accompliſhed our part. This, therefore, muſt now be done, and without any further delay.

But firſt of all we muſt recollect, that the period of time from which a war is ſaid to have ſubſiſted between all thoſe that dwelt beyond and within the pillars of Hercules, amounts to nine thouſand years: and this war it is now requiſite for us to diſcuſs. Of thoſe, therefore, that dwelt within the pillars of Hercules, this city was the leader, and is ſaid to have fought in every battle; but of thoſe beyond the pillars, the kings of the Atlantic iſland were the leaders. But this iſland we ſaid was once larger than Libya and Aſia, *but is now a maſs of impervious mud, through concuſſions of the earth; ſo that thoſe who are ſailing in the vaſt ſea can no longer find a paſſage from hence thither.* The courſe of our narration, indeed, will unfold the many barbarous nations and Grecian tribes which then exiſted, as they may happen

[1] This ſpeech of Hermocrates is not extant.

[2] Viz. the perſons of the dialogue.

to preſent themſelves to our view: but it is neceſſary to relate, in the firſt place, the wars of the Athenians and their adverſaries, together with the power and the polities of each. And in diſcourſing of theſe we ſhall give the preference to our own people.

The Gods, then, once were locally allotted [1] the whole earth, but not with contention: for it would be abſurd that the Gods ſhould be ignorant of what is adapted to every one, or that, knowing that which rather belongs to others, they ſhould endeavour, through ſtrife, to poſſeſs what is not their own. Likewiſe, receiving places agreeable to them, from the allotments of juſtice, they inhabited the various regions of the earth. In conſequence of this, too, like ſhepherds, they nouriſhed us as their poſſeſſions, flocks, and herds; with this exception, however, that they did not force bodies to bodies in the ſame manner as ſhepherds, who, when feeding their cattle, compel them to come together with blows: but they conſidered us as a docile and obedient animal; and, as if piloting a pliant ſhip, employed perſuaſion for the rudder; and with this conception as the leader, they governed the whole mortal race. Different Gods, therefore, being allotted, adorned different places. But Vulcan and Minerva [2], who poſſeſs a common nature, both becauſe they are

[1] As, according to the theology of Plato, there is not one father of the univerſe only, one providence, and one divine law, but many fathers ſubordinate to the one firſt father, many adminiſtrators of providence poſterior to, and comprehended in, the one univerſal providence of the demiurgus of all things, and many laws proceeding from one firſt law, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be different allotments, and a diverſity of divine diſtribution. The allotment, however, of a divine nature is a government exempt from all paſſivity, and a providential energy about the ſubjects of its government.

[2] Vulcan is that divine power which preſides over the ſpermatic and phyſical reaſons, or productive principles, which the univerſe contains: for whatever Nature accompliſhes by verging towards bodies, Vulcan performs in a divine and exempt manner, by moving Nature, and uſing her as an inſtrument in his own proper fabrication; ſince natural heat has a Vulcanian characteriſtic, and was produced by Vulcan for the purpoſe of fabricating a corporeal nature. Vulcan, therefore, is that power which perpetually preſides over the fluctuating nature of bodies; and hence, ſays Olympiodorus, he operates with bellows (εν φυσαις); which occultly ſignifies his operating in natures (αντι του εν ταις φυσεσι). But by *earth* we muſt underſtand *matter*, which was thus ſymbolically denominated by the antients, as we learn from Porphyry de Antr. Nymph. By Minerva we muſt underſtand the ſummit (κορυφη) of all thoſe intellectual natures that reſide in Jupiter, the artificer of the world: or, in other words, ſhe is that deity which illuminates all mundane natures with intelligence. The Athenians, therefore, who are ſouls of a Minerval characteriſtic, may be very

are the offspring of the ſame father, and becauſe, through philoſophy and the ſtudy of arts, they tend to the ſame things;—theſe, I ſay, in conſequence of this, received one allotment, viz. this region, as being naturally allied and adapted to virtue and prudence. But theſe Divinities having produced worthy, earth-born men, arranged in their intellectual part the order of a polity. Of theſe men the names are preſerved; but their works, through the extinction of thoſe that received them, and length of time, have diſappeared. For the ſurviving race of men, as has been obſerved before, are always mountaineers, and void of diſcipline, who have only heard the names of men that were powerful in the region, and who, beſides this, have been acquainted but with few of the tranſactions of the country. In conſequence, therefore, of loving theſe antient men, they gave the names of them to their children: but they were ignorant of the virtues and laws of thoſe before them; for of theſe they knew nothing, but what they gathered from certain obſcure rumours; and as for many generations they were in want of neceſſaries, both they and their children directed their attention to the particulars of which they were deſtitute, diſcourſed about theſe, and neglected paſt and antient tranſactions. For mythology, and an inveſtigation of antient affairs, commence in cities in conjunction with leiſure, when the neceſſaries of life are procured; but not before. On this account the names of antient tranſactions were preſerved, without any account of the tranſactions themſelves. But I infer that this was the caſe, ſaid Solon, becauſe thoſe prieſts, in their narration of the war at that period, inſerted many names ſimilar to thoſe that were adopted afterwards, ſuch as Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, Eriſichthon, and many other of thoſe names which are commemorated prior to Theſeus. This was likewiſe the caſe with the names of the women. The figure too and ſtatue of Minerva evinced, that at that period the ſtudies of women and men with reſpect to war were common, as an armed image was then dedicated to the Goddeſs; this ſerving as a document, that among animals of the ſame ſpecies both male and female are naturally able to purſue in common every virtue, which is

very properly ſaid to be the progeny of Vulcan and the Earth, becauſe Vulcan, who perpetually imitates the intellectual energy of Minerva in his fabrication of the ſenſible univerſe, imparts to them through this imitation thoſe *vehicles*, and thoſe *ſpermatic reaſons*, through which in conjunction with *matter* they become inhabitants of this terreſtrial abode.

adapted to their ſpecies. But at that time many other tribes of citizens dwelt in this region, who were ſkilled in the fabricative arts, and in agriculture. The warlike tribe, however, lived from the firſt ſeparate from divine men, and poſſeſſed every thing requiſite to aliment and education. None of them, however, had any private property; for all of them conſidered all things as common. They likewiſe did not think it worth while to receive from other citizens beyond a ſufficiency of nutriment; and they engaged in all thoſe purſuits which we related yeſterday as pertaining to the guardians of our republic. It was likewiſe plauſibly and truly ſaid of our region, that, in the firſt place, at that time its boundaries extended, on one ſide to the Iſthmus, and on the other to Epirus, as far as to Cithæron and Parnethe. Theſe boundaries are on the deſcent, having Oropia on the right hand, and limiting Aſopus toward the ſea on the left. It is likewiſe ſaid that the whole earth was vanquiſhed by the valour of this region; and that on this account it was at that time able to ſupport the numerous army formed from the ſurrounding inhabitants. But this it is ſaid was a mighty proof of virtue. For what is now left of this country may contend with any other in fertility of ſoil, in the goodneſs of its fruits, and in paſtures accommodated to every ſpecies of animals. But then it produced all theſe; not only thus beautiful, but likewiſe in the greateſt abundance. But how is this credible? And by what arguments can it be ſhown that theſe are the remains of the land that then exiſted? The whole of this region is ſituated like a long promontory, extending into the ſea, from the other continent. This the profound receptacle of the ſea every way ſurrounds. *As, therefore, many and mighty deluges happened in that period of nine thouſand years (for ſo many years have elapſed from that to the preſent time)*, the defluxions of the earth at theſe times, and during theſe calamities, from elevated places, did not, as they are elſewhere wont to do, accumulate any hillock which deſerves to be mentioned, but, always flowing in a circle, at length vaniſhed in a profundity. The parts, therefore, that are left at preſent are but as ſmall iſlands, if compared with thoſe that exiſted at that time; and may be ſaid to reſemble the bones of a diſeaſed body; ſuch of the earth as was ſoft and fat being waſhed away, and a thin body of the country alone remaining. But at that time the land, being unmingled, contained mountains and lofty hills; and the plains, which are now denominated Phellei, were then full of

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fat earth; and the mountains abounded with woods, of which there are evident tokens even at preſent. For there are mountains which now only afford nutriment for bees, but formerly, and at no very diſtant period, the largeſt trees were cut down from thoſe mountains, as being adapted for buildings; and of theſe edifices, the coverings ſtill remain. There were likewiſe many other lofty domeſtic trees; and moſt fertile paſtures for cattle. This region, too, every year enjoyed prolific rain, which did not then, as now, run from naked earth into the ſea, but, being collected in great abundance from lofty places, and preſerved for uſe in certain cavities of the earth, diffuſed copious ſtreams of fountains and rivers to every part of the country; the truth of which is confirmed by certain ſacred remains which are ſtill to be ſeen in the antient fountains. And ſuch was the natural condition of this region formerly; beſides which, it was cultivated, as it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe it would be, by real huſbandmen, who were men of elegant manners, and of a diſpoſition naturally good; who poſſeſſed a moſt excellent ſoil, moſt abundant ſtreams of water, and a moſt ſalubrious temperament of air.

But the city at that time was built in the following manner: In the firſt place, the Acropolis was not then, as it is at preſent. For now one rainy night having ſoftened the bare land round about, in a remarkable degree, at the ſame time produced an earthquake; *and thus there happened a* THIRD *fatal inundation of water,* PRIOR *to the deluge of Deucalion* [1]. But prior to this, the magnitude of the Acropolis extended as far as to Eridanus and Iliſſus, comprehended within itſelf Pnyx, and Lycabetus, and was bounded in a direction oppoſite to Pnyx. All the land too was glebous, except a few places in a more elevated ſituation which were plain. Its exterior parts on the left hand were inhabited by artiſts and huſbandmen, who cultivated the neighbouring land. But the warlike tribe alone inhabited the elevated parts, about the temple of Minerva and Vulcan, being diſtributed in one encloſure round the garden as it were of one edifice. For thoſe who raiſed public buildings, and common banquets for the winter ſeaſon, together with whatever is adapted to a common polity, and who furniſhed both theſe, and temples themſelves, without gold and ſilver, all of this de-

[1] The deluge of Deucalion appears to be the ſame with that which is mentioned by Moſes; but the Jews had no knowledge of any other.

ſcription

ſcription dwelt in the northern parts of this region. For gold and ſilver were not employed by any one at any time; but, purſuing a middle courſe between arrogance and illiberality, they built moderate houſes, in which both they, and the offspring of their offspring growing old, they always left them to others like themſelves. But in ſummer they uſed gardens, gymnaſia, and public banquets, in places ſituated towards the ſouth. There was likewiſe one fountain in the place where the Acropolis is now ſituated, which having been exhauſted by earthquakes, ſmall circulating ſtreams alone remain at preſent. But at that time every part was abundantly ſupplied with ſprings of water, which were of a ſalutary temperament both in ſummer and winter. In this manner, then, theſe places were formerly inhabited; and the men of whom we have been ſpeaking were guardians of their own citizens, but leaders of the other willing Greeks. They likewiſe were eſpecially careful that there might always be the ſame number of men and women who by their age are able to fight, and that this number might not be leſs than twenty thouſand. Theſe men, therefore, being ſuch as we have deſcribed, and always juſtly adminiſtering in this manner both their own affairs and thoſe of all Greece, they were eſteemed and renowned beyond every other nation by all Europe and Aſia, both for the beauty of their bodies and the all-various virtue of their ſouls.

In the next place, I ſhall communicate to you from the beginning the particulars reſpecting the adverſaries of theſe men, if I am able to recollect what I heard when I was a boy. But, ſomewhat prior to this narration, it is proper to obſerve, that you muſt not be ſurpriſed at often hearing me mention Grecian names of barbarous men. For the cauſe of this is as follows:—Solon intending to inſert this narration into his verſes, inveſtigated for this purpoſe the power of names, and found that thoſe firſt Egyptians who committed theſe particulars to writing transferred theſe names into their own tongue. He, therefore, again receiving the meaning of every name, introduced that meaning into our language. And theſe writings were in the poſſeſſion of my grandfather, and are now in mine: they were likewiſe the ſubject of my meditation while I was a boy. If, therefore, in the courſe of this narration you hear ſuch names as ſubſiſt among us at preſent, you muſt not be ſurpriſed; for you know the cauſe. But it will require a long diſcourſe to ſpeak from the beginning, as I did before, concerning the allot-

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ment of the Gods, and to ſhow how they diſtributed the whole earth, here into larger, and there into leſſer allotments, and procured temples and ſacrifices for themſelves. Neptune, indeed, being allotted the Atlantic iſland, ſettled his offspring by a mortal woman in a certain part of the iſland, of the following deſcription. Towards the ſea, but in the middle of the iſland, there was a plain, which is ſaid to have been the moſt beautiful of all plains, and diſtinguiſhed by the fertility of the ſoil. Near this plain, and again in the middle of it, at the diſtance of fifty ſtadia, there was a very low mountain. This was inhabited by one of thoſe men who in the beginning ſprung from the earth, and whoſe name was Evenor. This man living with a woman called Leucippe had by her Clites, who was his only daughter. But when the virgin arrived at maturity, and her father and mother were dead, Neptune [1] being captivated with her beauty had connection with her, and encloſed the hill on which ſhe dwelt with ſpiral ſtreams of water; the ſea and the land at the ſame time alternately forming about each other leſſer and larger zones. Of theſe, two were formed by the land, and three by the ſea; and theſe zones, as if made by a turner's wheel, were in all parts equidiſtant from the middle of the iſland, ſo that the hill was inacceſſible to men. For at that time there were no ſhips, and the art of ſailing was then unknown. But Neptune, as being a divinity, eaſily adorned the iſland in the middle; cauſed two fountains of water to ſpring up from under the earth, one cold and the other hot; and likewiſe beſtowed all-various and ſufficient aliment from the earth. He alſo begat and educated five male twins; and having diſtributed all the Atlantic iſland into ten parts, he beſtowed upon his firſt-born ſon his maternal habitation and the ſurrounding land; this being the largeſt and the beſt diviſion. He likewiſe eſtabliſhed this ſon king of the whole iſland, and made the reſt of his ſons governors. But he gave to each of them dominion over many people, and an extended tract of land. Beſides this, too, he gave all of them names. And his firſt-born ſon, indeed, who was the king of all the reſt, he called Atlas, whence the whole iſland was at that time denominated Atlantic. But the twin ſon that was born

[1] A dæmoniacal Neptune, or a dæmon belonging to the order of Neptune, by contributing to the procreation of the offspring of Clites, is, in mythological language, ſaid to have been captivated with her beauty, and to have had connection with her. See the firſt note to the Life of Plato by Olympiodorus.

immediately after Atlas, and who was allotted the extreme parts of the iſland, towards the pillars of Hercules, as far as to the region which at preſent from that place is called Gadiric, he denominated according to his native tongue Gadirus, but which we call in Greek Eumelus. Of his ſecond twin offspring, he called one Ampheres, and the other Eudæmon. The firſt-born of his third offspring he denominated Mneſeus, and the ſecond Autochthon. The elder of his fourth iſſue he called Elaſippus, and the younger Meſtor. And, laſtly, he denominated the firſt-born of his fifth iſſue Azaes, and the ſecond Diaprepes. All theſe and their progeny dwelt in this place, for a prodigious number of generations, ruling over many other iſlands, and extending their empire, as we have ſaid before, as far as to Egypt and Tyrrhenia. But the race of Atlas was by far the moſt honourable; and of theſe, the oldeſt king always left the kingdom, for many generations, to the eldeſt of his offspring. Theſe, too, poſſeſſed wealth in ſuch abundance as to ſurpaſs in this reſpect all the kings that were prior to them; nor will any that may ſucceed them eaſily obtain the like. They had likewiſe every thing provided for them which both in a city and every other place is ſought after as uſeful for the purpoſes of life. And they were ſupplied, indeed, with many things from foreign countries, on account of their extenſive empire; but the iſland afforded them the greater part of every thing of which they ſtood in need. In the firſt place, the iſland ſupplied them with ſuch things as are dug out of mines in a ſolid ſtate, and with ſuch as are melted: and orichalcum [1], which is now but ſeldom mentioned, but then was much celebrated, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the iſland, and was conſidered as the moſt honourable of all metals except gold. Whatever, too, the woods afford for builders the iſland produced in abundance. There were likewiſe ſufficient paſtures there for tame and ſavage animals; together with a prodigious number of elephants. For, there were paſtures for all ſuch animals as are fed in lakes and rivers, on mountains, and in plains. And, in like manner, there was ſufficient aliment for the largeſt and moſt voracious kind of animals. Beſides this, whatever of odoriferous the earth nouriſhes at preſent, whether roots, or graſs, or wood, or juices, or gums, flowers, or fruits,—theſe the iſland produced, and produced them well. Again, the

[1] It is uncertain what this orichalcum was: perhaps it was the ſame with *platina*.

iſland

iſland bore mild and dry fruits, ſuch as we uſe for food, and of which we make bread, (aliment of this kind being denominated by us leguminous,) together with ſuch meats, drinks, and ointments, as trees afford. Here, likewiſe, there were trees, whoſe fruits are uſed for the ſake of ſport and pleaſure, and which it is difficult to conceal; together with ſuch dainties as are uſed as the remedies of ſatiety, and are grateful to the weary. All theſe an iſland which once exiſted, bore ſacred, beautiful, and wonderful, and in infinite abundance. The inhabitants, too, receiving all theſe from the earth, conſtructed temples, royal habitations, ports, docks, and all the reſt of the region, diſpoſing them in the following manner:—In the firſt place, thoſe who reſided about the antient metropolis united by bridges thoſe zones of the ſea which we before mentioned, and made a road both to the external parts and to the royal abode. But the palace of the king was from the firſt immediately raiſed in this very habitation of the God and their anceſtors. This being adorned by one perſon after another in continued ſucceſſion, the latter of each always ſurpaſſing the former in the ornaments he beſtowed, the palace became at length aſtoniſhingly large and beautiful. For they dug a trench as far as to the outermoſt zone, which commencing from the ſea extended three acres in breadth, and fifty ſtadia in length. And that ſhips might ſail from this ſea to that zone as a port, they enlarged its mouth, ſo that it might be ſufficient to receive the largeſt veſſels. They likewiſe divided by bridges thoſe zones of the earth which ſeparated the zones of the ſea, ſo that with one three-banked galley they might ſail from one zone to the other; and covered the upper part of the zones in ſuch a manner that they might ſail under them. For the lips of the zones of earth were higher than the ſea. But the greateſt of theſe zones, towards which the ſea directed its courſe, was in breadth three ſtadia: the next in order was of the ſame dimenſion. But, of the other two, the watery circle was in breadth two ſtadia; and that of earth was again equal to the preceding circle of water: but the zone which ran round the iſland in the middle was one ſtadium in breadth. The iſland which contained the palace of the king was five ſtadia in diameter. This, together with the zones, and the bridge which was every way an acre in breadth, they incloſed with a wall of ſtone, and raiſed towers and gates on the bridges according to the courſe of the ſea. Stones, too, were dug out from under the iſland, on all ſides of it, and from within

and without the zones: ſome of which were white, others black, and others red: and theſe ſtone quarries, on account of the cavity of the rock, afforded two convenient docks. With reſpect to the edifices, ſome were of a ſimple ſtructure, and others were raiſed from ſtones of different colours; thus by variety purſuing pleaſure, which was allied to their nature. They likewiſe covered the ſuperficies of the wall which incloſed the moſt outward zone with braſs, uſing it for this purpoſe as an ointment; but they covered the ſuperficies of that wall which incloſed the interior zone with tin: and laſtly, they covered that which incloſed the acropolis with orichalcum, which ſhines with a fiery ſplendour.

The royal palace within the acropolis was conſtructed as follows:—In the middle of it there was a temple, difficult of acceſs, ſacred to Clites and Neptune, and which was ſurrounded with an incloſure of gold. In this place aſſembling in the beginning, they produced the race of ten kings; and from the ten diviſions of the whole region here collected every year, they performed ſeaſonable ſacrifices to each. But the temple of Neptune was one ſtadium in length, and three acres in breadth; and its altitude was commenſurate to its length and breadth. There was ſomething, however, barbaric in its form. All the external parts of the temple, except the ſummit, were covered with ſilver; for that was covered with gold. With reſpect to the internal parts, the roof was entirely formed from ivory, variegated with gold, ſilver, and orichalcum; but as to all the other parts, ſuch as the walls, pillars, and pavement, theſe were adorned with orichalcum. Golden ſtatues, too, were placed in the temple; and the God himſelf was repreſented ſtanding on a chariot, and governing ſix-winged horſes; while, at the ſame time, through his magnitude, he touched the roof with his head. An hundred Nereids upon dolphins were circularly diſpoſed about him; for at that time this was ſuppoſed to be the number of the Nereids. There were likewiſe many other ſtatues of private perſons dedicated within the temple. Round the temple, on the outſide, ſtood golden images of all the women and men that had decended from the ten kings: together with many other ſtatues of kings and private perſons, which had been dedicated from the city, and from foreign parts that were in ſubjection to the Atlantic iſland. There was an altar, too, which accorded in magnitude and conſtruction with the other ornaments of the temple; and in like manner, the palace was adapted to the magnitude

of

of the empire, and the decorations of the ſacred concerns. The inhabitants, likewiſe, uſed fountains both of hot and cold water, whoſe ſtreams were copious, and naturally ſalubrious and pleaſant in a wonderful degree. About the fountains, too, edifices were conſtructed, and trees planted, adapted to theſe fontal waters. Receptacles of water, likewiſe, were placed round the fountains, ſome of which were expoſed to the open air, but others were covered, as containing hot baths for the winter ſeaſon. Of theſe receptacles, ſome were appropriated to the royal family, and others, apart from theſe, to private individuals; and again, ſome were ſet apart for women, and others for horſes and other animals of the yoke; a proper ornament at the ſame time being diſtributed to each. They likewiſe brought defluent ſtreams to the grove of Neptune, together with all-various trees of an admirable beauty and height, through the fecundity of the ſoil: and thence they derived theſe ſtreams to the exterior circles, by conducting them through channels over the bridges. But in each iſland of theſe exterior circles there were many temples of many Gods, together with many gardens, and gymnaſia apart from each other, ſome for men, and others for horſes. But about the middle of the largeſt of the iſlands there was a principal hippodrome, which was a ſtadium in breadth, and the length of which extended round the whole circle, for the purpoſe of exerciſing the horſes. On all ſides of the hippodrome ſtood the dwellings of the officers of the guards. But the defence of the place was committed to the more faithful ſoldiers, who dwelt in the ſmaller circle, and before the acropolis; and the moſt faithful of all the ſoldiers were aſſigned habitations within the acropolis, and round the royal abodes. The docks, likewiſe, were full of three-banked galleys, and of ſuch apparatus as is adapted to veſſels of this kind. And in this manner the parts about the royal palaces were diſpoſed. But having paſſed beyond the external ports, which were three in number, a circular wall preſented itſelf to the view, beginning from the ſea, and every way diſtant from the greateſt of the circles and the port by an interval of fifty ſtadia. This wall terminated in the mouth of the trench which was towards the ſea. The whole ſpace, too, incloſed by the wall was crowded with houſes; and the bay and the greateſt harbour were full of ſhips and merchants that came from all parts. Hence, through the great multitude that were here aſſembled, there was an all-various clamour and tumult both by day and night. And thus we have

nearly related the particulars reſpecting the city and the antient habitation, as they were then unfolded by the Egyptian prieſts. In the next place, we ſhall endeavour to relate what was the nature, and what the arrangement, of the reſt of the region.

Firſt, then, every place is ſaid to have been very elevated and abrupt which was ſituated near the ſea; but all the land round the city was a plain, which circularly inveſted the city, but was itſelf circularly incloſed by mountains which extended as far as to the ſea. This plain too was ſmooth and equable; and its whole length, from one ſide to the other, was three thouſand ſtadia; but, according to its middle from the ſea upwards, it was two thouſand ſtadia. The whole iſland, likewiſe, was ſituated towards the ſouth, but from its extremities was expoſed to the north. Its mountains were then celebrated as ſurpaſſing all that exiſt at preſent in multitude, magnitude, and beauty; and contained many villages, whoſe inhabitants were wealthy. Here, too, there were rivers, lakes, and meadows, which afforded ſufficient nutriment for all tame and ſavage animals; together with woods, various both in multitude and kind, and in abundance adequate to the ſeveral purpoſes to which they are ſubſervient. This plain, therefore, both by nature and the labours of many kings in a long period of time, was replete with fertility. Its figure, too, was that of a ſquare, for the moſt part ſtraight and long; but on account of the trench which was dug round it, it was deficient in ſtraightneſs. The depth, breadth, and length of this trench are incredible, when compared with other labours accompliſhed by the hands of men: but, at the ſame time, we muſt relate what we have heard. Its depth was one acre; and its breadth every where a ſtadium. And as it was dug round the whole plain, its length was conſequently ten thouſand ſtadia [1]. This trench received the ſtreams falling from the mountains, and which, circularly flowing round the plain towards the city, and being collected from different parts, at length poured themſelves from the trench into the ſea. Ditches one hundred feet in breadth, being cut in a right line from this part, were again ſent through the plain into the trench near the ſea: but theſe were ſeparated from each other by an interval of one hundred ſtadia. The inhabitants brought wood to the city from the mountains, and other ſeaſonable

[1] That is, 1250 miles. This trench, however, was not a more ſurpriſing effort of human induſtry than is the preſent wall of China.

articles,

articles, in twofold veſſels, through the trenches; for the trenches interſected each other obliquely, and towards the city. Every year, too, they twice collected the fruits of the earth; in winter uſing the waters from Jupiter, and in ſummer bringing the productions of the earth through the ſtreams deduced from the trenches. With reſpect to the multitude of men in the plain uſeful for the purpoſes of war, it was ordered that a commander in chief ſhould be taken out of each allotment. But the magnitude of each allotted portion of land was ten times ten ſtadia; and the number of all the allotments was ſixty thouſand. There is ſaid to have been an infinite number of men from the mountains and the reſt of the region; and all of them were diſtributed according to places and villages into theſe allotments, under their reſpective leaders. The commander in chief, therefore, of each diviſion was ordered to bring into the field of battle a ſixth part of the war-chariots, the whole amount of which was ten thouſand, together with two horſes and two charioteers: and again, it was decreed that he ſhould bring two horſes yoked by the ſide of each other, but without a ſeat, together with a man who might deſcend armed with a ſmall ſhield, and who after the charioteer might govern the two horſes: likewiſe, that he ſhould bring two heavy-armed ſoldiers, two ſlingers, three light-armed ſoldiers, three hurlers of ſtones, and three jaculators, together with four ſailors, in order to fill up the number of men ſufficient for one thouſand two hundred ſhips. And in this manner were the warlike affairs of the royal city diſpoſed. But thoſe of the other nine cities were diſpoſed in a different manner, which it would require a long time to relate. The particulars reſpecting the governors were inſtituted from the beginning as follows:—Each of the ten kings poſſeſſed abſolute authority both over the men and the greater part of the laws in his own diviſion, and in his own city, puniſhing and putting to death whomſoever he pleaſed. But the government and communion of theſe kings with each other were conformable to the mandates given by Neptune; and this was likewiſe the caſe with their laws. Theſe mandates were delivered to them by their anceſtors inſcribed on a pillar of orichalcum, which was erected about the middle of the iſland, in the temple of Neptune. Theſe kings, therefore, aſſembled together every fifth, and alternately every ſixth year, for the purpoſe of diſtributing an equal part both to the even and the odd; and,

when aſſembled, they deliberated on the public affairs, inquired if any one had acted improperly, and, if he had, called him to account for his conduct. But when they were about to ſit in judgment on any one, they bound each other by the following compact. As, prior to this judicial proceſs, there were bulls in the temple of Neptune, free from all reſtraint, they ſelected ten of theſe, and vowed to the God, they would offer a ſacrifice which ſhould be acceptable to him, viz. a victim taken without iron, and hunted with clubs and ſnares. Hence, whatever bull was caught by them they led to the pillar, and cut its throat on the ſummit of the column, agreeably to the written mandates. But on the pillar, beſides the laws, there was an oath, ſupplicating mighty imprecations againſt thoſe that were diſobedient. When, therefore, ſacrificing according to their laws, they began to burn all the members of the bull, they poured out of a full bowl a quantity of clotted blood for each of them, and gave the reſt to the fire; at the ſame time luſtrating the pillar. After this, drawing out of the bowl in golden cups, and making a libation in the fire, they took an oath that they would judge according to the laws inſcribed on the pillar, and would puniſh any one who prior to this ſhould be found guilty; and likewiſe that they would never willingly tranſgreſs any one of the written mandates. They added, that they would neither govern, nor be obedient to any one who governed, contrary to the preſcribed laws of their country. When every one had thus ſupplicated both for himſelf and thoſe of his race, after he had drunk, and had dedicated the golden cup to the temple of the God, he withdrew to the ſupper, and his neceſſary concerns. But when it was dark, and the fire about the ſacrifice was abated, all of them, inveſted with a moſt beautiful azure garment, and ſitting on the ground near the burnt victims, ſpent the whole night in extinguiſhing the fire of the ſacrifice, and in judging and being judged, if any perſon had accuſed ſome one of them of having tranſgreſſed the laws.

When the judicial proceſs was finiſhed, and day appeared, they wrote the deciſions in a golden table, which together with their garments they dedicated as monuments, in the temple of the God. There were alſo many other laws reſpecting ſacred concerns, and ſuch as were peculiar to the ſeveral kings; but the greateſt were the following:—That they ſhould never

never wage war againſt each other, and that all of them ſhould give aſſiſtance if any perſon in ſome one of their cities ſhould endeavour to extirpate the royal race. And as they conſulted in common reſpecting war and other actions, in the ſame manner as their anceſtors, they aſſigned the empire to the Atlantic family. But they did not permit the king to put to death any of his kindred, unleſs it ſeemed fit to more than five out of the ten kings. Such then being the power, and of ſuch magnitude, at that time, in thoſe places, Divinity transferred it from thence to theſe parts, as it is reported, on the following occaſion. For many generations, the Atlantics, as long as the nature of the God was ſufficient for them, were obedient to the laws, and benignantly affected toward a divine nature, to which they were allied. For they poſſeſſed true, and in every reſpect magnificent conceptions; and employed mildneſs in conjunction with prudence, both in thoſe caſual circumſtances which are always taking place, and towards each other. Hence, deſpiſing every thing except virtue, they conſidered the concerns of the preſent life as trifling, and therefore eaſily endured them; and were of opinion that abundance of riches and other poſſeſſions was nothing more than a burthen. Nor were they intoxicated by luxury, nor did they fall into error, in conſequence of being blinded by incontinence; but, being ſober and vigilant, they acutely perceived that all theſe things were increaſed through common friendſhip, in conjunction with virtue; but that, by eagerly purſuing and honouring them, theſe external goods themſelves were corrupted, and, together with them, virtue and common friendſhip were deſtroyed. From reaſoning of this kind, and from the continuance of a divine nature, all the particulars which we have previouſly diſcuſſed, were increaſed among them. But when that portion of divinity, or divine deſtiny, which they enjoyed, vaniſhed from among them, in conſequence of being frequently mingled with much of a mortal nature, and human manners prevailed,—then, being no longer able to bear the events of the preſent life, they acted in a diſgraceful manner. Hence, to thoſe who were capable of ſeeing, they appeared to be baſe characters, men who ſeparated things moſt beautiful from ſuch as are moſt honourable: but by thoſe who were unable to perceive the true life, which conducts to felicity, they were conſidered as then in the higheſt degree worthy and bleſſed, in conſequence of being filled with an unjuſt

deſire

desire of possessing, and transcending in power. But Jupiter, the God of Gods, who governs by law, and who is able to perceive every thing of this kind, when he saw that an equitable race was in a miserable condition, and was desirous of punishing them, in order that by acquiring temperance they might possess more elegant manners, excited all the Gods to assemble in their most honourable habitation, whence, being seated as in the middle of the universe, he beholds all such things as participate of generation: and having assembled the Gods, he thus addressed them: * * * * * * * * * *

THE END OF THE CRITIAS, OR ATLANTICUS,

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE TIMÆUS,

EXTRACTED FROM THE COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS ON THAT DIALOGUE.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE TIMÆUS.

Page 473. *The former of theſe is, indeed, apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reaſon.*

LET us, in the firſt place, conſider how manifold intelligence is, and collect by reaſoning its various progreſſions. The firſt intelligence, therefore, is intelligible, which paſſes into the ſame with the intelligible, and is in no reſpect different from it. This is eſſential intelligence and eſſence itſelf, becauſe every thing in the intelligible ſubſiſts after this manner, viz. eſſentially and intelligibly. The ſecond is that which conjoins intellect with the intelligible, poſſeſſing an idiom connective and collective of the extremes, and being life and power; filling, indeed, intellect from the intelligible, in which alſo it eſtabliſhes intellect. The third is the conjoined intelligence in a Divine intellect itſelf, being the energy of intellect, through which it embraces the intelligible which it contains, and according to which it underſtands and is what it is: for, it is energy and intelligence itſelf, not indeed intelligible, but intellectual intelligence. The intelligence of partial intellects poſſeſſes the fourth order; for each of theſe contains all things partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, the intelligible, through which it is conjoined with wholes, and underſtands the whole intelligible world. The fifth intelligence is that of the rational ſoul; for as the rational ſoul is called intellect, ſo its knowledge is intelligence, viz. a tranſitive intelligence, with which time is connate. In the ſixth place, you may rank, if you pleaſe, phantaſtic knowledge, which is by ſome denominated intelligence, and the phantaſy itſelf is called a paſſive intellect, becauſe it knows whatever it knows inwardly, and accompanied with types and figures. For it is common to all intelligence to poſſeſs the objects of its knowledge

inwardly, and in this it differs from ſenſe. But the higheſt kind of intelligence is the thing known itſelf. The ſecond is that which ſees the firſt totally, and is the thing known ſecondarily. The third is the thing known partially, but perceives wholes through that which is partial. The fourth ſees wholes indeed, but partially, and not collectively. And the fifth is a viſion accompanied with paſſivity. Such, therefore, are the diverſities of intelligence.

At preſent, however, neither phantaſtic intelligence muſt be aſſumed; for this is not naturally adapted to know true being, becauſe it is indefinite, and knows the imaginable accompanied with figures. Eternal being, however, is unfigured; and, in ſhort, no irrational knowledge is capable of beholding being itſelf, ſince neither is it naturally adapted to perceive univerſal. Nor does Plato here ſignify the intelligence in the rational ſoul; for this does not poſſeſs collective viſion, and that which is coordinated with eternal natures, but proceeds according to time. Nor yet are total intelligences to be here underſtood; for theſe are exempt from our knowledge; but Timæus coordinates intelligence with reaſon. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect muſt now be aſſumed; for it is this in conjunction with which we once ſaw true being. For as ſenſe is below the rational ſoul, ſo intelligence is above it. For a partial intellect is proximately eſtabliſhed above our eſſence, which it alſo elevates and perfects; and to which we convert ourſelves when we are purified through philoſophy and conjoin our intellectual power with its intelligence. This partial intellect is participated by all other proximate dæmoniacal ſouls, and illuminates ours, when we convert ourſelves to it, and render our reaſon intellectual. It is this intellect which Plato in the Phædrus calls the governor of the ſoul, and ſays that it alone underſtands true being, which is alſo perceived in conjunction with this intellect, by the ſoul which is nouriſhed with intellect and ſcience. In ſhort, as every partial ſoul is eſſentially ſuſpended from a certain dæmon, and every dæmon has a dæmoniacal intellect above itſelf, hence, every partial ſoul will have this intellect ranked prior to itſelf as an impartible eſſence. Of this intellect, therefore, the firſt participant will be a dæmoniacal ſoul, but the ſecond, the partial ſouls under this, which likewiſe makes them to be partial. It alſo appears that the intellect immediately above every dæmon, ſo far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the dæmon which proximately participates it, but that it alſo comprehends the number of the ſouls which are under it, and the intellectual

paradigms

paradigms of them. Every partial ſoul, therefore, will have as an indiviſible eſſence its proper paradigm, which this intellect contains, and not ſimply the whole intellect, in the ſame manner as the dæmon which is eſſentially its leader. Hence, the impartible belonging to every partial ſoul, may be accurately defined to be the idea of that ſoul, comprehended in the one intellect which is deſtined to be the leader of the dæmoniacal ſeries, under which every ſuch ſoul is arranged. And thus it will be true that the intellect of every partial ſoul is alone ſupernally eſtabliſhed among eternal entities, and that every ſuch ſoul is a medium between the impartible above it and the partible nature below it. This, then, is the intelligence prior to the ſoul, and which the ſoul participates when its intellectual part energizes intellectually. Hence, in the latter part of this dialogue, Plato ſays, that this intelligence is in the Gods, but that it is participated by a few only of the human race.

It likewiſe appears that Plato, unfolding the knowledge of eternal being, calls it at firſt intelligence, but he alſo conjoins with intelligence reaſon. For, when reaſon underſtands perpetual being, as reaſon it energizes tranſitively, but as perceiving intellectually it energizes with ſimplicity, underſtands each particular ſo far as ſimple at once, but not all things at once, but paſſing from one to another; at the ſame time intellectually perceiving every thing which it tranſitively ſees, as one and ſimple.

In the next place, let us conſider what reaſon is, and how it is connate with intelligence. Reaſon, therefore, is threefold, doxaſtic, ſcientific, and intellectual. For ſince there are in us opinion, the dianoëtic part, and intellect, which laſt is the ſummit of the dianoëtic part, and ſince the whole of our eſſence is reaſon, in each of theſe parts reaſon muſt be differently conſidered. But neither is opinion naturally adapted to be conjoined with the intelligence of intellect in energy; for, on the contrary, it is conjoined with irrational knowledge, ſince it only knows *that* a thing is, but is ignorant of *the why*. Nor is the dianoëtic part, ſo far as it proceeds into multitude and diviſion, capable of recurring to an intellect above the human ſoul, but on the contrary, it is ſeparated through the variety of its reaſons from intellectual impartibility. It remains, therefore, that the ſummit of the ſoul, and that which is moſt characterized by unity in the dianoëtic part, muſt be eſtabliſhed in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being conjoined with it through alliance. This, then, is the reaſon which underſtands in us intelligibles, and an energy which Socrates in the Republic calls intelligence,

intelligence, in the ſame manner as he calls the dianoëtic power a knowledge ſubſiſting between intelligibles and objects of opinion. In a ſubſequent part of this dialogue, Plato ſays, that this reaſon, together with ſcience, is ingenerated in the ſoul when revolving about the intelligible. Science, however, has a more various energy, exploring ſome things by others; but the energy of intellect is more ſimple, ſurveying beings by an immediate projection of its viſive power. This higheſt, therefore, and moſt indiviſible part of our nature, Plato now denominates reaſon, as unfolding to us intellect and an intelligible eſſence. For, when the ſoul abandons phantaſy and opinion, together with various and indefinite knowledge, and recurs to its own impartibility, according to which it is rooted in a partial intellect, and when recurring it conjoins its own energy with the intelligence of this intellect, then, together with it, it underſtands eternal being, its energy being both one and twofold, and ſameneſs and ſeparation ſubſiſting in its intellections. For then the intelligence of the ſoul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal natures, that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that our reaſon, like a leſſer, may energize in conjunction with a greater, light.

But how is true being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reaſon? For true being is ſuperior to all comprehenſion, and contains in itſelf all things with an exempt tranſcendency. In anſwer to this it may be replied, that intellect poſſeſſing its own intelligible, is on this account ſaid to comprehend the whole of an intelligible eſſence; but reaſon, through an intellect coordinate to itſelf receiving conceptions of real beings, is thus through theſe ſaid to comprehend being. Perhaps, alſo, it may be ſaid that reaſon running round the intelligible, and energizing, and being moved as about a centre, thus beholds it; intelligence, indeed, knowing it without tranſition and impartibly, but reaſon circularly energizing about its eſſence, and evolving the united ſubſiſtence of all things which it contains.

Let us, in the next place, conſider what opinion is. According to Plato, then, the doxaſtic power comprehends the reaſons of ſenſibles, knows the eſſence of theſe, and *that* they are, but is ignorant of the cauſe of their exiſtence: the dianoëtic power, at the ſame time, knowing both the eſſences and the cauſes of ſenſibles, but ſenſe having no knowledge of either. For it is clearly ſhown in the Theætetus that ſenſe is ignorant of eſſence, being perfectly unacquainted with the cauſe of what it knows. Hence it

is neceſſary that opinion ſhould be ranked in the middle, and that it ſhould know the eſſences of ſenſibles through the reaſons or productive principles which it contains, but be ignorant of their cauſes. For in this right opinion differs from ſcience, that it alone knows *that* a thing is, ſcience being able to ſpeculate the cauſe of its ſubſiſtence. Senſe follows opinion, and is a medium between the organ of ſenſe and opinion. For the organ of ſenſe apprehends ſenſibles with paſſivity; and on this account it is deſtroyed when they are exceſſive. But opinion poſſeſſes a knowledge unattended with paſſion. Senſe participates in a certain reſpect of paſſion, but has alſo ſomething gnoſtic, ſo far as it is eſtabliſhed in the doxaſtic nature, is illuminated by it, and becomes inveſted with reaſon, being of itſelf irrational. In this the ſeries of gnoſtic powers is terminated, of which intelligence is the leader, being above reaſon and without tranſition. But reaſon has the ſecond order, which is the intelligence of our ſoul, and tranſitively paſſes into contact with intelligibles. Opinion is in the third rank, being a knowledge of ſenſibles. And the fourth in gradation is ſenſe, which is an irrational knowledge of ſenſibles. For the dianoëtic power ſubſiſting between intelligence and opinion, is gnoſtic of middle forms, which require an apprehenſion more obſcure than that of intelligence, and more clear than that of opinion. Hence opinion muſt be placed next to reaſon, becauſe it poſſeſſes gnoſtic reaſons of eſſences, but is otherwiſe irrational, as being ignorant of cauſes. But ſenſe muſt be conſidered as entirely irrational. For, in ſhort, each of the ſenſes knows the paſſion ſubſiſting about the animal from a ſenſible nature. Thus, for inſtance, with reſpect to an apple, the ſight knows that it is red from the paſſion about the eye; the ſmell, that it is fragrant from the paſſion about the noſtrils; the taſte, that it is ſweet; and the touch, that it is ſmooth. What then is it which ſays that this thing which thus affects the different ſenſes, is an apple? It is not any one of the partial ſenſes; for each of theſe knows one particular thing pertaining to the apple, but does not know the whole. Nor yet is this effected by the common ſenſe; for this alone diſtinguiſhes the differences of the paſſions; but does not know that the thing which poſſeſſes ſuch an eſſence is the whole. It is evident, therefore, that there is a certain power better than the ſenſes, which knowing the whole prior to thoſe things which are as it were parts, and beholding the form of this whole, is impartibly connective of theſe many powers. Plato calls this power opinion; and on this account he denominates that which is ſenſible, the object of opinion.

Further

Further ſtill, as the ſenſes frequently announce to us things different from what they are in reality, what is it which judges in us, and ſays, that the ſight, when it aſſerts that the diameter of the ſun is no more than a foot in length, is deceived, and that this alſo is the caſe with the taſte of the diſeaſed, when honey appears to it to be bitter? For it is perfectly evident that in theſe, and all ſuch like caſes, the ſenſes announce their paſſion, and are not entirely deceived. For they aſſert the paſſion which is produced about the inſtruments of ſenſe, and which is ſuch as they announce it to be; but that which declares the cauſe, and forms a judgment of the paſſion, is different. There is therefore a certain power of the ſoul which is better than ſenſe, and which no longer knows ſenſibles through an organ, but through itſelf, and corrects the groſs and inaccurate information of ſenſe. This power which ſubſiſts as reaſon with reſpect to ſenſe, is irrational with reſpect to the knowledge of true beings; but ſenſe is ſimply and not relatively irrational. Hence Socrates in the Republic ſhows, that opinion is a medium between knowledge and ignorance. For it is a rational knowledge, but is mingled with irrationality, in conſequence of knowing ſenſibles in conjunction with ſenſe. Senſe, however, is irrational alone; in the firſt place, becauſe it ſubſiſts in irrational animals, and is characteriſtic of every irrational life; and in the ſecond place, becauſe contrary to all the parts of the irrational ſoul, it is incapable of being perſuaded by reaſon. For the iraſcible and deſiderative parts, ſubmit to reaſon, are obedient to its commands, and receive from it inſtruction. But ſenſe, though it ſhould ten thouſand times hear reaſon aſſerting, that the ſun is geater than the earth, would at the ſame time ſee it of the dimenſion of a foot, and would not announce it to us in any other way. In the third place, ſenſe is irrational alone, becauſe it does not know that which it perceives: for it is not naturally adapted to perceive the eſſence of it. Thus, for inſtance, it does not know what a white thing is, but it knows that it is white through paſſion. It is alſo diſtributed about the inſtrument of ſenſe, and on this account therefore is irrational. In the fourth place, this is true of ſenſe, becauſe it is the boundary of all the ſeries of knowledge, poſſeſſes an eſſence moſt remote from reaſon and intellect, belongs to things external, and makes its apprehenſion through body: for all theſe particulars indicate its irrational nature. Every thing generated, therefore, is apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with ſenſe; the latter announcing the paſſions, and the former producing from itſelf the reaſons of generated natures, and knowing their eſſences. And as reaſon, when in con-

tact

tact with intelligence, ſees the intelligible, ſo opinion, coordinated with ſenſe, knows that which is generated. For the ſoul being of a middle eſſence, fills up the medium between intellect and an irrational nature: for by her ſummit, or the vertex of the dianoëtic part, ſhe is preſent with intellect, and by her extremity ſhe verges to ſenſe. Hence Timæus, in the former conjunction, ranked intelligence before reaſon, as being more excellent; but in the ſecond conjunction he places opinion before ſenſe. For there reaſon is poſterior to intelligence, as being a leſſer intellect; but here opinion is prior to ſenſe, as being rational ſenſe. Opinion, however, and reaſon bound the whole extent of the rational eſſence; but as the great Plotinus ſays, intellect is our king, and ſenſe our meſſenger. And reaſon indeed, together with intellect, ſees the intelligible; but by itſelf it ſpeculates the middle reaſons of things. Opinion, together with ſenſe, ſees that which is generated; but by itſelf it conſiders all the forms which its own eſſence contains.

P. 474. *It was generated. For this univerſe is viſible, and has a body, &c.*

As the demiurgus of wholes looking to himſelf, and always abiding after his accuſtomed manner, produces the whole world totally, collectively, or at once, and with an eternal ſameneſs of energy, ſo Timæus being converted to himſelf, lays down the whole theory, recurring to intellect from the dianoëtic power, and proceeding into reaſoning from intellect. Doubting therefore, and interrogating himſelf, he energizes according to the ſelf-moved nature of the ſoul; but anſwering, he imitates the projection of intellect. In the firſt place, therefore, he comprehends the dogma in one word γεγονεν, *it was generated*, and enunciates the concluſion prior to the demonſtration, directly after the manner of thoſe that energize enthuſiaſtically, who perceive the whole collectively, and contract in intellect the end previous to the digreſſion, in conſequence of ſeeing all things at once. But in the ſecond place ſyllogizing, he deſcends from intellect to logical evolutions, and an inveſtigation through demonſtration of the nature of the world. In a perfectly divine manner, therefore, he indicates from hypotheſes the whole form of the univerſe. For if the world is viſible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is viſible, tangible, and has a body, is ſenſible, and that which is ſenſible, and the object of opinion in conjunction with ſenſe, is generated: the world therefore is generated. And

this he ſhows demonſtratively from the definition: ſince geometricians alſo uſe demonſtrations of this kind. And thus much concerning the form of theſe words.

It is however evident that Timæus, in giving a certain generation to the world, eſtabliſhes it at the ſame time remote from temporal generation. For if the world has a *certain*, and not *every* principle of generation, but that which is generated from time has the principle of *all* generation, the world is not generated from time. Further ſtill, let us attend to the wonderful hypotheſes of Atticus, who ſays, that what according to Plato was moved in a confuſed and diſordered manner is unbegotten; but that the world was generated from time. Since then Plato admits that there is a cauſe of generation, let us ſee what he aſſerts it to be. For the world is ſenſible and tangible. Whether therefore was every thing ſenſible generated from time, or not every thing? For if every thing, that which was moved in a confuſed and diſordered manner was alſo generated from time: for he ſays, that this likewiſe was viſible. But if not every thing, the reaſoning is unſyllogiſtic, according to Atticus, and concludes nothing. Unleſs indeed Atticus ſhould ſay that the world is viſible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confuſed and diſordered manner is not *now* viſible, but *was* ſo prior to the fabrication of the world, ſince Plato thus ſpeaks, "Every thing which *was* viſible, being moved in a confuſed and diſordered manner;" but here he ſays, "The world *is* viſible and tangible, and has a body." Plato therefore ſhows that every thing which *is* viſible and tangible is generated, but not every thing which *was* ſo. Should Atticus then thus ſpeak, (for the man is ſkilful in taking up one word in the place of another,) we muſt ſay, that in the definition of what is generated, there is nothing of this kind, but it is ſimply ſaid, that every thing generated is the object of opinion, in conjunction with irrational ſenſe; ſo that if any thing is perfectly ſenſible, it will alſo be generated. But every thing viſible is ſenſible; ſo that what was moved with confuſion and diſorder was generated. Nor is it proper to ſay that it was unbegotten according to time, but that the univerſe was generated in time; ſince either both were generated, or both are unbegotten. For both are ſimilarly called viſible and generaed by Plato. But if both were generated, prior to this the world was changed into diſorder: for generation to a contrary is entirely from a contrary. And if the maker of the world is good, how is it poſſible that he ſhould not harmonize it beautifully; or that having beautifully harmonized it, he ſhould deſtroy it?

But

But if he was not good, how not being good, did he make it to be orderly and elegantly arranged? For to effect this is the work of a beneficent artificer. But if being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not necessary immediately to assign to the universe a temporal generation, because it is said to be visible and generated. And thus much in reply to Atticus.

Let us however return to our principles, and inquire whether the world always was, as being eternal, or is not eternal, but consubsistent with time, and whether it is self-subsistent, or produced by another. Such then is the inquiry. The answer to which is, that it was produced by another, and is consubsistent with time. But a thing of this kind is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has generation in consequence of its composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not producing itself. And if it is eternal, it has its whole subsistence coextended with time. For it was fabricated with reference to something else, and it was generated as a flowing image of real being. As therefore that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence. If then a simple and uniform essence is eternal, an essence composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation. Hence Plato divinely inquires, whether the world originated from a *certain* principle. For that which was *once* generated, originated from a temporal, fabricative, final, material, and formal principle. For principle being predicated multifariously, that which is produced in time originates according to all these modes. But the world originated from a *certain*, and not from *every* principle. What then was this principle? It was not temporal: for that which originates from this, is also allotted the principle of its generation from all the others. It originated indeed from that most leading and proper principle, the final, as Plato himself teaches us in the course of this Dialogue. For it was generated through *the good*, and this is the principle of generation from which it originated. In the first place, therefore, he shows that the world is generated, from its composition: for it is tangible and visible. These then are the extremities of the universe: for heaven is visible, but earth is tangible; and the visible is in earth, so far as it participates of light, and the tangible in heaven, so far as a terrene nature is comprehended in it according to cause. In short he says that the world has a body, that we may also take into account the middle perfections of the universe. And in this Plato speaks agreeably to the oracle, which says, "The world is an imitation of intellect, but that which is

fabricated poſſeſſes ſomething of body." So far therefore as the univerſe has ſomething corporeal, it is generated, for according to this it is both viſible and tangible. But every thing viſible and tangible is ſenſible: for *ſenſe is touching and ſeeing.* But that which is ſenſible is the object of opinion, as being mingled with diſſimilars, and as incapable of preſerving the purity of intelligible forms. And every thing of this kind is generated, as having a compoſite eſſence. Plato therefore does not ſubvert the perpetuity of the univerſe, as ſome have thought he does, following Ariſtotelic hypotheſes: and that this is true, we may eaſily learn as follows.

Time, ſays Plato, was generated together with heaven, or the univerſe. If therefore time is perpetual, the univerſe alſo is perpetual. But if time has a temporal beginning, the univerſe alſo has a temporal beginning; though it is of all things moſt abſurd that time ſhould have a beginning. But the advocates for the temporal origin of the world ſay, that time is twofold, one kind being diſordered, and the other proceeding according to number; ſince motion is twofold, one diſordered and confuſed, and the other orderly and elegant; and time is coordinate with each of theſe motions. But it is poſſible indeed for body to be moved equably or unequably, but impoſſible to conceive time equable and unequable: for thus the eſſence of time would be a compoſite. Though, indeed, why do I thus ſpeak? for when motion is unequable, time is equable. Now, therefore, there are alſo many motions, ſome more ſwift, and others more ſlow, and one of which is more equable than another, but of all of them there is one continued time, proceeding according to number. Hence it is not right to make this twofold time. But if time is one and continued, if it is unbegotten, the univerſe alſo is unbegotten, which is conſubſiſtent with time. But if time is generated, an abſurdity will enſue; for time will require time in order to its being generated, and this when it has not yet a being; ſince when time was generated, time was not yet.

Further ſtill, Plato conjoins the ſoul of the univerſe, immediately on its generation with the body of the univerſe, and does not give to it a life prior to that of the corporeal nature. Soul however ranks, according to him, among perpetual beings. If therefore ſoul is conſubſiſtent with body, but ſoul has a perpetual ſubſiſtence, body alſo is perpetual according to Plato: for that which is conſubſiſtent with a perpetual nature is unbegotten.

Again, Timæus here ſays, that the ſoul is generated, but Socrates in the Phædrus

drus ſays, that it is unbegotten. Hence he calls that which is clearly unbegotten according to time, after another manner begotten. Again, Plato calls the world incorruptible, in the ſame manner as thoſe who contend that it was generated in time. But in the Republic he clearly aſſerts, or rather the Muſes and not Plato, that every thing which is generated according to time is corruptible. But from theſe things you may underſtand what I ſay: for the world is ſhown by them to be unbegotten. For if the world is incorruptible, but nothing generated according to time is incorruptible, the world is not generated according to time. But why is a ſyllogiſm of this kind neceſſary, ſince Plato clearly ſays in the Laws, that time is infinite according to the paſt, and that in this infinity myriads on myriads of fertile and barren periods of mankind have taken place? Or rather, that we may reaſon from what we have at hand, Plato a little before, in this very dialogue, ſays, "that in thoſe places where neither intenſe cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of mankind is *always* preſerved, though ſometimes the number of individuals is increaſed, and ſometimes ſuffers a conſiderable diminution. But if the race of mankind *always* is, the univerſe alſo muſt neceſſarily be perpetual.

Again, therefore, if the demiurgus of the univerſe ranks among eternal beings, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not; for he would not poſſeſs a ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence, nor an immutable nature. But if he always fabricates, that which he produces always is. For what could be his intention, after having been indolent for an infinite time, in converting himſelf to fabrication? Shall we ſay that he apprehended it was better ſo to do? Was he then ignorant before that this was better or not? For if he was ignorant, he will, though a pure and divine intellect, be deprived of knowledge, which is abſurd to ſuppoſe. But if he knew that it was better, why did he not before begin to generate and make the world? In another reſpect alſo, thoſe appear to me to ſin againſt the demiurgus of the univerſe, who ſay that the world once was not. For if the world once had no exiſtence, the demiurgus once did not make it: ſince that which is made and the maker ſubſiſt together. But if he once did not make, he was then a maker in capacity; and if in capacity, he was then imperfect, and afterwards perfect, when he made the world. If, however, prior and poſterior ſubſiſt about him, it is evident that he does not rank among beings who eternally energize, but among thoſe that energize according to time, paſſing from not making to making. However, he produces time. How therefore, poſſeſſing an energy indigent of time, did he through this energy produce

time?

time? For he once made time, of which notwithſtanding he is in want, in order that he may make time.

How therefore may the world be ſaid to be generated? We reply, as that which always is to be generated, and always will be generated. For a partial body not only *is* to be generated, but there was a time when it *was* generated. But all heaven, or the univerſe, alone ſubſiſts in the being to be generated, or in becoming to be, and is not at the ſame time that which was generated. For as the ſolar light proceeds from its proper fountain, ſo the world is always generated, and always produced, and is as it were always advancing into being.

P. 474. *To diſcover therefore the Artificer and Father of this Univerſe, &c.*

Father and artificer differ with reſpect to each other, ſo far as the former is the cauſe of being, and the ſupplier of union, but the latter of powers, and a multiform eſſence; and ſo far as the former ſtably comprehends all things in himſelf, but the latter is the cauſe of progreſſion and generation; and ſo far as the former ſignifies ineffable and divine Providence, but the latter a copious communication of reaſons or productive principles. But *this univerſe* ſignifies corporeal maſſes, the whole ſpheres, and thoſe things which give completion to each. It alſo ſignifies the vital and intellectual powers which are carried in the corporeal maſſes. It likewiſe comprehends all mundane cauſes, and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of mundane gods proceeds. The one intellect, divine ſoul, and whole bulk of the univerſe, and its conjoined, divine, intellectual, pſychical, and corporeal number, ſince every monad has a multitude coordinate with itſelf, are alſo to be aſſumed in the place of the world. For the univerſe ſignifies all theſe. Perhaps too the addition of *this* is ſignificant of the world being in a certain reſpect ſenſible and partial. For the whole of an intelligible nature cannot be denominated *this*, becauſe it comprehends all intellectual forms. But to the viſible univerſe the particle τοδε, or *this*, is adapted, in conſequence of its being allotted a ſenſible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as he ſays, to find the artificer of this univerſe. For ſince, with reſpect to invention, one kind proceeds from things firſt according to ſcience, but another from things ſecondary according to reminiſcence, invention from things firſt may be ſaid to be difficult, becauſe the diſcovery of the powers which are

ſituated

ſituated between, is the province of the higheſt theory, but that from things ſecondary is ſtill more difficult. For, in order to behold from theſe the eſſence of the demiurgus, and the powers which he contains, it is neceſſary to ſurvey the whole nature of his productions. We muſt therefore behold all the apparent parts of the world, and its unapparent powers, according to which the ſympathy and antipathy of the parts in the univerſe ſubſiſt; and prior to theſe ſtable phyſical reaſons and natures themſelves, both the more partial and the more total, material and immaterial, divine and dæmonical, and thoſe of mortal animals. And further ſtill, we muſt ſurvey the genera of life, the eternal and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, the total and the partial, the rational and the irrational, and all the completions pertaining to eſſences more excellent than ours, through which every thing between the gods and a mortal nature is bound together. We muſt alſo be able to perceive all various ſouls, and different numbers of gods, according to different parts of the univerſe, together with the ineffable and effable impreſſions of the world, through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who, without ſurveying theſe, attempts the viſion of the demiurgus, will, through imperfection, be deprived of the intellectual perception of the father of the univerſe. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be united with that which is all perfect. It is neceſſary, indeed, that the ſoul becoming an intellectual world, and aſſimilated in her power to the whole and intelligible world, ſhould approach near to the maker of the univerſe, and through this approximation become familiar with him, through continuity of intellectual projection. For an uninterrupted energy about any thing calls forth and reſuſcitates our eſſential reaſons. But through this familiarity the ſoul, being ſtationed at the gate of the father, will become united with him. For the diſcovery of him is this, to meet with him, to be united with him, to aſſociate alone with the alone, and to ſee him with immediate viſion, the ſoul for this purpoſe withdrawing herſelf from every other energy. The diſcovery therefore of the father of the univerſe is ſuch as this, and not that which is effected by opinion; for ſuch a diſcovery is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Nor yet is it ſcientific; for this is ſyllogiſtic and compoſite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual eſſence of the intellectual demiurgus. But the diſcovery of which Plato now ſpeaks ſubſiſts according to immediate viſive projection (κατα την επιβολην την αυτοπτικην), a contact with the intelligible, and an union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may be properly denominated difficult, whether

as laborious, and appearing to ſouls after all the journey of life*, or as the true labour of ſouls. For after the wandering of generation and purification from its ſtains, and after the light of ſcience, intellectual energy, and the intellect which is in us, will ſhine forth, eſtabliſhing as in a port the ſoul in the father of the univerſe, purely ſeating her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light with light, not ſuch as that of ſcience, but more beautiful, intellectual, and uniform than this. For this is the paternal port, and the diſcovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

But when Plato ſays, "it is impoſſible to reveal him through the miniſtry of diſcourſe to all men," it perhaps indicates the cuſtom of the Pythagoreans, who preſerved in ſecrecy aſſertions reſpecting divine natures, and did not ſpeak concerning them to the multitude. For, as the Elean gueſt in the Sophiſta ſays, "The eyes of the multitude are not ſufficiently ſtrong to look to truth." This alſo, which is a much more venerable aſſertion, may perhaps be ſaid, that it is impoſſible for him who has diſcovered the father of the univerſe, to ſpeak of him, ſuch as he has ſeen him. For this diſcovery was not effected by the ſoul ſpeaking, but by her being initiated in divine myſteries, and converting herſelf to the divine light; nor was it in conſequence of her being moved according to her proper motion, but from her becoming ſilent, according to that ſilence which leads the way. For ſince the eſſence of other things is not naturally adapted to be enunciated through names, or through definition, or even through ſcience, but by intelligence alone, as Plato ſays in his ſeventh Epiſtle, after what other manner is it poſſible to diſcover the eſſence of the demiurgus than intellectually? Or how, having thus diſcovered him, can that which is ſeen be told through nouns and verbs, and communicated to others? For a diſcurſive energy, ſince it is attended with compoſition, is incapable of repreſenting a uniform and ſimple nature. But here ſome one may ſay, Do we not aſſert many things concerning the demiurgus, and other gods, and concerning *the one* itſelf, the principle of all things? We reply that we ſpeak *concerning* them, but we do not ſpeak the αυτο, or *the very thing itſelf*, which each of them is. And we are able indeed to ſpeak of them *ſcientifically*, but not *intellectually*: for this, as we have ſaid before, is to diſcover them. But if the diſcovery is a ſilent energy of the ſoul, how can ſpeech flowing through the mouth be ſufficient to lead into light that which is diſcovered, ſuch as it truly is?

* And this is what Homer divinely inſinuates in the Fable of Ulyſſes.

After

After this, Proclus, following, as he ſays, the light of ſcience, inveſtigates who the demiurgus of the univerſe is, and in what order of things he ranks. For Numenius the Pythagorean (ſays he), celebrating three gods, calls the firſt *father*, the ſecond *maker*, and the third *work* or *effect* (ποιημα), for the world, according to him, is the third god; ſo that with Numenius there is a two-fold demiurgus, viz. the firſt and ſecond god, but that which is fabricated is the third divinity. Numenius, however, in thus ſpeaking, in the firſt place, does not act rightly in connumerating *the good* with theſe cauſes. For *the good*, or the ſupreme principle of things, is not naturally adapted to be conjoined with certain things, nor to poſſeſs an order ſecondary to any thing. But with Plato *father* is here ranked after *artificer*. Further ſtill, he coarranges that which is exempt from all habitude, viz. the ineffable cauſe of all, with the natures under, and poſterior to, him. But theſe things ought to be referred to ſubordinate natures, and all habitude ſhould be taken away from that which is firſt. That which is paternal therefore in the univerſe cannot be adapted to the firſt principle of things. And, in the third place, it is not right to divide father and artificer, ſince Plato celebrates one and the ſame divinity by both theſe names. For one divine fabrication, and one fabricator and father, are every where delivered by Plato.

With reſpect to Harpocration, it would be wonderful if he were conſiſtent with himſelf in what he ſays concerning the demiurgus. For this man makes the demiurgus two-fold, and calls the firſt god Heaven and Saturn, the ſecond Jupiter and Zena, and the third Heaven and the World. Again, therefore, transferring the firſt god into another order, he calls him Jupiter, and the king of the intelligible world; but he calls the ſecond, the Ruler; and the ſame divinity according to him is Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The firſt god therefore is all theſe, though Plato in the Parmenides takes away from *the one*, or the firſt god, every name, all diſcourſe, and every habitude. We indeed do not think it proper to call the firſt even father; but with Harpocration the firſt is father, ſon, and grandſon.

Again Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocration, directly makes the demiurgus to be the ſame with *the good*, though the demiurgus is called by Plato *good* (αγαθος), but not *the good* (τοαγαθον). The demiurgus is alſo denominated by Plato *intellect*; but *the good* is the cauſe of all eſſence, and is beyond being, as we learn from the 6th book of the Republic. But what will he ſay reſpecting the paradigm, to which the demiurgus looks in fa-

bricating the world? For it is either prior to the demiurgus, and ſo according to Atticus there will be ſomething more antient than *the good*; or it will be in the demiurgus, and ſo that which is firſt will be *many*, and not *the one*; or it will be after the demiurgus, and ſo *the good*, which it is not lawful to aſſert, will be converted to things poſterior to itſelf, and will intellectually apprehend them.

After theſe men, Plotinus the philoſopher places a two-fold demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, and the other the governor of the univerſe. And he ſays rightly: for in a certain reſpect the mundane intellect is the demiurgus of the univerſe. But the father and artificer, whom he places in the intelligible, is tranſcendently the demiurgus; Plotinus calling every thing between *the one* and the world intelligible: for there, according to him, the true heaven, the kingdom of Saturn, and the intellect of Jupiter, ſubſiſt. Juſt as if any one ſhould ſay that the ſphere of Saturn, that of Jupiter, and that of Mars, are contained in the heavens: for the whole of an intelligible eſſence is one many, and is one intellect comprehending many intelligibles. And ſuch is the doctrine of Plotinus.

In the next place, Amelius (the diſciple of Plotinus) makes a triple demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one that *is*, the ſecond that *hath*, and the third that *ſees*. But theſe differ, becauſe the firſt intellect is truly that which is; but the ſecond is indeed the intelligible which it contains, yet has that which is prior to itſelf, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the ſecond. And the third is indeed likewiſe the intelligible which it contains; for every intellect is the ſame with its conjoned intelligible; but it contains that which is in the ſecond, and ſees the firſt: for that which it poſſeſſes is obſcure in proportion to its diſtance from the firſt. According to Amelius, therefore, theſe three intellects and artificers are the ſame as the three kings with Plato, and as Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn, with Orpheus; and that which is eſpecially the demiurgus according to him is Phanes. To Amelius, however, it is proper to ſay, that Plato is every where accuſtomed to recur from multitude to the unities from which the order in the many proceeds; or rather prior to Plato, from the very order of things themſelves, *the one* is always prior to *multitude*, and every divine order begins from a monad. For it is indeed requiſite that a divine number ſhould proceed from a triad *, but prior to the triad

* As all things abide in their causes, proceed from them and return to them, as is demonſtrated by Proclus

triad is the monad. Where therefore is the demiurgic monad, that there may be a triad from it? And how is the world one, not being fabricated by one cause? For it is requisite by a much greater priority that the cause of the world should be united and be monadic, that the world may become only-begotten. Let there then be three artificers; but who is the one prior to the three; looking indeed to one paradigm, but making the word only-begotten? It is not proper, therefore, that the demiurgic number should begin from a triad but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry, thinking to accord with Plato, calls the supermundane soul the demiurgus, and the intellect of this soul to which he is converted, animal itself, as being according to him the paradigm of the demiurgus. It is requisite, therefore, to inquire of Porphyry, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the demiurgus, and how this accords with Plato, who continually denominates the demiurgus a god and intellect, but never calls him soul? How likewise does Plato call the world a god? And how does the demiurgus pervade through all mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul; but all things partake of demiurgic providence. And divine fabrication indeed is able to generate intellect and gods; but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing above the order pertaining to soul. I omit to observe that it is by no means certain that Plato knew any imparticipable soul.

To Porphyry succeeds the divine Jamblichus, who having written largely against the opinion of Porphyry, and subverting it as being Plotinean, delivers to us his own theology, and calls all the intelligible world the demiurgus. If therefore he means that all things subsist demiurgically in the demiurgus, both being itself, and the intelligible world, he accords with himself, and also with Orpheus, who says,

All that exists in confluent order lies
Within the belly of the mighty Jove.

Proclus in his Elements of Theology, this must also be true of the immediate and first procession from the highest god. The first offspring, therefore, from the ineffable principle of things will be an all-perfect triad, the leader of a divine number; and in like manner every divine number will proceed from a triad, and this from a monad: for there is no number prior to three, unity being the principle of number, and the duad partaking of the nature both of unity and number. This will be evident from considering that it is the property of number to receive a greater increase from multiplication than addition, viz. when multiplied into itself; but unity is increased by being added to, but not by being multiplied by itself, and two in consequence of its middle nature produces the same when added to, as when multiplied by itself. See the Introduction to The Parmenides.

Nor is it in any reſpect wonderful that each of the gods ſhould be the univerſe, but at the ſame time each differently from the reſt; one demiurgically, another according to connecting comprehenſion (συνοχικως), another immutably, and another in a ſtill different manner according to a divine idiom. But if Jamblichus means that the whole extent between the world and *the one* is the demiurgus, this indeed is worthy of doubt, and we may reply to the aſſertion from what he himſelf has taught us. For where are the kings prior to Jupiter, who are the fathers of Jupiter? Where are the kings mentioned by Plato, whom Jamblichus arranges above the world, and about *the one?* And how can we ſay that eternal being itſelf is the firſt being, but that the demiurgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himſelf alſo eternal being as well as animal itſelf? For ſhall we not thus be compelled to ſay that the demiurgus is not eternal being; unleſs ſo far as he alſo is comprehended together with other eternal beings? But that Jamblichus himſelf, though moſt prolific in theſe things, has in ſome of his other writings more accurately celebrated the demiurgic order, may be inferred from this, that in ſpeaking concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the Timæus, after the intelligible triads, and the three triads of gods in the intellectual hebdomad, he aſſigns the third order in theſe proceſſions to the demiurgus. For he ſays that theſe three gods are alſo celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who denominate the firſt of theſe intellects, and which comprehends in itſelf total monads, ſimple, indiviſible, boniform, abiding in and united with itſelf, and conſider it as poſſeſſing ſuch like ſigns of tranſcendency. But they ſay that the moſt beautiful ſigns of the middle intellect, and which collects together the completion of ſuch like natures, are that which is prolific in the gods, that which congregates the three intellects, repleniſhes energy, is generative of divine life, and is the ſource of progreſſion and beneficence to every thing. And they inform us that the moſt illuſtrious tokens of the third intellect, which fabricates wholes, are prolific progreſſions, fabrications and connected comprehenſions of total cauſes, whole cauſes bounded in forms, and which emit from themſelves all fabrications, and other prerogatives ſimilar to theſe. It is proper, therefore, to judge from theſe aſſertions, what the Jamblichean theology is concerning the demiurgus of wholes.

After him Theodorus*, following Amelius, ſays, that there are three artificers; but he does not arrange them immediately after *the one*, but at the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual gods. He likewiſe calls one of theſe eſſential intellect, another intellec-

* Theodorus, as well as Jamblichus, was the diſciple of Porphyry.

tual

tual eſſence, and another the fountain of ſouls; and ſays that the firſt is indiviſible, the ſecond is diſtributed into wholes, and that the third has made a diſtribution into particulars. Again, therefore, we may ſay the ſame things to him as we ſaid to the noble Amelius, that we acknowledge theſe to be three gods, or analogous to theſe, but not alſo three artificers; but we ſay that one of theſe is the intelligible of the demiurgus, the ſecond his generative power, and the third that which is truly demiurgic intellect. But it is requiſite to conſider whether the fountain of ſouls is to be arranged as the third: for power belongs to the middle, as he alſo ſays, and hence the fountain of ſouls ſhould be partially, and not univerſally, denominated the fountain of life. For the fountain of ſouls is only one of the fountains in this middle; ſince life is not in ſouls only, nor in animated natures alone, but there is alſo divine and intellectual life prior to that of the ſoul, which they ſay, proceeding from this middle, emits a diverſity of life from diſtributed channels. Such then, in ſhort, are the dogmas of antient interpreters reſpecting the demiurgus.

Let us now, therefore, briefly relate the conceptions of our preceptor on this ſubject, and which we think accord in a very eminent degree with thoſe of Plato. The demiurgus, therefore, according to him, poſſeſſes the extremity * of the intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life, emitting from himſelf total fabrication, and imparting dominion to the more partial fathers of wholes. He is likewiſe immovable, being eternally eſtabliſhed on the ſummit of Olympus, and ruling over two-fold worlds, the ſuperceleſtial and celeſtial, and comprehending the beginning, middle, and end of all things. For of every demiurgic diſtribution, one kind is of wholes with a total ſubſiſtence, another of wholes with a partial ſubſiſtence, another of parts with a total†, and another of parts with a partial ſubſiſtence. But fabrication being fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds in itſelf the total providence of wholes, but a demiurgic triad is ſuſpended from it which governs parts totally, and diſtributes the power of the

* There are three divine orders, which according to antient theologists are said to comprehend the total orders of the gods, viz. the intelligible, (the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of things,) the intelligible and at the same time intellectual, and the intellectual order. The demiurgus of the universe subsists at the extremity of this last.

† There is wanting here in the original *το δε των μερων ολικως.*

monad;

monad*; juſt as in the other, or partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad which orderly diſtributes wholes partially, and parts partially. But all the multitude of the triad revolves round the monad, is diſtributed about it, divides its fabrications, and is filled from it. If theſe things then are rightly aſſerted, the demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of the intellectual gods, being eſtabliſhed indeed in the intelligible, but full of power, according to which he produces wholes, and converts all things to himſelf. Hence Timæus call him *intellect*, and *the beſt of cauſes*, and ſays *that he looks to* an intelligible paradigm, that by this he may ſeparate him from the firſt intelligible gods; but by calling him *intellect*, he places him in an order different from that of the gods, who are both intelligible and intellectual: and by the appellation of *the beſt of cauſes*, he eſtabliſhes him above all other ſupermundane fabricators. He is, therefore, an intellectual god exempt from all other fabricators. But if he was the firſt† deity in the intellectual order, he would poſſeſs a permanent characteriſtic, abiding after his accuſtomed mode: for this is the illuſtrious prerogative of the firſt intellectual god. If he was the ſecond‡ deity of this order he would be particularly the cauſe of life; but now in generating ſoul, he energizes indeed together with the crater, but is eſſentially intellect. He is therefore no other than the third‖ of the intellectual fathers: for his peculiar work is the production of intellect, and not the fabrication of body. For he makes body, yet not alone, but in conjunction with neceſſity; but he makes intellect through himſelf. Nor is it his peculiar work to produce ſoul: for he generates ſoul together with the crater; but he alone both gives ſubſiſtence to and cauſes intellect to preſide over the univerſe. As he is therefore the maker of intellect, he very properly has alſo an intellectual order. Hence he is called by Plato, *fabricator and father*; and is neither father alone, nor fabricator alone, nor again, father and fabricator. For the extremes are father§ and fabricator; the former poſſeſſing the ſummit of intelligibles, and ſubſiſting prior to the royal ſeries, and the latter ſubſiſting at the extremity of the order; and the

* Τριαδος is erroneously printed in the original instead of μοναδος.

† Viz. Saturn. ‡ Viz. Rhea. ‖ Viz. Jupiter.

§ Being itſelf, or the ſummit of the intelligible order, is called *father* alone; Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order, is called *father and artificer*; Jupiter, or the extremity of the intellectual order, is called *artificer and father*; and Vulcan, who is the fabricator of a corporeal nature, is called *artificer*.

one

one being the monad of paternal deity, and the other being allotted a fabricative power in the univerſe. But between both theſe are, father and at the ſame time artificer, and artificer and at the ſame time father. For each of theſe is not the ſame; but in the one the paternal, and in the other the fabricative has dominion; and the paternal is better than the fabricative. Hence the firſt of the two media is more characterized by *father*; for, according to the Oracle, "he is the boundary of the paternal profundity, and the fountain of intellectual natures." But the ſecond of the media is more characterized by *cator:* for he is the monad of total fabrication. Whence alſo I think that the former is called *Metis* (μητις) but the latter *Metietes* (μητιετης); and the former is ſeen, but the latter ſees. The former alſo is ſwallowed up, but the latter is ſatiated with the power of the former; and what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectuals; for the one is the boundary of the intelligible, and the other of the intellectual gods. Likewiſe concerning the former Orpheus ſays, "The father made theſe things in a dark cavern;" but concerning the latter, Plato ſays, "Of whom I am the demiurgus and father." And in his Politicus he reminds us of the doctrine of the demiurgus and father; becauſe the former of theſe divinities is more characterized by the paternal, and the latter by the demiurgic peculiarity. But every god is denominated from his idiom, though at the ſame time he comprehends all things. And the divinity indeed, who is alone *the maker* or artificer, is the cauſe of mundane natures; but he who is both *artificer* and *father* is the cauſe of ſupermundane and mundane natures. He who is *father* and *artificer* is the cauſe of intellectual, ſupermundane, and mundane natures; and he who is *father* alone is the cauſe of things intelligible, intellectual, ſupermundane and mundane. Plato, therefore, thus repreſenting the demiurgus, leaves him ineffable and without a name, as ſubſiſting prior to wholes, in the allotment of *the good.* For in every order of gods there is that which is analogous to *the one*; and of this kind is the monad in every world. But Orpheus alſo gives him a name as being thence moved; and in this he is followed by Plato in other parts of his writings: for the Jupiter with him, who is prior to the three ſons of Saturn, is the demiurgus of univerſe.

After the abſorption, therefore, of Phanes, the ideas of all things appeared in Jupiter, as the theologiſt (Orpheus) ſays:

> Hence with the univerſe great Jove contains
> Heav'n's ſplendid height, and æther's ample plains;

The

The barren sea, wide-bosom'd earth renown'd,
Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound;
Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main,
With all that nature's ample realms contain;
And gods and goddesses of each degree,
All that is past, and all that e'er shall be;
Occultly, and in confluent order lie
In Jove's vast womb, the ruler of the sky.

But being full of ideas, through these he comprehends wholes in himself, which also the theologist indicating, adds,

Jove is the first and last, high thund'ring king;
Middle and head, and all things spring from Jove.
King Jove the root of earth and heav'n contains:
One power, one dæmon is the source of all.
For in Jove's royal body all things lie,
Fire, earth, and water, æther, night, and day.

Jupiter, therefore, comprehending wholes, at the same time gives subsistence to all things in conjunction with Night. Hence to Jupiter thus inquiring,

Tell me how all things will as one subsist,
Yet each its nature separate preserve?

Night replies,

All things receive enclos'd on ev'ry side,
In æther's wide ineffable embrace:
Then in the midst of æther place the heav'n,
In which let earth of infinite extent,
The sea, and stars, the crown of heav'n, be fixt.

And Jupiter is instructed by Night in all the subsequent mundane fabrication: but after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds,

But when around the whole your pow'r has spread
A strong coercive bond, a golden chain
Suspend from æther.

viz. a chain perfectly strong and indissoluble, proceeding from nature, soul and intellect. For being bound, says Plato, with animated bonds, they became animals,

——————the golden chain suspend from æther.

The divine orders above the world * being denominated Homerically a golden chain. And Plato, emulating Homer, says in this dialogue, "that the demiurgus *binding* intellect in soul, and soul in body, fabricated the universe, and that he gave subsistence to the junior gods, through whom also he adorns the parts of the world." If therefore it is Jupiter who possesses one power, who swallows Phanes in whom the intelligible causes of wholes primarily subsist, who produces all things according to the admonitions of Night, and who confers dominion both on other gods and the three sons of Saturn, he it is who is the one and whole demiurgus of the universe, possessing the fifth order among those gods that rank as kings, as is divinely shown by our preceptor in his Orphic conferences, and who is coordinate with Heaven and Phanes; and on this account he is artificer and father, and each of these totally.

But that Plato also has these conceptions concerning the mighty Jupiter is evident from the appellations which he gives him in the Cratylus, evincing that he is the cause and the supplier of life to all things: for, says he, that through which life is imparted to all things is denominated by us διὰ and ζῆνα. But in the Gorgias, he coordinates him with the sons of Saturn, and at the same time gives him a subsistence exempt from them, that he may be prior to the three, and may be participated by them, and establishes Law together with him, in the same manner as Orpheus. For, from the admonitions of Night, according to Orpheus, Law is made the assessor of Jupiter, and is established together with him. Further still, Plato in his Laws, conformably to the theologist, represents total Justice as the associate of Jupiter: and in the Philebus he evinces that a royal soul and a royal intellect presubsist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause; agreeably to which he now also describes him as giving subsistence to intellect and soul, as unfolding the laws of fate, and producing all the orders of mundane gods and animals, as far as to the last of things; generating some of these by himself alone, and others through the celestial gods as media. In the Politicus also he calls Jupiter the demiurgus and father of the universe, in the same manner as in this dialogue, and says that the present order of the world is under Jupiter, and that the world is governed

* Instead of τῶν θείων πραξεων υπο των εγκοσμιων, as in the original, it is necessary to read as in our translation των θειων ταξεων υπερ των εγκοσμιων.

according to fate. The world, therefore, living a life under the dominion of Jupiter, has Jupiter for the demiurgus and father of its life. The divine poet Homer likewiſe repreſents him fabricating on the ſummit of Olympus, ("Hear me, all ye gods and goddeſſes!") and converting the two-fold coordinations of divinities to himſelf. Through the whole of his poetry, too, he calls him the ſupreme of rulers, and the father of men and gods, and celebrates him with all demurgic conceptions. Since, therefore, according to all the Grecian theology, the fabrication of the univerſe is aſcribed to Jupiter, what ought we to think reſpecting theſe words of Plato? Is it not that the deity which is celebrated by him as artificer and father is the ſovereign Jupiter, and that he is neither father alone, nor father and artificer? For the father was the monad, as the Pythagoreans ſay: but he is this very order of gods, the decad, at which number proceeding from the retreats of the monad arrives, this being a univerſal recipient, venerable, circularly inveſting all things with bound, immutable, unwearied, and which they call the ſacred decad. After the paternal monad, therefore, and the paternal and at the ſame time fabricative tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds; being *immutable* indeed, becauſe *immutable deity* is conſubſiſtent with it, but *inveſting all things with bound*, as being the ſupplier of order to things diſordered, and of ornament to things unadorned, and illuminating ſouls with intellect, as being itſelf intellect totally; body with ſoul, as poſſeſſing and comprehending the cauſe of ſoul; and producing things which are truly generated as middle and laſt, in conſequence of containing in itſelf demiurgic being.

P. 485. *In the firſt place, he received one part from the whole, &c.*

After Proclus has diſcuſſed every thing pertaining to the mathematical ſpeculation of the pſychogonic * diagram, an epitome of which we have given in the Introduction to this dialogue, he proceeds to a more principal and profound explanation of this part of the Timæus, as follows: In the firſt place, ſays he, we think it proper to ſpeak about the diviſion of the ſoul, according to which it is divided in theſe ratios, and likewiſe to remove whatever may be an impediment to us in apprehending the truth concerning it. Let no one therefore think that this diviſion is corporeal, for we have before ſhown that the medium of the ſoul is exempt from body, and from the whole of that eſſence which is

* Viz. the diagram pertaining to the generation of the ſoul.

divided about it. Nor let any one who admits that it is better than body ſuppoſe that it ought to be divided after the ſame manner as the extremes and intervals by which body is meaſured. For things which poſſeſs interval, are not totally through the whole of themſelves preſent to themſelves, and when divided are not able to preſerve an unconfuſed union. But ſoul, participating of an impartible deſtiny, is united to itſelf, and exhibits all the ſame elements ſubſiſting in all the ſame. Nor again, let any one ſuppoſe that this is a ſection of number. For ſoul is indeed number, but not that which ſubſiſts according to quantity, but that which is eſſential, ſelf-begotten, uniform, and converted to itſelf. Nor let any one compare the preſence of theſe ratios in all things to ſpermatic reaſons: for thoſe are imperfect, corporeal and material, and are in every reſpect ſurpaſſed by the immaterial and pure eſſence of the reaſons of the ſoul. Nor yet let any one aſſimilate the above-mentioned parts to the theorems of ſcience, in conſequence of each poſſeſſing the whole: for we do not now conſider the knowledge, but the eſſence of the ſoul. Nor is it proper to think that diverſities of eſſences are ſimilar to the diſtinctions of habits: for the latter are all-variouſly diverſified in thoſe that poſſeſs them, but the former are eſtabliſhed with a ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence in demiurgic boundaries. It is requiſite, therefore, to ſuſpend the primary principle of the pſychogonic diviſion from a demiurgic cauſe, and from thoſe perfect meaſures which eternally preſubſiſt in beings, and to which the demiurgus alſo looking divides the ſoul. For as he divides this univerſe by intelligible paradigms, ſo alſo he ſeparates the eſſence of the ſoul by the moſt beautiful boundaries, aſſimilating it to more antient and principal cauſes. The mode, therefore, of diviſion is immaterial, intellectual, undefiled, perfective of the eſſence of the ſoul, generative of the multitude it contains, collective through harmony into one order, and connective of things divided; at the ſame time being the cauſe of the unmingled purity in the ſoul, and producing a confluent communion of reaſons. And the demiurgus appears indeed to conſume the whole by dividing it into parts: and thus, after a manner, Timæus alſo aſſerts; for he ſays, that the demiurgus conſumed the whole from which he ſeparated theſe parts. But as he had previouſly ſaid that ſoul is not only partible, but alſo impartible, it is requiſite to preſerve both, and to conſider that while the wholeneſs remains impartible, a diviſion into multitude is produced: for if we take one of theſe only, I mean the ſection, we ſhall make it only indiviſible. The whole, therefore, is divided together with the whole remaining impartible; ſo that it

equally participates of both. Hence it is well obſerved by the dæmoniacal Ariſtotle, that there is ſomething impartible in partible natures, by which they are connected*; ſo that it is much more neceſſary that ſomething impartible ſhould remain in things whoſe nature is not only partible, but alſo impartible. For if it ſhould not remain, that which conſiſts from both will be alone partible. But that it is neceſſary that the whole ſhould remain in the generation of the parts is evident; ſince the demiurgus is an eternal fabricator. But he conſtituted the ſoul one whole prior to its diviſion: for he does not produce at one time and deſtroy at another; but he always produces every thing, and this eternally; and makes that which is produced to remain ſuch as it is. The wholeneſs, therefore, is not deſtroyed in giving ſubſiſtence to the parts, but remains and precedes† the parts. For he did not produce the parts prior to the whole, and afterwards generate the whole from theſe; but, on the contrary, produced the whole firſt, and from this gave ſubſiſtence to the parts. Hence the eſſence of the ſoul is at the ſame time a whole and poſſeſſes parts, and is one and multitude. And ſuch is the diviſion which Timæus aſſumes in the ſoul.

But let the mode of its explanation accord with the eſſence of the ſoul, being remote from apparent harmony, but recurring to eſſential and immaterial harmony, and ſending us from images to paradigms. For the ſymphony which flows into the ears, and conſiſts in ſounds and pulſations, is entirely different from that which is vital and intellectual. Let no one therefore ſtop at the mathematical ſpeculation of the preſent paſſage, but let him excite in himſelf a theory adapted to the eſſence of the ſoul. Not let him think that we ſhould look to intervals, or differences of motions; for theſe things are very remote, and are by no means adapted to the propoſed object of inquiry; but let him

* That which ultimately connects bodies must necessarily be impartible; for if it also consisted of parts, those parts would require something else as the cause of their connection, and this something else, if also partible, another connecting principle, and so on *ad infinitum*. Body, therefore, derives its connection from the presence of something incorporeal.

† Whole, as Proclus soon after this informs us, has a triple subsistence, prior to parts, in a part, and posterior to parts. We have a beautiful image of the first of these of which Proclus is now speaking, in the centre of a circle considered as subsisting with the extremities of the radii terminating in it. For these extremities, considered as giving completion to the centre, so far as centre, may be said to be as it were parts of it; but when they are considered as they may be, as proceeding from the centre, they are posterior to it.

conſider the aſſertions eſſentially, and examine how they indicate the medium pertaining to the ſoul, and how they exhibit demiurgic providence. In the firſt place, therefore, ſince wholeneſs is triple, one being prior to parts, another ſubſiſting from parts, and another in each of the parts, that wholeneſs of the ſoul which is now delivered is that which ſubſiſts prior to parts; for the demiurgus made it one whole prior to all diviſion, which, as we have ſaid, remains ſuch as it is, without being conſumed in the production of the parts: for to be willing to diſſolve that which is well harmonized is the province of an evil artificer. He would however diſſolve it, if he conſumed the whole in the parts. But Plato inſinuates that wholeneſs which conſiſts from parts, when he repreſents the demiurgus conſuming the whole mixture in the ſection of the eſſence of the ſoul, and renovating the whole of it through the harmony of its parts; this whole receiving its completion from all according parts. And a little further on he will teach us that wholeneſs which ſubſiſts in each of its parts, when he divides the whole ſoul into certain circles, and attributes all the above-mentioned ratios to them, which he has already rendered apparent; for he ſays that the three are in each of the parts, in the ſame manner as in the whole. Every part, therefore, is in a certain reſpect a triadic whole, after the ſame manner as the whole. Hence it is neceſſary that the ſoul ſhould have three wholeneſſes, becauſe it animates the univerſe, which is a whole of wholes, each of which is a whole as in a part. As it therefore animates in a two-fold reſpect, viz. both that which is a whole, and thoſe wholes which are as parts, it requires two wholeneſſes; and it tranſcends the natures which are animated, poſſeſſing ſomething external to them, ſo as, in the language of Timæus, to ſurround the univerſe as with a veil. Hence by the wholeneſs prior to parts it entirely runs above the univerſe, and by the other two connects it, and the natures which it contains; theſe alſo ſubſiſting as wholes.

In the next place, we muſt obſerve that Plato, proceeding from the beginning to the end, preſerves that which is monadic and alſo that which is dyadic in the ſoul: for he reduces its hyparxis into eſſence, ſameneſs, and difference, and biſects number, beginning from one part, into the double and triple; and contemplating the media, he comprehends two in one, and according to each of theſe unfolds two-fold ratios, the ſeſquialter and ſeſquitertian, and again cuts theſe into ſeſquioctaves and remainders (λειμματα). In what follows alſo, he divides one length into two, and one figure of the ſoul into two periods; and, in ſhort, he very properly never ſeparates the dyadic from the monadic; for

for to intellect the monadic alone is adapted, on which account it is alſo impartible, but to body the dyadic; and hence, in the generation of a corporeal nature, he begins from the duad of fire and earth, and arranges two other genera of elements between theſe. But ſoul ſubſiſting between body and intellect is at the ſame time a monad and a duad; and this becauſe in a certain reſpect it equally participates of bound and infinity; juſt as intellect is allied to bound, but body more accords with infinity, through its ſubject matter, and its diviſion *ad infinitum*. And if after this manner ſome have referred the impartible and partible to the monad and indefinite duad, they have ſpoken agreeably to things themſelves; but if they have conſidered the ſoul to be number in no reſpect differing from monadic numbers, their aſſertions have been utterly diſcordant with the eſſence of the ſoul. It is therefore at the ſame time both a monad and duad, reſembling by the monadic, intellectual bound, and by the dyadic, infinity; or by the former being the image of the impartible, and by the latter the paradigm of partible natures. This alſo ſhould be conſidered, that Timæus here ſpeaks of a two-fold work of the demiurgus: for he divides the ſoul into parts, and harmonizes the divided portions, and renders them accordant with each other. But in ſo doing he at the ſame time energizes both Dionyſiacally and Apolloniacally. For to divide and produce wholes into parts, and to preſide over the diſtribution of ſpecies, is Dionyſiacal; but to perfect all things harmonioufly is Apolloniacal. As the demiurgus, therefore, comprehends in himſelf the cauſe of both theſe gods, he divides and harmonizes the ſoul: for the hebdomad is a number common to both theſe divinities; ſince theologiſts ſay that Bacchus was divided into ſeven parts, and they aſcribe the heptad to Apollo, as the power that connects all ſymphonies; for in the monad, duad, and tetrad, from which the hebdomad is compoſed, the diſdiapaſon firſt conſiſts. Hence they call the god, the leader of the hebdomad, and aſſert that the ſeventh day is ſacred to him: for they ſay that on that day Apollo was born from Latona, in the ſame manner as Diana on the ſixth day. This number, therefore, in the ſame manner as the triad, accedes to the ſoul from ſuperior cauſes; the triad indeed from intelligible, but the hebdomad from intellectual* cauſes. But the heb-

* The number 7, according to the Pythagoreans, is the image of intellectual light; and hence the intellectual order is hebdomadic, conſiſting of two triads, viz. Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, and the three Curetes, and a ſeparating monad which is called by antient theologiſts Ocean. See the fifth book of Proclus on Plato's Theology, and the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.

domad

domad is derived from theſe gods, that the diviſion into ſeven parts may be a ſign of the Dionyſiacal ſeries, and of that dilaceration which is celebrated in fables. For it is requiſite that the ſoul participating a Dionyſiacal intellect, and, as Orpheus ſays, carrying the god on her head, ſhould be divided after the ſame manner as he is divided; and that the harmony which ſhe poſſeſſes in theſe parts ſhould be a ſymbol of the Apolloniacal order. For in the fables* reſpecting this god, it is Apollo who collects and unites the lacerated members of Bacchus, according to the will of his father.

In the next place, three middles are aſſumed, which not only in the ſoul, but alſo every where ſhadow forth the daughters of Themis, who are three, as well as theſe middles: for the geometrical middle is the image of Eunomia; and hence in the Laws Plato ſays, that ſhe governs polities, and is the judgment of Jupiter, adorning the univerſe, and comprehending in herſelf the truly political ſcience. But the harmonic middle is the image of Juſtice, which diſtributes a greater ratio † to greater, and a leſſer to leſſer terms, this being the employment of Juſtice. And the arithmetical middle is the image of Peace: for it is ſhe, as he alſo ſays in the Laws, who attributes to all things the equal according to quantity, and makes people preſerve peace with people, for the ſolid proportion prior to theſe is ſacred to their mother Themis, who comprehends all the powers of theſe. And thus much generally reſpecting theſe three middles.

That we may, however, ſpeak of them more particularly, it is requiſite to obſerve that they are unific and connective of the eſſence of the ſoul, viz. they are unions, analogies, and bonds. Hence Timæus alſo calls them bonds. For above, he ſays, that the geometric middle is the moſt beautiful of bonds, and that the others are contained in this; but every bond is a certain union. If, therefore, theſe middles are bonds, and bonds are unions of the things bound, the conſequence is evident. Theſe therefore pervade through the whole eſſence of the ſoul, and cauſe it to be one from many wholes, as they are allotted a power which can bind various forms. But theſe being three, the geometric binds every thing which is eſſential in ſouls: for eſſence is one reaſon ‡ which pervades through all things, and connects things firſt, middle, and laſt, in the ſame manner

* See my Diſſertation on the Eleuſinian and Bacchic Myſteries.

† Thus in 6, 4, 3, which are in harmonic proportion, the ratio of 6 to 4 is greater than that of 4 to 3.

‡ Reaſon muſt here be conſidered as ſignifying a productive and connective principle of things, to which ratio in quantity is analogous.

as in the geometric middle there is one and the ſame ratio which perfectly pervades through three terms. The harmonic middle connects all the divided ſameneſs of ſouls, imparting a communion of reaſons to the extremes, and a kindred conjunction; this ſameneſs which it connects being more apparent in more total, but leſs apparent in more partial ſouls. And the arithmetic middle binds the all-various difference of the progreſſion of the ſoul, and is leſs inherent in things greater according to order, but more in ſuch as are leſſer. For difference has dominion in more partial natures, juſt as ſameneſs has in ſuch as are more total and more excellent. Thoſe middles alſo may be compared with each other, in the ſame manner as ſameneſs and difference: and as eſſence is the monad of theſe, ſo the geometric middle of thoſe. The geometric middle therefore is the union of all the eſſences which are comprehended in the thirty-four terms. The harmonic is the union of equally numerous identities, and the arithmetic of differences; all theſe middles at the ſame time being extended through all the terms. For how could a certain whole be produced from them, unleſs they were as much as poſſible united with each other, eſſentially indeed by one of theſe, but variouſly by the other two? Hence theſe two become the ſupplement of the geometric middle, juſt as ſameneſs and difference contribute to the conſummation of eſſence; for in conſequence of their poſſeſſing contrariety to each other, the geometric middle conciliates their diſſenſion, and unites their interval. For the harmonic middle, as we have ſaid, diſtributes greater ratios to greater, and leſſer to leſſer terms: ſince it evinces that things greater and more total according to eſſence are more comprehenſive, and tranſcend in power ſubject natures. But the arithmetic middle, on the contrary, diſtributes leſſer ratios to greater terms, and greater ratios to leſſer terms*. For difference prevails more in ſubordinate natures, as, on the contrary, the dominion of ſameneſs is more apparent in ſuperior than in inferior natures. And the geometric middle extends the ſame ratio to all the terms, illuminating union to things firſt, middle, and laſt, through the preſence of eſſence to all things. The demiurgus, therefore, imparts to the ſoul three connective unions, which Plato calls middles, becauſe they appear to bind the middle order of the univerſe. For the geometric collects the multitude of eſſences, and unites eſſential progreſſions; ſince one

* Thus, in the numbers 6, 4, 2, which are in arithmetic proportion, the ratio of 6 to 4, i. e. the ratio of the greater terms is less than the ratio of 4 to 2, the ratio of the lesser terms: for the ratio of 6 to 4 is $1\frac{1}{2}$, but that of 4 to 2 is 2.

ratio

ratio is an image of union. But the harmonic binds total identities and their hyparxes into one communion; and the arithmetic conjoins firſt, middle, and laſt differences. For, in ſhort, difference is the mother of numbers, as we learn in the Parmenides. But in every part there were theſe three, viz. eſſence, ſameneſs, and difference; and it is requiſite that all theſe ſhould be conjoined with each other through a medium, and binding reaſons.

In the next place, we ſay that the ſoul is a plenitude of reaſons, being more ſimple indeed than ſenſibles, but more compoſite than intelligibles. Hence Timæus aſſumes ſeven ratios in it, viz. the ratio of equality, mutiple, ſubmultiple, ſuperparticular, and ſuperpartient, and the oppoſites of theſe, the ſubſuperparticular and ſubſuperpartient ratios*: but he does not aſſume the ratios which are compoſed from theſe; ſince they are adapted to corporeal natures, which are compoſite and diviſible; while on the contrary the ratios in the ſoul proceed indeed into multitude and diviſion, but at the ſame time, together with multitude, exhibit ſimplicity, and the uniform together with diviſion. Neither therefore like intellect is it allotted an eſſence in the monad and the impartible (for intellect is alone monadic and impartible); nor is it multitude and diviſion alone.

Again, it is requiſite to underſtand that numbers which are more ſimple and nearer to the monad have a more principal ſubſiſtence than ſuch as are more compoſite; ſince Plato alſo eſtabliſhes one part prior to all thoſe that follow, refers all of them to this, and ends in thoſe which are eſpecially compoſite and ſolid. This then being admitted, I ſay that equality, and the ratio of equality, have the ratio of a monad to all ratios; and what the monad is in eſſential quantity, that the equal is† in relative quantity. Hence, according to this reaſoning, the ſoul introduces a common meaſure to all things which ſubſiſt according to the ſame ratios, and one idea bearing an image of ſameneſs; but according to the multiple.

* For an account of these ratios, see the Note to the 8th Book of the Republic on the Geometric Number, vol. i.

† That all the species of inequality of ratio proceed from equality of ratio may be shown as follows:—Let there be any three equal terms, as, for instance, three unities, 1, 1, 1. Let the first therefore be placed equal to the first, viz. 1; the second to the first and second added together, viz. to 2; and let the third be equal to the first, twice the second, and the third added together, viz. to 1, 2, 1, or 4. This

ple and ſubmultiple ratio, it governs all ſeries, connects wholes themſelves, and exhibits every whole form of mundane natures often produced by it in all things. Thus, for inſtance, it exhibits the ſolar and lunar form in divine, dæmonical, and human ſouls, in irrational animals, in plants, and in ſtones themſelves. It poſſeſſes therefore the ſeries as one according to multiple ratio, the whole of which repeatedly appears in the ſame ſeries, and adorns the moſt univerſal genera by more partial ſeries. But by ſuperparticular and ſubſuperparticular ratios it governs things which ſubſiſt as wholes in their participants, and are participated according to one of the things which they contain. And, according to ſuperpartient and ſubſuperpartient ratios, it governs ſuch things as are participated wholly indeed by ſecondary natures, but in conjunction with a diviſion, into multitude. Thus, for inſtance, man participates of animal, and the whole form is in him, yet, not alone, but at the ſame time, the whole is according to one thing, viz. the human form; ſo that, together with the whole, and one certain thing* which is a part of it, it is preſent to its participant. But things which are called common genera, participate indeed of one genus, yet do not participate of this alone, but together with this of many other genera† which are parts, and not a part of that one genus. Thus, for inſtance, a mule participates of the ſpecies, from which it has a mixt generation. Each ſpecies therefore either participates of one genus according to one thing, and imitates the ſuperparticular

will produce duple proportion, viz. 1, 2, 4. By the same process with 1, 2, 4, triple proportion will arise, viz. 1, 3, 9; and by a like process with this again, quadruple proportion, and so on. Multiple proportion being thus produced from equal terms, by inverting the order of these terms, and adopting the same process, sesquialter will be produced from duple proportion, sesquitertian from triple, &c. Thus, for instance, let the three terms 4, 2, 1, be given, which form a duple proportion: let the first be placed equal to the first, viz. to 4; the second to the first and second, viz. to 6; and the third to the first, twice the second, and the third, viz. to 4, 4, 1, or 9, and we shall have 4, 6, 9, which form a sesquialter proportion; for $\frac{6}{4} = 1\frac{1}{2} = \frac{9}{6}$. By a like process with 9, 3, 1, which form a triple proportion, a sesquitertian proportion will arise, viz. 9, 12, 16; and so of other species of superparticular proportion. In like manner, by inverting the terms which compose superparticular proportion, all the species of superpartient proportions will arise. And hence it appears that equality is the principle of all inequalities, in the same manner as the monad of all numbers.

* Thus in the superparticular ratio of 3 to 2, 2 is contained in 3, and together with it one part of 2, viz. the $\frac{1}{2}$ of it.

† Thus in the superpartient ratio of 10 to 6, 6 is contained in 10, and together with it two parts of 6, viz. 4, which is two-thirds of 6.

ratio,

ratio, which contains the whole, and one part of the whole; or it participates of one common genus, and which is extended to many ſpecies, and thus imitates the ſuperpartient ratio, which, together with the whole, contains more parts of it than one: and there is not any participation of formsbeſides theſe. Looking therefore to theſe things, we can eaſily aſſign the cauſe of thoſe things which ſubſiſt according to one ſpecies, as for inſtance of the ſun, the moon, and man; and alſo of thoſe which ſubſiſt according to many ſpecies in conjunction with that which is common. For there are many ſuch like natures both in the earth and ſea, as, for inſtance, ſatyrs and marine nymphs, the upper parts of which reſemble the human form, and the lower the extremities of goats and fiſhes. There is alſo ſaid to be a ſpecies of dragons with the faces of lions, ſuch as theſe poſſeſſing an eſſence mingled from many things. All theſe ratios therefore are very properly preaſſumed in the ſoul, becauſe they bound all the participations of forms in the univerſe; nor can there be any other ratios of communion beſides theſe, ſince all things are deduced into ſpecies according to theſe.

Again, therefore, a hebdomad of ratios correſponds to a hebdomad of parts; and the whole ſoul through the whole of it is hebdomadic in its parts, in its ratios, and in its circles, being characterized by the number ſeven. For if the demiurgic intellect is a monad, but ſoul primarily proceeds from intellect, it will ſubſiſt as the hebdomad with reſpect to it: for the hebdomad is paternal and motherleſs *. And perhaps equality imparts a communion equally to all the ratios of the ſoul, that all may communicate with all. But multiple ratio indicates the manner in which natures that have more of the nature of unity meaſure ſuch as are multiplied, wholly pervading through the whole of them; and alſo the manner in which impartible natures meaſure ſuch as are more diſtributed. Superparticular and ſubſuperparticular ratio appears to ſignify the differences according to which total reaſons do not wholly communicate with each other, but poſſeſs indeed a partial habitude, yet are conjoined according to one particular thing belonging to them which is moſt principal. And the ſuperpartient and ſubſuperpartient ratio indicates the laſt nature, according to which the communion of the reaſons of the ſoul is diviſible, and multiplied through ſubjection. For the more ſublime reaſons are wholly united to the whole of themſelves; but thoſe of a middle ſubſiſtence are not

* The hebdomad is ſaid to be motherleſs, becauſe in monadic numbers 7 is not produced by the multiplication of any two numbers between 1 and 10.

united to the whole of themſelves, but are conjoined according to their higheſt part; and thoſe that rank in the third degree are diviſibly connaſcent according to multitude. Thus, for inſtance, *eſſence* communicates with all reaſons, meaſuring all their progreſſions; for there is nothing in them uneſſential: but *ſameneſs* being itſelf a genus, eſpecially collects into one communion the ſummits of theſe; and *difference* in a particular manner meaſures their progreſſions and diviſions. The communion therefore of the ratios of the ſoul is every where exhibited: for it is either all-perfect, or it alone ſubſiſts according to ſummits, or according to extenſions into multitude.

Again, therefore, let us in the next place attend to the manner in which the ſeven parts ſubſiſt*. The firſt part, indeed, is moſt intellectual and the ſummit of the ſoul, being conjoined with *the one*, and the hyparxis of its whole eſſence. Hence it is called one, as being *uniform*; its number is comprehended in union, and it is analogous to the cauſe and the center of the ſoul. For the ſoul abides according to this, and ſubſiſts in unproceeding union with wholes. And the tetrad indeed is in the firſt monads, on account of its ſtability, and its rejoicing in equality and ſameneſs. But the number 8 is in the monads of the ſecond order, through its ſubjection, and that providence of the ſoul which extends itſelf from its ſupreme part, as far as to the laſt of things. The triad is in the monads of the third order, through the circular progreſſion of the multitude in it, to the all-perfect. And at the ſame time it is manifeſt from theſe things as images, that the ſummit of the ſoul, though it is uniform, is not purely one, but that this alſo is united multitude, juſt as the monad † is not without multitude, but is at the ſame time monad; but the one of the gods is alone *one*. And *the one* of intellect is indeed more one than multitude, though this alſo is multiplied; but *the one* of the ſoul is ſimilarly one and multitude, juſt as *the one* of the natures poſterior to ſoul, and which are divided about bodies, is more multitude than one. And *the one* of bodies is not ſimply one, but a phantaſm and image of *the one*. Hence the Elean gueſt in the Sophiſta ſays, that every thing corporeal is broken in pieces, as having an adventitious one, and never ceaſing to be divided. The ſecond part multiplies the part prior to it by generative progreſſions, which

* Let it be remembered that the firſt numbers of the ſoul are, as we have obſerved in the Introduction to this Dialogue, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27.

† In the diſſertation on nullities, at the end of my tranſlation of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, I have demonſtratively ſhown that infinite multitude is contained cauſally in the monad.

the

the duad indicates, and unfolds all the progreſſions of eſſence. Hence alſo it is ſaid to be double of the firſt, as imitating the indefinite duad and intelligible infinity. But the third part converts the whole ſoul again to its principle: and it is the third part of it which is convolved to the principles, and which indeed is meaſured by the firſt part, as being filled with union from it, but is more partially conjoined to the ſecond part. Hence it is ſaid to be triple of that, but ſeſquialter of this: for it is indeed contained from the half by the ſecond part, as not poſſeſſing an equal power, but is perfectly contained by the firſt. Again the fourth, and alſo the fifth part, peculiarly evince that the ſoul preſides over ſecondary natures; for theſe parts are intellectual cauſes of thoſe incorporeals which are divided about bodies, ſince they are ſuperficies and tetragonic; this being derived from the ſecond, but that from the third part; for the fourth part is the ſource of progreſſion and generation, and the fifth of converſion and perfection. For both are ſuperficies; but the one ſubſiſts twice from the ſecond, and the other proceeds thrice from the third. And it appears that the one *, imitating the proceſſion about body, is productive of generative powers, but that the other † is productive of intellectual regreſſions: for all knowledge converts that which knows to the thing known; juſt as every nature wiſhes to generate, and to make a progreſſion downwards. The ſixth and ſeventh parts infert in the ſoul the primary cauſes of bodies, and of ſolid bulks: for theſe numbers are ſolid; and the one ‡ is derived from the ſecond part, and the other § from the third. But Timæus, in what he here ſays, converting things laſt to ſuch as are firſt, and the terminations of the ſoul to its ſummit, eſtabliſhes this to be octuple, and that twenty-ſeven times, the firſt. And thus the eſſence of the ſoul conſiſts of ſeven parts, as abiding, proceeding, and returning, and as the cauſe of the progreſſion and converſion, both of eſſences diviſible about bodies, and of bodies themſelves.

If you pleaſe you may alſo ſay, becauſe the ſoul is allotted an hypoſtaſis between impartible and partible eſſences, that it imitates the former through the triad, and preaſſumes the latter from the tetrad. But every ſoul is from all theſe terms, becauſe every rational ſoul is the centre of wholes. The harmonic and arithmetic middles, therefore, fill theſe intervals, which have an eſſential ſubſiſtence, and are conſidered

* Viz. 4. † Viz. 9. ‡ Viz. 8 is derived from 2. § Viz. 27 is derived from 3.

according

according to eſſence, theſe as we have ſaid collecting their ſameneſſes, and thoſe their differences.

We may likewiſe, approaching nearer to things themſelves, ſay, that the ſoul, according to one part, viz. its ſummit, is united to natures prior to itſelf; but that, according to the double and triple parts, it proceeds from intellect and returns to it; and that, according to the double of the double, and the triple of the triple, it proceeds from itſelf, and is again converted to itſelf; and through its own middle to the principles of its eſſence; for abiding according to them, it is filled from them with every thing of a ſecondary nature. And as the progreſſion from itſelf is ſuſpended from the progreſſion prior to itſelf, ſo the converſion to itſelf depends on that which is prior to itſelf. But the laſt parts, according to which the ſoul gives ſubſiſtence to things poſterior to itſelf, are referred to the firſt part, that a circle may be exhibited without a beginning, the end being conjoined with the beginning, and that the univerſe may be generated animated and intellectual, ſolid numbers being coordinated with the firſt part. From theſe middles, alſo, Timæus ſays that ſeſquialter, ſeſquitertian, and ſeſquioctave ratios reſult. What elſe then does he wiſh to indicate by theſe things, than the more partial differences of the ratios of the ſoul? For the ſeſquialter ratios preſent us with an image of diviſible communion indeed, but according to the firſt of the parts; but the ſeſquitertian of communion according to the parts in the middle; and the ſeſquioctave of that which ſubſiſts according to the extremes. Hence the middles are conjoined with each other according to the ſeſquioctave ratio. For when they are beheld according to oppoſite genera, they poſſeſs the leaſt communion: but each is appropriately conjoined with the extremes. Timæus alſo adds, that all the ſeſquitertian ratios are filled with the interval of the ſeſquioctave together with the leimma, or remainder; indicating by this that the terminations of all theſe ratios end in more partial hypoſtaſes, until the ſoul has comprehended the cauſes of things laſt in the world, and which are every way diviſible. For ſoul has previouſly eſtabliſhed in herſelf, according to the demiurgic will, the principles of the order and harmony of theſe. Soul, therefore, contains the principles of harmonious progreſſion and converſion, and of diviſion into things firſt, middle, and laſt; and ſhe is one intellectual reaſon, which is at the ſame time filled with all reaſons.

With

With theſe things alſo accord what we have before aſſerted, that all its harmony conſiſts from a quadruple diapaſon, with the diapente and tone. For harmony ſubſiſts in the world, in intellect, and in ſoul; on which account alſo Timæus ſays that ſoul participates of and is harmony. But the world participates of harmony decadically, ſoul tetradically, and intellect monadically. And as the monad is the cauſe of the tetrad, and the tetrad of the decad, ſo alſo intellectual harmony is the ſupplier of that which pertains to the ſoul, and that of the ſoul is the ſource of ſenſible harmony: for ſoul is the proximate paradigm of the harmony in the ſenſible world. Since, however, there are five figures* and centers† in the univerſe which give completion to the whole; hence the harmony diapente is the ſource of ſymphony according to parts to the world. Again, becauſe the univerſe is divided into nine‡ parts, the ſeſquioctave ratio makes its communion cemmenſurate with ſoul. And here you may ſee that ſoul comprehends the world according to cauſe, and renders it a whole, harmonizing it conſidered as one, as conſiſting of four, and of five parts, and as divided into nine parts. For the monad, tetrad, pentad, and ennead, comprehend the whole number according to which all the parts of the world are divided. Hence the antients conſidered the Muſes, and Apollo the leader of the Muſes, as preſiding over the univerſe, the latter ſupplying the one union of the whole harmony, and the former connecting its divided progreſſion: and the eight Syrens mentioned in the Republic appear to give completion to the ſame numbers. Thus then, in the middle of the monad and ennead, the world is adorned tetradically and pentadically; tetradically indeed, according to the four ideas of animals which its paradigm comprehends, but pentadically according to the five figures through which the demiurgus adorned all things, introducing as Timæus ſays a fifth idea, and arranging this harmonically in the univerſe.

* Proclus here means the five regular bodies, viz. the dodecahedron, the pyramid, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the cube. It is a remarkable property of these figures, that the sum of their sides is the same as that of their angles, and that this sum is pentadic; for it is equal to 50. Thus the dodecahedron contains 12 sides, the pyramid 4, the octahedron 8, the icosahedron 20, and the cube 6; and $12 + 4 + 8 + 20 + 6 = 50$. In like manner, with respect to their angles, the dodecahedron has 20, the pyramid 4, the octahedron 6, the icosahedron 12, and the cube 8; and $20 + 4 + 6 + 12 + 8 = 50$.

† Viz. the northern, southern, eastern and western centers, and that which subsists between these.

‡ Viz. into the five centers and the four elements considered as subsisting every where.

Again,

Again, therefore, let us ſay from the beginning, that the demiurgus poſſeſſing two-fold powers, the one being productive of ſameneſs, and the other of difference, as we learn in the Parmenides, he both divides and binds the ſoul. And he is indeed the final cauſe of theſe, that the ſoul may become the middle of wholes, being ſimilarly united and divided; ſince two things are prior to it, the gods as unities, and beings as united natures; and two things are poſterior to it, viz. thoſe natures which are divided in conjunction with others* and thoſe which are perfectly diviſible†. You may alſo ſay that *the one* is prior to the former, viz. to the gods and beings, and that *matter* is poſterior to the latter; that ſameneſs and difference* which are the idioms of the demiurgic order are effective; and that the ſections and bonds of the father are paradigmatic. For he firſt among the gods cuts and binds with infrangible bonds; theologiſts obſcurely ſignifying theſe things when they ſpeak of Saturnian exſections, and thoſe bonds which the fabricator of the univerſe is ſaid to hurl round himſelf, and of which Socrates reminds us in the Cratylus. We may alſo conſider numbers as having a formal power with reſpect to diviſions; for the parts of the ſoul are ſeparated according to theſe. But the middles and the ratios which give complétion to theſe are analogous to bonds: for it is impoſſible to conſider concauſes, which have the relation of matter, in ſouls which have an incorporeal eſſence. Theſe things being premiſed, it is evident how the demiurgus of all diviſion, energizing with two-fold powers, the dividing and the binding, divides from primary cauſes the triform nature and triple mixture of the ſoul, the whole ſoul at the ſame time remaining undiminiſhed. For ſince he conſtituted the ſoul as a medium between an impartible eſſence, and that nature which is divided about bodies, and ſince an impartible eſſence is triple, abiding, proceeding and returning, hence he eſtabliſhed a ſimilitude of this in three parts; adumbrating its permanency by the firſt part, its progreſſion by the ſecond, and its converſion by the third. And perhaps on this account the ſecond is ſaid to be double of the firſt: for every thing which proceeds has alſo that which abides ſubſiſting prior to its progreſſion. But the third part is ſaid to be triple of the firſt: for every thing which is converted proceeds alſo and abides. Since alſo ſoul produces the eſſence poſterior to itſelf, it likewiſe contains in itſelf the whole of this eſſence. Hence it contains every incorporeal eſſence, but which is at

* Viz. corporeal forms and qualities. † Viz. bodies.

the

the ſame time inſeparable from bodies, according to the fourth and fifth parts; but every corporeal eſſence according to ſolid numbers, viz. the ſixth and ſeventh parts. Or, it produces and converts itſelf to itſelf, according to ſquare numbers, ſince it is ſelf-ſubſiſtent * and ſelf-energetic, but every diviſible eſſence poſterior to itſelf according to cube numbers. The one ratio of geometric analogy eſſentially binds theſe parts, divided as we have ſaid into three and ſeven. But the harmonic middle binds them according to ſameneſs, and the arithmetic according to difference. Theſe two likewiſe lie between the geometric middle, and are ſaid to fill the double and triple intervals, becauſe all ſameneſs and all difference are uniformly comprehended under eſſence and the harmony pertaining to it. But from theſe middles the multitude of ſeſquialter, ſeſquitertian, and ſeſquioctave ratios becomes apparent; which multitude is indeed binding and connective, as well as the middles, but is of a more partial nature, becauſe each of theſe is a certain ratio; but each of the middles conſiſts from many ratios, either the ſame or different. And as analogy or proportion is more comprehenſive than ratio, ſo the above-mentioned middles afford a greater cauſe to the ſoul of connecting the multitude which it contains, this cauſe pervading intellectually through the whole of it. The ſeſquialter, ſeſquitertian, and ſeſquioctave ratios are, therefore, certain bonds of a more partial nature, and are comprehended in the middles, not according to different habitudes of them with reſpect to the extremes, for this is mathematical, but according to cauſal comprehenſion and a more total hypoſtaſis.

Again, theſe bonds contain the ſecond and third progreſſions of the ratios; the ſeſquialter compreſſing through five centers the harmony of the ratios; the ſeſquitertian, through the four elements which ſubſiſt every where, evincing their power, and rendering all things known and allied to each other; and the ſeſquioctave harmonizing the diviſion into nine and eight. Hence the antients at one time, conſidering the parts of the world as eight, and at another as nine, placed over the univerſe eight Syrens, and

* Even ſquare numbers are beautiful images of ſelf-ſubſiſtence. For that which produces itſelf effects this by its hyparxis or ſummit, ſince the being of every thing depends on its principal part, and this is its ſummit. But the root of a number is evidently analogous to hyparxis; and conſequently an even ſquare number will be an image of a nature which produces itſelf. And hence ſelf-production is nothing more than an involution of hyparxis.

nine Muſes, from whom harmony is derived to wholes. The ſeſquitertian and ſeſquialter ratios, therefore, are more total than the ſeſquioctaves; and hence they are the ſuppliers of a more perfect ſymphony, and comprehend the harmonious ſection of the world in leſs numbers. Here therefore the diviſions in the participants are diſtant from each other, but in the incorporeal ratios of the ſoul the more total comprehend the more partial. But ſince the ſeſquioctaves are the cauſes of a more partial ſymphony, hence that which is poſterior to theſe is juſtly ſaid to be thruſt down into the extremity of the univerſe. Nor is it diſcordant to the whole of things, that diviſible defluxions from each of the elements ſhould be driven into the ſubterranean region. For ſince the elements ſubſiſt in many places, in the heavens, and in the regions under the moon, the ratio poſterior to the ſeſquioctave collecting the laſt ſediment of them in the ſubterranean region, conjoins them with wholes, that from the union of both the whole harmony of the univerſe may be complete. Hence we have ſaid that the harmony of the ſoul is perfectly intellectual and eſſential, preceding according to cauſe ſenſible harmony, and that Timæus, wiſhing to exhibit this through images, employed harmonic ratios, preſuppoſing that there are certain cauſes in the ſoul more comprehenſive than others, and which ſubſiſt prior to every form and to all the knowledge of the ſoul. On this account I think it is not fit to diſcuſs things of this kind, by explaining the parts, or the ratios, or the analogies, but we ſhould contemplate all things eſſentially, according to the firſt diviſion and harmony of the ſoul, and refer all things to a demiurgic and intellectual cauſe. Hence we ſhould comprehend the ſeſquioctaves and remainders (λειμματα) in the ſeſquitertian and ſeſquialter ratios, theſe in the middles, and the middles in that one middle which is the moſt principal of all of them; and ſhould refer more partial to more total cauſes, and conſider the former as derived from the latter. And thus much concerning harmonic ratios.

P. 490. *He at the ſame time formed an eternal image flowing according to number of eternity abiding in one.*

That eternity then, ſays Proclus, is more venerable, has a more principal ſubſiſtence, and is as it were more ſtable than animal itſelf, though this is the moſt beautiful and perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato has informed us in the firſt part of this dialogue,

is

is entirely evident. For if the eternal is ſaid to be and is eternal, as that which participates, but eternity is neither ſaid to participate of animal itſelf, nor to receive its appellation from it, it is evident that the one is ſecondary, but the other more ſimple and primary. For neither does eternity participate of animal itſelf, becauſe it is not an animal, nor is time a viſible animal, nor any other animal. For it has been ſhown that animal itſelf is only-begotten and eternal; and hence eternity is more excellent than animal itſelf; ſince the eternal is neither that which eternity is, nor is better than eternity. But as we all acknowledge that what is endued with intellect, and that what is animated, are poſterior to intellect and ſoul, in like manner the eternal is ſecondary to eternity. But here ſome one may ſay, what can be more venerable than animal itſelf, ſince it is ſaid by Plato to be the moſt beautiful of intelligibles, and according to all things perfect? We reply, that it is moſt beautiful from receiving the ſummit of beauty, through vehement participation of it, but not from its tranſcendent participation of *the good*. For it is not ſaid to be the *beſt* of intelligibles. To which we may add, that it is not ſimply the moſt beautiful of all intelligibles, but of all intelligible animals. Eternity, therefore, is not any animal, but infinite life. In the next place, it is not neceſſary, that what is every way perfect ſhould be the firſt. For the perfect poſſeſſes all things; ſo that it will contain things firſt, middle, and laſt. But that which is above this diviſion will be ſuper-perfect. Nothing therefore hinders, but that eternity may be ſuperior to the moſt beautiful and in every reſpect perfect animal, ſince intelligible animals are many, if it is the beſt, and ſuper-perfect.

If theſe things then are rightly aſſerted, eternity will neither be one certain genus of being, as ſome have thought it to be, ſuch as eſſence, or permanency, or ſameneſs: for all theſe are parts of animal itſelf, and each of theſe poſſeſſes as it were an oppoſition, viz. eſſence, non-being; permanency, motion; ſameneſs, difference; but nothing is oppoſed to eternity. All theſe therefore are ſimilarly eternal, viz. the ſame, the different, permanency, motion; but this would not be the caſe if eternity were one of theſe. Eternity, therefore, is not oppoſed to any thing either of theſe, or to any of the things poſterior to itſelf: for time, which may ſeem to ſubſiſt diſſimilarly to eternity, in the firſt place, does not revolve about the ſame things with it, but about things which do not receive their continuous coherence from eternity; and in the next place it is an image of, and is not oppoſed to eternity, as Plato now ſays, and as we

ſt all ſhortly demonſtrate. Eternity, therefore, will not be any one genus, nor the whole collection of the genera of being: for again, there would be multitude in it, and it would require the union of that which abides in one. But it is itſelf that which abides in one; ſo that it would abide, and yet not abide in one. It would abide indeed as eternity, and as the cauſe of union to beings, but it would not abide as being compoſed from multitude. To all which we may add, that it is intellect which comprehends the genera of being, and that the conception of intellect is different from that of eternity, in the ſame manner as the conception of ſoul from that of time: for the energy of intellect is intranſitive intelligence, but of eternity, impartible perpetuity.

What then will eternity be, if it is neither any one of the genera of being, nor that which is compoſed from the five, ſince all theſe are eternal, and eternity has a prior ſubſiſtence? What elſe than the monad* of the intelligible unities? But I mean by unities, the ideas of intelligible animals, and the genera of all theſe intelligible ideas. Eternity is the one comprehenſion, therefore, of the ſummit of the multitude of theſe, and the cauſe of the invariable permanency of all things, not ſubſiſting in the multitude of intelligibles themſelves, nor being a collection of them, but in an exempt manner being preſent to them, by itſelf diſpoſing and as it were forming them, and making them to be wholes. For perfect multitude is not unfolded into light, nor is the all-various idea of intelligibles produced immediately after *the good*; but there are certain natures between, which are more united than all-perfect multitude, but indicate a parturiency and repreſentation of the generation of wholes, and of connected comprehenſion in themſelves. How many, and of what kind theſe are, the gods know divinely, but the myſtic doctrine of Parmenides will inform us in a human and philoſophic manner, to which dialogue we ſhall refer the reader for accurate inſtruction in theſe particulars. For we ſhall now ſhow that eternity is above all-perfect animal, and that it is proximately above it, from the very words of the philoſopher.

Becauſe animal itſelf, therefore, is ſaid to be eternal, it will be ſecondary to eternity; but becauſe there is nothing eternal prior to it, it will be proximately poſterior to eternity. Whence then is this evident? Becauſe, I ſay, neither is there any thing temporal prior to the world, the image of animal itſelf, but the world is the firſt participant of time, and animal itſelf of eternity. For if as eternity is to time, ſo is animal

* Μονας is omitted in the original; but the ſenſe requires that either this word, or the word αιτια, cauſe, ſhould be inſerted.

itſelf

itſelf to the world, then, as geometricians would ſay, it will be alternately as eternity is to animal itſelf, ſo is time to the world. But time is firſt participated by the world; for it was not prior to the orderly diſtribution of the univerſe: and hence eternity is firſt participated by animal itſelf. And if time is not the whole ſenſible animal (i. e the world), for it was generated together with it, and that which is generated with a thing is not that thing with which it is generated, if this be the caſe, neither will eternity be intelligible animal, ſo that neither will it be an animal, leſt there ſhould be two intelligible animals: for Plato has before ſhown that animal itſelf is only begotten (μονογενες). Hence we muſt not ſay that eternity is an animal, but different from animal itſelf. Neither, therefore, in ſhort, is it an animal: for it is either an animal the ſame with or different from animal itſelf, neither of which, as we have ſhown, can be aſſerted. It is not the latter, becauſe animal itſelf is only begotten, nor the former, becauſe neither is time the ſame with that which is temporal. But if it is participated by and does not participate of intelligible animal, it will be a god prior to it, intelligible indeed, but not yet an animal. The order of eternity, therefore, with reſpect to animal itſelf, is apparent: for it is evident that it is higher, and proximately higher, and that it is the cauſe to intelligibles of a ſubſiſtence according to the ſame things, and after the ſame manner. It has indeed been ſaid to be permanency, but this is a coordinate cauſe, and rather affords ſameneſs of ſubſiſtence about energy; but eternity is an exempt cauſe. It is alſo evident that it is the comprehenſion and union of many intelligible unities; and hence it is called by the oracles *father-begotten light**, becauſe it illuminates all things with unific light. "For," ſays the Oracle, "this alone, by plucking abundantly from the ſtrength of the father, the flower of intellect, is enabled by intellection to impart a paternal intellect to all the fountains and principles; together with intellectual energy and a perpetual permanency according to an unſluggiſh revolution." For, being full

* This is one of the Chaldæan Oracles, which, as I have ſhown in my collection of them in the Supplement to vol. iii. of the Monthly Magazine, were delivered by Chaldæan Theurgiſts under the reign of Marcus Antoninus. The original is as follows:

Πατρογενες φαος· πολυ γαρ μονος
Εκ πατρος αλκης δρεψάμενος νοου ανθος,
Εχει τω νοειν πατρικον νουν ενδιδοναι
Πασαις πηγαις τε και αρχαις·
Και το νοειν, αει τε μενειν αοκνῳ στροφαλιγγι.

of

of paternal deity, which the Oracle calls the flower of intellect, it illuminates all things with intellect, together with an eternal fameneſs of intellection, and an amatory converſion and energy about the principle of all things. Theſe things, however, I revolve in the inacceſſible adyta of the dianoëtic part.

Again, inveſtigating on all ſides the intellectual conception of the philoſopher about eternity, let us conſider what is the meaning of its abiding in *one*. For we inquire, in what *one?* Shall we ſay, in *the good*, as it has appeared to the moſt theological of the interpreters? But neither does *the good* abide in itſelf, through its ſimplicity, as we learn in the firſt hypotheſis of the Parmenides, and therefore much leſs does any thing elſe abide in it. For, in ſhort, nothing is in it, nor with it, in conſequence of its being exempt from coordination with any thing. Hence it is not uſually called good, or one, but *the good* and *the one*, that we may underſtand its monadic tranſcendency, and which is beyond every nature that is known. But now eternity is not ſaid to abide in *the one*, but in one; ſo that neither does it abide in *the good*. Shall we ſay then, that by eternity abiding in one, its united nature as it were, its permanency in its own one, and its ſubſiſting as one multitude, are implied? Or, in ſhort, the number of that which does not proceed, that it may be the cauſe of union to the multitude of intelligibles? Shall we ſay that this alſo is true, that it may impart to itſelf the ſtable and the whole prior to things eternal? For to abide in one, is to have the whole and the ſame hyparxis invariably preſent at once. Every divine nature, therefore, begins its energy from itſelf, ſo that eternity alſo eſtabliſhes itſelf in one prior to things eternal; and in a ſimilar manner connects itſelf. Hence being is not the cauſe of permanency, as Strato * the natural philoſopher ſays it is, but eternity†; and it is the cauſe of a permanency, not ſuch as is always in generation, or becoming to be, but which, as Timæus ſays, invariably ſubſiſts in one. But if eternity unfolds a duad, though we are often ſtudious to conceal it; for the ever is conjoined with being, according to the ſame, and *eternity* is *that which always is* (*εστιν αιων, ο αει ων*); if this be the caſe, it appears to have the monad of being prior to it, and the one being, viz. the higheſt being, and to abide in this one,

* Strato was a philoſopher of Lampſacus. He was the diſciple and ſucceſſor of Theophraſtus; and flouriſhed 289 years before Chriſt.

† For eternity is ſtability of being; and in like manner immortality is ſtability of life, and memory of knowledge.

agreeably

agreeably to the doctrine of our preceptor, that the firſt being may be one prior to the duad, as not departing from *the one*. And the duad indeed in eternity, which cauſally unfolds multitude, is united to the firſt being in which eternity* abides; but the multitude of intelligibles is united to eternity itſelf, which in a tranſcendent and united manner comprehends and connects all their ſummits. For that the conception of the firſt being is different from that of eternity is evident; ſince to be for ever is perfectly different from ſimply to be. If therefore any thing is *eternal*, this alſo *is*; but the contrary does not follow, that if any thing *is*, this alſo is *eternal*. Hence, *to be* is more total and generative than *to be for ever*, and on this account is nearer to the cauſe of all beings, of the unities in beings, of generation itſelf, of matter, and, in ſhort, of all things. Theſe three, therefore, orderly ſucceed each other; *the one being*†, as the monad of beings; *eternity* as the duad, together with being poſſeſſing *the ever*; and *the eternal*, which participates both of being and the ever, and is not primarily eternal being, like eternity. And *the one being* is alone the cauſe of being to all things, whether they are truly or not truly beings; but eternity is the cauſe of permanency in being. And this is what Strato ought rather to have ſaid, and not to have defined being to be the permanency of things, as he writes in his book Concerning Being, transferring the idiom of eternity to being.

Let us now attend to the following admirable account of time, by Proclus.

How then is time ſaid by Plato to be an image of eternity? Is it becauſe eternity abides in *one*, but time proceeds according to *number*? Theſe things however rather indicate their diſſimilitude than ſimilitude to each other. For Plato nearly oppoſes all things to all, *proceeding*, to *abiding*, *according to number*, to *one*, the *image* to *the thing itſelf*. It is better, therefore, to ſay, that divinity produced theſe two as the meaſures of things, I mean eternity and time, the one of intelligible and the other of mundane beings. As the world, therefore, is ſaid to be the image of the intelligible, ſo alſo the mundane meaſure is denominated the image of the intelligible meaſure. Eternity, however, is a meaſure as the one, but time as number: for each meaſures the former things

* As the intelligible triad, or the firſt proceſſion from the ineffable cauſe of all, conſists, as will be ſhown in the Introduction to the Parmenides, of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, eternity forms the middle of this triad, being, as Plotinus divinely ſays, infinite life, at once total and full, and abides in the ſummit of this triad, i. e. in being itſelf or the firſt and intelligible being.

† Το εν ον, viz. being characterized by and wholly abſorbed in *the one*; for ſuch is the firſt being.

united, and the latter things numbered: and the former meaſures the permanency of beings, but the latter the extenſion of generated natures. But the apparent oppoſitions of theſe two, do not evince the diſſimilitude of the meaſures, but that ſecondary are produced from more antient natures. For progreſſion is from *abiding*, and number from *the one*. May we not therefore ſay, that time is on this account an image of eternity, becauſe it is productive of the perfection of mundane natures, juſt as eternity connectedly contains, and is the guardian of beings. For as thoſe natures which are unable to live according to intellect, are led under the order of Fate, leſt by flying from a divine nature they ſhould become perfectly diſordered; in like manner things which have proceeded from eternity, and are unable to participate of a perfection, the whole of which is eſtabliſhed at once, and is always the ſame, end indeed in the government of time, but are excited by it to appropriate energies, through which they are enabled to receive the end adapted to their nature, from certain periods which reſtore them to their antient condition.

But how is time ſaid to be a moveable image of eternity? Shall we ſay becauſe the whole of it is in motion? Or is this indeed impoſſible? For nothing is moved according to the whole of itſelf, not even ſuch things as are eſſentially changed: for the ſubject of theſe remains. Much more therefore muſt that which is moved, according to other motions, abide according to eſſence, and this if it be increaſed, and changed, and locally moved. For if it did not abide according to ſomething, it would at the ſame time cauſe the motion to be evaneſcent; ſince all motion is in ſomething. Nothing, therefore, is as we have ſaid moved according to the whole of itſelf, and eſpecially ſuch perpetual natures as it is fit ſhould be eſtabliſhed in their proper principles, and abide in themſelves, if they are to be continually preſerved. But in a particular manner the image of eternity ought in a certain reſpect to poſſeſs perpetuity according to fameneſs, and ſtability; ſo that it is impoſſible that time ſhould be moved according to the whole of itſelf, ſince neither is this poſſible to any thing elſe. Something of it, therefore, muſt neceſſarily remain, ſince every thing which is moved is moved in conſequence of poſſeſſing ſomething belonging to it which abides. The monad of time, therefore, abides ſuſpended from the demiurgus; but being full of meaſuring power, and wiſhing to meaſure the eſſential motions of the ſoul, together with phyſical and corporeal motion, and alſo beings energies and paſſions, it proceeds according to number. Hence time,

abiding

abiding by its impartible and inward energy, and being participated by its external energy, and by the natures which are meaſured proceeds according to number; i. e. it proceeds according to a certain intellectual number, or rather according to the firſt number, which as Parmenides would ſay being analogous to *the one being*, or the firſt of beings, preſides over intellectuals, in the ſame manner as the firſt being preſides over intelligibles. Time, therefore, proceeds according to that number; and hence it diſtributes an accommodated meaſure to every mundane form.

You may alſo ſay ſtill more appropriately, that time which is truly ſo called proceeds according to number, numbering the participants of itſelf, and being itſelf that intellectual number, which Socrates obſcurely indicates when he ſays that ſwiftneſs itſelf and ſlowneſs itſelf are in true number, by which the things numbered by time differ, being moved ſwifter or ſlower. Hence Timæus does not ſpeak with prolixity about this true number, becauſe Socrates had previouſly in the Republic perfectly unfolded it, but he ſpeaks about that which proceeds from it. For that being true number, time, ſays he, proceeds according to number. Let then true time proceed according to intelligible number, but it proceeds ſo far as it meaſures its participants, juſt as the time of which Timæus now ſpeaks proceeds as that which is numerable, poſſeſſing yet an image of eſſential time, through which it numbers all things with greater or leſſer numbers of their life, ſo that an ox lives for this and man for that period of time, and the ſun and moon and the other ſtars accompliſh their revolutions according to different meaſures. Time, therefore, is the meaſure of motion, not as that by which we meaſure, but as that which produces and bounds the being of life, and of every other motion of things in time, and as meaſuring them according to and aſſimilating them to paradigms. For as it refers itſelf to the ſimilitude of eternity which comprehends paradigmatic cauſes, in like manner it ſends back to a more venerable imitation of eternal principles things perfected by it, which are circularly convolved. Hence theurgiſts ſay that time is a god, and deliver to us a method by which we may excite this deity to render himſelf apparent. They alſo celebrate him as older and younger, and as a circulating and eternal God; not only as the image of eternity, but as eternally comprehending it prior to ſenſibles. They add further, that he intellectually perceives the whole number of all the natures that are moved in the world, according to which he leads round and

reſtores to their antient condition in ſwifter and ſlower periods every thing that is moved. Beſides all this, they celebrate him as interminable through power, in conſequence of infinite circulation. And laſtly, they add that he is of a ſpiral form, as meaſuring according to one power things which are moved in a right line, and thoſe which are moved in a circle, juſt as the ſpiral uniformly comprehends the right line and the circle.

We muſt not, therefore, follow thoſe who conſider time as conſiſting in mere naked conceptions, or who make it to be a certain accident; nor yet muſt we aſſent to thoſe who are more venerable than theſe, and who approach nearer to reality, and aſſert with them that the idiom of time is derived from the ſoul of the world energizing tranſitively. For Plato, with whom we all deſire to accord reſpecting divine concerns, ſays that the demiurgus gave ſubſiſtence to time, the world being now arranged both according to ſoul and according to body, and that it was inſerted in the ſoul by him, in the ſame manner as harmonic reaſons. Nor again, does he repreſent the god faſhioning and generating time in the ſoul, in the ſame manner as he ſays the Divinity fabricated the whole of a corporeal nature within the ſoul, that the ſoul might be the deſpot and governor of it; but having diſcourſed concerning the eſſence, harmony, power, motions, and all various knowledges of the ſoul, he produces the eſſence of time, as the guardian and meaſurer of all theſe, and as that which aſſimilates them to paradigmatic principles. For what benefit would ariſe from all mundane natures being well-conditioned, without a perpetual permanency of ſubſiſtence; and in imitating after a manner the idea of their paradigm, but not evolving to the utmoſt of their power the whole of it, and in receiving partibly impartible intelligence? Hence the philoſopher places a demiurgic cauſe and not ſoul over the progreſſion of time.

In the next place, looking to things themſelves, you may ſay that if ſoul generated time, it would not thus participate as being perfected by it; for that ſoul is perfected by time, and alſo meaſured by it according to its energies, is not immaniſeſt, ſince every thing which has not the whole of its energy collectively and at once, requires time to its perfection and reſtoration, through which it collects its proper good, which it was incapable of acquiring impartibly, and without the circulations of time. Hence, as we have before obſerved, eternity and time are the meaſures of the permanency and perfection of things; the former being the one ſimple comprehenſion of the intelligible unities,

and

and the other the boundary and demiurgic meaſure of the more or leſs extended permanency of the natures which proceed from thence. If, therefore, ſoul, after the ſame manner with intellect and the gods, apprehended every object of its knowledge by one projecting energy, and always the ſame, underſtanding immutably, it might perhaps have generated time, but would not require time to its perfection. But ſince it underſtands tranſitively, and according to periods by which it becomes reſtored to its priſtine ſtate, it is evidently dependant on time for the perfection of its energy.

After this, it is requiſite to underſtand that inanimate natures alſo participate of time, and that they do not then only participate of it when they are born, in the ſame manner as they participate of form and habit, but alſo when it appears that they are deprived of all life; and this not in the ſame manner, as they are even then ſaid to live, becauſe they are coordinated with wholes, and ſympathize with the univerſe, but they alſo peculiarly and eſſentially participate of a certain time, ſo far as they are inanimate, continually diſſolving as far as to perfect corruption. To which we may add, that ſince the mutations, motions and reſts pertaining to ſouls and bodies, and, in ſhort, all ſuch things as rank among oppoſites in mundane affairs, are meaſured by time, it is requiſite that time ſhould be exempt from all theſe; for that which is participated by many things, and theſe diſſimilar, being one and the ſame, and always preſubſiſting by itſelf, is participated by them conformably to this mode of ſubſiſtence; and ſtill further, being in all things, it is every where impartible, ſo that it is every where one thing, impartible according to number, and the peculiarity of no one of the things which are ſaid to ſubſiſt according to it. And this Ariſtotle alſo perceiving, demonſtrates that there is ſomething incorporeal and impartible in diviſible natures, and which is every where the ſame, meaning by this the *now* in time. Further ſtill, time not being eſſence, but an accident, it would not thus indicate a demiurgic power, ſo as to produce ſome things perpetually in generation, or becoming to be, but others with a more temporal generated ſubſiſtence; and ſome things more ſlowly proceeding to being than theſe, but ſwifter than more imbecil natures; at the ſame time diſtributing to all things an accommodated and proper meaſure of permanency in beings. But if time is a demiurgic eſſence, it will not be the whole ſoul, nor a part of ſoul; for the conception of ſoul is different from that of time, and each is the cauſe of different and not of the ſame things. For ſoul imparts life, and moves all things, and hence the world, ſo far as it approaches to ſoul, is filled with life,

and participates of motion; but time excites fabrications to their perfection, and is the supplier of measure and a certain perpetuity to wholes. It will not, therefore, be subordinate to soul, since soul participates of it, if not essentially, yet according to its transitive energies. For the soul of the universe is said to energize incessantly, and to live intellectually through the whole of time. It remains, therefore, that time is an essence, and not secondary to that of soul. In short, if eternity were the progeny of intellect, or were a certain intellectual power, it would be necessary to say that time also is something of this kind pertaining to soul: but if eternity is the exempt measure of the multitude of intelligibles, and the comprehension of the perpetuity and perfection of all things, must not time also have the same relation to soul and the animastic order? So that time will differ from eternity, in the same manner as all proceeding natures from their abiding causes. For eternity exhibits more transcendency with respect to the things measured by it than time, since the former comprehends in an exempt manner the essences and the unities of intelligibles; but the latter does not measure the essences of the first souls, as being rather coordinated and generated together with them. Intelligibles also are more united with eternity than mundane natures with time. The union indeed of the former is so vehement, that some of the more contemplative philosophers have considered eternity to be nothing else than one total intellect; but no wise man would be willing to consider time as the same with the things existing in time, through the abundant separation and difference between the two.

If then time is neither any thing belonging to motion, nor an attendant on the energy of soul, nor, in short, the offspring of soul, what will it be? For perhaps it is not sufficient to say that it is the measure of mundane natures, nor to enumerate the goods of which it is the cause, but to the utmost of our power we should endeavour to apprehend its idiom. May we not therefore say, since its essence is most excellent, perfective of soul, and present to all things, that it is an intellect, not only abiding but also subsisting in motion? Abiding indeed according to its inward energy, and by which it is truly eternal, but being moved according to its externally proceeding energy, by which it becomes the boundary of all transition. For eternity possessing the abiding, both according to its inward energy, and that which it exerts to things eternal, time being assimilated to it according to the former of these energies, becomes separated from it according to the latter, abiding and being moved. And as with respect to the essence of

the ſoul, we ſay that it is intelligible, and at the ſame time generated, partible, and at the ſame time impartible, and are no otherwiſe able perfectly to apprehend its middle nature than by employing after a manner oppoſites, what wonder is there if, perceiving the nature of time to be partly immovable and partly ſubſiſting in motion, we, or rather not we, but prior to us, the philoſopher, through *the eternal*, ſhould indicate its intellectual monad abiding in ſameneſs, and through *the moveable* its externally proceeding energy, which is participated by ſoul and the whole world? For we muſt not think that the expreſſion *the eternal* ſimply indicates that time is the image of eternity, for if this were the caſe, what would have hindered Plato from directly ſaying that it is the *image*, and not the *eternal image* of eternity? But he was willing to indicate this very thing, that time has an eternal nature, but not in ſuch a manner as animal itſelf is ſaid to be eternal: for that is eternal both in eſſence and energy; but time is partly eternal, and partly, by its external gift, moveable. Hence theurgiſts call it eternal, and Plato very properly denominates it not *only* ſo; for one thing is *alone* moveable, both eſſentially and according to the participants of it, being *alone* the cauſe of motion, as ſoul, and hence it *alone* moves itſelf and other things: but another thing is *alone* immovable, preſerving itſelf without tranſition, and being the cauſe to other things of a perpetual ſubſiſtence after the ſame manner, and to moveable natures through ſoul. It is neceſſary, therefore, that the medium between theſe two extremes ſhould be that which, both according to its own nature, and the gifts which it imparts to others, is immovable and at the ſame time moveable, eſſentially immovable indeed, but moved in its participants. But a thing of this kind is time; hence time is truly, ſo far as it is conſidered in itſelf, immovable, but ſo far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and ſubſiſts together with them, unfolding itſelf into them. It is therefore eternal, and a monad, and center eſſentially, and according to its own abiding energy; but it is, at the ſame time, continuous and number, and a circle, according to its proceeding and being participated. Hence it is a certain proceeding intellect, eſtabliſhed indeed in eternity, and on this account is ſaid to be eternal. For it would not otherwiſe contribute to the aſſimilation of mundane natures to more perfect paradigms, unleſs it were itſelf previouſly ſuſpended from them. But it proceeds and abundantly flows into the things which are guarded by it. Whence I think the chief of theurgiſts celebrate time as a god, as Julian in the ſeventh of the Zones, and venerate it by theſe names, through which it is unfolded in

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its participants; cauſing ſome things to be older, and others to be younger, and leading all things in a circle. Time, therefore, poſſeſſing a certain intellectual nature, circularly leads according to number, both its other participants and ſouls. For time is eternal, not in eſſence only, but alſo in its inward energy; but ſo far as it is participated by externals, it is alone moveable, coextending and harmonizing with them the gift which it imparts. But every ſoul is tranſitively moved, both according to its inward and external energies, by the latter of which it moves bodies. And it appears to me that thoſe who thus denominated time χρονος, had this conception of its nature, and were therefore willing to call it as it were χορευοντος νους, an intellect moving in meaſure; but dividing the words perhaps for the ſake of concealment, they called it χρονος. Perhaps too, they gave it this appellation becauſe it abides, and is at the ſame time moved in meaſure; by one part of itſelf abiding, and by the other proceeding with meaſured motion. By the conjunction, therefore, of both theſe, they ſignify the wonderful and demiurgic nature of this god. And it appears, that as the demiurgus being intellectual began from intellect to adorn the univerſe, ſo time being itſelf ſupermundane, began from ſoul to impart perfection. For that time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority ſupermundane, is evident; ſince as eternity is to animal itſelf, ſo is time to this world, which is animated and illuminated by intellect, and wholly an image of animal itſelf, in the ſame manner as time of eternity.

Time, therefore, while it abides, moves in meaſure; and through its abiding, its meaſured motions are infinite, and are reſtored to their priſtine ſtate. For moving in meaſure, the firſt of intellects about the whole fabrication of things, ſo far as it perpetually ſubſiſts after the ſame manner, and is intellect according to eſſence, it is ſaid to be eternal; but ſo far as it moves in meaſure, it circularly leads ſouls, and natures, and bodies, and, in ſhort, periodically reſtores them to their priſtine condition. For the world is moved indeed, as participating of ſoul; but it is moved in an orderly manner, becauſe it participates of intellect; and it is moved periodically with a motion from the ſame to the ſame, imitating the permanency of the intellect which it contains, through the reſemblance of time to eternity. And this it is to make the world more ſimilar to its paradigm; viz. by reſtoring it to one and the ſame condition, to aſſimilate it to that which abides in one, through the circulation according to time. From theſe things alſo, you have all the cauſes of time according to Plato; the demiurgus indeed,

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as the fabricative cauſe; eternity as the paradigm; and the end the circulation of the things moved to that which is one, according to periods. For in conſequence of not abiding in one, it aſpires after that which is one, that it may partake of *the one*, which is the ſame with *the good*. For it is evident that the progreſſion of things is not one, and in a right line, infinitely extended as it were both ways, but is bounded and circumſcribed, moving in meaſure about the father of wholes, and the monad of time infinitely evolving all the ſtrength of fabrication, and again returning to its priſtine ſtate. For whence are the participants of time enabled to return to their priſtine condition, unleſs that which is participated poſſeſſed this power and peculiarity of motion? Time, therefore, the firſt of things which are moved, circulating according to an energy proceeding to externals, and returning to its priſtine ſtate, after all the evolution of its power, thus alſo reſtores the periods of other things to their former condition. By the whole progreſſion of itſelf indeed, it circularly leads the ſoul which firſt participates of it; but by certain parts of itſelf, it leads round other ſouls and natures, the celeſtial revolutions, and among things laſt, the whole of generation: for in conſequence of time circulating all things circulate; but the circles of different natures are ſhorter and longer. For again, if the demiurgus himſelf made time to be a moveable image of eternity, and gave it ſubſiſtence according to his intellection about eternity, it is neceſſary that what is moveable in time, ſhould be circular and moved in meaſure, that it may not apoſtatize from, and may evolve the intelligence of the father about eternity. For, in ſhort, ſince that which is moveable in time is comprehenſive of all motions, it is requiſite that it ſhould be bounded much prior to the things which are meaſured by it: for not that which is deprived of meaſure, but the firſt meaſure, meaſures things; as neither does infinity bound, but the firſt bound. But time is moved, neither according to ſoul, nor according to nature, nor according to that which is corporeal and apparent; ſince its motions would thus be diviſible, and not comprehenſive of wholes. It would likewiſe thus participate of irregularity, either more or leſs, and its motions would be indigent of time. For all of them are beheld in time, and not in progreſſion, as thoſe which are the meaſures of wholes, but in a certain quality of life, or lation, or paſſion. But the motion of time is a pure and invariable progreſſion, equal and ſimilar, and the ſame. For it is exempt both from regular and irregular motions, and is ſimilarly preſent to both, not receiving any alteration through the motions themſelves being changed, but remaining

ing the ſame ſeparate from all inequality, being energetic and reſtorative of whole motions according to nature, of which alſo it is the meaſure. It alſo ſubſiſts unmingled with the natures which it meaſures, according to the idiom of its intellectual energy, but proceeds tranſitively, and according to the peculiarity of ſelf-motion. And in this reſpect, indeed, it accords with the order of ſoul, but is inherent in the things which are bounded and perfected by it according to a primary cauſe of nature. It is not however ſimilar in all reſpects to any one thing. For in a certain reſpect it is neceſſary that the meaſure of wholes ſhould be ſimilar to all things, and be allied to all things, but yet not be the ſame with any one of the things meaſured.

The motion, therefore, of time proceeds evolving and dividing impartible and abiding power, and cauſing it to appear partible; being as it were a certain number, diviſibly receiving all the forms of the monad, and reverting and circulating to itſelf. For thus the motion of time proceeding according to the meaſures in the temporal monad conjoins the end with the beginning, and this infinitely; poſſeſſing indeed itſelf a divine order, not *arranged* as the philoſopher Jamblichus alſo ſays, but that which *arranges*; nor an order which is attendant on things precedent, but which is the primary leader of effects. This motion is alſo at the ſame time meaſured, not indeed from any thing endued with interval, for it would be ridiculous to ſay that things which have a more antient nature and dignity, are meaſured by things ſubordinate, but it is meaſured from the temporal monad alone, which its progreſſion is ſaid to evolve, and by a much greater priority from the demiurgus, and from eternity itſelf. With relation to eternity, therefore, which is perfectly immovable, time is ſaid to be moveable; juſt as if ſome one ſhould ſay that ſoul is diviſible about bodies, when conſidered with relation to intellect, not that it is this alone, but that when compared with intellect, it may appear to be ſuch, though when compared with a diviſible eſſence, it is indiviſible. Time, therefore, is moveable not in itſelf, but according to the participation from it which appears in motions, and by which they are meaſured and bounded; juſt as if it ſhould be ſaid that ſoul is diviſible about bodies, ſo far as there is a certain diviſible participation of it about theſe of which it comprehends the cauſe. For thus alſo time is moveable, as poſſeſſing the cauſe of the energy externally proceeding from it, and which is diviſibly apparent in motions, and is ſeparated together with them. As motions, therefore, become temporal through participation, ſo time is moveable, through being participated by motions.

P. 499.

P. 299. *Whatever ideas, therefore, intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itſelf, &c.*

The demiurgic wholeneſs, ſays Proclus * (p. 266), weaves parts in conjunction with wholes, numbers with monads, and makes every part of the univerſe to be a world, and cauſes a whole and a univerſe to ſubſiſt in a part. For the world is allotted this from its ſimilitude to animal itſelf, becauſe animal itſelf is an entire monad and number, an all-perfect intelligible intellect, and a plenitude of intelligible cauſes, which it generated ſo as to abide eternally in itſelf. For there is one multitude which abides in cauſes, and another which proceeds and is diſtributed; ſince the demiurgus himſelf alſo gives ſubſiſtence to ſome genera of gods in himſelf, and produces others from himſelf, into ſecondary and third orders. His father Saturn likewiſe generates ſome divinities as paradigmatic cauſes of fabrication abiding in himſelf, and others as demiurgic cauſes coordinated with wholes. And the grandfather of Jupiter, Heaven, contains ſome divinities in, and ſeparates others from himſelf. Theologiſts alſo manifeſt theſe things by myſtic names, ſuch as *concealment*, *abſorption*, and *the being educated by Fate*. But by a great priority to theſe, intelligible intellect, the father of wholes, generates ſome cauſes, and unfolds them into light, in himſelf, but produces others from himſelf; containing within his own comprehenſions, ſuch as are uniform, whole, and all-perfect, but producing through difference into other orders ſuch as are multiplied and divided. Since therefore every paternal order gives ſubſiſtence to things after this manner, this world, which is an imitation of the intelligible orders, and is elevated to them, very properly contains one *allneſs* prior to partial animals, and another, that which receives its completion from them, and together with the former receives the latter, that it may be moſt ſimilar both to the demiurgic and paradigmatic cauſe.

With reſpect to animal itſelf, we have before ſaid what it is according to our opinion, and we ſhall alſo now ſay, that of the intelligible extent, one thing is the higheſt, united

* The beginning of the Commentary on this part of the Timæus is unfortunately wanting in the original; and by a ſtrange confuſion, the words και η τριτη, which there form the beginning, are connected with the comment on the preceding text, which comment is also imperfect; and what is ſtill more ſtrange, the part which is wanting to the completion of this preceding comment is to be found in p. 270, beginning at the words το δε ουτως, line 11.

and occult; another is the power of this, proceeding, and at the ſame time abiding; and another, that which unfolds itſelf through energy, and exhibits the intelligible multitude which it contains. Of theſe alſo, the firſt is intelligible being, the ſecond intelligible life, and the third intelligible intellect. *Animal itſelf*, however, cannot be the firſt being: for multitude is not there, nor the tetrad of ideas, but through its ſingleneſs and ineffable union it is called *one* by Plato. And, in ſhort, animal itſelf is ſaid to participate of eternity, but the firſt being participates of nothing, unleſs ſome one ſhould ſay it participates of *the one*, which is itſelf a thing in every reſpect deſerving conſideration. For may we not ſay that what is above being itſelf, is even more excellent than this appellation *the one?* But that is primarily *one*, which is not ſuch according to participation. Animal itſelf, therefore, cannot be being itſelf, through the above-mentioned cauſes. Neither can it be intelligible life: for animal is ſecondary to life, and is ſaid to be animal by a participation of life. In ſhort, if animal itſelf were the ſecond, eternity would be being; but this is impoſſible: for being itſelf is one thing, and eternal being another; the former being the monad of being, and the latter the duad, having the ever connected with being. Beſides the former is the cauſe of being to all things, but the latter, of their permanency according to being. If therefore animal itſelf is neither the one being, nor being itſelf, nor that which is immediately poſterior to this, for eternity is this, being intelligible power, infinite life, and wholeneſs itſelf, according to which every divine nature is at once a whole; ſince this is the caſe, animal itſelf muſt be the remaining third. For animal itſelf muſt neceſſarily in a certain reſpect be intellect, ſince the image of it entirely ſubſiſts with ſenſe, but ſenſe is the image of intellect; ſo that in that which is primarily animal, intellect will be primarily inherent. If therefore it is ſecondary to life, it muſt neceſſarily ſubſiſt according to intelligible intellect: for being intelligible, and an animal, as Plato ſays, the moſt beautiful of intelligibles, and only begotten, it will poſſeſs this order. Hence animal itſelf is intelligible intellect, comprehending the intellectual orders of the gods in itſelf, of which alſo it is collective, unific, and perfective, being the moſt beautiful boundary of intelligibles, unfolding their united and unknown cauſe to intellectual natures, exciting itſelf to all-various ideas and powers, and producing all the ſecondary orders of the gods. Hence alſo Orpheus calls it the god Phanes, as unfolding into light the intelligible unities, and aſcribes to him *the forms of animals*, becauſe the firſt cauſe of intelligible animals ſhines forth in him; and *multiform*

ideas,

ideas, because he primarily comprehends intelligible ideas. He also calls him *the key of intellect*, because he bounds the whole of an intelligible essence, and connectedly contains intellectual life. To this mighty divinity the demiurgus of the universe is elevated, being himself, indeed, as we have before said, intellect, but an *intellectual* intellect, and particularly the cause of intellect. Hence he is said to behold animal itself: for to behold is the peculiarity of the intellectual gods; since the *theologist* * also denominates intelligible intellect *eyeless*. Concerning this intellect therefore he says,

Love, *eyeless*, rapid, feeding in his breast.

For the object of his energy is intelligible. But the demiurgus being intellect, is not a participated intellect †, that he may be the demiurgus of wholes, and that he may be able to look to animal itself. But being imparticipable, he is truly intellectual intellect. And, indeed, through simple intelligence, he is conjoined with the intelligible, but through various intelligence, he hastens to the generation of secondary natures. Plato, therefore, calls his intelligence *vision*, as being without multitude, and as shining with intelligible light; but he denominates his second energy *dianoëtic*, as proceeding through simple intelligence to the generation of demiurgic works. And Plato indeed says, that he *looks* to animal itself; but Orpheus, that he *leaps to* and *absorbs it*, Night ‡ pointing it out to him: for through this goddess, who is both intelligible and intellectual, intellectual intellect is conjoined with the intelligible. You must not however on this account say, that the demiurgus looks to that which is external to himself: for this is not lawful to him; but that being converted to himself, and to the fountain of ideas which he contains, he is also conjoined with the monad of the all-various orders of forms. For since we say that our soul by looking to itself knows all things, and that things prior are not external to it, how is it possible that the demiurgic intellect, by understanding itself, should not in a far greater degree survey the intelligible world? For animal itself is also contained in him, though not monadically, but according to a certain divine number. Hence he is said by theologists, as we have observed, to absorb the intelligible

* Viz. Orpheus.

† Viz. he is not an intellect consubsistent with soul.

‡ Night subsists at the summit of that divine order which is denominated intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.

god, being himſelf intellectual, in conſequence of containing the whole of an intelligible eſſence, formal diviſions, and the intelligible number, which Plato indicating denominates the ideas of the demiurgus, *ſuch* and *ſo many*, by the former of theſe appellations manifeſting *the idioms of cauſes*, and by the latter, *ſeparation according to number*.

If theſe things then ſubſiſt after this manner, it is not proper to place an infinity of forms in intelligibles: for that which is definite is more allied to principles than the indefinite; and firſt natures are always more contracted in quantity, but tranſcend in power natures poſterior to and proceeding from them. Nor muſt we ſay with ſome, that animal itſelf is ſeparate from the demiurgus, thus making the intelligible to be external to intellect: for we do not make that which is ſeen ſubordinate to that which ſees, that it may be external, but we aſſert that it is prior to it: and more divine intelligibles are underſtood by ſuch as are more various, as being contained in them; ſince our ſoul alſo entering into itſelf, is ſaid to diſcover all things, divinity and wiſdom, as Socrates aſſerts. Animal itſelf therefore is prior and not external to the demiurgus. And there indeed all things ſubſiſt totally and intelligibly, but in the demiurgus intellectually and ſeparately: for in him the definite cauſes of the ſun and moon preſubſiſt, and not one idea alone of the celeſtial gods, which gives ſubſiſtence to all the celeſtial genera. Hence the Oracles aſſert *, that his demiurgic energies burſt about the bodies of the world like ſwarms of bees: for a divine intellect evolves into every demiurgic multitude the *total* ſeparation of theſe energies in intellect.

P. 499.—*But theſe ideas are four, &c.*

As with reſpect to demiurgic intelligence, a monad is the leader of intellectual multitude, and as with reſpect to paradigm, unical form ſubſiſts prior to number, in like manner diſcourſe, the interpreter of divine concerns, ſhadowing forth the nature of the things of which it is the meſſenger, firſt receives the whole of the thing known collectively, and according to enthuſiaſtic projection, but afterwards expands that which is convolved, unfolds the one intelligence through arguments, and divides that which is united; conformably to the nature of things, at one time interpreting their union, and at another their ſeparation, ſince it is neither naturally adapted, nor is able to comprehend both

* Viz. The Chaldæan Oracles. See the Parmenides.

theſe

theſe at once. Agreeably to this, the diſcourſe of Plato firſt divinely unfolds the whole number of intelligible ideas, and afterwards diſtributes into parts the progreſſions which this number contains: for there intelligible multitude is apparent, where the firſt monads of ideas ſubſiſt. And that this is uſual with Plato we have before abundantly ſhown. Deſcending therefore from words to things, let us in the firſt place ſee what this tetrad itſelf of ideas is, and whence this number originates, and in the next place what the four ideas are, and how they ſubſiſt in animal itſelf, whether ſo as that its all perfect nature receives its completion from theſe, or after ſome other manner, for by thus proceeding we ſhall diſcover the divinely intellectual conception of Plato. It is neceſſary, however, again to recur to the above-mentioned demonſtrations, in which we ſaid that the firſt, united, and moſt ſimple intelligible eſſence of the gods, proceeding ſupernally from the unity of unities, but according to a certain mode which is ineffable and incomprehenſible by all things, one part of this eſſence ranks as the firſt, is occult and paternal; but another part ranks as the ſecond, and is the one power, and incomprehenſible meaſure of wholes; and the third part is that which has proceeded into energy and all various powers, and is at the ſame time both paternal and fabricative. The firſt of theſe alſo is a monad, becauſe it is the ſummit of the whole intelligible extent, and the fountain and cauſe of divine numbers; but the ſecond is a duad, for it both abides and proceeds as in intelligible genera, and has *the ever* connected with being; and the third is the tetrad which is now inveſtigated, which receives all the occult cauſe of the monad, and unfolds in itſelf its unproceeding power. For ſuch things as ſubſiſt in the monad primarily, and with unproceeding union, the tetrad exhibits in a divided manner, now ſeparated according to number, and a production into ſecondary natures. But ſince the third poſſeſſes an order adapted to it, yet alſo entirely participates of the cauſes prior to itſelf, it is not only the tetrad, but beſides this which is ſtill greater, as a monad it is allotted a paternal, and as a duad a fabricative and prolific tranſcendency. So far therefore as it is called animal-itſelf, it is the monad of the nature of all animals, intellectual, vital, and corporeal; but ſo far as it comprehends at the ſame time the male and female nature, it is a duad; for theſe ſubſiſt in an appropriate manner in all the orders of animals, in one way in the gods, in another in dæmons, and in another in mortals; but ſo far as from this duad, it gives ſubſiſtence to the four ideas of animals in itſelf, it is a tetrad; for the fourfold fabrication of things proceeds according to theſe ideas, and the firſt productive

cauſe

cauſe of wholes is the tetrad. Plato therefore teaching this tetradic power of the paradigm, and the moſt unical ideas of mundane natures, ſays, that they are four, comprehended in one animal itſelf. For there is one idea there, animal itſelf; and there is alſo a duad, viz. the female and the male, or, according to Plato, poſſeſſing genera and ſpecies: for he calls two of the ideas genera, viz. the intellectual and the air-wandering, but the other two ſpecies, as being ſubordinate to theſe. There is alſo a tetrad; and as far as to this, intelligible forms proceed into other productive principles according to a different number. For according to every order there is an appropriate number, the leſſer comprehending more total ideas, but the more multiplied number ſuch as are more partial; ſince more divine natures being contracted in quantity, poſſeſs a tranſcendency of power; and the forms of ſecond natures are more multiplied than thoſe prior to them; ſuch as are intellectual more than intelligibles, ſupermundane than intellectual, and mundane than ſupermundane forms. Theſe then are the forms which proceed to an ultimate diſtribution, juſt as intelligibles receive the higheſt union: for all progreſſion diminiſhes power and increaſes multitude. If therefore Timæus diſcourſed about a certain intellectual order, he would have mentioned another number, as for inſtance the hebdomadic or decadic; but ſince he ſpeaks about the intelligible cauſe of ideas, and which comprehends all ſuch animals as are intelligible, he ſays that the firſt ideas are four. For there the tetrad ſubſiſts proceeding from the intelligible monad, and filling the demiurgic decad. For "divine number, according to the Pythagorean hymn upon it, proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad, which produces the mother of all things, the univerſal recipient, venerable, placing a boundary about all things, undeviating and unwearied, which both immortal gods and earth-born men call the ſacred decad *." Here the uniform and occult cauſe of being† is called the undecaying monad, and the retreats of the monad: but the manifeſtation of intelligible multitude, which the duad ſubſiſting between the monad and tetrad unfolds, is denominated the divine tetrad; and the world itſelf receiving images of all the divine numbers, ſupernally imparted to it, is the decad: for thus we may underſtand theſe verſes looking to the fabrication of the world. And thus much concerning this tetrad.

* The laſt line of these verses, viz. αθανατοι τε θεοι, και γηγενεις ανθρωποι, is not in Proclus, but is added from the Commentaries of Syrianus on Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, where alone it is to be found.

† Viz. The ſummit of the intelligible triad, or ſupereſſential being.

In

In the next place, let us conſider what the four ideas are, and what are the things to which they give ſubſiſtence: for there are different opinions concerning this, ſome eſpecially regarding the words of Plato, aſſerting that the progreſſion is into gods, and the mortal genera, but others looking to things, that it is into gods, and the genera ſuperior to man, becauſe theſe ſubſiſt prior to mortals, and it is neceſſary that the demiurgus ſhould not immediately produce mortals from divine natures. Others again conjoin both theſe, and follow what is written in the Epinomis, that gods ſubſiſt in the heavens, dæmons in the air, demigods in water, and men and other mortal animals in the earth. Such then being the diverſity of opinion among the interpreters, we admire indeed the lovers of things, but we ſhall endeavour to follow our leader *. Hence we ſay that the celeſtial genus of gods comprehends all the *celeſtial* genera, whether they are divine, angelic, or dæmoniacal; but the *air*-wandering, all ſuch as are arranged in the air, whether gods, or their attendant dæmons, or mortal animals that live in the air. Again, that the *aquatic* comprehends all the genera that are allotted water, and thoſe natures that are nouriſhed in water; and the pedeſtrial, the animals that are diſtributed about the earth, and that ſubſiſt and grow in the earth. For the demiurgus is at once the cauſe of all mundane natures, and the common father of all things, generating the divine and dæmoniacal genera by and through himſelf alone, but delivering mortals to the junior gods, as they are able proximately to generate them. The paradigm alſo is not the cauſe of ſome, but by no means of other animals, but it poſſeſſes the moſt total cauſes of all things.

It is alſo requiſite to conſider the propoſed words in an appropriate manner, according to every order; as, for inſtance, the genus of gods arranged in the heavens, in one way, in thoſe that are properly called gods, and in another, in the genera more excellent than man. For we ſay that there are celeſtial angels, dæmons, and heroes, and that all theſe are called gods, becauſe the divine idiom has dominion over their eſſential peculiarity. Again, we muſt conſider the winged and air-wandering in one way in the aërial gods, in another in dæmons, and in another in mortals. For that which is *intellectual* in the gods, is denominated *winged*; that which is *providential*, *air-wandering*, as pervading through all the ſphere of the air, and connectedly containing the whole of it. But in dæmons, *the winged* ſignifies rapidity *of energy*; and *the air-wandering* indicates their being every where preſent, and proceeding through all things without impediment.

* Viz. Syrianus, the preceptor of Proclus.

And

And in mortals, *the winged* manifeſts the motion through one organ of thoſe natures that alone employ the circular motion; but *the air-wandering*, the all-various motion through bodies: for nothing hinders partial ſouls that live in the air from pervading through it. Again, *the aquatic* in divine natures, indicates a government inſeparable from water: and hence the oracle calls theſe gods *water-walkers* *; but in the genera attendant on the gods, it ſignifies that which is connective of a moiſt nature. And indeed *the pedeſtrial*, in one place, ſignifies that which connectedly contains the laſt ſeat of things, and proceeds through it, in the ſame manner as *the terreſtrial*, that which ſtably rules over this ſeat, and is perfective of it through all-various powers and lives; but in another place it ſignifies the government at different times of different parts of the earth, through an appropriate motion. And thus much concerning the names.

But from theſe things it may be inferred that intelligible animal itſelf is entirely different from animal itſelf in the demiurgus; ſince the former has not definite ideas of mortal animals. For the demiurgus wiſhing to aſſimilate what the world contains to every thing in himſelf, produced mortal animals, that he might make the world all-perfect; but he comprehends the definite ideas of theſe, producing them from the immortal genera. He knows therefore mortal animals, and it is evident that he knows them *formally*; and he thinks fit that the junior gods, looking to him, and not to animal itſelf, ſhould fabricate them, in conſequence of containing in himſelf ſeparately the ideas of mortals and immortals. In animal itſelf, therefore, with reſpect to the aërial, or aquatic, or terreſtrial, there was one idea of each of theſe, the cauſe of all aërial, aquatic, or pedeſtrial animals, but they are divided in the demiurgus; and ſome are formal comprehenſions of immortal aërial, and others of mortal aërial animals; and after the ſame manner with reſpect to the aquatic and terreſtrial genera. The formal multitude therefore in animal itſelf, is not the ſame with that in the demiurgus, as may be inferred from theſe arguments.

We may alſo ſee that Plato makes a diviſion of theſe genera into monad and triad, (oppoſing the ſummit of the celeſtial genus to the total genera,) and into two duads. For he denominates the celeſtial and winged, genus, but the aquatic and pedeſtrial, ſpecies; the

* Here, also by an unaccountable mistake, all that follows after the word ὑδροβατησας, *water-walkers*, which is in p. 270, and which ought immediately to follow this word, begins near the bottom of p. 272, at the words επι δε των επομενων, &c.

latter

latter poſſeſſing an order ſubordinate to the former, in the ſame manner as ſpecies to genus. It is likewiſe requiſite to obſerve that he omits the region of fire in theſe, becauſe the divine genus comprehends the ſummit of fire. For of ſublunary bodies, fire has not any proper region, but ſubſiſts according to mutation alone, always requiring the nouriſhment of air and water. For its proper place, as fire, is on high: but neither is it there, ſince it would be ſeen, being naturally viſible; nor can it arrive thither, being extinguiſhed by the ſurrounding air, which is diſſimilar to it. If, therefore, it is requiſite that there ſhould be a wholeneſs of fire, and that poſſeſſing a form it ſhould be ſomewhere, and not alone conſiſt in being generated, and if there is no ſuch fire under the moon, fire will alone ſubſiſt in the heavens, abiding ſuch as it is, and always poſſeſſing its proper place. For a motion upwards * is not the property of fire when ſubſiſting according to nature, but is alone peculiar to fire when ſubſiſting contrary to nature. Thus alſo the SACRED DISCOURSE of the Chaldæans conjoins things aërial with the lunar ratlings, attributing to fire the celeſtial region, according to a diviſion of the elements in the world. For the fire in generation is a certain defluxion of the celeſtial fire, and is in the cavities of the other elements. There is not however a ſphere of fire by itſelf, but the ſummit of air imitates the purity of ſupernal fire. And we denominate this ſublunary fire, and call the region under the heavens the place of fire: for this is moſt ſimilar to the celeſtial profundity, as the termination of air is to water, which is groſs and dark. But you ſhould not wonder if the moſt attenuated and pure fire will be in the ſummits of air, as the moſt groſs and turbid is in the boſom of the earth; not making this pure fire to be a wholeneſs different from the whole air, but conſidering it, being moſt attenuated, as carried in the pores of the air, which are moſt narrow. Hence it is not ſeen through two cauſes; from not being diſtinct from the air, and from conſiſting of the ſmalleſt parts: ſo that it does not reſiſt our ſight in the ſame manner as the light of viſible objects. True fire, therefore, ſubſiſts in the heavens; but of ſublunary fire, that which is moſt pure, is in the air proximate to the celeſtial regions, which Plato in the courſe of this Dialogue calls æther; and that which is moſt groſs, is contained in the receſſes of the earth.

* Agreeably to this, Plotinus obſerves, that every body, when in its proper place, is either at reſt, or moves circularly.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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